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The thrust of this work is the evaluation of the expropriation of Nigeria’s vital human 
resources through the brain drain and its implications for its overall development. Nigeria has 
been adjudged a top emigration country on account of the continuous efflux of its human 
resources to all parts of the world. Despite the lack of agreement about the exact migrant 
stock of Nigerians in the diaspora, Nigeria is listed among the top remittance receiving 
countries in the world. The implication of brain drain to Nigeria is that it serves as a feeder-
zone for the human resource needs of other countries, especially developed countries. 
Undoubtedly, the erosion of Nigeria’s human resources has had far-reaching negative effects 
on its development trajectory as the vital highly-skilled personnel needed for national 
development are lost. This study delineates certain specific development sectors of the 
Nigerian economy, such as the health, domestic investment, and technology acquisition and 
transfer, as the fulcrum of its investigation. It sets as its objectives the task of interrogating 
the effect of the brain drain on the efficiency Nigeria’s healthcare delivery system; how the 
domestic investment incentives have boosted diaspora-led investment in the Nigerian 
economy, and whether the tighter regulation of the global regime of intellectual property 
rights are amenable to brain gain that can facilitate technology transfer. Using a combination 
of public choice and modern world system theories synthesised from the political economy 
theoretical framework, we generated relevant data through secondary sources and analysed 
them in the tradition of qualitative descriptive methodology using one-group time series 
research design. The study finds that the depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health 
professionals through the brain drain leads to inefficient healthcare delivery. This depletion is 
sustained by lack of political will by successive Nigerian governments to eliminate the 
conditions that conduce to the emigration of its highly-skilled health manpower and the 
relaxation of immigration policies by Western countries. Nigeria’s domestic investment 
profile has been boosted through diaspora-led investments in the Nigerian economy. The 
tighter regulation of the global regime of intellectual property rights is inhibitive of diaspora-
led industrial investments towards technology transfer. The challenge of diaspora integration 
in Nigerian development is locatable in the absence of coordinated domestic efforts in that 
direction.   
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1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The brain drain question in the development crises of African countries is not an 
entirely new phenomenon. It has been a recurring decimal in the development analyses of 
Africa since its contact with the Western World. Notwithstanding the supposed benefits of 
Euro-African contact, Africa suffered great losses than it gained from this contact: its natural 
path to socio-economic and political growth was derailed, thus atrophying its prospects of 
growth and development. Indeed, the fundamental stratagem employed to institute these 
losses was the wholesale and organized depopulation of Africa’s human resources through 
the instrumentality of the slave trade, which Igwe (2002:398) affirms “lasted for hundreds of 
years up to the 19th century, and which affected or destroyed millions of innocent black 
Africans. ...” The notoriety of the slave trade is underpinned by its combination of human 
losses with human suffering, degradation and disorientation and, ultimately, the subjugation 
of Africa’s developmental capacity (Babangida 1991:244).  
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A direct consequence of the pillage of Africa by the West was the foregone possibility 
of development. The human resources that were essential to trigger off development were lost 
to the Western World. The blood and sweat of these Africans contributed immensely to the 
consolidation of the fledgling western capitalist developmental trajectory. Coleman (1986:41) 
contends that the same period that saw Africa tumbling down the cliff to economic 
subjugation and asphyxiation also marked the emergence of Europe from medieval stagnation 
and its transmutation through agricultural, industrial and intellectual revolutions. In analyzing 
the impact of earliest Western onslaught on Nigeria via slave trade, Coleman (1986:40) 
asserts “the total effect of the slave trade upon Nigerian society, institutions, and peoples will, 
perhaps, never be known”. 
The unquantifiable character of the effect of the depletion of African human resources 
is exacerbated by the unconscionable rapacity of capitalism. Capitalism, through the 
instrumentality of colonialism, neo-colonialism and contemporaneously, globalisation, 
created a world system of unequal relationship between nations. This unequal relationship, 
which characterises the world economic system, is moulded in iron-cast compartments that 
are so interconnected that exit from one sphere to the other has been made nearly impossible. 
The modern world system, which is compartmentalised into the industrialized, developed, 
newly industrializing, transiting and developing countries, appears to be a deliberate creation 
of the capitalist system to minimize tension in the world system. As Toyo (2002:8) succinctly 
puts it, “between the countries of Western Europe, the USA and Japan on the one hand and 
rest of the capitalist world on the other, it is obvious who has to go to whom for investment 
funds or the capital equipment vital for growth or  development in today’s world”. 
As it is, Africa appears to be “an excellent candidate for perpetual membership in the 
periphery” (Offiong 2001:ix). What has consigned Africa, and indeed Nigeria, to the position 
of “the wretched of the world system” is the contemporary brain drain that has skimmed the 
cream of their human resources (professionals) from the development challenge of the 
continent. There is a tendency in the Euro-American literature to attach recency to the brain 
drain phenomenon and its adverse effects (Carrington and Detragiache 1999; El-Khawas 
2004:37). Such a recent periodization inheres from a narrow conceptualisation of what brain 
drain represents. The brain drain phenomenon is narrowly viewed as the emigration of highly 
educated workers, such as scientists, engineers, physicians and other professionals from 
developing countries to developed countries rather than the emigration of a nation’s labour 
power. The imputation of recency to the brain drain appears a clever ploy to undermine its 
historical significance in driving Euro-American development. The brain drain has always 
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been the hallmark of Africa’s interaction with the developed countries. Essentially, there is a 
dialectical character in the transmutation of brain drain as its form and character are dictated 
by prevailing productive forces in each epoch. An important point to note is that every epoch 
has what it considers fundamentally important in its developmental matrix. While brawn (raw 
strength) was pivotal in the development schema of the slave era, in contemporary times, 
brain power (knowledge and skills) appears to be the reigning currency. To deny the 
importance of the “uneducated slaves” in the developmental matrix of pre-capitalist and early 
capitalist epochs and thus not recognise that their physical removal from their home countries 
to Europe and the Americas constituted a massive brain drain was decidedly self-deceptive 
and therefore begs the question. The observation of Babangida (1991:244-245) is apt:  
The people so forcefully transported have been estimated to 
number from 10 million to 30 million. Those who were 
captured were the young and virile Africans, the very class on 
whom the development of the continent would have devolved. 
The chaos accompanying the slave trade retarded the 
African march towards development, progress and 
advancement in science and technology. In fact the period of 
the slave trade was one of retrogression. 
Conversely, the loss to Africa was gain to Europe and America as attested by the 
plantations that underpinned their prosperity. Three issues appear to distinguish the brain 
drain of the slave trade era from contemporary brain drain: first is, the repository of the 
ultimate decision to migrate (voluntary or forced); second is, the relative independence of the 
migrant to choose career path; and third, the freedom which the migrant exercises to send 
certain part of his earnings back to home countries (remittances). 
The actual figure of Nigerian migrant population is a matter of uncertainty and 
speculation (Orozco and Millis 2007:3; Afolayan et al 2009:55) Orozco and Millis (2007:3) 
pointedly asserts that the “official statistics on Nigerian emigration are inaccurate and 
incomplete. For example, according to the United Nations, there are approximately 1.1 
million Nigerians living outside their home country, representing 0.84 percent of the Nigerian 
population”.  The World Bank (2011:195) holds that 0.6 percent of Nigeria’s estimated 154.7 
million, or approximately 1.0 million people, are in the diaspora. These estimates are patently 
unrepresentative of Nigeria’s migrant stock, bearing in mind that there is a steady traffic of 
Nigerians out of the country under the auspices of both personal arrangements and various 
immigration lotteries of the developed countries. Orozco and Millis (2007:3) estimate that 
about 3.9 percent of Nigerians, or 5.1 million people, reside abroad. Hernandez-Coss and Bun 
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(2007:40) have a different set of figures: they estimate that Nigerians living in the US alone 
are in the region of 5 million in addition to those living elsewhere in the industrialized world. 
Soludo (2007:21) estimates that about 17 million Nigerians are in the diaspora. Nigeria is 
generally recognised as a mobile country on account of the ubiquity of its citizens across the 
globe (Orozco and Millis 2007:1). There is virtually no extended Nigerian family that does 
not have someone in the diaspora, and who, often, is willing and likely to extend assistance to 
their relatives towards emigration. For instance, Emeagwali (2009:1) informs that he 
facilitated the emigration of 35 of his closest relatives, including his parents and all his 
siblings, nieces and nephews to the US. Also considering the likelihood that estimated 
Nigerian migrant stock might not include the undocumented, citizens of Nigerian ancestry, 
asylum seekers, refugees and trafficked persons, (as was done in the calculation of Nigerians 
in the UK according to Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007:8), we estimate that the percentage of 
Nigerians in the diaspora based on its population is within five percentage bracket, or 7.25 
million.  
Remittances remain the most visible by-product of brain drain. Remittances represent 
home-bound portion of what the brain and brawn power of migrants has earned abroad. 
While, in certain quarters, remittances are considered adequate compensation for lost skills as 
they help to improve recipients’ standard of living and reduce poverty as well as finance 
imports and investments (Spatafora 2005:84; World Bank 2006:86; Fajnzylber and Lopez 
2008:2-3; Le 2010:1), in other quarters, its contributions to the home economy are considered 
insignificant considering that they are not only “compensatory and hence countercyclical” but 
also have “a negative impact on GDP growth” (Chami et al 2003:5). But, nevertheless, global 
pool of remittances have consistently increased in volume and thus carved a niche as a 
veritable source of foreign exchange earning.  From US$101.3 billion in 1995, the total global 
remittances rose to US$131.5 billion in 2000 and US$416.0 billion in 2009; with estimates for 
2010 put at US$440.1 billion (World Bank 2008:17; 2011:19). 
Since 2002 when the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) started collecting data from 
banks and International Money Transfer Operators’ (MTOs) bank agents, there has been a 
steady increase in the volume of remittances to Nigeria. Remittances to Nigeria in 2004 were 
put at US$2.26 billion (Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2006:38). This figure jumped to between 
US$ 9.22 billion and US$17.9 billion in 2007 placing Nigeria in the bracket of top ten 
remittance recipients amongst developing countries (CBN 2007:228; World Bank 2011:195). 
The growth in the volume of remittances to developing countries, which according to the 
World Bank (2011:21) rose from US$81.3 billion in 2000 to US$307.1 billion in 2009 has 
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been interpreted by certain scholars as “a relatively attractive source of external finance for 
developing countries, one that can help foster development and smooth crises” (Spatafora 
2005:70). Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001:275) have distinguished two growth effects in 
relation to brain drain – “ex ante ‘brain effect’ (migration prospects foster investments in 
education because of higher returns abroad) and an ex post ‘drain effect’ (because of actual 
migration flows) and assert that the overall perception of the impact of brain drain is 
dependent on which effect dominates. There is little doubt that the growth effects in relation 
to brain drain in Africa is ex post drain effect. The brain drain is a deliberate sap on the 
development expectations of Africa. As Oyowe (1996:59) puts it, “the cost to the home 
countries of losing their professionals is incalculable – in terms of both development and 
opportunities and loss of investment”. But many pro-migration scholars have argued that 
remittances mitigate the negative impact of the brain drain as they provide resources for 
investment as well as contribute to reducing the incidence of poverty in the home country 
(Tomori and Adebiyi 2007:297-301; Spatafora 2005:72-73).  
Taiwo (2007:20); Osili (2007:114) believe that although remittances possess great 
potential to generate positive impact, this is dependent on the end use to which remittance 
flows are deployed in the origin country. The difficulty in establishing how individual 
remittances have contributed to national development considering that most developing 
countries, including Nigeria, lack a coherent framework for the utilisation of diaspora 
remittances for holistic developmental purposes led us to take a close and critical look at how 
remittances have contributed to national investment portfolio. As IFAD (2007:2) avers, 
“today, the impact of remittances is recognised in all developing regions of the world, 
constituting an important flow of foreign currency to most countries and directly reaching 
millions of households – approximately 10 per cent of the world’s population” 
But remittances alone cannot compensate adequately for the human capital losses 
experienced by many developing countries. The truth is that there is scant room for 
comparison between the contributions of diaspora remittances (no matter how strategically 
deployed and utilised) and the loss of developmental initiatives that the emigration of these 
professionals represents. The brain drain – brain gain dichotomy is driven by the varying 
theoretical perspectives on development. Indeed, the attachment of extreme importance to the 
fallouts of brain drain (such as remittances, increased investments and transfer of technology, 
skills and entrepreneurship) and their elevation to position of primacy in national 
development matrix reflects orthodox theoretical perspective on development. Within this 
context, brain drain is perceived as stimulating western-form of development through such 
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instrumentalities as brain exchange, circulation and reverse-migration. But development is 
much more than copycatism or reliance on crumbs from the developed countries. It involves 
independent models anchored on domestic capacity and driven by domestic human capital. 
Therefore, to point at the fallouts of brain drain and identify same as pivots of 
development is a paradox of sorts that requires critical examination and satisfactory 
resolution. Considering the development dilemma of Nigeria and the increasing recognition 
of the indispensability of human capital in the development matrix, this study critically 
interrogates brain drain in Nigeria and reassesses its dynamics in the light of the country’s 
development trajectory in the rapidly transforming 21st century. Of specific concern to this 
study is the consideration of how brain drain has impacted on the efficiency of Nigeria’s 
healthcare delivery as well as the direction of the investment potentials of the diaspora vis-à-
vis domestic investment portfolio. It also considers the brain gain argument within the 
context of legislative and institutional frameworks for diaspora engagement in Nigeria’s 
development as well as the synthesis of diverse national experiences of disapora engagement 
in national development. 
 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
Although Nigerians have been emigrating since the country’s contact with the West, 
the earliest emigration was different from the contemporary type in terms of scope, purpose 
and effect on the country. Then, the scope of emigration was small as people left in trickles, 
the purpose was for self-enhancement through the acquisition of higher academic credentials 
from the well-developed academic system of the developed countries for national 
development, and the effect on the country was positive as the quality of its human capital 
was greatly enhanced. But contemporary emigration is different in terms of these parameters: 
it is threateningly widespread in scope; its purpose is motorised by personal consideration of 
survival and escape from the socio-economic and political contradictions of the domestic 
economy; and, its effect is far-reaching as it erodes the country’s vital human capital base that 
is indispensable for national development.  Another difference is that then, the people who 
left the country always returned to contribute to national development. In fact they left as 
unskilled and half-schooled young men and women but returned with enhanced skills and 
capabilities. But now, the people who emigrate are the highly-skilled, well-schooled 
professionals who, often, obtained their education through the subsidisation of government 
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thus, creating what has been described as brain drain. Among these migrants, there is scant 
contemplation of returning home as they naturalise in their host countries and become their 
citizens. The need to recover and harness these diaspora human resources and mainstream 
them into national development has been in the front burner of national and international 
discourse and has led to the adoption of several policy prescriptions. Several strategies have 
been put in place by Nigeria in its effort to mainstream its diaspora into national 
development. Until recently, there was nothing systematic in government’s approach to 
diaspora issues. The Nigerian government’s policies on diaspora issues were ad hoc, 
piecemeal and reactive. The earliest strategy adopted by Nigerian government was the 
recognition and conferment of dual citizenship rights to Nigerians. Although this policy has 
had salutary effects in maintaining citizenship ties between Nigeria and its diaspora, the 
policy was essentially motorised by the overriding elite concern to resolve citizenship crisis 
for their children who were born abroad. This view is strengthened by the absence of a 
counterpart policy to address diaspora issues in a productive way.  It was in 2000 that former 
President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) began an enthusiastic programme of 
mainstreaming Nigerian diaspora in its development programmes, especially the attraction of 
foreign investments.  
The presence of Nigerians in almost every country of the world, and their apparent 
relevance in those countries, contrasts sharply with the domestic development dilemma that 
tends to characterise their country, Nigeria. The country faces acute development challenges.  
Paradoxically, while many Nigerians are integral members of the science and technology 
teams abroad, the country’s science and technology needs are contracted to foreign nationals.  
For instance, in 1997, the land mapping of Nigeria was carried out by some consultants from 
Canada, with about $3 million dollars borrowed from the World Bank (Ojeme 2011). Also, 
Nigeria’s satellite programmes, Nigsat 1 and 2, depended on the UK for vital technical 
expertise.  
Since the 1980s, highly-skilled Nigerians have been emigrating in droves, ostensibly 
in search of greener pastures but actually to exit the domestic constraints that have 
undermined good life. Good life in this context connotes the existence of a conducive 
domestic environment that favours the practice and enjoyment of the proceeds of one’s 
professional calling necessary to have good standard of living that guarantees high life 
expectancy. The World Bank Development Prospects Group reported in 2007 an estimated 
emigration rate of 36 percent for Nigerians with tertiary education (Mberu and Pongou 2010).  
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Emigration appears to have had untoward consequences on the trajectory of Nigeria’s 
development.  
This study, which examined the depth, extent and consequences of the brain drain 
phenomenon on Nigeria’s development, was motivated by several factors: the first is the 
development paradox that characterises the Nigerian state despite its abundant human and 
material resources. This paradox is intensified by the empirical and anecdotal evidence 
suggesting the ubiquity of Nigerians around the world. The brain drain syndrome appears to 
have adversely affected several sectors of the Nigerian economy, especially the education, 
science and technology, and health sectors. The rate of emigration of physicians and nurses in 
2007 was estimated, by World Bank sources, at about 13.6 percent and 11.7 percent 
respectively.  At a point, these sectors were almost comatose. The relevant question is how to 
address the seeming unidirectional nature of the emigration of Nigeria’s highly-skilled 
professionals.  
The second factor is the increasing primacy of human capital in the development 
matrix and the paradox of penury in plenty: while Nigeria has an impressive pool of human 
capital abroad, it lacks them at home. In contemporary global setting, the shift in the 
emphasis from finance capital as the engine of industrialisation and development to human 
capital means that the more educated a person is, the more important they are valued in the 
schema of development. In view of this trend, the issue at stake is how Nigeria can evolve a 
brain gain strategy to leverage its human capital advantage in the diaspora. 
The third factor is the burgeoning volume of remittances from Nigerians in the 
diaspora. Nigeria’s remittance stock has been steadily increasing. The increasing remittance 
stock could be a product of two factors: more emigrants in the arena and improved reporting 
system of remittance flows. However, Nigeria currently occupies a position in the global top 
ten remittance-receiving countries. The relevant issue is whether remittances can compensate 
for the forgone human capital as well as the effect of its opportunity cost on Nigeria’s 
development.  
The fourth is the seeming similarities between slave trade of earlier epoch and 
contemporary labour migration. Extant analyses, aware of the negative effects of slave trade, 
place their emphasis on the trickle down effects of labour migration generally, and brain 
drain particularly. What are the actual linkages between brain drain and brain gain within the 
context of Nigeria’s experience and how compensatory are they?  
The fifth is the reconciliation of Western countries’ double standard on brain drain: 
while they profess commitment to halt brain drain phenomenon from developing countries, 
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including Nigeria, their domestic policies tend to pull migrants. For instance, leading Western 
countries such the US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand and Canada recognise the 
debilitating effects of brain drain and yet, they have dismantled, liberalised, and modified 
their immigration laws thus simplifying immigration to their countries. 
The consideration of the singular obsession of Nigerians with emigration and its effect 
on Nigeria’s development is the sixth factor that motivated this study. This obsession is 
motorised, in the main, by the international commodification of labour, that is, the 
assignment of greater value to the labour power from the developing countries than these 
countries could assign. The issue, therefore, is how Nigeria can utilise its human capital in the 
face of international competition for manpower, considering its peripheral status in the 
international system  
  
 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Current estimated statistics put the global migrant stock as at 2010 in the 
neighbourhood of 215.8 million people, up from 190.6 million migrants in 2005 (World Bank 
2008:16). About 171.6 million of this current stock are from the developing countries and are 
“dispersed out” of their home countries and domiciled in other countries, especially 
developed countries, where they put their knowledge, skills and experience to use for the 
betterment of both the host countries and themselves (IFAD 2007:2; World Bank 
2011:18,19). Although there is no consensus on the exact number of Nigerians living outside 
the country, it is generally acknowledged that Nigeria is a high migrant country.. Estimates 
vary widely and range from 1.1 million to about 17 million (Orozco and Millis 2007:3; 
Soludo 2007:21; World Bank 2011:195). The bases for these estimates are unclear. However, 
out of US$351 billion remitted by migrants from developing countries to their home 
countries in 2011, Nigerian migrants accounted for US$11 billion (Mohapatra, Ratha, and 
Silwal 2011:1-3). 
The impetus to migrate is a product of interrelated factors spanning the domestic and 
international environments. Although there is a tendency to confuse brain drain with labour 
migration, there is a big difference. The difference lies in the innate and acquired skills and 
capabilities of the migrants. While labour migration could play some positive roles in the 
domestic economies of developing countries, in terms of dousing tensions and pressures from 
imperfect employment scenarios, brain drain is essentially negative as it erodes the vital 
26 
 
human capital necessary for national developmental purposes. This study, while taking a 
sweeping look at labour migration is concerned with the emigration of highly-skilled 
Nigerians and the effect which such emigration has had on the socio-economic and political 
formation of the country. 
While modern migration generally appears to be anchored on individual decisions, 
these decisions are not made in isolation but within the context of the state system, especially 
their material condition within that system as well as the stimuli from the international 
system. Thus, the brain drain of Nigerian professionals and other highly-skilled personnel is 
not a product of isolated occurrence. It is a product of, and a response to, the stimuli from two 
interrelated sources: the domestic and international environments. Nigeria’s monocultural 
economic base confers on it certain constraints that limit its expansion beyond a certain point. 
It is these constraints that underpinned the impetus for brain drain. The internal dynamics in 
the Nigerian economy such as economic stagnation, macroeconomic instability, political 
tension, inter-tribal and civil wars, famine and hunger, economic self-interest and sundry 
factors facilitated the seeming mass emigration of highly-skilled Nigerians (Afolayan et al 
2009:65-67; Tomori and Adebiyi 2007:303; World Bank 2006:59-63). In other words, the 
reality of the Nigerian economic situation reflected negatively on these professionals and 
thus, impelled them to search for where their skills could fetch them better earnings. Thus, 
brain drain is a manifestation of natural economic behaviour, although this economic 
behaviour is itself determined by the interaction of socio-economic and political forces.  
While Nigeria’s internal dynamics engendered and shaped the conditions that 
facilitated brain drain, it was the international stimuli that gave, and still gives, it concrete 
manifestation as well as sustained it. The political economy of the developed countries 
dictated the imperative of massive infusion of human capital, not only to maintain the status 
quo of the contemporary world order, but also to keep their leadership position in that world 
order within the threshold of competitiveness.` 
There is the brain gain argument, which has mainly maintained that brain drain is a 
win-win process as it underpins the creation of net wealth for the world economy. It is 
estimated that an increment of an equivalent of 3 percent in the proportion of migrant 
workers in the labour force of developed countries would increase world welfare by over 
US$150 billion per annum (Sriskandarajah 2005:4). Undoubtedly, there are  positive 
“feedback effects” from the Nigerian diaspora in the form remittances, the creation of 
business and trade networks, and diaspora involvement in certain developmental projects 
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under the auspices of national and international agencies, but are these feedback effects 
compensatory enough of the forfeiture of the skills of these migrants?  
The questions that arise and which derive their essence from the interplay of socio-
economic and political forces within the Nigerian and international arena are: 
1) Does the sustained depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals through the 
brain drain necessarily lead to inefficient healthcare delivery? 
2) Have domestic investment incentives boosted diaspora-led investments in the 
Nigerian economy? 
3) Is the tighter regulation of the global regime of intellectual property rights inhibitive 
of diaspora-led industrial investments towards technology transfer? 
 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
This study envisages to achieve both broad and specific objectives. Its broad objective is 
to examine the brain drain phenomenon within the context of Nigeria’s development 
dilemma. This examination is at two levels: the state and the individual levels. At the state 
level, its examination involves the interrogation of the underlying forces that motorise brain 
drain, especially the interplay of the economic, social, and political forces in spawning and 
sustaining it. Another aspect of it is the evaluation of the policy and sundry strategies adopted 
by the Nigerian state to roll back, mitigate and contain the effects of brain drain on the 
trajectory of the country’s development. At the individual level, it envisages to examine the 
primacy of economic factors over social factors, especially in shaping the decision of highly-
skilled Nigerians to emigrate and the dilemmas that hinder reintegration in the country.  The 
specific objectives of this study derive important insights from the broad objectives and 
include: 
1) To determine if the sustained depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals 
through brain drain necessarily leads to inefficient healthcare delivery. 
2) To assess whether domestic investment incentives boost diaspora-led investments in 
the Nigerian economy. 
3) To find out if the tighter regulation of global regime of intellectual property rights is 





1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study has both theoretical and practical significance. At the theoretical level, it 
offers a new insight into the underlying basis for brain drain in the modern world system. The 
modern world system is characterised by compartments which are hierarchically arranged. 
The world system is powered by economic determinism and as such brain drain is a corollary, 
no, a necessary fallout from the economic marginalisation and strangulation of the 
developing countries including Nigeria. This study therefore evolves ideas which resolve the 
seeming disjuncture between brain drain and Nigeria’s development crisis and explores 
strategies to convert the brain drain to truly brain gain outside the spheres of extant 
Eurocentric orthodoxy. 
At the practical level, this study is significant as its evaluation of the entire 
architecture of migration with particular reference to brain drain and its effect on Nigeria’s 
developmental quest provides the necessary clues to scholars and policy makers about its true 
nature and the true utilitarian value of remittances in the schema of national development. It 
also buttresses the argument  that contemporary brain drain is a well thought-out strategy to 
ensure the peripherality of Nigeria through sustained depletion of its skilled professionals that 
are indispensably vital to its development. It evolves strategies on how the current tide of 
brain drain could be converted to brain gain, that is, how its positive effects could be 
maximised and its negative effects minimised in relation to Nigeria’s developmental 
trajectory.  
This study further has the potentiality of serving as a secondary source of data to 
future researchers on related subject matter. 
 
 
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The central preoccupation of this section is the general and specific investigation of 
the impacts of brain drain on national development as captured in extant literature. Although, 
general works spanning other geographical boundaries and covering such areas as brain gain, 
labour migration, and ancillary areas are reviewed, the bulk of the review particularly focuses 
on case study works on Nigeria. In reviewing relevant literature on the brain drain 
phenomenon on Nigeria’s development, the review delineates three developmental areas as 
the core of its inquiry, to wit brain drain in the healthcare delivery and the health sector, 
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domestic investment and international regime of intellectual property rights and technology 
transfer. The major aim of this survey is to establish not only the state of scholarship in these 
areas but also the nature of the knowledge gap to be filled.  
 
 
i) General Works on African Migration and Earliest Brain Drain 
 
The history of the African continent is compactly suffused with the expropriation of 
its human and natural resources. Usman and Falola (2009:1) opine that population movement 
is “synonymous with the history of Africa itself”. Population movement connotes physical 
movement by groups of humans from one geographical area to another. It involves three 
factors: the population of people moving must be substantial; the population must move 
outside the geographical area to another, often far-flung, and with remote possibility of 
coming back. The third factor is dependent on the cause of movement. Population movement 
could occur through three major mechanisms: voluntary, forced or induced. Africa has 
experienced all these mechanisms of population movement. At the earliest time, human 
migration was said to have started in Africa through Homo erectus which migrated out of 
Africa across Eurasia about a million years ago (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/human_ 
migration). Early human migration was voluntary as it was in the quest for survival. As 
Usman and Falola (2009:2) observe, these early movements were unsystematic and often 
involved entire groups or villages whose movement was in reaction to such negativities as 
changing climate and landscape, inadequate food supply and war.  
Population movement had occurred in substantial scale and regular frequency in the 
history of Africa. Between 1400 and 1900, African continent experienced waves of 
population movements through the instrumentality of slave trades. Nunn (2007:3) identifies 
four simultaneous trades: the Trans-Saharan, Red Sea, Indian Ocean and Trans-Atlantic slave 
trade. The first three predate the Trans-Atlantic slave which was the largest and most well-
known. The Trans-Atlantic slave trade route sourced young men and women from West 
Africa, West Central Africa and Eastern Africa who were then shipped to Europe and its 
countries in the New World. The combined effect of these slave trades was a massive and 





During the Trans-Atlantic slave trade alone, approximately 12 
million slaves were exported from Africa. Another 6 million 
were exported in the other three slave trades. These figures do 
not include those who were killed during the raids or those who 
died on their journey to the coast. 
 
 
The forceful relocation of vital human capital of Africa was for the benefit of 
economies of host countries. African slaves provided the labour needed to expand the Euro-
American plantations (Harley 2002:12). According to reports, Britain accounted for 41% of 
shipments, followed by Portugal 29%, France 19%, Netherlands 6%, British North 
America/United States 3% and Denmark 1% (http://www.pstalker.com/migration/ng-history-
1.htm). There was an inverse effect of slavery on Africa and slaving Europe: while for Africa, 
concerted efforts at enslavement depleted its vital human resources thus creating insecurity 
and weakening and destroying the village and state systems as well as other form of group 
aggregation, for Europe, it had positive effects on its economies. The collapse of the village 
and state systems meant that productive activities could not be coordinated, hence stagnation 
and underdevelopment. Rodney (1972:106-107) avers that economic activities within the 
African continent were adversely affected both directly and indirectly by population loss. The 
dominance of Britain in the slave trade and its eventual emergence in the mid-eighteenth 
century as the world’s greatest trading nation was an indisputable pointer to the unevenness 
of slave trade. It should not be forgotten that it was the labour power of African slaves that 
drove up production in sugar, tea, tobacco and other plantations in Europe and the Americas 
which conferred dominance on the British economy. As Harley (2002:2) acknowledges, “two 
century (sic) earlier, England had been in an economic backwater, exporting unfinished 
heavy, woollen clothe to the Low Countries for further finishing before their sale throughout 
Europe”. 
Africans, for over four centuries, were forcibly moved to Europe and the Americas as 
slave labour in sugarcane, tobacco, cotton and other plantations. By working in these 
plantations, African slaves contributed in strengthening the already economic advantages of 
Europe as the crops from these plantations were major foreign currency earners. In other 
words, while the toll on Africa with regards to the negative effect of slave trade was high, 
Europe rode to economic glory. Obadina (2008) contends that transatlantic slave trade and 
slavery constituted the building blocks of capitalism as the output of African slaves gave 
value to the colonies in the New World as well as contributed to the development and 
expansion of international trade. 
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Brain drain, like globalisation, is not a recent phenomenon. It has been a 
distinguishing characteristic of western contact with Africa and has had far reaching effects. 
There is a tendency by some Eurocentric scholars to conceptualise brain drain within 
spatiotemporal space of contemporary era. El-khawas (2004:37) adduces recency to the brain 
drain phenomenon: 
 
It began in the 1960s following independence and has 
continued ever since. Every year, thousands of Africans head 
overseas looking for better opportunities. The numbers were 
small initially, but they later increased as political, economic 
and social conditions in Africa deteriorated. 
 
 
Thus, brain drain is seen with the lens of today’s human resource formation and 
requirements and therefore, conceptualised as the emigration of highly skilled persons from 
one country to the other, often from poor countries of the Third World to the rich countries of 
the developed world. Their operative consideration in evaluating the concept of brain drain is 
not the innate characteristics or humanity of the population but their acquired skills. And 
skills are narrowly defined within the context of contemporary needs of the West.  
The attachment of contemporaneity to the periodization of brain drain misses the 
point as it has been an integral component of African existence and experience. A more 
productive way to look at brain drain is to situate it within the context of historical epochs. 
Each epoch in history has its developmental thrusts and the necessary instruments of 
achieving them. In the pre-industrial epoch which was dominated by agriculture, the most 
vital skill was raw physical strength as it was needed to plough the ground, manage the 
mechanical agricultural devices and tend the crops for long hours. Historically, the needs of 
the West dictated the kind of skills to be appropriated. In the pre-industrial period the 
economy of the western world required massive human labour that was non-existent in their 
domains.  African slaves served useful production purposes which unleashed wealth and 
power for Europe. In this epoch, 
 
African slaves became the human machinery, which constituted 
an indispensable portion of the means of production of the 
commercial crops in the plantations of the New World. The 
slaves represented a substantial fraction of the capital at the 
disposal of the Plantation Owners. It was this available capital 
which slowly developed the physical infrastructures of the New 
World, while at the same time enriching the mother-countries 
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 The unavailability of this vital resource for development ignited both the mercantilist 
and imperialistic drive that led to the expropriation of African human resources to the West 
for over four centuries. As Rodney (1972:104) affirms, “when one tries to measure the effect 
of European slave trading on the African continent, it is very essential to realise that one is 
measuring the effect of social violence rather than trade in any normal sense of the word”. 
The violence which slave trade brought on Africa was not just social but extended to 
political, economic, cultural and psychological. The over four centuries of onslaught on 
Africa’s human resources had a decisive cumulative effect on the peripheral status that Africa 
occupies in contemporary world system. It eroded its potential of using its human resources 
to launch its development no matter how defined. This point is made more critical because 
the contributions of African slaves laid the foundation for the robust European economies 
that spawned the industrial revolution.  
In others words, African labour spearheaded the economic revolution that endowed 
the West with advantages that positioned them at the forefront of development. In a way, 
economic prosperity in the West had a far-reaching negative impact on Africa as it translated 
to retrogression. This paradox was a product of massive loss of able-bodied young men and 
women. As Rodney (1972:105) avers, “slave buyers preferred their victims between the ages 
of 15 and 35, and preferably in the early twenties; the sex ratio being about two men to one 
woman. Europeans often accepted younger African children, but rarely any older person”. 
The implication of the selectivity of European slave buyers was that it skimmed the cream of 
African vitality and potential for development and appropriated it for European development. 
Slave trade was not so much a historical accident as a deliberate design to put the West in the 
forefront of development. And it did. Babangida (1991:245) observes: 
The chaos accompanying the slave trade retarded the African 
march towards development, progress and advancement in 
science and technology. In fact the period of the slave trade was 
one of retrogression. While Africa and Europe were almost at 
par in terms of development up to the 15th century when great 
empires such as those of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Kanemi-Bornu 
(sic), Binin, Ife, Oyo and Great Zimbabwe flourished, the slave 
trade destroyed all that was left of the African achievement and 





The direct effect of slave trade on Africa was the distortion it brought upon it: first, 
the virile segment of its population was poached to its developmental detriment. Second, 
there was a sharp distortion in the demographic composition of Africa that ultimately 
undermined its capacity to engender development. Thirdly, the profits made from slavery 




Table 1.1: Estimates of Slave Imports for the Whole Period of the Trade,  





Philip Curtin’s Estimate, 1441-1866 
 
South America 4,700,000 49.1 
Caribbean 4,040,000 42.2 
North America     651,000 6.8 
Old Worlda    175,000 1.8 
New World Total 9,381,000 98.2 




David Eltis’s Estimate, 1519-1866 
 
Central and South America 4,855,000 50.5 
Caribbean Islands 4,252,200 44.3 
North America    361,000 3.8 
Africab    131,000 1.4 
New World Total 9,468,200 98.6 
Grand Total 9,599,200 100 
aSao Tome, Madeira, Canaries, Cape Verde Islands, Europe 
bSlaves captured by anti-slaving patrols, 1810-60 and re-landed in Africa. 
Source: Rawley and Behrendt 2005:16. 
 
Table 1.1 shows separate and independent reconstruction of the estimated African 
slaves that landed in various parts the world by Philip Curtins and David Eltis respectively. 
While Curtis put the total number of African slaves at 9,556,000, David Eltis estimated that 
9,599,200 African slaves were “safely” landed. Both figures are within the same threshold. 
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But Rodney (1972:104) disagrees with these figures on three counts: one, their data only 
mirrored slaves that were “safely landed”; two, there were so many people at the time who 
had a vested interest in smuggling slaves and withholding data; and three, any basic figure of 
African slaves landed alive must make allowances to cover transhipment mortality, which 
averaged 15 – 20 percent.  
Africa was yet to recover from the rapacity of slave trade when it was railroaded into 
the global capitalist system. Indeed, the integration of African economies into the global 
capitalist system underpinned the contemporary relationship of dependency: African 
economies became a poor reflection of the Euro-American economies, a feeder zone for the 
western economies. Contemporary brain drain is therefore a continuation of over four 
centuries of slave trade. Obadina (2008) records an analogy of which, more or less, depicts 
contemporary attitude towards brain drain:  
The slave trade whetted their appetite [African elite] for the 
products of a changing world. Sadly it was not only tinpot 
rulers who were mesmerised by the glitters of western artefacts. 
An African slave in Cuba in the nineteenth century recalled 
how his people were captivated by the bright colour of 
European manufactures. It was the scarlet which did for the 
Africans: both the kings and the rest surrendered without a 
struggle. When the kings saw that the whites were taking out 
these scarlet handkerchiefs as if they were waving, they told the 
blacks, “Go on then, go get a scarlet handkerchief” and the 
blacks were so excited by the scarlet they ran down the ships, 
like sheep and there (sic) were captured. 
 
The current phase of brain drain followed the same pattern. Having acquired skills 
that were under-utilised in a system characterised by instability and visionless leadership, the 
African professionals succumbed to the favourable immigration policies and prospects of 
better life in the developed countries. Both slavery and labour migration are sides of the same 
coin. A fundamental difference lies in the prevalent skills in each historical epoch. Both 
slavery and brain drain were fuelled by the various domestic contradictions in each epoch: 
while slavery ran on the petrol of elite avarice and covetousness, labour migration was 
impelled by inept leadership and limited economic opportunities. Both slave trade and brain 
drain have one major utilitarian value: they added immense value to western economies to the 
detriment of home countries. It is therefore patently erroneous to assume that brain drain is a 
contemporary phenomenon.  
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The abolition of slave trade was not borne out of moral duty to right the wrongs of 
slavery but depicted a new epoch in the trajectory of capitalism. Industrial revolution with its 
many diversifications required broader sources of raw materials and natural resources beyond 
what the plantations in Europe and the Americas could offer. It, therefore, led to a major shift 
in economic thinking and permutation that manifested in the abolition of the slave trade and 
the acquisition of colonies. The quest to obtain a chunk of the “Africa pie” spawned tension 
among the European powers that was resolved in the Berlin Conference of 1884 through the 
partitioning of Africa (Offiong 2001:9). The Berlin conference was a watershed in the 
integration of Africa into the global capitalist economy with its attendant peripheralisation. 
The structural relationship between Africa and the West as embodied in modern world 
system is that of unequal partners. Ake (1981:14) recognises the centrality of this integration 
in explaining African socio-economic and political experience when he asserts: “The 
integration of Africa into the world capitalist system by western colonialism and imperialism 
is the event which has had the most influence in shaping the economic and political 
development of contemporary Africa”.  
The inequality between Africa and the West is a major stimulus that motorises brain 
drain. This inequality is depicted by the robust economies of western countries with 
expansionary prospects in contradistinction to the poverty-stricken economies of Africa with 
gloomy future. Brain drain is a systemic response to the innate attributes of the global 
capitalist system which engenders disjuncture between marketable skills and commensurable 
compensation system. Both slave trade and brain drain are human capital flight. For, as slave 
trade eroded the development capacity of Africa by siphoning its vital human capital, so does 
contemporary brain drain phenomenon. Estimates of Africa’s human loss via slave trade have 
been put at between 10 million and 200 million (Rodney 1972:104; Rawley and Behrendt 
2005:15; Obadina 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_slave_trade).  
It is, indeed, a great paradox that even with the designation of August 23 as the 
International Day for the Remembrance of the Slave Trade and its Abolition by UNESCO in 
1998 and a bouquet of apologies since 2006 by France, the US and UK for their roles in slave 
trade, they have continued to evolve policies to attract African professionals. In 2000, the US 
Congress raised the annual cap on the number of temporary work visas granted to highly 
skilled professionals under its H1B visa programme from 115,000 to 195,000 per year 
effective through 2003. In the same year, the British government, in cooperation with a 
research charity organization, the Wolfson Foundation launched a £20 million, five-year 
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research award scheme that had two major goals: to lure back UK’s leading expatriate 
scientists and to attract top young researchers to the UK (http://wikipedia). 
This seeming double standard inhered from the non-appreciation of the depth of 
destruction which slave trade inflicted on African development. The evil of slave trade was 
not just about the dehumanization, cruelty and injustice done to the individual, it extended to 
its effects on the collectivity of African population, its manifestations especially  the 
subsisting underdevelopment, poverty and human misery that appear to be its unedifying 
trademark. The West’s apology about slave trade is an empty rhetoric as contemporary brain 
drain which it promotes is as odious and devastating to African economies. Undoubtedly 
contemporary brain drain had the same set of effects that slave trade had on African 
development: massive distortions in its developmental thrust, stagnation and 
underdevelopment.  Both phenomena ensured the subsidisation of the western economies and 
to its detriment. There has been a tendency in the analysis of slave trade to down play its 
pernicious disempowerment of the African continent and emphasize its liberating qualities. 
This reinterpretation of the effect of slave trade conferred on it “civilising mission” that is; 
that it provided “opportunity” for Africans to be co-owners of Europe and America and the 
New World (Aisien 2009). 
As the Trans-Atlantic slave trade was Africa’s visa to Europe and the Americas, it 
was as much its visa to underdevelopment, poverty and peripherality. The contention of 
Aisen (2009) represents the quintessential Eurocentric rebuttal that tended to downplay the 
ruinous propensity of contemporary brain drain. It is not out of sync or outside the sphere of 
possibility to speculate that if slave trade had not happened, perhaps, capitalism would not 
have developed the way it did neither would it have made Africa a peripheral partner. Indeed, 
Africa could have been the epicentre of capitalist expansion considering its human, natural 
and material endowments. But as Obadina (2008) has observed: “the loss in human resources 
had dire consequences for labour-dependent agricultural economies” of Africa. Slave trade 
also distorted and dislocated the rudimentary manufacturing activities as they effectively 
replaced indigenous products. Again, slave trade prevented the emergence of true business 
class as it engendered a new set of parasitic rentier class that depended on rents from their 
human cargoes (Obadina 2008). Indeed Nunn (2007:2) finds a “robust negative relationship 
between the number of slaves exported from each country and subsequent economic 
performance. The African countries that are the poorest today are the ones from which the 
most slaves were taken.”  
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The favourable allowance made by contemporary analysts about the effects of slave 
trade is as a result of the political victory of President Barrack Obama in the US presidential 
election in 2008. But the victory of President Obama could not obliterate the negativities 
associated slavery. Kaba (2008:18) notes that by the beginning of the 21st century, people of 
West African ancestry constituted part of the most influential individuals in the world such as 
scientists of all kinds, professional entertainers, athletes, politicians, businessmen and women 
etc. And yet they were not in West Africa but in the US and other developed countries of the 
world. Like slave trade, massive migration of skilled Africans and other professionals has had 
untold toll on its developmental trajectory. This toll is evident in the negativities recorded by 
Africa in all indices of development.  According to IFAD (2007:8) about 30 million Africans 
are in the Diaspora making contributions to the socio-economic and technological wellbeing 
of their host countries, often in the western hemisphere. As at 2006, twenty African countries 
were within the bracket of least developed countries (Kohnert 2007:6). With more 
professionals and skilled Africans emigrating in response to suction pressures from the core 
countries, the underdevelopment status of African countries has continued to deepen. 
Hundred of thousands of African doctors and health professionals are in the core countries 
where their expertise has contributed to improved healthcare system and life expectancy. 
Contrasted with Africa, life expectancy is on the downward trend as its healthcare system is 
comatose as a result of dearth of healthcare professionals and other supporting 
infrastructures. Statistics show that human resource needs of the West, just as in the pre-
industrial revolution era, were poached from African and other developing countries 
necessitating the view that Third World countries subsidise the economies of the West.  
Essentially, labour power, which in contemporary era, covers raw strength, talents, 
skills and knowledge, defers to the law of demand and supply and is pre-eminently 
preoccupied with the pursuit of highest compensation. The brain drain phenomenon is 
traceable to several factors. Not all migration can be classified as brain drain. What 
determines the classification is the level of training of the migrant as well as their overall 
relevance in modern production processes. Balaam and Veseth (2005:361) observe, “some 
migrants are responding to global economic forces, such as changing patterns of production 
and finance, while others are driven by distinctly local concerns, such as political repression 
or tribal warfare”. The emigration that leads to brain drain and which is pernicious to national 
development is the one that involves trained and highly-skilled professionals. 
Balaam and Veseth (2005:361-2) have classified migrants as falling into: 
(a) Temporary labour migrants: This category comprises people who move out of 
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their countries of origin to other countries temporarily. Although Balaam and 
Veseth (2005:361) have averred that temporary labour migrants possess low job 
skills, it is certainly not true that this category is inhabited only by such low labour 
group. Very high level professionals could be temporary labour migrants. Such 
high-level professionals that often travel out of Africa on exchange programmes 
can be rightly categorised as temporary labour migrants; 
(b) Highly-skilled and business migrants: who may be temporary or permanent. These 
could be staff or consultants of multinational corporations; 
(c) Irregular migrants: Those that are illegal immigrants on account of their 
undocumented status in the host country;  
(d) Refugees and Internally displaced persons (IDPs): those who live outside their 
host countries on account of natural or man-made disasters; 
(e) Asylum seekers: those who have fled their countries as a result of political 
persecution, war or life-threatening scenarios; 
(f) Family members: those who are emigrating to join family members who had 
previously left the home country. 
The forces that shape brain drain are both domestically generated and externally 
induced. Internally, the continuous search for opportunities for a better deal in terms of 
personal growth and professional fulfilment has been part of the propelling forces in the 
emigration of skilled professionals from Nigeria to the developed world. And these 
opportunities appear not only scarce but highly circumscribed owing to the position that 
Nigeria occupies in the modern world capitalist system. Nigerian economy within the milieu 
of the modern world capitalist system is faced with economic difficulties of monstrous 
dimensions. Nwozor (2005) links it to what he termed the “commodity trap”: Nigeria serves 
as the feeder zone, supplying raw materials to the developed countries and importing finished 
goods from them. The precariousness of this position manifests forcefully in periods of global 
commodity price slump. As Keating (2001: 3) observes, between 1965 and 1995, many Third 
World countries, but particularly those in the sub-Saharan Africa, had negative rates of 
economic growth. According to the World Bank classification of economies in 2009, only 
Equatorial Guinea occupies a space in the hierarchy of high income earners in the world 
income map. Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Mayotte Seychelles and South Africa are 
listed under upper middle income, the rest countries of Africa are lumped in the lower middle 
income and mainly low income brackets. Nigeria is located in the low-income bracket (World 
Bank 2011:391). The deep-seated contradictions in the Nigerian economy as a result of its 
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peripheral status in the modern global capitalist system are epitomised by prevalent poverty 
and poor development indices.   
The nature of African economies especially their incapacity as a result of their 
monocultural orientation imposes limitations on their prospects for expansion. African 
economies (except to some degree South Africa) are characterised by: 
Primary production, low share of world trade, low 
manufactured output and exports, low savings and investment, 
dominance of ODA and low private capital inflow, rapid 
population growth, dominance of public sector vis-à-vis a weak 
private sector, heavy external debt (CBN Briefs 2002-
2003/05:35). 
 
These characteristics are true of the Nigerian economy. What this implies is that the 
Nigerian economy is acutely limited in terms of engendering the requisite conditions for the 
absorption and optimal utilisation of their skilled labour. But despite its limited capacity to 
optimally utilise its skilled human capital, their mass emigration engendered domestic 
contractions that foreclosed the likelihood of long-run expansion that could have positively 
positioned its economy (Federal Ministry of Information 2000:128). 
The pernicious consequences of brain drain on African economies are often explained 
away in terms of being skewedly imbued with positive potentials for domestic growth. 
Writing generally about Africa, Rena (2008) avers that emigration provides African skilled 
professionals the opportunity to chip away at the vast inequalities that characterised the world 
system and thus accelerate progress through the acquisition of higher skills. These newly 
acquired skills are deployed to the benefit of the domestic economies.  
The inelasticity of opportunities in African countries, including Nigeria, is not only 
the direct consequence of integration into the global capitalist system but the sustained 
conspiracy of the developed countries. As Rena (2008) avers: 
Africa’s enormous agricultural potential is vastly untapped. 
Africa’s vast mineral wealth and strategic significance have 
encouraged foreign powers to intervene in African affairs. 
During the Cold War era, 1945-1990, there was increasing 
super-power intervention in Africa. The United States and the 
Soviet Union were major players on the Africa scene. 
 
The major powers found willing collaborators in Nigerian elite, whose lack of sense 
of patriotism contributed in effectively holding down its economy in the mire of 
underdevelopment. Despite Nigeria’s legendary endowments in mineral and natural resources 
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including a uniquely diverse ecosystem, its economy is monocultural and lacks the capacity 
to add value to these resources. The effect is that human development indicators are 
miserably uninspiring and hopeless. Rena (2008) argues that the stupendous revenues from 
these endowments mainly fuelled “state corruption, environmental degradation, poverty and 
violence rather than badly needed development. It is reported that Nigeria’s receipts from oil 
between 1973 and 1981 were in the region of over US$60 billion (Ikpeze 2004:6).  
Brain drain is part of the process in the exploitation chain in the world system. 
Therefore, the argument of mutuality in terms of sharpened skills of the émigrés is flawed. 
This is so because the value added to the skills of African professionals is specifically 
tailored to meet the needs of the host countries’ economies and may be incongruent to the 
Nigerian situation. Again, there is no guarantee of prompt availability of these migrant 
professionals when they are needed as majority of them have permanent resettlement in their 
host countries as their goal. Once the African skilled professional leaves the shores of his/her 
country and is absorbed into the economies of the host country, their new adopted country 
becomes their primary constituency and the fruits of their skills are deployed to its further 
development. According to the United Nations, an African professional working in the US 
contributes about US$150,000.00 per year to the US economy (Emeagwali 2009:2). 
Contrasted with this is the estimate of UNCTAD that “one highly trained African migrant 
between 25 and 35 years, the age group into which most of the Africans going abroad fall, 
represents a cash value of US$184,000 at 1997 prices” (Rena 2008). What this figure 
represents is the roughly calculable loss, which Africa suffers on each of its migrants 
domiciled in the major cities of the West. 
There is no doubt that there are likely positive feedback effects associated with the 
migration of the individual skilled professional. But the point that requires detailed 
elaboration is whether these effects are merely compensatory or a pedestal to effect greater 
socio-economic and political changes necessary for development. Available evidence 
suggests that the so-called brain gain or brain circulation to the home country is at best, 
probabilistic. There are pockets of evidence linking certain developmental initiatives to the 
diaspora in countries like China and Mexico but the percentage of skills transferred to home 
countries is not only tokenistic but mere spill-over. Africans who migrated to the US, and 
indeed other parts of the developed countries contribute 40 times more wealth to their host 
countries than to the African economy (Rena 2008; Emeagwali 2009:2). What this means is 
slow death for Africa’s development prospects. The situation is made worse by the 
institutionalised global legal frameworks that inhibit the “globalization of knowledge”. As 
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Balaam and Veseth (2005:336) recognise, “tight legal controls, copyrights and licensing often 
curbed LDCs’ access to such technology…” as might be vital for the take-off of African 
economies. In other words, with these inhibitions on the way, there can never be wholesale 
harvests of the skills of the African diaspora for Africa’s development.   
The external forces that motorise migration are rooted in the nature of role assignment 
in the international economic system. By this arrangement, almost every African state acts as 
a feeder zone. By the pervasiveness of brain drain, almost every African country suffers from 
the dearth of relevant professionals to man and drive the critical sectors of their economies 
towards development. The effect of brain drain is that it “increases the scarcity of highly-
needed skilled labour in developing countries and consequently reduces long-run economic 
growth and income “(Research Group on the Global Future 2005). And conversely, the 
destination countries increased the abundance of highly needed skilled labour and, thus, 
achieved better ratio of such professionals to population as well as short-run and long-run 
economic growth and global domination. 
There had been a tendency to downplay the effect of brain drain on Third World 
underdevelopment by projecting arguments of mutual advantages and benefits to both the 
origin and destination countries. For instance, Teson (2008:2) claims that “most of the time 
there is nothing unfair about the brain drain, whether one considers it from the standpoint of 
the emigrant, the source country or the host country”. The same argument had been put 
forward by the apologists of slave trade in their attempt to numb the psyche of the world 
about the disastrous consequences of slave trade as well as its detrimental effect on African 
development. European and American scholars contended that despite the “moral evil” 
associated with slave trade it was nonetheless “economically good” for Africa as Africa 
gained wealth from the trade as well new food crops (Rodney 1972:110). What has not been 
demonstrated by these apologists is whether the wealth gained by African was commensurate 
with the wealth they created for Europe. 
Contemporary brain drain was anchored an economistic principles and designed to 
target the skilled personnel that would add value to the economies of the destination 
countries. Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001:276) consider education as the engine of 
growth. This much is evident in the new immigration policies that tended to lower entry 
conditions in Europe and North America and Australasia: emphasis is laid on the possession 
of certain minimum academic attainment as part of the conditions that qualify an applicant 
for consideration. In other words, intending immigrants are expected to possess certain 
minimum academic qualifications that would make them pliable enough to fit into critically 
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relevant sectors of their destination countries’ economies. This point is true of many 
developed countries especially the US whose immigration policy is based on both individual 
skills and quota system (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 2001:285). 
It has been argued by some scholars that the international pressures necessitating 
brain drain and the prospects of higher wages motivate individuals to acquire higher 
education which in turn leads to the attainment of an overflow of human capital necessary for 
the source countries’ development. They called this “beneficial” brain drain (Beine, Docquier 
and Rapoport 2001:288). A critical issue which is downplayed and glossed over is the time 
frame needed to educate people as well as the replenishment questions. For sure, the hiatus 
created between emigration and replacement potentially deepens the development dilemma of 
the source countries. The replenishment dilemma of African human resources is made more 
critical by the absence of institutional support to African Universities and centres for higher 
education. Compared to other continents such as Asia and Latin America which have 
functional academic cooperation and partnership agreement with the EU and receive financial 
support from the European Commission, Africa is not accorded any attention that is more 
than cursory. This scenario led Mohammed (2005:8) to observe: 
This can only be viewed as a clear confirmation of the low 
priority accorded to Africa by the EU policy makers regarding 
higher education partnerships and academic cooperation. It is 
also an indication of the extent to which Africa’s role in the 
global production of knowledge had been downgraded. 
 
Another strand of the argument on mutual and reinforcing benefits is anchored on 
remittances. Not only is it argued that remittances offset the cost of education of emigrants on 
the origin country, they also actually serve as investment capital which contribute to the 
expansion of development prospects of the source country (Batista, Lacuesta and Vincente 
2007:6). It has been suggested that African diaspora constitutes a brain reserve or brain bank 
that could be tapped to assist in resolving the developmental challenges facing Africa 
(Mohamoud 2005; Agrawal, Kapur and McHale 2008). In other words, Africa’s human 
resources in the developed countries are held on trust and still available for the utilisation of 
the source country. Nothing can be further from the truth. The point is that the feasibility of 
such happening in grand scale is doubtful bearing in mind that the institutions where these 
skilled personnel are working might not be disposed to releasing them on extended period of 
time outside the framework of their vacation period.  
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It is important to differentiate between brain drain within the group of core countries 
and brain drain that is characterised by a unidirectional movement of skilled and semi-skilled 
personnel from the periphery countries to the core countries. While brain drain within the 
former is not only reinforcing, associated shortcomings are assuaged by influx from the 
developing countries. In other words, brain outflow is matched by brain inflow leading to 
relative equilibrium. In spite of the ample compensation of Canadian brain drain (to the US) 
through brain gain from the rest of the World, Devoretz and Laryea (1998:1) argued that the 
effect of brain drain on Canadian economy was real and costly. Contrasted with Nigeria 
where brain drain is unidirectional and creates serious human resource gap, the effect of brain 
drain is not only real and costly but destructive and anti-development. This point is 
particularly true since the response to the shortfall in human resource capacity in African 
countries was the infusion of western “experts” and consultants” into these economies with 
dire financial consequences. The UNDP estimated that Africa spends about US$4 billion a 
year to cover the human capital gap (BBC 2001; The Africa Monitor 2007). What this 
implied was that the progress of African countries towards development was already 
mortgaged. Mohamoud (2005:8) acquiesces that brain drain, 
Is impeding potential economic growth, and remains a 
handicap for sustainable development in many countries in 
Africa. Given the limited stock of skilled professionals in 
Africa, the continued exodus of the enormous human capital, if 
it continues at the current rate, will condemn the continent to 
the unenviable status as a perpetual net loser of talent and 
innovative capacity.  
 
Easterly and Nyarko (2008:2) argue that brain drain has both cost and benefit for 
Africa. In other words, Africa gains as much as it loses. There is no doubt that brain drain 
yields some benefits to Africa especially at the micro-level, but the loss associated with it 
especially in terms of development crisis at the macro-level far outweighs whatever gain 
attributable to it. Evidence abounds regarding the positive impacts of immigrants on GDP per 
capita growth of the host countries. After examining the economic impact of immigration on 
host country with particular reference to Norway, Feridun (2005:359) concludes that “when 
level of immigration increases GDP per capita also increases”. He also contends that the 
development of the Norwegian society will depend among other things on whether the 
country is capable of securing a successful integration of foreigners (Feridun 2005:359). 
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A major determining factor in the whole question of migration is that there is acute 
disequilibrium in the means and ends necessary to power and achieve high productivity. 
Brain drain is a stop-gap measure and is strictly designed to benefit destination countries. 
Therefore whatever benefits that accrue to the individual, in terms of higher wages, and to the 
source countries, in terms of remittances, are mere fallouts which are outside the core 
contemplation of the various immigration policies of the western countries. The core 
contemplation of tempered immigration policies by the West was to address their shifting 
demographic composition As Nyarko (2010:11) records: 
Africa currently has, and is projected to continue to have, a 
relatively young population, while that of Europe is projected 
to become much older over time. While large numbers [of] 
Africans will be looking for work, large numbers of Europeans 
will be in need of services and support during their old age. 
Estimates state that there will be a short-fall of 20 million 
skilled and non-skilled workers by 2030. 
 
What this implies is that Africa remains a veritable source of human resource supply. 
Nyarko (2009:6) has attempted to downplay the debilitating impact of brain drain by arguing 
that “the big issue with high-skilled labour in many sub-Saharan African nations is not the 
brain drain, but the exceptionally small numbers of highly skilled workers”. In other words, 
that the problem of African development is not the emigration of already trained personnel 
but the incapacity of African states to deepen the pool of their skilled professionals. In 
furtherance to the argument using the health sector as an example Nyarko (2010:8) posits that 
if all the drained doctors were to return to Africa, the average ratio of doctor –patient which is 
in the neighbourhood of 11,000 in Ghana and 88,000 in Malawi would never compare with 
the doctor-patient ratio in the developed countries which averaged between 227 and 500. This 
argument seemed to have missed the point. The issue is not the sheer number of skilled 
personnel that have emigrated but the percentage of migrants in relation to the total stock of 
such skilled professionals. UNCTAD (2007) reports that human capital loss in LDCs range 
between one third and half of trained professionals. Again, the question is not about 
comparison with the West on doctor-patient ratio or any of such indices or narrowing the gap 
in science and technology, but on the foregone opportunities of Africa to develop at its pace 
with its manpower. It is all about the relevant skilled personnel being available in Africa to 
drive the necessary parameters of development at the pace of Africa. There are ample 
possibilities that had the vital human resources remained in Africa, the continent would have 
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moved forward farther away from the level of underdevelopment it is currently trapped and 
closer to the run-way to development. As UNCTAD (2007) avers, 
Lost “human capital”, as it is called, can have serious 
consequences. The work of skilled professionals is a 
precondition for upgrading the production structures and the 
exports of LDCs, and for improving the sophistication of 
domestic businesses not to mention for improving domestic 
health and education, which benefit entire population. Without 
enough trained agronomists, biologists, engineers, scientists, 
doctors, nurses and information and communication technology 
(ICT) professionals, it is impossible for the firms and farms of 
LCDs to use technology to upgrade their products and 
efficiency and that makes it difficult for them to face foreign 
competitors. The emigration of qualified people thus damages 
long-term growth and development prospects. This is 
particularly true for LDCs, given their relatively low 
populations of skilled professionals. 
 
The assumed symbiotic benefits accruable from migration stop at the threshold of the 
individual. At the macro-level, migration has deepened the contradictions of 
underdevelopment and sucked the prospects of African development into the eddy of 
subservience in the modern world system.  
 
 
ii) Development and Underdevelopment Issues in the Migration and Brain Drain 
Debate 
 
The concepts of development and underdevelopment have remained contentious 
within the social sciences. The contention surrounding their exact meanings inheres from the 
ideologically kaleidoscopic colourations that are attached to them. According to Igwe 
(2002:115) concerns with development in all its ramifications – economic, political, socio-
cultural, technological, individual, etc –acquired a boosted impetus with the post-World War 
II instant emergence of many new states that had just secured political independence after 
more than 500 years of Western colonialism, slave trade and other indescribable forms of 
inhumanism. 
The contending ideological schools, the orthodox and radical variants, conceived 
development differently. The radical variant rose as a result of the failure of the orthodox 
prescriptions and explanations to transform and illuminate the forces germane to engendering 
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development. The orthodox school conceived development in terms of modernisation and 
integration (Igwe 2002:115).   The major international institutions are perennially concerned 
with issues of development. It was this concern that led the United Nations (UN) to declare 
the 1960s as the Development Decade through its General Assembly Resolution 1710 (xvi). 
The crux of the Development Decade consisted in the objective to: 
Accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the 
economy of the individual nation and their social advancement 
so as to attain in each under-developed country a substantial 
increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its own 
target, taking as the objective a minimum rate of growth of 
aggregate national income of five percent at the end of the 
decade (Quoted in Offiong 1980:1).  
 
 The UN Development Decade envisaged development as a gradual and orderly 
movement towards an ideal state of modernism. Development within this context was 
conceived in accordance with the Western paradigm that equated development to efforts 
deployed to, or march towards a pseudo-Western system (Igwe 2002:115). As Ollawa 
(1981:2) further elaborates, development within this paradigm was conceptualised as orderly 
change toward the realization of capitalist economic and western democratic political 
structures and underdevelopment as a departure from, and the persistence of internal factors 
or pre-capitalist structures. 
The lack of development, or better still, underdevelopment, which characterised 
African states including Nigeria after the UN Development Decade led to a reappraisal of the 
western concept of development. Western conceptualisation of development emphasizes the 
replication of the characteristics of western economies. So, to western developmentalist, 
emphasis is focussed on such indices as industrialisation, economic affluence, military 
hegemony, advanced technology, urbanisation and the parliamentary political process. Also, 
such economic parameters and aggregates as gross national product, aggregate investment 
and capital accumulation and the sectoral distribution of employment and output constituted 
the defining attributes of development (Nnoli 1981:21; Olopoenia 1983:14). 
The orthodox conceptualisation of development has been challenged by scholars of 
the radical school on account of its inability to bring about the transformation of the African 
economies to take on the characteristics of the developed countries.  Nnoli (1981:21) 
criticises the orthodox conceptualisation of development on the ground that it is a mere 
checklist of artefacts and argues that development transcends the acquisition or replication of 
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the characteristics of western economies. Within this school, development is conceived in 
term of progression from a lower and often undesirable state to a high and preferred one 
(Olopoenia 1983:14). Such progression necessarily entails an “all-round interconnected 
progressive transformation of man, society and nature, made possible by his incremental 
mastery over them…” (Igwe 2002:115). A central question is: what constitutes the 
parameters of the ideal higher state that nations would aspire to attain? And herein lies the 
point of departure between the orthodox and the radical schools. While the orthodox school 
props up the DCs as the ideal high state which the African and Third World countries should 
aspire to emulate in their material characteristics and attempt a catch-up, the radical school 
insists that such a higher state is a trajectory from the periphery to some part of the centre, if 
not the centre of the international political economy (Igwe 2002:116). 
The contemporary emphasis of development revolves around man and his creative 
energies as well as his interaction with the environment within the state formation. Following 
this line, Nnoli (1981:36) conceives development as, 
A dialectical phenomenon in which the individual and society 
interact with their physical, biological and interhuman 
environments transforming them for their own betterment and 
that of humanity at large and being transformed in the process. 
The lessons learned and experiences acquired in this process 
are passed on to future generations, enabling them to improve 
their capacities to make further valuable changes in their 
interhuman relations and their ability to transform nature. 
 
Development, therefore, targets man as its centrepiece. In other words, the purpose 
and end of development is the upliftment of man to the highest point possible through the 
manipulation and transformation of nature and the environment. Such transformation does 
not depend on what Nnoli (1981:21) describes as “a checklist of artefacts” but on the capacity 
of contemporary state formations to independently sustain its own kind of progression. It is 
not the acquisition of the “good things of life” - those sets of luxurious personal and national 
effects that ameliorate the difficulties of living or increase the outside perception of a state’s 
power and wealth - that determines development but the exclusive control of the productive 
forces in such a way that the overall well-being of the individual is satiated. Toyo (2002:566) 
opines that development is not simply industrialisation although industrialisation is part of it. 
It involves independence or self-reliance as well as growth-promoting changes in relations of 
production in the distribution of income among people in the economy.  
Offiong (1980:21), Nnoli (1981:36), Olopoenia (1983:23-4) see real development as 
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involving a structural transformation of the economy, society, polity and culture of the Third 
World countries that permits the self-generating and self-perpetuating use and development 
of the people’s potentials. Dudley Seers poses three fundamental questions that put the 
meaning of development in proper perspective in the following manner: 
The questions to ask about a country’s development are 
therefore, what has been happening to poverty? What has been 
happening to unemployment? What has been happening to 
inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, 
then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for 
the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems 
have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would 
be strange to call the result “development” even if per capita 
income doubled (cited in Olopoenia 1983:23).  
 
Development, thus reflects widespread attack on, and reversal of, absolute oppression, 
poverty, unemployment, inequalities and all other manifestations of exploitation that tend to 
consign the economies of Third World countries to the periphery of the global economic 
system. So,  instead of development being synonymous with recreating the conditions of life 
in the DCs, and the provision of such infrastructures as airport, seaports, super highways,  
sophisticated institutions, it implies “both redistribution with growth and the meeting of the 
basic needs of the masses…”(Olopoenia 1983:23).  
What the new thinking on development emphasizes is investment in people in order to 
sustain the thrust of development. For instance, both the “basic needs” and “redistribution 
with growth” deal with the liquidation of poverty, unemployment and inequality by providing 
basic necessities for decent livelihood for the great majority of the population and the 
redistribution of economic opportunities in a more egalitarian direction. Olopoenia (1983:24-
5) holds that: “… for development to be attained in a growing economy there must be a 
deliberate effort not only for meeting basic needs but also for making it possible for a 
majority of the population to participate in and benefit from the process of economic 
growth”.  
Development does not begin and end with the creation of the necessary conditions for 
people to meet their basic needs or to partake in reaping the benefits of economic growth; it 
involves a dynamic and continuous transformative process towards sustainability. Offiong 
(2001:223) emphasizes that sustainable development depends much on investing in people. It 
is human beings that are principal means of achieving development in any economy. For 
instance, the rapid growth of the South East Asian economies depended on their investment 
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in education which increased their pool of skilled professionals for their industries (Toyo 
2002:538). The plight of Nigeria and African development is its inability to keep its trained 
personnel as they are poached by the DCs. Africa exports a large percentage of its graduating 
manpower to the US and Europe.  
The nature of African incorporation into the world capitalist system and its current 
position in that system dictate its development trajectories. Africa occupies the periphery 
where they have been doomed to live at the pleasure of the DCs and they do not pretend that 
they desire African countries to exit their peripheral status. Over the years, the DCs have 
deployed one strategy or another to ensure the circumscription of independent African 
development For instance, after the resolution of the sixth special session of the UN General 
Assembly in 1974 calling for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), the West formed 
a counter group code-named the G7 (now G8). The programme of action for NIEO consisted 
of the facilitation of the pace of development and the change of the unequal economic 
balance between the LDCs and the industrialised states (Balaam and Veseth 2005:337). 
Contrarily, the G7 which was formed in 1975 was to ensure the checkmating of the 
increasing boldness of the LDCs. It should be recalled that prior to the bold call for NIEO, 
OPEC had set the stage for Third World activism toward the reordering of the global 
capitalist system. OPEC-sanctioned embargo on oil shipments to some industrialised states 
jolted the DCs as it led to a 400 per cent increase in the price of oil (Balaam and Veseth 
2005:337). The purpose of G7, therefore, was not only to protect the stranglehold of the DCs 
on the global capitalist system but to ensure that new economic power blocks would not 
emerge outside the framework and conditions stipulated by them. 
 Brain drain, which metamorphosed from slave trade, has effectively depleted the pool 
of skilled professionals needed by Africa to engender its development. The various 
immigration policies in the DCs attest that brain drain is not accidental but a premeditated 
strategy to frustrate African development. The DCs were able to create the necessary 
conditions for the harvest of African brain by its bouquet of economic reforms which they 
forced down the throats of African and Third World countries through the Bretton Woods 
institutions of the World Bank and the IMF. These economic reforms, which were designed 
by the IFIs to supposedly tackle internal factors undergirding Africa’s domestic 
contradictions helped them and the DCs to have unfettered control of their economies such 
that their claims to national sovereignty are questionable (Offiong 2001:19).  
Despite the positivities attributed to brain drain such as remittances, brain gain and 
brain circulation, these are not adequate enough to drive development. In actuality, brain 
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drain has deepened Nigeria’s development dilemma while enhancing that of the DCs. As 
Andre Gunder Frank (cited in Meier 1995:107) asserts, 
Underdevelopment is not simply non-development, but is a 
unique type of socio-economic structure that results from the 
dependency of the under developed country on advanced 
capitalist countries. This results from foreign capital removing 
a surplus from the dependent economy to the advanced country 
by structuring the underdeveloped economy in an “external 
orientation” that is characterised by the export of primary 
commodities, the import of manufactures and dependent 
industrialization.   
  
The centrality of knowledge in the contemporary phase of capitalist expansion has 
made Africa’s brains prime targets especially with distortions in the demographic make up of 
the DCs. The effect of brain drain generally on Africa is the erosion of the basis to anchor its 
march to sustainable development. As Toyo (2002:559-60) has contended, “investigation in 
Nigeria and some other LDCs revealed that poverty in capital was not the main constraint to 
development.  More serious were entrepreneurship and technical knowledge which are most 
potent when they move together”. Nigeria is categorised as a highly mobile country, by 
which is meant that a significant proportion of its population is in the diaspora making 
contribution to their host economies and conversely denying such contribution to their home 
country. Nigeria’s underdevelopment is deepened by such erosion of human capital as 
modern economies are dependent on human capital for its progress.  
There is a serious contention about the place of brain drain in the development matrix. 
While some contend that brain drain undergirds the backwardness of Third World countries 
especially African countries, others posit that the net-gains from out-migration outweigh the 
negative effects. Mundende (1989:185-186) Ghosh and Ghosh (2001:40) capture this 
divergence in what they categorised as nationalist and internationalist approaches. As Ghosh 
and Ghosh (2001:40) outline: 
While to an internationalist, brain migration is a welfare-
income-development maximizing natural process, to a 
nationalist, it is a perverse process leading to loss of income, 
welfare and development and a widening of international 
inequality between DCs and LDCs. 
 
The essential nature of brain drain is its unidirectionality, that is, the movement of 
vital human capital away from less developed countries to developed countries. Such a 
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movement has mutually reinforcing effects: it creates holes in the human capital formation in 
the sending country while filling such holes in the receiving country. The loss of such vital 
human capital naturally has serious implications in the development potentials of a country. 
And it is even more complex when the country is at the fringes of the global economic, 
technological, scientific and political system.  
There has been a trend of quixotic sophistry in the treatment of brain drain syndrome. 
There is an argument that the backwardness of developing countries constituted the main 
cause of brain drain and that rather than brain drain being a hindrance to the prospects of 
development in the LDCs, it actually helps in resolving contradictions that could have 
deepened their underdevelopment (Ghosh and Ghosh 2001:4; Mundende 1989:2). But this is 
farther from the truth. The developed countries have, through a combination of immigration 
policies, ensured that the right calibre of trained personnel is admitted into their country. The 
underlying motive for attracting HQM from the LDCs is purely economic. As Mundende 
(1989:188) rightly observes,  
Migration is a selective process confined mainly to persons of 
certain ages, occupations and education. Skilled manpower is 
needed to run the wheels of industry and to coordinate 
development efforts of the economy. Emigration creates 
vacancies where there should be none, and although the 
situation may not be critical in all sectors of the economy, it 
can lead to continuous dependence of developing countries on 
developed countries for manpower requirements. 
 
 In other words, brain drain deepens the dependence of African countries in more 
complex ways that are, at first, readily appreciated. While the West applauds itself for its 
foreign aid deployment to Africa which in recent times has been on downward trend, foreign 
aid suffers capital flight as it finds its way through several cleverly surreptitious channels 
back to the West or form the indebtedness of these economies. Apart from the importation of 
virtually all the needs of African economies from the West, the shortfall of human needs in 
Africa arising from brain drain has cost it a fortune –it is estimated that Africa employs about 
150,000 expatriate professionals at a cost of US$4billion a year (Tebeje 2005). 
Neoclassical postulations have tended to underplay the significance of the effect of 
brain drain on both the actual state of development in developing countries especially Africa 
and the prospects of development.  They contend that head or tail, that the world economy is 
the beneficiary of brain drain. Their argument centred on the premise that international 
circulation of human capital based on free choice results in optimisation of individual’s 
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productivity and overall welfare. And that as long as individual migrant’s income increases 
and the income of those left behind does not decrease by the fact of migration that the world 
is better for it (Sousa 1989:198-200). The flaws associated with the position of neoclassical 
postulation about brain drain consist in its assumption that the global capitalist system 
operates a level-playing field where countries operate at the same pedestal. It also confuses 
the gains of the developed countries as the gains of the entire system thus denying the 
inequality and division that characterise the modern world system. Bhagwati and Hameda 
(cited in Sousa 1989:200) have also criticised the neoclassical approach as individualising 
brain drain “without taking adequate account of the structure within which individual 
decisions were made and of the relevant interdependence and dynamic effects”. 
Nigeria occupies the lower rungs on every global index of development. Actually, 
there is no aspect of development that it is not in deficit. This being so, every brain that 
leaves its shores not only worsens its development dilemma but also circumscribes its 
prospects for development. Ghosh and Ghosh’s observation that “the outflow of this strategic 
manpower (brain drain) creates many structural maladjustments and produces enormous 
negative externalities and thereby retards the process of economic development of the brain-
losing country” is true of Nigeria (Ghosh and Ghosh 2001:42). 
But many pro-migration scholars deny this by advancing the argument of brain 
circulation and brain gain (Teson 2008:5). By these concepts they contend that transitional 
movement of people is a positive phenomenon as it benefits both the developed and 
developing countries. (Rizvi 2005:175). This implies that the effects of brain drain is quid pro 
quo: there is nothing unfair about brain drain as whatever loss a country experiences by brain 
drain, it regains through other means, possibly reverse-migration with attendant skills and 
remittances (Teson 2008:2). But as African economies have demonstrated, brain circulation 
has been far-fetched and resides outside the orbit of development agenda. The continuous 
economic crisis besetting African economics, itself a product of a combination of factors 
rooted in global framework of inequality, makes brain gain and circulation far-fetched.  
There cannot be development without human resources. It is human resources that 
transform the relevant factors of production to achieve development. And if the bulk of 
trained human capital which Africa requires to propel its development agenda is lost, then 
development can as well be a mirage. From historical experience, the engine of development 
revolves around the middle class. It is the middle class that drives development through small 
and medium-scale industrialisation and taxation base. But the combination of 
disadvantageous world system and the brain drain syndrome has stalled the prospects of 
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development in Africa. In contrast, the so-called brain gain in terms of remittances dulls into 
insignificance in the face of the fact that an African professional working in the United States 
contributes about US$150,000 per year to the US economy (Rena 2008). 
Statistics have put the volume of yearly human capital loss to Africa at 20,000 skilled 
professionals. And Nigeria contributes a substantial part of this figure. What this implies is 
that “every year there are 20,000 fewer people in Africa to deliver key public services, drive 
economic growth, and articulate calls for greater democracy and development” 
(Sriskandarajah 2005b). Pro-migration scholars have argued that brain drain helps sending 
countries to increase its stock of educated people as the international demand would whet 
more and more people’s desire to acquire education. (Teson 2008:5, Batista, Lacuesta and 
Vicente 2007:3-4).This is certainly incorrect. Rather than brain drain increasing investment in 
education and the stock of educated people, it actually decreases growth in the stock of 
educated people and also threatens the entire education sector. As Adebayo (2010:3) attests, 
brain drain drained hundreds of thousands of professionals out of Nigeria’s universities, 
polytechnics, colleges of education, teaching hospitals, and research centres. The impact was 
such that many of these institutions became hollow and shallow with only 36 percent of the 
required number of academic staff on the ground. In other words, the capacity of the 
educational sector to keep up with the required number of students was greatly impaired. 
Ghosh (2001:41) captures it thus: 
Brain drain involves the loss of strategic manpower from key 
positions. It seriously affects skill formation and involves the 
loss of money invested in education and training. Needless to 
say, the loss of strategic manpower adversely affects education, 
research and training in infrastructure-building, creative talent, 
present and future technology building, and the entire 
intellectual climate of the brain-losing country, and it creates a 
growth-retarding backwash effect 
 
Another aspect is the cost of training these highly skilled personnel. Quoting 
UNCTAD sources, Rena (2002) informs that one highly trained African migrant between 25 
and 35 years, represents a cash value of US$184,000 at 1997 prices. This represents a 
cumulative loss of US$3.68 billion per year to Africa. There is no doubt that there exists an 
interconnection between brain drain and development. That interconnection does not indicate 
mutual benefit but rather produces major and residual beneficiaries. Sousa (1989:202) has 
pointed out that “the gain accruing to developed countries were of three types: ‘opportunity 
cost’ or saving in investment for training domestic skills required in the absence of migration; 
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net increases in national output; and the effect of ‘reverse transfer of technology’ ”. 
There are many propositional logic portraying positive potentials of brain drain on 
domestic economies. These propositional logic attribute to brain drain the reverse effect of 
inducing development in the sending country through such mechanisms as remittances, 
reverse-migration with attendant financial savings and newly acquired productive skills and 
diaspora effect resulting in investment and trade (Batista Lacuesta and Vicente 2007:4). The 
developmental impacts of these factors are assumptive in more ways than one: first, the 
continued depletion of human resources of African countries created serious distortion that 
deepened their unattractiveness. Such unattractive economies have repelled rather than 
attracted the diaspora to make contributions to national development. Second, remittances 
represent an insignificant portion of a migrant’s earning. IFAD (2007:2) notes that migrants 
typically send US$100, 200 and 300 at a time. These amounts constitute an insignificant 
fraction of the migrant’s earnings. The bulk of the migrants’ earnings are spent in the host 
countries, thus stimulating the host countries’ economies. In concrete terms therefore, African 
professionals, for instance, contribute 40 times more to the US economy than to the African 
economies in the ratio of US$300 to Africa and US$12,000 to the US economy (Rena 2008; 
Emeagwali 2009). 
A major reason why scholars point to remittances as being compensatory of brain 
drain and therefore attribute positive externalities to them is because of their continuous 
appreciation as well as the comparative edge it has exhibited over ODA and other sources of 
external financing. In Nigeria, remittance inflows have, since 2002, surpassed ODA by 
approximately five times (Englama 2007:9).  Therefore, the touted positivities of brain drain 
on the overall development of Nigeria and Africa are marginal. Because the incentives for 
attracting and retaining Nigerian and other African skilled professionals is mainly economic, 
there is little chance that a migrant who is profitably employed would return to home country 
in the form of reverse-migration except forced to do so. And considering that their input to 
the economies of DCs is enormous, they would be encouraged, even cajoled, to stay put. 
Reverse-migration therefore involves those professionals whose expertise is not particularly 
required by the DCs. Those professionals whose skills are critical for African development 
are rather unreachable as their services are sorely needed in the DCs. As a joint statement by 
the Network of African Science Academies (NASAC) (2009:1) recognises: 
… a sustainable economic future for Africa lies in 
strengthening the continent’s S and T [Science and 
Technology] capacity. ... This goal can only be met if Africa 
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educates and retains a critical mass of world-class scientists and 
technologists with the knowledge and expertise to address the 
continent’s key scientific, technological and economic 
problems. 
 
All over the DCs, the key sectors are maintained by the brains drained from Africa 
and around the Third World. While other parts of the Third World especially such countries 
as China, India, Mexico, Philippines and so on, have superfluous brain pool that can be 
referred to as brain overflow (Ghosh 2001:41), Africa is still constrained by inadequate brain 
pool. For instance, about one third of all African scientists live and work in the DCs. This 
dire deficit in the optimum number of skilled personnel required to drive African 
development led NASAC (2009:1) to observe that the level of brain outflow “represents a 
significant loss of economic potential for the continent, especially in today’s global society 
where scientific and technological knowledge drive development”.  
There is basically no alternative to high quality human capital in engendering 
development in national economies. Indeed, sustainable development cannot occur in the 
absence of a crop of skilled and competent personnel to drive it. The dialectics of brain drain 
has shown that what Africa can ever hope to get out of its critically relevant skilled personnel 
that have migrated abroad are remittances and occasional philanthropic gestures as brain 
drain tends to transmute to “a one-way permanent migration” (Ghosh 2001:41). Remittances 
on their own cannot replace or compensate for the loss of a country’s human capital 
considering the indispensability and vital role human capital plays as an engine of 
development. As Emeagwali (2009:2) perceptively observes, 
 
Ask someone who is ill what “wealth” means, and you will get 
a very different answer than from most other people. ...Money 
cannot teach your children. Teachers can. Money cannot bring 
electricity to your home. Engineers can. Money cannot cure 
sick people. Doctors can. Because it is only a nation’s human 
capital that can be converted into real wealth, that human 
capital is much more valuable than its financial capital. 
 
 The permanence of brain drain in receiving countries is facilitated by socio-economic 
and cultural integration. Many skilled professionals have not only moved their families but 
are intertwined in marital associations that have conferred citizenship rights on them. And 
their patriotic attachment to their new countries seriously dilutes their attachment to their 
home country. In other words, the post-emigration emotions of migrants are not propelled by 
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patriotic zeal but pity. It is this feeling of pity that motorises the philanthropic gesture of the 
African diaspora towards alleviating the pains of poverty etched on the landscape of their 
countries. But the fact is that alleviating poverty through remittances and philanthropism 
cannot enthrone development but only deepen dependence especially in the absence of the 
relevant skilled professionals to drive development. 
 
iii)  Trends in Nigerian Migration and Brain Drain 
 
Nigeria is a country characterised by massive immigration and emigration, although 
its net migration calculation tilts towards emigration (Adedokun 2003; Orozco and Millis 
2006; De Haas 2006; Mberu and Pongou 2010). Nigeria is generally challenged by wide-
ranging migration issues. The nature of migration in Nigeria takes the form of internal, 
regional and international. Internal migration connotes the movement of people within a 
country and is depicted by movement from one location to another, often from rural to urban 
areas. Other forms of internal migration include rural - rural movement and urban - urban 
movement. Although movement to such urban cities as Enugu, Onitsha, Kano, Sokoto, Jos, 
Port Harcourt, Calabar and other major cities in Nigeria account for significant  portion of 
internal migration, major absorbing zones such as Lagos and Abuja account for the bulk of 
internal migration (Afoloyan et al 2009; Mberu and Pongou 2010). The forces that induce 
internal migration are multifarious. They range from such push factors as dwindling rural 
economy (scarcity of land, improvised soil, declining crop yields, poor harvest and soil 
erosion); poverty, conflicts and environmental, political, religious and cultural factors to pull 
factors such as organized life in the cities, paid employment, availability of socio-economic 
and political infrastructures (Nwokocha n.d; Nwajiuba 2005).  
Nigerians are also known to have migrated to countries within Africa. Mberu and 
Pongou (2010) aver that the trend of migration amongst Nigerians in the pre-independence 
period was mainly regional. Nigerians emigrated to such countries as Ghana, Togo, Cote 
D’ivoire, Benin Republic (Dahomey), Mali, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) and Niger. The push 
and pull factors underpinning these emigrations consisted in the search for greener pastures 
and lax national immigration policies. The expansions in trade, cash-crop production, 
infrastructural development and extraction of solid minerals created demands for farmers, 
workers and middlemen. Another factor was the lax immigration policies then. Between 1901 
and 1902, the pull factors that underpinned the emigration of Nigerians to Ghana gold mines 
offered. The rise in the number of Nigerians who emigrated to Ghana was attributable to 
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three factors: the gold mines and the economic opportunities they offered; Ghana’s robust 
economy and attendant economic development and the vigorous pan-African movement that 
took root there. The pool of Nigerian immigrants was such that in 1969, the Ghanaian 
authorities issued alien expulsion order, which affected about 140,000 Nigerians (Mberu and 
Pongou 2010). The migration of Nigerians to other parts of Africa, in substantial numbers, 
outside the traditional West African sub-region was as a result of several factors. Mberu and 
Pongou (2010) identify such factors as: quest for more business opportunities; socio-cultural 
ties; and ethno-religious affinities.  
The post-independence trends in Nigerian migration could be divided into three 
phases. The first phase coincided with, and covered, the immediate post-independence 
period, up to 1980s when economic downturn reversed the ensemble of pull factors in 
Nigerian emigration patterns. The second phase covered the period 1980s to the 1990s when 
different types of economic reforms created certain contradictions in the Nigerian economy. 
The third phase started from 2000 and still subsists. It was spawned by wide-ranging 
development in the international arena such as globalisation and its advertised advantages as 
agent of prosperity, economic growth and development; the dismantling of immigration 
policies in the developed countries; and, actual incentives in developed countries for the 
repatriation of earnings through the instrumentality of remittances.  
The internationalisation of Nigerian migration in substantial stock started in the 
twilights of Nigeria’s colonial rule but expanded in the post-independence period. Apart from 
the developed countries of Europe and North America, Nigerians increasingly emigrated to 
African countries such as Sudan, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Botswana and South Africa. (De 
Haas 2006; Afoloyan et al 2009). The pull factors consisted in the quest for higher academic 
qualifications to bridge the manpower gaps in the administrative sectors of the Nigerian State. 
As Mberu and Pongou (2010) put it: 
Flows from Nigeria to countries beyond the region did not 
occur on a large scale until after independence in 1960. From 
the 1950s through the 1970s, the emerging elites moved mainly 
to the United Kingdom due to the legacy of colonial ties, for 
educational pursuit, and in a few cases for administrative 
matters. 
 
Migration in this era did not constitute brain drain as the Nigerian economy possessed 
the necessary ingredients of robustness. Most Nigerians who sojourned abroad in the 1960s 
and 1970s came home after completing their education and were employed by the Nigerian 
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civil service (at the federal, regional and state government levels) and the burgeoning oil and 
private sectors of the economy (Mberu and Pongou 2010). 
As Nigerians troop abroad, Nigeria is also a target of immigrants. From 
independence, Nigeria has been “a strong attractive pole for immigrant populations” 
(Afoloyan et al 2009:48). Available data suggest that the stocks of migrants have been in the 
upward trend. Quoting the Nigerian Population Commission (NPC) data, Afoloyan et al 
(2009) show that total migrant stock in Nigeria rose from 101,450 in 1963, 477,135 in 1991, 
and 751,126 in 2000 to 972,126 in 2005 with projected estimates for 2010 put at 1.1 million 
people. A closer look at the 1963 and 1991 Nigerian censuses shows that even though the 
total number of non-African migrants rose from 46,951 in 1963 to 74,534 in 1991, their 
percentage share had declined from 46.3 percent to 15.6 percent. Currently, there is 
increasing presence of citizens arriving in Nigeria from ECOWAS countries. The percentage 
of the migrant stock from ECOWAS countries rose from 63.4 percent in 2001 to 97.5 percent 
in 2005 (Afoloyan et al 2009). The composition of immigrants include regular immigrants 
such as refugees/asylum-seekers; labour migrants; students; tourists and visitors; and 
irregular immigrants such as victims of human trafficking/smuggling and foreigners 
voluntarily returning home (Afoloyan et al 2009). 
While there is agreement amongst scholars that Nigerians constitute a significant 
African migrant stock, there is sharp disagreement about precise figure of Nigerian migrants. 
The disagreement emanates from lack of reliable empirical data. Every figure bandied in the 
literature appears to be a product of arbitrary conjectures and projections. Orozco and Millis 
(2007:3) argue that official statistics on Nigeria’s emigration are inaccurate and incomplete. 
This view resonates in Afoloyan et al (2009:56) when they aver that:  
Data on emigrant flows are equated with those on the departure 
of people from Nigeria. Departure data are based on the 
information supplied on the cards filled out by travelers at the 
country’s official exit points. Since data on departures were not 
cross tabulated with the duration of stay, the data generated can 
serve only as passenger flows… .  
 
Afoloyan et al (2009) do not venture an opinion on the projected stock of Nigerians in 
the diaspora. While the United Nations based their percentage of Nigerian migrants on 0.7 
percent of the population, the World Bank anchored its own estimation on 0.6 percent thus 
yielding different figures (World Bank 2011: 195; World Statistics Pocket Book 2010:144). 
Orozco and Millis (2007) estimate that about 3.9 percent of Nigerians, or 5.1 million people 
59 
 
(in 2007 population figure) constituted Nigerian diaspora. While not proffering a rounded 
figure of Nigerian migrant stock, Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007) estimate that Nigerians 
living in the United States alone were in the neighbourhood of 5 million. This figure excluded 
Nigerian migrants in African countries and other OECD countries. Soludo (2007) contends 
that about 17 million Nigerians were in the diaspora. Hagher (2011) estimates the stock of 
Nigerians in the Diaspora to be around 12 million. 
Despite the lack of unanimity in the extant literature about the stock of Nigerians in 
the Diaspora, there is an agreement that substantial portion of Nigeria’s professionals are 
domiciled abroad and that it constitutes brain drain as many of them are highly-skilled (Oni 
2000; Nwajiuba 2005; Soludo 2007; De Haas 2006; Hagher 2011).  Also, brain drain is 
associated with two types of negativities: it cripples development of the economy and 
depletes human resources necessary to undertake developmental mission (Mohamoud 2005; 
El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2006). The brain drain phenomenon is hinged on the argument of 
unidirectional movement of highly-skilled professionals and that the overweight of incentives 
in the developed countries circumscribes the possibilities of return. Brain gain is hinged on 
the reversibility of these circumstances and that it could be a reality (Hunger 2002).  
The reality of brain drain, especially the subsisting domestic and international push 
and pull factors that spawned it, has moved discourse on it from belligerence and anti-
Western polemics to the evolvement of processes for harnessing diaspora potentials 
(Mohamoud 2005: Nwajiuba 2005). Several factors account for the shift in orientation: the 
first factor was the paradigmatic reconceptualisation of brain drain as a zero-sum, permanent 
and irreversible negative phenomenon. It was reconceptualised as a mutually-beneficial brain 
circulation. Earlier literature focused on ex post effect of the brain drain and investigated its 
consequences. Its position was that brain drain unambiguously reduced the average level of 
education and generated loss for those left behind. In contrast, the new literature emphasized 
the positive impact of skilled migration flows (Docquier, Lohest and Menfouk 2005:3). 
Experience of several countries such as China, India, Mexico, Philippines amongst others, 
where the diaspora demonstrably contributed to national developmental efforts helped to 
drive this reconceptualisation. As noted by UNDP (2007:1). 
Drawing from the modernisation theory and dependency 
theory, this hypothesis predicts the long-term positive effects in 
the case of (a) direct return or (b) network building process of 
the emigrated knowledge elite… . Generally, the positive 
aspects could take such forms as incentives to acquire higher 
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education, remittances, return migration of skilled 
professionals, and the creation of business networks. 
 
The second factor was the burgeoning global remittance portfolio and its beneficial 
effects at the micro and macro economic levels of many states. Three issues heightened 
interest in the potentials of remittances as an effective development tool. One, it constituted a 
major source of diaspora engagement in national economies. In 1996, Egypt received US$2.8 
billion, Morocco US$2.2 billion, Algeria US$1billion, Nigeria US$947 million and Tunisia 
US$736 million as remittances and this constituted one of their largest sources of foreign 
exchange inflows (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2006:96); two, remittances overtook ODA as a 
source of foreign finance. In 2009, the World Bank sources estimated the total remittances to 
developing countries at US$317 billion whereas the OECD figures for net ODA from DAC 
countries for the same period was US$199 billion (Judge and De Plaen 2011:2); the three, the 
effectiveness of remittances in precisely reaching its target recipients or addressing targeted 
developmental projects.  
The third factor that underpinned the paradigmatic shift in the perception of brain 
drain vis-à-vis national development is the subsistent incapacity of national economies to 
reverse the push factors that spawned and motorised emigration and the perception that rather 
than undermine development, that brain gain catalyzes development through the transference 
of the expertise and acquired knowledge of the diaspora into the domestic arena (Nwajiuba 
2005:4). 
The fourth factor was the progress made in the expansion of information and 
communication technologies, which enhanced and facilitated communication between 
migrants and home countries (Nwajiuba 2005:4). 
Nigeria is seemingly a late comer in harnessing and mainstreaming its abundant and 
highly skilled population into national development framework. But even in the absence of a 
coherent national framework, the Nigerian diaspora had been active in development by 
sending remittances and engaging in hometown projects (Van Hear et al 2004). A study by 
Nwajuiba (2005) focusing on Southeastern region of Nigeria finds that its people are highly 
migrant, and that the factors that influence their choice of destination include economic, 
social, education, climactic, and language and that remittances constitute 50 percent of house-
hold expenditure. Remittances rose from under US$2.3 in 2004 to US$ 6.5billion in 2005 and 
had been on the rise. In a study by Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2006), focusing on the UK-
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Nigeria remittances corridor, they conclude that both recorded and unrecorded remittances to 
Nigeria must be around US$ 5 billion.  
De Haas (2006:15); Hagher (2011) contend that Nigeria’s migration agenda has been 
the prevention of emigration rather than mainstreaming migration and remittances in its 
development strategy. According to Afolayan et al (2009:69): 
For a long time, the government of Nigeria   maintained a 
laissez-faire attitude towards migration. This was apparent in 
both the 1988 and 2004 national policy on population, which 
made casual reference to migration. The 2004 national policy 
on population, for example, mentions that the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs collects data on international migration and 
transmits them to the National Population Commission for 
analysis; but this is the only reference to migration.  
 
It was only recently that migration and Nigerian Diaspora were factored into the 
country’s development agenda. De Haas (2006); Hagher (2011) attribute the factors that 
contributed to the new policy direction to formal re-introduction of democracy in 1999; 
increasing freedom of speech; the success story of other states such as India and China, 
amongst others in incorporating the diaspora in its development models; the international 
sanctions against Nigeria and the shuttle diplomacy of former President Obasanjo, which 
yielded insights into the potentials of the Nigerian diaspora. 
The launch of the Presidential Dialogue in 2002 with Nigerians abroad signposted the 
change in policy orientation towards engaging the diaspora in national development. 
Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) drew a link between democratisation 
and economic growth on the one hand and the role of emigrants and donors in national 
economic development on other hand (De Haas 2006:16). The concrete steps taken by the 
Nigerian state was the establishment of an organisation named Nigerians in the Diaspora 
Organisation (NIDO) and the Nigerian National Volunteer Services (NNVS) as well as the 
creation and appointment of a Special Assistant to the President on Nigerians in the Diaspora 
(De Haas 2006; African Diaspora Policy Centre 2011; Hagher 2011). The Nigerian 
government’s economic reform document called the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS) recognised the potentials of Nigerian diaspora as agent of 
development and the centrality of appropriate incentives in inducing them to invest at home. 
It avers,  
If appropriate incentives are in place, the brain drain of 
Nigerians could be turned into a brain gain - through increased 
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remittances, technology transfer, and even return of capital 
flight (which could repatriate up to $2-$5 billion a year). In 
other words, there are ample opportunities to jump-start faster 
growth - if the right strategy can be crafted and implemented 
(NNPC 2004: 12-13). 
 
According to NNPC (2004), the programme of development under NEEDS for the 
period 2003-2007 was estimated to cost US $4.5 billion. The bulk of the money was expected 
to be sourced from outside Nigeria through overseas development assistance in the form of 
grants, loans and technical assistance and investments by the Nigerian diaspora. It projected 
that increasing number of Nigerians in the diaspora was willing to return and contribute to the 
Nigerian economy and that the efforts of government would be geared towards attracting and 
inducing both Nigerian and African diasporas to invest in Nigeria (NNPC 2004). 
Despite the policy initiatives by the Nigerian state to transform brain drain to brain 
gain, there is nothing much on the ground to suggest serious progress. African Diaspora 
Policy Centre (2011:15) attributes the underlying causes to policy reversals and 
inconsistencies. Other factors have been outlined as follows: 
Many of the policy measures on the Diaspora adopted by the 
various governments appear not to be based on empirical 
knowledge and research on the complexities of migration and 
development. As a result, many of the activities that are 
designed to mainstream the initiatives of the Diaspora into the 
development process are very good on paper, but translating 
them into reality through effective implementation has 
remained difficult to accomplish.       
                           
Brain drain has had far-reaching effects on all sectors of the Nigerian economy 
through the emigration of vital human resources required to power development. Thus, such 
key areas as health, education, investment, technology development and so on lack the 
requisite manpower to man them.  
Significant economic growth in any country hinges on deliberate investment in its human 
capital. Otu and Adenuga (2006:2) contend that no country has achieved sustained economic 
development without substantial investment in human capital. Human capital, therefore, is at 
the epicentre of national economic growth and development. As observed by Otu and 
Adenuga (2006:2-3): 
People are assets - in fact, a country’s most valuable assets. It is 
essential for human development that these assets be deployed 
sensibly. A defective incentive system can result in a waste of 
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human resources and often, too, in a higher incidence of 
poverty and greater inequality in the distribution of income. It 
is not enough to use existing resources wisely, we must also 
add to the existing resources through human capital formation.  
 
Human capital formation is characterised by the enhancement of people’s skills, 
knowledge, productivity, creativity and inventiveness. These factors, aforementioned, assist 
the people, indeed empower them to identify their own priorities and implement programmes 
and projects of direct benefit to them and the country. The collective deployment of the 
people’s potentials translates to economic growth and development. The development 
trajectories of Southeast Asian countries bear testimonies to the indispensability of human 
capital development in railroading the economy onto the tracks of development. As Balaam 
and Veseth (2005:342) note: 
The combined impact of investment strategies in education and 
job training in the NICs [newly industrializing countries] has 
resulted in a quality labour force, creating increased economic 
efficiency, industrial flexibility, and greater economic equality. 
Government initiatives in reducing the illiteracy rate and 
providing adequate access to job training are evident in 
comparatively high enrolment rates and government investment 
in creating an educated and skilled workforce. The important 
point here is not that government expenditures on education 
have resulted in economic development. Rather, in a number of 
NICs, the emphasis on education has led to the growth of 
literate and skilled work force, which has been essential to the 
success of the industrial and investment policies and has 
promoted growth in productivity. 
 
Nigeria did not seem to have evolved a framework for the harnessing of its human 
capital. The exemplification of this was the dearth of policies concerned with deliberate and 
sustained human capital development. Otu and Adenuga (2006) contend that planning in 
Nigeria was devoid of official consideration of the importance of human capital in the 
development process. What preoccupied planners was the accumulation of physical capital 
for rapid growth and development. But capital alone cannot transform a society. Soyode 
(1983) opines that even where capital is adequate, the absence of adequate supply of 
manpower leads to stunted development. The mindset of Nigerian development planners, 
prior to and in the years following independence in 1960, was that a major inhibitor to 
Nigeria’s economic development was dearth of capital. Therefore efforts were geared 
towards tackling capital shortage which was identified as the major constraint to 
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development. Soyode (1983:48) observes that “when machines and equipment have been put 
together to facilitate a process, the productive capacity is ‘enfeebled’ when there is shortage 
of personnel to execute plans, use, maintain and repair equipment and machinery, as well as 
shortage of supervisory staff”. 
With the exponential upsurge in Nigeria’s earning from the “oil boom” in the 1970s, 
capital was no longer the issue. According to Soyode (1983), the development objectives of 
the various regimes could not be achieved because of inadequate manpower whose 
competencies were doubtful. Lack of adequate local manpower to meet the development 
challenges in the 1970s and 1980s was evident in the preponderance of expatriates in the 
different projects that were executed in the country then. Soyode (1983) observes that 
expatriates accounted for 40 percent of technical officers and 100 percent of engineering 
corps in the construction of Kaduna Township Road projects. Similar dominance of 
expatriates   in projects all over the country was recorded. As Soyode (1983:49) put it, “in 
short, in the construction of roads and bridges, Nigerians dominate the unskilled labour and 
artisan grades of manpower while expatriates dominate the engineering corps and form a 
substantial proportion of the technical officers”. 
A country which is desirous of developing must have an appropriate mix of 
manpower from high-level to low-level and anything in-between. Harbison appreciated this 
when he states that: 
... a country which is unable to develop its human resources, 
cannot build anything else whether it be a modern political 
system, a sense of national unity or a prosperous economy, 
where there is disagreement is where the emphasis should be 
placed: widespread literacy; high-level manpower; or middle-
level manpower or the appropriate mix (cited in Soyode 
1983:49). 
 
Most countries pursue a simultaneous development of all classes of labour in order to 
meet the demands of wide spectrum developmental objectives. The Nigerian government 
through the Third Development Plan (1975-80) embarked on massive education and 
manpower development. Usoro (1983:141) chronicles it thus: 
The rate of progress made in education within the last two 
decades remains one of the most outstanding since 
independence. In primary, secondary, technical, teacher 
training and university level education the incredible surge in 
the number of institutions established and in enrolment 
illustrates the desire of successive administrations to satisfy the 
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nation’s yearning for qualified manpower in various fields of 
learning.  
 
There was astronomical surge in the number of schools as well as enrolment (Usoro 
1983; Otu and Adenuga 2006). The Nigerian Government introduced the universal primary 
education (UPE) in 1976 which positively affected primary education in terms of enrolment 
and number of schools. For instance, the number of primary schools rose from 21,223 in 
1975/76 to 37,467 in 1979/80. Also enrolment shot up from 5 million to 12 million during the 
same period (Usoro 1983). There was also a multiplier effect on both post-primary and 
tertiary education: for tertiary institutions, the number rose from two in 1960 to thirteen in 
1980 and so was the enrolment which rose from a little over 400 to over 57,000 students in 
1980 (Usoro 1983; Otu and Adenuga 2006). Since then there has been a continuous 
increment in both the number of schools and enrolment statistics. As at 2004 there were 
65,627 primary schools, 13,333 post-primary schools and 215 tertiary institutions covering 
polytechnics, colleges of technology, colleges of education and universities in Nigeria. For 
enrolment, about 2.8 million pupils were in primary schools, 7 million in post-primary 
schools and 6.7 million in the tertiary institutions (Otu and Adenuga 2006). 
The development need in Nigeria was such that the manpower development embarked 
upon by the different levels of educational institutions was immediately mopped up by the 
economy. As Balogun et al (2003:222) opine, “in the 1960s and 1970s, the Nigerian economy 
provided jobs for its teeming population and absorbed considerable imported labour in the 
scientific sectors. The wage rate compared favourably with international standards and there 
was relative industrial peace in most industry sub-groups”.  
A corollary to this state of affairs was that very few people were below the poverty 
line as the Nigerian economy was robustly productive resulting in the agricultural, industrial 
and public sectors absorbing most of the labour force. However, from the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the Nigerian economy began to have problems which made it impossible for it to 
continue to provide for its teeming population. The forces that underpinned the reversal in 
Nigeria’s economy were both internal and international. The internal forces included: a 
combination of poor domestic economic policies, corrupt leadership, monocultural economic 
base, and deteriorating external terms of trade (World Bank 1995:26; Shah 2001). The 
international forces have been identified to include: the oil shocks, world economic recession, 
deteriorating terms of global trade, debt overhang and macroeconomic imbalances and 
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skewed international economic system (CBN Research Department 2003; Spero 1977:148-
149; Nweke 1985:1-19; De Vries 1987:208; Payer 1989:7-16; Toyo 2002:527). 
The response of the Nigerian government to the deteriorating economic situation was 
introduction of a bouquet of economic reforms, notably, the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) and its conditionalities (Economic and Statistical Review 1996: 1; Offiong 
2001:232-233). Balogun et al (2003) trace the precipitating factor to the manpower crisis in 
Nigeria to SAP especially the implementation of currency devaluation. As they put it: 
A major consequence of the rapid depreciation of the naira was 
the sharp rise in the general price level, leading to a significant 
decline in real wages. The low wage in turn fuelled a 
weakening purchasing power of wage earners and declining 
aggregate demand. Consequently, industries started to 
accumulate unintended inventories and, as rational economic 
agents, the manufacturing firms started to rationalize their 
workforce. In the public sector, an embargo was placed on 
employment... (Balogun et al 2003:222-223). 
 
SAP had far-reaching effect on every aspect of the Nigerian system as it represented a 
watershed in human capital deterioration in Nigeria. The institutions involved in human 
capital development were sucked into the eddy of crisis that enveloped the government. With 
dwindling resources, government could not meet the obligations of funding. The effect of this 
economic crisis was overwhelmingly negative. Yaqub (2007:2) notes, “the consequence of 
this development led to the beginning of the worst aspects of the phenomenon of brain drain 
whose impact has been with the universities... .” 
The health sector was amongst the sectors worst hit by the unabated depletion of 
Nigeria’s high quality human resources. Nigerian health professionals, in deference to the 
SAP-instigated contractions in the economy left the country in droves. The beneficiaries of 
this human capital flight out of Nigeria were the developed countries and the oil-rich states of 
the Middle East (Mbanefoh 2007:4). And, of course, the losers are the Nigerian people who 
are denied the services of these professionals. The Nigerian predicament is representative of 
the African predicament in terms of dearth of health professionals because of their mass 
emigration to the developed countries. As Mbanefoh (2007:3) observes,  
… the health status of the continent has been low compared to 
other continents of the world. For instance, going by the 
recommendation of the World Health Organization (WHO) of 
one doctor per a population of 5,000 people, about 10 Africa 




 The Nigerian scenario is not any better considering the strong current of its migratory 
flows. The depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals even affected the capacity 
of Nigeria’s health institutions to produce qualified health personnel. In the University 
College Hospital (UCH) Ibadan, the Department of Surgery which had, prior to that time, 23 
lecturers and consultants in 1984 was left with only five by April 1989 and consequently 
student intake fell from 279 to 124 in the corresponding period (Mbanefoh 2007:4). 
 The state of Nigeria’s health sector is dismal. Nigeria is listed among 36 African 
countries categorised as having critical shortage of human service providers for efficient 
health care delivery (World Health Report 2006:12-13; http://www.who.int/workforce 
alliance/countries/57crisiscountries.pdf). The dismalness is exemplified by health indices. As 
Uneke et al (2008) have pointed out, “life expectancy dropped from 53.8 for females and 52.6 
years for males in 1991 to 48.2 years for female and 46.8 for males in 2000. Both the infant 
mortality (IMR) and maternal mortality rate (MMR) represented one of the highest around 
the world: while the IMR rose from 87.2 per 1000 live births in 1990 to 105 in 1999; the 
MMR was 800 per 100,000 prompting the World Health Report of 2000, to rank the country 
187 in the world. Uneke et al (2008) attribute the sorry state of Nigeria’s health care delivery 
system to acute shortage of health professionals. Yahya (2006:23) contends that: 
In the case of Nigeria’s health sector, recurrent expenditure for 
the payment of salaries, consumables such as medicines and 
disposable materials and the maintenance of health facilities 
and equipment were drastically reduced as a result of low 
allocations… . Corrupt practices continue to erode the quality 
of primary health care, amongst other important public 
services. This general decline in primary health care systems 
has had a number of impacts on Nigeria’s capacity to sustain 
immunization services.  
 
Uneke at al (2008) also identify factors driving human resource challenges in the 
health sector as comprising: (a) insufficiently resourced and neglected health systems; (b) 
poor human resources planning and management practices and structures; (c) unsatisfactory 
working conditions characterised by heavy workloads, lack of professional autonomy, poor 
supervision and support, long working hours, unsafe workplaces, inadequate career structure, 
poor remuneration package, poor access to needed supplies, tools and information and limited 
or no access to professional development opportunities; (d) internal and international 
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migration of health workers. World Health Report (2006:xvii) schematically represents the 
forces that drive health care thus: 
 
Figure 1: Forces Driving the Workforce 
  














Source: World Health Report 2006:xvii 
The overall effect is the rolling back of previous gains made in the health sector as 
these various factors act as push factors that drive Nigeria’s qualified health personnel into 
the embrace of the developing countries’ health system (Yahya 2006:23). The inequality that 
characterises the modern world system is reflected in the distribution of health workers as 
well as the nature of health care delivery system in the developed and developing countries. 
As the World Health Report (2006:8) captures it: “health workers are distributed unevenly. 
Countries with the lowest relative need have the highest numbers of health workers, while 
those with the greatest burden of diseases must make do with a much smaller health 
workforce”. This is a product of brain drain and the implication is that the health crisis that 
characterises developing countries especially African countries will continue to exacerbate as 
long as there is brain drain. Anekwe (2003) considers brain drain a worrisome phenomenon 
as it erodes university-educated manpower which constitutes the engine room of the 
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stand in for lost human capital which is critical for quality healthcare delivery. The effect of 
lost human capital has been captured by Newsday Editorial in the following words: 
If you consider that poor Africa with 1/7 of the world 
population has about 28 percent of the global disease burden 
and yet it has just a mere 1.3 percent of the total world health 
force to cope with this huge burden, then it is not surprising 
that the continent is the sickest place in the whole world... . The 
result is that every year, millions of Africans, especially 
children die from diseases that elsewhere have long been 




It is estimated that the percentage increase required by African countries to shore up 
its stock of health workers (estimated to be 590,198 as at 2006) was 139 percent (World 
Health Report 2006:13). Shoring up the health worker needs of Nigeria is not a simple matter 
as it involves two issues: one, enormous capital outlays that are simply unavailable; and two, 
continued pressures from the developed countries for health professionals. The internal needs 
of the UK National Health Service for expansion have maintained opportunities which poorly 
paid and unmotivated professional health workers form Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa find 
irresistible (De Haas 2006). For the capital outlay needed to provide the requisite manpower 
for the health sector, World Health Report (2006:13) avers:  
Making up the shortfall through training requires a significant 
investment. Assuming very rapid scaling up in which all the 
training is completed by 2015, the annual training costs range 
from a low of US$ 1.6 million per country per year to almost 
US$ 2 billion in a large country like India. … Financing it 
would require health expenditures to increase by US$ 2.80 per 
person annually in the average country…  . 
 
 The strong resurgence in the incidence of communicable and non-communicable 
diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria as well as the seemingly intractable HIV/AIDS 
epidemic has increased the burden of diseases on the healthcare delivery system of Nigeria 
and other African countries. Dovlo (2004:2) contends that the economic difficulties of the 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa which manifest in low funding and consequent deterioration 
of health infrastructure laid the foundation for the negativities that characterise the healthcare 
delivery system. One of such effects was the erosion of the gains made earlier in terms of 
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rolling back diseases as exemplified by reduction in life expectancy in seventeen out of forty 
eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa between 1981 and 1999 (Dovlo 2004:2). 
 Despite the recognition of the acute manpower crisis in Nigeria’s health sector and 
that of other African states, the developed countries have continued to suck available trained 
health professionals out of Africa to satisfy their immediate and future needs. The loss to 
Nigeria is gain to the developed countries. For instance, while the erosion of Nigeria’s 
qualified health professionals created distortions that engendered crisis in the health sector, 
including low life expectancy, the infusion of foreign doctors in the developed countries 
strengthened their health sector and thus translated to higher life expectancy. The contrast 
speaks volumes: in 2003, Nigeria with a population of 122.8 million had 34,923 doctors and 
127, 580 nurses while the UK with a population of 58.8 million had 133,641 physicians and 
704, 332 nurses in 1997 (Nnamuchi 2007:23). It was estimated that England alone would 
need 25,000 more doctors by 2008 than it did in 1997 (Dovlo 2004:6). This projection 
implies that there is no likely abatement in the brain drain of health professionals in the short- 
or medium-run. In 2003, 1,248 Nigerian doctors were granted full registration with additional 
324 and 350 doctors granted specialist and limited registration rights respectively. Also in 
2002, 1,501 work permits were issued to Nigerian nurses (Dovlo 2004:7). 
 Two paradoxes appear to characterise Nigeria’s health sector: Nigeria increases its 
total health expenditure (THE) to boost both human and infrastructural facilities in its health 
sector only for these trained personnel to be lured out to service developed countries’ health 
sector. ODA from the developed countries to African economies surreptitiously reverts back 
to them through payment of salaries to their experts for technical assistance. Quoting World 
Bank sources, Emeagwali (2009:3) informs that in a particular year while 70,000 skilled 
Africans emigrated, about 100,000 skilled expatriates were brought in as replacement with 
emoluments higher than both prevailing local and international rates. The sustained depletion 
of health professionals created craters that spawned crisis in their health sector. To bridge 
these craters and resolve the health crisis, it was contended that increased financing was 
required (World Health Report 2006:13). Both the OECD and African countries have striven 
to increase their ODA and total health expenditure respectively. As the Global Fund (2010:4) 
elaborates: 
In the last decade, total net official development assistance 
from the OECD/DAC countries has been increasing. Official 
development assistance flows reached their highest level ever at 
US$ 121.5 billion in 2008, representing 0.31 percent of 
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members’ combined gross national income (GNI). This was a 
significant increase of over 126 percent from the $53.7 billion 
(representing 0.22 percent of GNI) provided in 2000. 
 
 Also Nigeria’s THE has been on the increase: it rose from N157.081 million in 1998 
to N976.687 million in 2005 (NHA 2005:26; 2009:16). But it would appear that the accruing 
benefits in the increment of the funding of the health sector ultimately serve the interest of the 
developed countries as Africa, especially Nigeria serves as their feeder zone. As Emeagwali 
(2009:2-3) contends, “because a significant percentage of African doctors and nurses practice 
in US hospitals, we can reasonably conclude that African medical schools serve American 
people and not African people. 
 THE comprises the total funding in the health sector. Health funding in Nigeria 
involves the government (Federal, State and Local Governments), health insurance (social 
and private), external funding and private out-of-pocket spending (AHWO 2008:20). 
Healthcare funding covers curative, preventive and rehabilitative services. The three tiers of 
government (that is, the Federal, State and Local Government) handle different layers of the 
healthcare delivery system even though there could be an overlap. This is so because health is 
on the concurrent list of the Nigerian Constitution. As such, “each level of Government 
budgets for its own responsibility of health care service delivery. The Federal Government 
handles tertiary health care services, the State Governments handle secondary health care 
services, and the Local Governments handle primary health care services delivery” (AHWO 
2008:20). 
 The core global initiative for development which is the Millennium Development 
Goals MDGs) framework has three major healthcare issues as its cardinal objectives. The 
MDGs denote international framework for development which was evolved by world leaders 
to address the development challenges of the developing countries. The MDGs framework 
consists of eight goals, the achievement of which would translate to development. These 
goals are: 
i) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 
ii) Achieve universal primary education; 
iii) Promote gender equality and empower women; 
iv) Reduce child mortality;  
v) Improve maternal health; 
vi) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
vii) Ensure environmental sustainability; 
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viii) Develop a global partnership for development (World Development Report 
2004:2).  
Goals 4, 5 and 6 which deal with the reduction of child mortality, the improvement of 
maternal health and the combating of AIDS, malaria and other diseases respectively have 
proved difficult to actualise by Nigeria since the commencement of the implementation of 
MDGs in Nigeria in 2000 (Abani, Igbuzor and Moru 2005:237). The data in all the health-
related goals show either stagnancy or worsening conditions. Since 2004, Nigerian 
government has been evaluating progress in the trajectory of the MDGs in the country. The 
midpoint evaluation of the progress of Nigeria towards the actualisation of MDGs showed 
deterioration in the infant mortality rate which actually rose from 81 per 1000 live births in 
year 2000 to 110 per 1000 live births in 2005/2006 which is farther away from the global 
target of 30 per 1000 live births in 2015. Under-five mortality rate also increased from 184 
per 1000 live births in 2000 to 201 per 1000 live births in 2007 (FGN 2008:7-8). The same  
fate enveloped the goal of improving maternal health as “approximately two thirds of all 
Nigerian women and three quarters of rural women deliver outside of health facilities and 
without medically-skilled attendants present” (FGN 2008:9). Despite progress recorded in 
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases, the prospect of meeting the 
2015 MDGs targets is categorised as slow (FGN 2008:84-85). Emeagwali (2009) attributes 
the crisis in the health sector of African countries to brain drain of health professionals. 
Contrary to the position of pro-migration scholars about the compensatory role of 
remittances, Emeagwali (2009:2) contends that money alone cannot eliminate poverty or 
bring about good health or heal the sick in the absence of qualified health professionals. The 
erosion of qualified health professionals from developing countries is not only akin to 
perverse subsidy but also depicts fatal flows that enfeeble the health system as well as 
threaten the corporate survival of the entire system (World Health Report 2006:101). 
Schrecker and Labonte (2004:410) contend that: 
... the costs of health professionals’ emigration are far greater 
than just the direct costs of their training; they also include the 
reduced ability of health systems in the country of origin to 
deliver services and reductions in training and research 
capacity, both of which undermine long-term domestic 
economic and social development. 
 
 Nigeria is estimated to have the largest stocks of health professionals and only 
comparable to Egypt and South Africa. AHWO (2008:21) informs that “in 2005, there were 
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about 39,210 doctors and 124,629 nurses registered in the country, which translates into 
about 39 doctors and 124 nurses per 100,000 population as compared to the Sub-Sahara 
African average of 15 doctors and 72 nurses per 100,000 population”. As it is, Nigeria’s 
reputed large stocks of qualified health professionals tend to serve the developed countries 
than its own domestic healthcare challenges. Yahya (2006:23-24) avers that Nigeria’s 
vaccination schedule against polio, tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), tuberculosis, 
measles, cerebro-spinal meningitis, diphtheria, hepatitis-B and yellow fever has not been 
effective: up to 200,000 children die each year from vaccine-preventable diseases. It was part 
of the bid to narrow the figure that led to the recruitment of child-vaccinators to assist in the 
administration of oral polio vaccine (OPV) in Bauchi, Kaduna and Kano states. According to 
the World Health Report (2006:99):  
It appears that doctors trained in sub-Saharan Africa and 
working in OECD countries represent close to one quarter 
(23%) of the current doctor workforce in those source 
countries, ranging from as low as 3% in Cameroon to as high as 
37% in South Africa. Nurses and midwives trained in sub-
Saharan Africa and working in OECD countries represent one 
twentieth (5%) of the current workforce but with an extremely 
wide range from as low as 0.1% in Uganda to as high as 34% in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Nigeria’s health policy is embodied in the National Health Policy and Strategy to 
Achieve Health for All Nigerians which was introduced in 1988 and revised in 2004. The 
National Health Policy (NHP) envisaged to address holistically, the challenges that inhibit 
quality healthcare delivery. Lambo (2004:iv) describes it as representing:  
the collective will of the governments and people of this 
country to provide a comprehensive health care system that is 
based on primary health care. It describes the goals, structure, 
strategy and policy direction of the health care delivery system 
in Nigeria. It defines the roles and responsibilities of the three 
tiers of government without neglecting the non-governmental 
actors. Its long-term goal is to provide the entire population 
with adequate access not only to primary health care but also to 
secondary and tertiary services through a well-functioning 
referral system. 
 
As elaborate, detailed and updated as the Revised National Health Policy 2004 was, it 
did not properly recognise brain drain as a cardinal problem and major cause of health crisis 
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in Nigeria. Brain drain featured only twice in the document and was only mentioned in the 
following connection:  
i) Recruitment agencies for health services in other 
countries shall register with the Federal Ministry of 
Health (FMOH) and operate within the provisions of the 
memoranda of understanding with the FMOH; [and], 
 
ii) The Ministries of Health shall create and sustain a 
conducive working environment for the motivation and 
retention of human resources for health care delivery, 
while deliberate efforts shall be made to offer additional 
incentives to encourage skilled Nigerians working 
abroad to return and take up employment in Nigeria’s 
National Health Care System (The Revised National 
Health policy 2004:20). 
 
Nnamuchi (2007:6) recognises that despite lofty government policies to revamp 
Nigeria’s health sector in terms of primary health care (PHC) initiative, national health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and international fund schemes such as the US$131 million Dutch 
Insurance Health Fund (IHF), the realisation of healthcare delivery goals is hampered by lack 
of coordinated response to critical health sector needs. What this implies is that efficient 
healthcare system is dependent on the availability of qualified personnel to drive both the 
process and the system. The basis for the position of the revised National Health policy 
(2004:20) with regard to the place of brain drain in the health sector crisis is flawed and this 
flawed understanding underpinned its lack of strategy to contain it. Contrary to the 
assumption that the recruitment of Nigerian health professionals would be carried out through 
recruitment agencies and host country governments, recruitment was often facilitated through 
personal contacts and lotteries organised by the developed countries thus circumventing 
institutional requirements for brain drain. Nnamuchi (2007:22-23) observes that “this is 
hardly surprising as there is no incentive for these countries to toe the government line”. 
One of the major expectations of brain drain is the possibility of reverse-migration 
with attendant influx of foreign capital as well as diaspora-led investment initiatives. This 
mindset informed the delineation of the diaspora as a reserved army of opportunities. As 
Soludo (2006) contends, 
 
It is estimated that about 17 million Nigerians are in Diaspora, 
and currently remit about US$4 billion in remittances per 
annum. It is also estimated that there are tens of billions of 
dollars of Nigerians’ wealth abroad. If we recall that about 50 
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percent of the FDI inflows into China in the last two decades 
was actually from ethnic Chinese in Diaspora, it could be 
appreciated what the potentials hold for Nigeria. 
 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to investments made to create enterprises 
abroad or acquire substantial stakes in existing enterprises by foreign owners outside their 
countries. Aremu (2005:2) argues that: 
 
As the internationalization of production and consumption 
becomes a prominent feature of today’s global economy due to 
the TNCs’[Transnational corporations] global operations, more 
firms than ever (in more industries and in more countries) are 
networking their economic activities in the form of FDI. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was considerable reservation and mistrust on the part of 
governments of many developing countries about the importance of FDI in their overall 
economic development programme (Khor 2001). This distrust was fuelled by the fear that 
foreign capital would be used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the 
newly independent countries of the world thereby converting them to neo-colonial states 
(Nkrumah 1968). But starting from the 1980s there was a significant shift of perspectives in 
many developing countries towards FDI. Three factors are identifiable as spawning this shift: 
the economic crisis that engulfed the majority of these countries including Nigeria; the 
debilitating external debt; and the growing importance of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank with their orthodoxy on ingredients of economic development. As 
noted by Khor (2001), the favourable disposition of developing countries to FDI was swayed 
by a new orthodoxy which held that as a form of foreign capital FDIs are superior to loans 
because rather than land the host country in a debt crisis it would serve as a panacea for 
removing obstacles to development. 
In sundry reform packages designed for Third World countries by the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), FDI has been particularly identified as vitally important. Indeed, 
it is eulogized as a necessary condition for economic growth and development (Yakub 2003). 
It is assumed that it facilitates transfer of financial resources for investment in the domestic 
economy and enhances the acquisition of modern technology, managerial skills and 
efficiency in production and distribution (Ebajemito et al 2004; Oyeranti 2003; Englama et al 
2004; Aremu 2005; Borensztein et al 1998).  
Yauri (2006) has attributed the unpredictability of autonomous FDI flows as a major 
difficulty in identifying, with any degree of specificity, the determinants of FDI flows. But 
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Banga (2003); Yauri (2006) identify such economic fundamentals as large market size, low 
labour cost and high productivity, availability of high skill levels, lower external debt and the 
extent or state of electricity, openness of the host country, political risks and social factors in 
the economy as being at the heart of considerations for FDI inflows.  
Yauri (2006) distinguishes between market-oriented and non-market seeking FDI. 
The difference between these two forms of FDI has been provided by Asiedu (2002). The 
main objective of market-seeking FDI is essentially to serve domestic markets. In other 
words, goods are produced in the host country and sold in the local market. Therefore, this 
type of FDI is driven by domestic demand such as large market and high income in the host 
country. Non-market seeking FDI, on the other hand, is characterised by the tendency of 
goods (intermediate and finished) to be produced in the host country but sold abroad (Asiedu 
2002). 
Ebajemito et al (2004) in their study of the FDI scenario in Nigeria identify high 
production costs, inadequate infrastructure, financial sector distress and pervasive corruption, 
high rate of crime, spiralling inflation, political instability and macroeconomic imbalances as 
the underlying hindrances to the influx of FDIs. They, therefore, recommend the pursuit of 
strong macroeconomic policies, which will incorporate the eradication of corruption, the 
improvement of infrastructure and the support and promotion of regional integration as 
strategies to strengthen the investment level of Nigeria. The diaspora was not factored into 
the equation at all in this work.  
The relevance of the diaspora in the overall argument about economic growth and 
development is most obvious in the disagreement amongst scholars about the real place of 
FDI as a mechanism for economic growth and development. The neo-classical scholars have 
argued that resource gaps in the economies of developing countries are at the base of their 
growth and development crisis. As panacea, they see FDI as possessing the necessary 
ingredients to wipe off these gaps and engender growth (Yauri 2006). 
FDI is essentially perceived as a way of filling in gaps between domestically available 
supplies of savings, foreign exchange, government revenue, technology and management 
skills, and the planned levels of these resources necessary to achieve developmental targets 
(Todaro 1981). A necessary consequence of FDI which has been identified by scholars as its 
high point is the combination of managerial ability, technical personnel and knowhow, 
administrative organization and innovation in products and production techniques which FDI 
presumably brings to the host country (Meier 1984; Odife 1989). 
77 
 
The study carried out by Docquier and Lodigiani (2006) hold that skilled migration 
stimulates aggregate FDI inflows in the origin country. According to Docquier (2006), these 
FDI inflows are achieved through reverse-migration: through the instrumentality of 
knowledge and financial capital, migrants’ efforts generate beneficial effects on productivity 
and technology diffusion. As the World Bank (2006:71) affirms, “industrial parks helped to 
lure entrepreneurs back to China. In Taiwan (China), the Hsinchu Industrial Park attracted 
more than 5,000 returning scientists in 2000 alone”. 
The negative perception of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and FDI especially 
the belief that these developmental agencies merely perpetuate the dependency relationship 
between developing and developed countries has dictated the slant of Third World 
scholarship about the best combination of strategies for Third World development. With 
regards to actual trends in FDI, Asobie (2007) has demonstrated that profit is the motivating 
factor and this is often earned through exploitative means such as detrimental equity share 
arrangement, obsolete technology and illegal repatriation of capital through over-invoicing. 
While not dismissing FDI, Asobie (2007) counsels that as basis for FDI, democratic ethos 
reflective of interests and desires of the vast majority of the populace should be the principal 
consideration. Coupled with this are proper schooling of negotiators with intending investors 
or MNCs on the overriding interests of the state, improvement of bargaining strategies and 
embarking on sustained efforts at methodically studying and initiating the production of 
modern industrial machines and equipment. A study by De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) 
confirms the “crowding out” effect of FDI on local entrepreneurship as well as the 
discouragement of the entry of new local entrepreneurs. 
Ratha, Mohapatra and Plaza (2008) recognise that official aid alone can never be 
adequate for funding efforts to accelerate economic growth, poverty alleviation and other 
MDGs in Africa. The private sources of finance are very important in shaping the trajectory 
of state development. As they contend: 
Ultimately the private sector will need to be the engine of 
growth and employment generation, and official aid efforts 
must catalyze innovation financing solutions for the private 
sector. It is important to stress that financing MDGs would 
require increasing the investment rate above the domestic 
saving rate, and bridging the financing gap with additional 




Beyond official and other traditional sources of external financing, there has been 
emphasis on the remittances from migrants. Remittances are regarded as veritable source of 
external financing owing to their continued percentage appreciation in overall framework of 
external financing. Indeed, Russell et al (1990) suggest that labour emigration and 
remittances from abroad have become increasingly crucial to the survival of communities in 
many developing countries as they not only satisfy subsistence needs but also bring increased 
investments, transfer of technology, skills and entrepreneurship. Generally, remittances to the 
developing countries have been on the increase. Workers’ remittances especially to Sub-
Sahara Africa more than doubled from US$4.6 billion in 2000 to US$10.3 billion in 2006 
(Ratha, Mohapatra and Plaza 2003).  
Since the 1980s the Nigerian economy has been characterised by major 
contradictions. These contradictions created the fodder upon which several reform packages 
fed. The structural adjustment programme (SAP) which was the most detailed and pervasive 
of the reform packages envisaged to boost the Nigerian economy by attracting FDI. Through 
a combination of strategies especially the devaluation of the Nigerian currency, it was hoped 
that the floodgate of FDI would be opened. Toyo (2002); Nwozor (2005) contend that the 
promise of unprecedented influx of FDI by SAP was essentially hyperbolic as the subsisting 
contradictions in the economy which SAP was unable to resolve constituted an albatross to 
international confidence which was necessary for FDI inflows. SAP deepened the economic 
woes of Nigeria and successive regimes grappled with its fallouts. Economic and Statistical 
Review (1996) avers that since the introduction of SAP in 1986, the Nigerian economy has 
witnessed many challenging macroeconomic problems, among which were rapidly 
deteriorating value of the Naira, high and negative rate of interest, high rate of inflation and 
fiscal imbalance.   
The vestiges of the failure of SAP and its FDI promise were still evident in the 
Nigerian economy when Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999. The Obasanjo 
government acknowledged the enormity of the socio-economic and political challenges 
facing the nation thus: 
... [we] inherited an economy with the following 
characteristics: declining capacity utilization in the real sector, 
poor performance of major infrastructural facilities, large 
budget deficit, rising level of unemployment and inflation. In 
addition, the economy had grave problems of import 
dependence, reliance in a single commodity (oil), weak 
industrial base, low level of agricultural production, weak 
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private sector, high external debt overhang, inefficient public 
utilities, low quality social services and an unacceptable rate of 
unemployment (Federal Ministry of Information, Nigeria 
Returns to Democracy 2000:128). 
 
Nigeria subscribes to the tenets of the Washington Consensus especially the 
liberalisation of inflows of FDI. Aremu (2005: 6-7) captures it thus, “Nigeria, like many other 
developing countries, has over the years been compelled to liberalise her financial and 
investment markets in line with the Ten Commandments of Washington Consensus with the 
hope that it will enhance sizeable amount of private capital inflow”. The economic reform 
formulated by the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) to address both the macroeconomic 
instability and the developmental challenges of Nigeria code-named NEEDS (National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy) laid serious emphasis on FDI. The 
four-pronged strategies of NEEDS are anchored on: reforming government and institutions; 
growing the private sector; implementing a social charter and value re-orientation (CBN 
Briefs 2004-2005). Nigeria’s PRSP, a precursor to NEEDS estimated that more than 2 
million Nigerians, mostly highly educated have emigrated to Europe and the US (NNPC 
2004). The recent trend in the volume of remittance inflows which rose to US$2.26 billion in 
2004 created interest amongst policy makers about the relevance of diaspora remittances in 
the overall developmental framework of Nigeria especially considering that ODA had been 
on the downward trend since 2002 (Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007:38).  
Essentially, political change towards democratization appeared to have spawned the 
policy shift that viewed international migration positively. De Haas (2006:16) points out that: 
The launch of the “presidential dialogue with Nigerians 
abroad” in 2002 marked this shift in policies. The presidential 
dialogue aims at incorporating the Nigerian Diaspora in 
national development policies. This also coincides with the 
stated willingness among the government to establish and 
reinforce links with Nigerian migrants as well as the numerous 
associations they have established abroad.  
  
Before this new policy thrust, international migration was a non-issue in Nigerian 
politics and no connection was made between migration and national development strategies 
in any form in the myriad policies on national development (De Haas 2006). The recognition 
of the importance of remittances led to the liberalisation of Nigeria’s financial market, thus 
making it possible to open foreign currency denominated accounts and the relaxation of rules 
in foreign exchange trade (Tomori and Adebiyi 2007). 
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Balaam and Veseth (2005) point out that diaspora networks have become an 
important agent in national development. Diaspora networks in high emigration countries 
have made great impact on national development - ranging from economic contributions in 
terms of diaspora investment; involvement in domestic political power contest like Mexico to 
financing civil war like in Sri Lanka and sundry terrorist sponsorships. Chinese diaspora has 
been exemplary in their involvement in state development. Balaam and Veseth (2005:371) 
note that: 
One of the chief beneficiaries of Chinese diaspora network 
connections is China itself. During the period of strong 
communist control of the Chinese economy, the focus of the 
diaspora network was on creating connections and 
opportunities for Chinese migrants outside of mainland China. 
As China has adopted more market-based economic reforms, 
however, a reverse flow of funds has been channelled through 
the diaspora network. Perhaps as much as 15 percent of 
“foreign” investment in China today comes from the diaspora. 
 
Easterly and Nyarko (2008) see brain drain positively and, therefore, stress that brain 
drain is good for Africa considering that  ideas and knowledge generated in the process 
propel the engine of national growth. As they put it, “this circulation of brains helps in the 
diffusion of knowledge which is precisely what is needed in our developing economies”. In 
its efforts to key into the potential benefits accruing from the diaspora, De Haas (2006:17) 
informs that the Nigerian government set up organizations, notable amongst them being the 
Nigeria in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) and the Nigeria National Volunteer Service 
(NNVS), to harness the diaspora and channel their energies towards the development of 
Nigeria through investments. De Haas (2006:17) further asserts, “it is unclear how NIDO and 
NNVS function in practice [as] no (independent) evaluations are available”. 
Oyeranti (2003) identifies factors responsible for the creation of enabling environment 
for FDI in developing countries as those emanating from structural reform programmes. The 
reforms led to progressive lowering of barriers to trade and foreign investments; the 
liberalisation of domestic financial markets and removal of restrictions on capital movements 
and the implementation of privatisation. The important thing to note about FDI is that both 
the investors and host countries benefit from it. Oyeranti (2003) has argued that certain 
factors underlay industrial countries’ quest for FDI namely, the search for higher returns and 
opportunities for risk diversification. Two key developments appeared to have firmly 
entrenched the quest of industrial countries to look outwardly.  First was competition and 
rising costs in domestic markets and second was the transformation of financial markets from 
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relatively insulated and regulated national markets to a more globally integrated market 
(Oyeranti 2003). These developments coincided with the monumental economic crisis that 
enveloped developing countries as well as the new orthodoxy of the IMF and World Bank 
about the importance of FDI as a major stimulus of economic growth and development. Thus, 
FDI became a focus of policy makers in low-income countries. Even though Nigeria has the 
potential to attract enormous FDI in all sectors of its economy, FDI flows have been mainly 
in the oil sector where the country derives over 90 percent of its export earnings (Yakub 
2005). 
The evident truth that the concentration of FDI in the oil sector has not done the 
country much good led Aremu (2005) to contend that FDI inflows to Nigeria lack the 
relevant ingredients that could help to integrate the economy into international production 
chains. This is despite the fact that the volume of FDI has been on the upward trend. Statistics 
show that FDI flows rose to an annual average of N6, 407.1 million in 1986-92 and 
subsequently to N77, 500 million in 1993-98. Garba (2003:173) notes, “the increases appear 
to be very impressive. However, it is notable that the increases are (a) nominal and (b) naira 
denominated. Adjustment for inflation and exchange rate depreciation would indicate that the 
trend was anything but impressive”. 
Generally, the quality of FDI that Nigeria attracts is not commensurate with its 
potentials. This is despite the concerted efforts of the government to create and nurture the 
enabling environment for the thriving of investments. Garba (2003) attributes Nigeria’s 
inability to attract expected FDIs to the negative ranking of the country on many indices of 
risks, financial viability, governance and infrastructure development. Fabayo (2003) also 
notes that prior to 1993, Nigeria used a combination of infant industry protection, local 
content rules, FDI restrictions coupled with other restrictive policies to retard the contribution 
of FDI to gross capital formation but since 1993, the rapid loosening of controls and 
regulations on the activities of multinational corporations in Nigeria has helped to elevate 
FDI in the overall framework of capital formation.  
Through the instrumentality of NEEDS, the government put in place a number of 
mechanisms to create the enabling environment for the attraction of FDI. One was the 
contraction of, and indeed the relinquishing of, government involvement in the commanding 
heights of the economy and the concession of more space to the private sector. Obviously, 
this was a departure from the economic development model of Nigeria. Since independence, 
Nigeria had leaned towards the public sector-led growth perspective. Successive regimes 
believed that the quickest way to industrialise and achieve fast economic growth was for the 
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government to be a major player in economic activities (Ebo 2004:25). The economic crisis 
that characterised the Nigerian economy and the conditionalities imposed by the IFIs induced 
a rethinking of this development strategy. NEEDS was principally formulated to usher the 
Nigerian economy into the era of private sector-led growth and development through 
privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation and infrastructural development. Two was the 
creation of institutional frameworks to generate business opportunities. And three was the 
recognition of the diaspora as serious catalytic agents for private investments. NEEDS 
recognised the potentials of the Nigerian diaspora as the vanguard of Nigeria’s FDI drive as 
well as investors. It states clearly that: 
 
With better management of the economy and the restoration of 
investor confidence, a higher level of investment inflow is 
expected, especially in view of the high returns that investment 
in Nigeria offers.  About $1.5 billion a year is expected to be 
attracted into manufacturing, steel, construction, solid minerals, 
and large-scale farming over the period. Efforts will be made to 
attract investment from wealthy Nigerians at home and abroad, 
and strategies will be developed for inducing other Africans in 
the diaspora to invest in Nigeria (NNPC 2004:116) 
 
 A major defect in the study by Ebo (2004); Tule (2008) was their absolute silence on 
Nigerian diaspora and their likely contributions in the quest for private sector-led economic 
growth and development. 
Murat, Pistoresi and Rinaldi (2008) in their cliometric study of Italian diaspora and 
FDI, found a positive relationship between Italian Diaspora and attraction of FDI. They 
recognise Italians’ “strong-ties” relationship with their home country as a major factor in 
attracting FDI to Italy. The strong-ties relationship between Italian diaspora and Italy is 
underpinned by three factors, namely; one, the circular nature of the Italian emigration, with 
many returning home regularly thus maintaining enduring ties with families and towns of 
origin; two, the tendency of Italians living abroad to live in ethnic communities (little Italys) 
that maintained the integrity of their ethnic identity; and three, Italian government’s 
emigration policy which preserved the citizenship of Italians in the diaspora. Murat, Pistoresi 
and Rinaldi (2008:28) outline the effect of these strong ties between Italian diaspora and their 
country thus: 
The strong ties between the Italian diaspora and their homeland 
have also boosted inward FDI. In this case the mechanism at 
work was constituted mainly by the valuable information on 
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business opportunities in Italy that companies managed by 
emigrants utilized to invest in Italy from abroad. Moreover, the 
Italian citizenship has given them an additional advantage with 
respect to other potential foreign investors. 
 
This led Kuznetsov and Sabel (2005) to view migration from the prism of win-win for 
all countries. Ikenwilo (2007) has counselled that African government could create a better 
links with diaspora organisations, which could help to encourage qualified African health 
care professionals (among others) to identify with development of their countries of origin, 
especially if they are given a sense of belonging and responsibility in their various countries. 
Ketkar and Ratha (2007) have identified diaspora bonds as a veritable mechanism to 
tap into the earnings of diasporans for the development of their home countries. They 
conceptualise diaspora bonds as “a debt instrument issued by a country- or potentially; a sub-
sovereign entity or a private corporation – to raise financing from its overseas diaspora”. The 
study by Ketkar and Ratha (2007) examined the diaspora bonds in Israel and India – two 
countries that have had varying experiences with diaspora bonds. Israel since 1951 and India 
since 1991 have raised hard currency financing from their respective diasporans. According 
to Ketkar and Ratha (2007:3), “Bonds issued by the Development Corporation for Israel 
(DCI), established in 1951 to raise foreign exchange resources from the Jewish Diaspora, 
have totalled well over $25 billion. Diaspora bonds issued by the government-owned State 
Bank of India (SBI) have raised over $11 billion to date”. Diaspora bonds are particularly 
regarded by Israeli authorities as a stable source of overseas borrowing as well as an 
important mechanism for maintaining ties with diaspora Jewry. The importance of these 
bonds is underscored by its usage. According to Ketker and Ratha (2007:7), “Currently, Israel 
uses proceeds from bond sales to diaspora Jewry to finance major public sector projects such 
as desalination, construction of housing, and communication infrastructure”. 
The Indian experience is somewhat different from that of Israel. Ketkar and Ratha 
(2007:20) capture the difference thus: 
The government of Israel has nurtured this asset class [diaspora 
bonds] by offering a flexible menu of investment options to 
keep the Jewish diaspora engaged since 1951. The Indian 
authorities, in contrast, have used this instrument 
opportunistically to raise financing during times when they had 
difficulty in accessing international capital markets (for 




The point to be noted in the experiences of Israel and India, however, is that these 
countries actively tapped on the financial strength of their diasporas for development. 
Mahroum, Elridge and Daar (2006) argue that migration is not a one-way path but involves a 
dynamic process of networking and linkages. These linkages create brain circulation which is 
beneficial to every country – both the host and home countries. They contend that emigrants 
enhance the development of their countries through the instrumentality of knowledge and 
technology transfers as exemplified by the Hsinchu Science-based industrial Park in Taiwan 
(whose activities account for 10 percent of GDP in Taiwan. Since the return of Nigeria to 
civil rule in 1999, there have been concerted efforts by the Nigerian government to 
incorporate the diaspora into its developmental aspirations.  
Kuznetsov (2006) notes that members of the expatriate communities occupy vantage 
position in contributing to the development of their home countries. He identifies three 
resources that put them in that stead as: unusually high motivation to have a significant 
influence on the course of events; knowledge and expertise of both global opportunities and 
local particulars and financial resources to act on new opportunities (Kuznetsov 2006). In 
critical moments, the diaspora has served as an engine which motorised the consolidation of 
development. For instance, when Korean government-backed consortium failed to obtain key 
technologies from the US, it was the Korean diaspora in the US that provided the critically 
relevant technical knowledge. As Kuznetsov (2006:225) has elaborated: 
A small network of Koreans working for cutting-edge firms in 
the United States proved critical in identifying binding 
constraints and designing ways to obtain and transfer the 
necessary knowledge... . The contribution of these expatriates 
was neither reverse engineering nor industrial espionage. They 
helped identify critical constraints, ways to get around them 
and relevant technical knowledge in the United States. 
 
Extant academic and policy literature on remittances can be thematically categorised 
into four which delineate their thrust of argument and conclusion. These categories include:  
a. Analyses based on the raison d’être for remittances; 
b. Analyses preoccupied with issues relating to methods or avenues for remittances. 
Such analyses cover transfer channels, costs and policy options for reducing cost of 
remittances; 
c. Analyses of human capital emigration and their macroeconomic effects on both the 
host and home country.  
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d. Analyses of the impact of remittances on development in receiving countries.  
Remittances are associated with international migration. Asmellash (2006) describes 
remittances as “financial counterpart” to migration. There cannot be remittance inflows or 
outflows except there is international migration, that is, the dramatis personae have fulfilled 
certain conditions: the remitter has left his/her home country and settled elsewhere outside its 
shores, from where he or she sends money to certain people – the recipients who have 
remained in the home country. That is why Maumbe and Owei (2006:5) assert that “it is 
difficult to separate the subject of international migration from remittances because it is the 
Diaspora community that drives remittance economy”. Several factors have influenced and 
sustained the tendency to migrate. These include unsettling economic and political 
conditions; outbreak of man-made disaster such as wars, civil strife, terrorism and; natural 
catastrophes such as earthquake, droughts, floods and famine among others (Maumbe and 
Owei 2006). 
Taiwo (2007:20) contends that international migration “has the potential to contribute 
to sustainable development through remittances, skill transfer, investment, brain circulation 
and Diaspora networks. The most notable positive economic effect of migration is in 
remittances”. International migration (both voluntary and forced) is not new: it has always 
been part of human civilisation. However, what has changed, according to Economic 
Commission for Africa (2006:2), is “the increasing voluntary movement of both low-skill, 
low-wage workers and high-skill, high-wage workers from less developed countries to 
developed countries that is fuelled by the dynamics of globalization, in particular the 
structural needs of industrialized markets”. DFID (2006) has defined migrants as “people 
who, in an effort to improve their lives, move, for a temporary or permanent period, from 
their place of birth, and who do not necessarily enjoy the same rights and entitlements 
available to non-migrant individuals of that place” (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files 
/migration-policy-paper-draft.pdf). 
This definition appears restricted as it does not take cognizance of nor differentiates 
between voluntary and forced migration. By emphasizing movement from place of birth, it 
deals only with first line migrants and excludes their descendants. What this implies is that 
such descendants might not be categorised as immigrants, which is not the case as these still 
maintain links with their fathers’ relatives in developing countries. With reference to the US, 
Papademetriou and Terrazas (2009) have identified the composition categories of migrant 
flow as: lawful permanent residents (LPR), humanitarian migrants (HM) (including refugees 
and asylum seekers), unauthorised migrants, and temporary workers and students. Newland 
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and Patrick (2004:1) have observed that, “Migration does not always result in the long-term 
dispersal of a people; some migrants leave their home countries only temporarily, or 
assimilate into countries of settlement so completely that they lose their distinctive identity 
and ties to their homelands”. 
In other words, it is the recognition of the distinctive identity and ties to the homeland 
that spawns the ground for a Diaspora community. Diaspora communities maintain affinity 
with their home countries. This position is exemplified in G. Sheffer’s conceptualisation of 
Diaspora as “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries 
but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin – their 
homelands” (Cited in Newland and Patrick 2004:1). From its original meaning (derived from 
the Greek  word “diaspeirein” meaning “sow”, “scatter” as in the scattering of seed, and 
which for the Greeks meant the seeding of Greek colonies in distant land), the word Diaspora 
has mutated through conceptualisation as association with forced expulsion and dispersal 
with expectations of return, to its current meaning implying a settled community, rather than 
a group of temporary migrants with the intention and ability to return to their country of 
origin (Encarta Dictionary 2007; Newland Patrick 2004). 
Orozco (2006) conceptualises remittances as a portion of earnings a migrant sends to 
relatives back home. Tewolde (2005); Englama (2007); Taiwo (2007) provide a more 
extensive meaning of remittances. Remittances cover monetary and non-monetary items and 
goods or financial instruments transferred by international migrant workers living and 
working abroad to residents of the home economies or countries. In calculating remittances 
from international migrant workers, certain rules apply. According to Englama (2007:4) 
calculation of remittances is “limited to transfers made by workers who have stayed in 
foreign economies for at least one year while transfers from migrants that are self-employed 
are excluded”. Generally, a standardised meaning of remittance has been offered by the IMF 
in its Balance of Payments manual. The manual conceptualises remittance as having three 
components: workers’ remittances, compensation to employees and migrant transfers (Taiwo 
2007; Englama 2007). Workers remittances include goods and financial instruments 
transferred by migrants who reside and work in another country for more than one year; they 
are recorded under the current transfers in the current account of the balance of payments. 
Workers’ remittances could be in cash or in kind to resident households in the country of 
origin. Compensation to employees is records of remuneration for work done. It is part of the 
unilateral transfers account in the current account section of the balance of payments. 
Compensation to employees is regarded as credit item in the current account and is therefore 
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very helpful in partially offsetting the deficit in trade on merchandise and services. Migrant 
transfers are also regarded as workers’ remittances and comprise assets that migrants take 
with them when they move from one country to another. Migrant transfers are treated as 
capital transfer of financial assets as they move from one country to another and stay for 
more than one year. So, the remittance economy deals with the domestic economic value 
derived from proceeds earned by nationals or individuals working abroad and remitted to the 
home country (Maumbe and Owei 2006). 
Englama (2007); Asmellash (2006) have sub-classified remittances into three namely: 
financial remittances, social remittances and remittances-in-kind. Financial remittances cover 
the inflow of cash and financial products both through formal and informal channels. Formal 
channels are legally recognised means through which cash could be sent and received. 
Formal channels include banks and network of International MTOs. Many countries have 
also introduced Diaspora bond as part of its strategies to harness fund from the Diaspora. 
Social remittances are in the form of provision of social amenities in the local communities in 
the area of health, education and so on. It also includes the transfer and inculcation of values 
and norms that could transform the society for the better. A social remittance occurs when 
migrants communicate ideas intentionally to their home country in order to achieve reforms. 
Remittances-in-kind are goods that are sent from abroad to home countries. 
Remittances worldwide have been on the increase owing principally to the effects of 
globalisation and the increasing mobility of labour. Formal remittance flow worldwide in 
2007 was estimated at US$317.7 billion, signifying a leap from the 2006 figure of US$ 297.1 
billion (World Bank 2008:17). While Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2008) report that the 
estimated value of remittances to developing countries in 2007 was US$240 billion, Taiwo 
(2007) puts it at US$251. The difference notwithstanding, these figures paint a picture of 
developing countries’ dominance of worldwide remittances. There is agreement amongst 
scholars that the official figures posted as the trend of remittances do not represent the true 
picture of the general trend of remittances. Informal and unreported remittances play 
significant role in the remittance architecture. In 2007, informal and unreported remittances 
were estimated at US$86 billion (Taiwo 2007).  
In their study of the UK-Nigeria remittance corridor, Hernandez-Coss and Bun 
(2007:5) report that in 2004, the officially recorded flow from the UK to the developing 
countries was £2.3 billion or approximately US$4.42 billion. An estimated 10-15 percent of 
this amount (representing a remittance corridor value of between US$450 and $650 million) 
found its way to Nigeria. In spite of this enormous chunk of overall remittances, no special 
88 
 
framework was erected to harness these inflows and their multiplier benefits to the Nigerian 
economy. Money transfer transactions consisted mainly of cash-to-cash transfers through 
money transfer operators (MTOs), the expensive and lengthy account-to-account bank 
transfer and informal channels such as hand-to-hand transfers (Hernandez-Coss and Bun 
2007:22). There is no concrete evidence about the numerical strength of Nigerian migrants in 
the UK. Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007:8) estimate that even though there were about 
90,000 Nigerians living in the UK who had established a significant migrant community 
through several decades of settlement, yet this figure could not be true representative of the 
Nigerian migrant population as “research indicates that this figure may be higher and does 
not include the undocumented and UK citizens of Nigerian descent”. However, remittances 
have been flowing from the UK to recipients in Nigeria, Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007:8) 
identify Nigerian remittance senders to include “those who are UK citizens, those who have a 
‘right of abode’ or permanent residence, those who are in the UK on a temporary status such 
as a student or work visa, those who have illegal status because their visas are expired and 
those who are undocumented”. And there appeared to be a discernible remittance patterns 
amongst Nigerian migrants in the UK. At the top of motivations to send remittances to the 
home country amongst Nigerians was the cultural imperative of consanguineous 
philanthropism which is motorised by altruistic consideration of remittances as a means of 
providing economic support to recipients. While recognising the important role which culture 
plays in inducing remitters to send remittances to recipients in Nigeria, Hernandez-Coss and 
Bun (2007:8) implicate policy failure in the area of state welfare to the weak and the 
vulnerable thus, “since there are limited formal welfare systems in Nigeria, senders often feel 
obligated to provide for immediate family members as well as for extended family, friends 
and orphans”. 
In spite of the number of Nigerian migrants in the UK and their almost religious 
disposition towards sending remittances, informality rather than formality characterises the 
choice of channel for sending remittances. It is not that formal money transfer channels are 
lacking in the UK; indeed, they abound. There are approximately 1,000 money transfer 
operators (MTOs) involved in cash-to-cash transfers, in addition to other service providers 
such as banks, post services and card value transfers. But remitters tended to patronise 
informal transfer channels, that is, they sent money to the home country through people 
carrying cash, community and ethnic networks, trader networks, value transfers and bus 
couriers. Such factors as favourable foreign exchange rates, residency status of the sender and 
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limited knowledge of available remittance options constitute the main factors that encourage 
informality in remittances (Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007:13). 
Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007:37-38) have pointed out that notwithstanding that 
Nigeria receives about 65 percent of total official remittance inflows within Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) and 2 percent of formal global remittance flows, that high levels of poverty and 
disparity in income characterised its economic situation. Even more perplexing was that in 
the year 2001 when Nigeria was ranked 18th amongst top 25 remittance receiving countries in 
the world, about 70 percent of Nigerians were living below the international poverty line of 
US$1 a day. The work of Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007) did not make any serious effort to 
link (or delink) remittances to development or as an agent of poverty reduction beyond the 
general acknowledgement of the enormous in-pouring of remittances to Nigeria and their 
potentiality to spearhead development. 
Orozco and Millis (2007:3) in their study of the Nigeria-US remittance corridor which 
is reported to be the topmost remitting country in the world, report that “in the US, a single 
transfer company reports processing 125,000 transfers monthly to Nigeria”. In the absence of 
reliable data to underpin their study, Orozco and Millis (2007) evolve their own strategy to 
calculate and estimate remittance inflows. The formula they adopted was to estimate the total 
amount of money sent by migrants by relying on data from a re-estimation of the total 
Nigerian migrant population abroad and from information on the propensity of migrants to 
remit and on the amount and frequency of their remittances. According to Orozco and Millis 
(2007:4), “the results show US$4-5 billion sent to Nigeria, an amount relatively comparable 
to the flow the Central Bank [of Nigeria] estimates for 2007. This estimate serves as a 
baseline and reference for what could be flowing into the country from different regions”. 
Orozco and Millis (2007) indict Nigeria’s regulatory framework as being the main 
source limiting international foreign currency payments. Nigeria’s regulatory framework for 
money transfer is anchored on the narrow definition of authorised dealership which simply 
means licensed banks or authorised non-banking corporate organisations. For this reason, 
formal channel for remittances consists of banks acting as agents for international MTOs. On 
the US-Nigeria remittance corridor, a world of difference characterises the inbound (Nigeria) 
and outbound (US) sides of the corridor. While the US side of the corridor is characterised by 
competition which is “relatively diffuse and unclear”, the Nigerian side is characterised by 
monopoly of two MTOs through 24 banks. Orozco and Millis (2007:32) canvass the need to 
expand participation in the remittance market as “expanding competition lowers prices, 
improves service quality, reduces informality, and increases financial access”. 
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Although the work of Orozco and Millis (2007) shed light on the direction of 
remittances, the institutions that facilitate remittance and the relative volume of remittance 
especially from the US corridor, it did not attempt the exposition of linkages between these 
remittances and amelioration or otherwise of poverty. Indeed the methodology adopted by 
Orozco and Millis (2007:13) produced a survey result that “reflects the behaviour of higher –
income recipients rather than recipients as a whole”.  
Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2008) note that Africa is part and parcel of the rising global 
trend in remittance flows. According to them, “between 2000 and 2007, remittances to the 
continent increased by more than 141 percent, from US$11.2 billion to nearly US$27 billion 
(Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2008:2). Nigeria is not left out in the remittances boom: between 
2002 and 2009, Nigeria recorded an unprecedented growth in its remittances - remittances 
from Nigeria Diaspora leapt from US$1.35 billion in 2002 to US$6.46 billion in 2005 and 
then to US$19.99 billion in 2009 (Taiwo 2007; CBN 2007:228; 2009:268). The upsurge in 
the volume of remittances is driven by global expansion in information and communication 
technology (ICT). This global expansion in ICT provided the impetus to the remittance 
economy by providing the conducive technological environment and platform for MTOs, 
banks, post offices, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals to conduct 
commercial transactions between domestic and transnational communities (Maumbe and 
Owei 2006). Prior to the ICT revolution, remittances had depended on the inefficient means 
of money order, international postal order and telex messages. But now these means of 
remitting money have progressively inched into obsolescence. Maumbe and Owei (2006:14) 
observe that: 
In the civilized modern world, the internet, mobile phones and 
faxes are the frontier technology that will drive the growth of 
remittance economy. With mobile phones becoming standard 
gadget for all classes of citizens, its potential in combination 
with the internet and e-mail could fundamentally transform the 
drudgery previously associated with sending money to distant 
relatives. 
 
Several factors determine workers’ remittances to countries of origin. Certain scholars 
attribute the migrants’ pull to remit money to their countries of origin to the prevailing 
economic circumstance in the home country as well as political stability and consistency in 
government policies and financial intermediation (Wahba 1991). There are also moral 
considerations especially where the original factor that instigated migration emanated from 
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problems of economic and political instability or outbreak of man-made disasters such as 
wars and civil strife or natural catastrophes such as droughts, floods, famine and so on. 
Having migrated based on these factors, those who find themselves gainfully employed in 
foreign countries consider it morally binding not only to keep in touch (or close contact) with 
immediate family members, relatives and friends but also to contribute in alleviating their 
economic woes hence remittances (Maumbe and Owei 2006; Lucas and Stark 1985). Taiwo 
(2007) adds that remittances could be a direct or indirect reimbursement of earlier or past 
expenses such as schooling or cost directly related to migration or could be related to saving 
for the rainy day. In this case, remittances are more like an insurance deposit to guarantee life 
of ease when the remitter returns to the home country either on relocation or holidays. 
More (2005) identifies family ties as one of the factors that determine remittances. 
Because this link is permanent, financial market conditions which affect inflows like FDI do 
not affect the flow of remittances. Again, the extended family system in Africa expands the 
pool of beneficiaries of remittances. More (2005:2) observes that due to both the 
characteristic informality as well as polygamic orientation of African family ties, the number 
of recipient per sender is higher than in other areas, thus extending the relationship between 
families and remittances. More (2005); De Haas (2006); Orozco (2000) draw attention to the 
poor statistical information and the penchant of Africans to embrace informality in the course 
of remittances as veritable hindrance to precise knowledge of the extent of the effect of 
remittances on development. According to More (2005:4): 
A joint report prepared by the IMF and the World Bank 
indicates that formal remittances could represent up to 75% of 
those accounted at world level. These informal remittances 
often travel through paralegal systems, organized clandestinely 
and which are given different names depending on the 
geographical region: from fei-ch’ien (China) to hundi (Pakistan, 
Bangladesh) and commonly known as hawala in Arab 
countries… . The same report mentions that this informal 
phenomenon is more acute in Africa than in any other 
continent. 
 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, there is unanimity of opinions that remittances 
play a vital role in the contemporary world in triggering development especially as other 
sources of aid for developing countries’ economies have progressively declined. Taiwo 
(2007) contends that what should be done to encourage remittances is to strengthen and 
entrench remittances as a serious contributor to economic development. In other words, 
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Concerted efforts should be made to enhance the ratio of 
officially transferred financial resources and at the same time 
ponder on how to increase the development efficiency of 
remittances. This is because the larger the resources of the 
Diaspora saved or invested for economic expansion, the better 
for the country particularly, if official remittances derived from 
the recipient countries are properly harnessed. This is expected 
to enhance the chances of moving the economy on the path of 
sustainable growth (Taiwo 2007:250). 
  
Apart from remittances relevantly contributing to the economic wellbeing of 
households, it has far more important macroeconomic effect. Orozco (2008:9) argues, 
Money transfers are financial transactions that have important 
implications for the stability of the financial system as a source 
of foreign currency as well as a means for financial assets 
building. In developing countries, adequately leveraging such 
flows contributes an important opportunity for economic 
development. 
 
Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2008) corroborate that remittances have become an 
important source of foreign resource flows observing that between 2000 and 2006 while aid 
flows to the African continent increased by 94 percent, recorded remittances rose by 95.4 per 
cent. This picture suggests that remittances as a source of foreign resource flows assumed 
more significance. The significance is closely associated with several factors especially the 
fact that international remittances to Africa are relatively stable source of external finance in 
comparison with FDI, ODA and net private inflows (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2008). 
There appears to be a disagreement in the literature about the centrality of remittances 
in the schema of development especially in the area of poverty alleviation. Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor (2008) have delineated these contending views as optimistic view and pessimistic 
view. In the optimistic view school, remittances represent an important source of foreign 
financial resource flows. In a study which certain scholars carried out they found that every 
dollar received from migrants working abroad leads to increase in gross national product 
(GNP) (Adelman and Taylor 1990). Remittances are a potential source of augmentation of 
individuals’ incomes and a country’s foreign exchange reserves. As Taiwo (2007:25) 
observes, “an access to foreign exchange earnings provides valuable support to balance of 
payments accounts and helps development through importation of essential goods. Whether 
or not the foreign exchange will actually be spent on imports essential for development is, of 
course, a key issue”. Not only does the inflow of remittances favourably affect the foreign 
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exchange earnings and foreign exchange reserves of the labour exporting countries, Englama 
(2007) points out that large remittance flows improve a country’s creditworthiness for the 
purpose of external borrowing.  
On the other hand, the pessimistic view school perceives remittances as an “illness” 
that weakens the economy. Remittance receipts have the capability, especially in countries 
with low GDP, to distort the smooth functioning of the capital markets as well as destabilize 
exchange rate regimes through the creation of parallel currency markets (Chimhowu, Piesse 
and Pinder 2003). Bridi (2005); Chami et al (2004) have pointed out that expectations of 
remittances from abroad induces idleness and laziness on the part of the recipients. 
Capistrano and Sta Maria (2007) categorise the impacts of beneficial and detrimental effects 
of migration and overseas remittances into three – at the macro or national level; at the 
community level and at the household level. At the macro or national level, inflows of 
remittances increase the foreign earnings of the labour exporting country (Englama 2007). At 
the community level, through the instrumentality of remittances from individual migrants and 
migrant associations infrastructural developments are embarked upon. In other words, these 
remittances from abroad spawn the ground for the creation of new social assets and services 
as well as physical infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, roads, scholarships and other 
community projects. At the level of the household, remittances provide the platform for a 
turnaround in the consumption pattern of the recipients. As Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 
(2008:10) observe, “international remittances increase family incomes, thus raising 
consumption of both durable and non-durable goods and /or savings. Indeed, in Africa, 
remittances are part of a private welfare system that transfers purchasing power from 
relatively richer to relatively poorer members of a family”. But the impact of remittances on 
economic development generally is hinged on the sustainability of the inflow as well as the 
development of the appropriate structures to channel the inflows into the areas that are 
beneficial to the economy (Englama 2007:13). 
Migration is driven by a combination of factors but what ultimately determines the 
depth and pervasiveness of migration is the perception of opportunity differentials between 
countries (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009). It is the ever-increasing gap in the opportunity 
differentials between the developed and the developing countries that propels the brain drain 
that characterises the modern world system. Through the various adjustment programmes 
spearheaded by the IMF and the World Bank, the currencies of the developing countries 
underwent massive devaluation. Devaluation of national currencies weakened domestic 
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economic system and thus had the negative effect of strengthening brain erosion. As 
Papademetriou and Terrazas (2009:12) observe: 
Currency fluctuations in response to the business cycle may 
encourage some migrants to remain abroad rather than return to 
their countries of origin. A strengthening US dollar increases 
the real value of remittances (relative to country of origin 
currency) by making migrants’ income even more valuable for 
family members remaining in the country of origin. 
 
Thus, such remittances have far-reaching positive effects on the economic wellbeing 
of the households. There is a caveat though: the positive effects of remittances on the 
economic wellbeing of the recipients are only possible where such remittances are put to 
good and productive use and not merely consumptive use (Taiwo 2007).  
There is no unanimity of opinions amongst scholars about the impact of remittances 
on poverty. Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2008) in their study found that international 
remittances reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in Africa. As they put it, “after 
instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances, we find that a 10 
percent increase in official international remittances as a share of GDP leads to a 2.9 percent 
decline in the poverty headcount or the share of people living in poverty” (Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor 2008:1). 
Associated with remittances is the question of whether they are sent through formal or 
informal channels. These two channels - formal (that is, legally recognised means of money 
transfer which involves the banking system) and informal (which is alternative remittance 
system outside the sphere of officialdom) provide all the picture of money transfers 
worldwide. Several factors determine the choice of either of these channels by patrons. 
Englama (2007) asserts, “the attractiveness of either system is predicated on a number of 
factors which include among others: the cost of transactions, speed, security of funds, 
geographic proximity/accessibility, convenience in terms of familiarity and language”. 
Orozco (2008) considers the formal channel as being central to evolving remittance-
dependent development policies. 
More (2005) has attributed the great propensity to informality in remittance inflows in 
sub-Saharan Africa to two major factors: weakness of the financial systems, which are either 
rudimentary or nonexistent in many countries and; high proportion of intra-regional 
migration or nomadism (where workers in seasonal employment such as agriculture migrate 
with their remittances). Scholars believe that formal channel represents part of the picture 
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which is not even up to a half. It is believed that the remittance flows from the informal 
channel far outweigh inflows from formal channel. Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2008); 
Englama (2007); Pieke, Van Hear and Lindley (2005); Fagen and Bump (2006); Sander 
(2003) estimate that the informal channel is equal to 1.5 times the value of formal remittances 
and Fagen and Bump (2006) approximate the ratio of informal to formal channels at double. 
There has been the tendency of remittances to be on the increase. Sanders (2003) 
argues that even though formal or official remittances to developing countries have doubled 
over the years, especially over the last decade, remittances to Africa have grown little and 
actually declined in relative market share. Informal remittance systems are attributed with 
positive and negative sides. According Pieke, Van Hear and Lindley (2005:15),  
On the positive side, informal financial systems are usually 
more accessible to poor people, and those living in rural areas, 
than banks. Hawala-type systems and credit unions have been 
noted for their extensive outreach in some poor countries in 
comparison with banks… . On the negative side, the potential 
use of informal remittance systems for criminal or terrorist ends 
has been highlighted by initiatives to combat money laundering 
during the 1990s and by the investigations of the funding of the 
September 11th terrorist attack in the USA in 2001. 
 
Hertlein and Vadean (2006), while acknowledging difficulties in explaining motives 
behind remittances, identify three factors as motorising the engine of remittances. According 
to Hertlein and Vadean (2006:2): 
The main driving force is often considered to be altruism, in 
other words, concern on the part of migrants toward family 
members still in the country of origin… . Beyond the altruistic 
care of relatives, self-interest can also be a significant motive to 
remit… . In addition to these two motives, an implicit 
agreement can exist between migrants and relatives they leave 
behind. Relatives often cover the high cost of moving and 
settling abroad and are later repaid once the migrant has 
established himself in the destination country. 
 
Whether remittances are sent through formal or informal channels, there is 
considerable evidence of their importance to migrants, their relatives and the economies of 
their country of origin (Pieke, Van Hear and Lindley 2005). Scholars are united in their 
position that remittances have been consistently stable as a source of external finance in 
developing countries and thus assume great importance (Englama 2007; Anyanwu and 
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Erhijakpor 2008; Taiwo 2007; Fagen and Bump 2006). Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2008:8-9) 
have observed that: 
Between 2000 and 2006 the standard deviation of the ratio of 
international remittances to the GDP was 5.39 while that of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), official development 
assistance (ODA) and net private inflows stood at 8.95, 9.58 
and 14.4 respectively. Indeed, one reason remittances have 
attracted attention is that they are seen as more stable than other 
foreign currency flows to developing countries. 
 
But there are discordant tunes amongst scholars about the veritable effect of 
remittances on development and poverty generally: they tended to dichotomize between 
development and poverty and the effect of remittances on them. As More (2005:7) argues, 
While remittances reduce poverty automatically and 
autonomously, their effect on development depends on how 
they are used by the receiver.  If they are kept untouched under 
the mattress, then they produce no effect whatsoever. If they 
are used for expenses in relation to health, education or are 
invested, albeit to refurbish a home, then they will produce a 
positive effect. But this will not occur if the money is spent on 
luxury items such as an imported DVD player. 
 
In their study of the link between remittances in conflict-ridden areas and the 
sustenance of livelihoods, Fagen and Bump (2006) note that large segments of the 
populations living in conflict, war-to-peace transition and crisis contexts depend so much on 
remittances. Therefore, remittances are private sector inputs that serve as insurance 
mechanisms against sliding deeper into the abyss of poverty. This is because remittances, as 
More (2005:2) holds, are “... far more stable and less cyclic than any other flow of capital. 
Accordingly, they act as insurance against economic instability. For example, when 
remittances exceed 3 percent of GDP they acquire a sufficient critical mass to make financial 
crises less probable when foreign exchange reserves are reduced”. 
Fagen and Bump (2006) identify the various forms in which remittances act to reduce 
poverty and induce development. Remittances, in addition to being a major source of income 
for large numbers of people in poor countries, act as a magnet by attracting additional 
investible funds that would otherwise not be available. In other words, remittances by 
impacting on the lives of the people also impact on development. Even though there does not 
seem to appear unanimity amongst scholars as to the precise manner or extent to which 
remittances promote development, Fagen and Bump (2006:4-5) maintain that:  
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… there is little question that remittance income reaches social 
sectors that international assistance usually misses. Recipients 
may then use this income for health, education, improvement in 
nutrition and housing, or sometimes to sustain productive 
enterprises. Especially in countries or areas where weak or non-
functioning political and financial institutions limit 
international access, the desired beneficiaries of development 
have received support far more reliably from family members 
than from internationally funded projects.  
 
The high currency value attributed to remittances is as a result of the fact that 
remittance flows have no counter-flow, that is, they are gifts. In other words, remittances are 
private sector inputs delineated by family ties and accentuated by strong desires to rewrite the 
socio-economic circumstances of relatives in the home countries. More (2005) raises the 
point that the permanence of the ties of consanguinity shields remittance inflows from the 
vagaries of financial market conditions that plague such other sources of external financing as 
foreign investment. But the determination of the overall effect of remittance inflows on 
African development through the prism of the actual volume or real net worth of remittance 
has been a major challenge. A combination of poor quality statistical records manifesting in 
inadequate, non-existent or misleading statistics and high degree of informality in remittances 
are at the root of this challenge. Hertlein and Vadean (2006) in studying the factors that 
determine the remittance amounts draw a strong correlation between a migrant’s duration of 
stay abroad and the size of payments. Temporary migrants especially those with their families 
still in the home countries tend to remit the highest sums relative to their income. In contrast, 
permanent emigrants generally migrate with their family members thereby reducing contact 
with the home country and by extension remittances. Identified also, as a major determinant 
of remittances, is the level of education of the migrants: the lower the qualification, the more 
the likelihood of higher percentage of the migrants’ income being sent as remittances. The 
higher the qualification, the less likely that remittances will be high as the family members 
are with the emigrant. In other words, the temporariness or permanence of the status of the 
migrants is dependent on the educational background and the nature of job they do as well as 
what they earn from it. 
Several countries have attached great importance to remittances. This is to be 
expected considering that remittance payments from migrants tend to represent a more 
significant percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) in small or low-income national 
economies, indeed amounting to 2.2 percent of the GDP of developing countries (Hertlein 
and Vadean 2006). Hertlein and Vadean (2006) contend that migration and the attendant 
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remittances have significant effect on poverty through income distribution of households (as 
they improve the incomes of both middle-class and poorer households); spending habits 
(increase in household spending stimulates demand for consumer goods and services which 
triggers production and results in the creation of new jobs); education and health (increased 
remittances lead to corresponding increase in school enrolment like in El Salvador where the 
likelihood of urban children quitting school reduced to 10 percent) and investment. 
Philippines is among the few countries that have managed emigration. Under the 
auspices of Overseas Employment Programme, Filipino government since 1974 fostered and 
regulated temporary labour emigration through labour contracts especially to the Middle East 
on account of the oil boom. As at 2004 up to 7.5 million Filipinos or 8 percent of the 
population lived abroad and made remittances through official channels that amounted to 5.2 
percent of the GDP (Hertlein and Vadean 2006). In spite of the Filipino government’s 
exemplary efforts in managing temporary emigration and coordinating remittances through 
the erection of favourable policy frameworks, Hertlein and Vadean (2006:6) observe: 
Views on Philippines emigration policy are divided. Its means 
of managing temporary emigration are considered exemplary, 
as no other country has managed to generate such organized 
and protected migration flows. However, critics note that the 
stated goal of abolishing irregular emigration has not been met; 
instead, there seem to be two parallel migration movements. 
Moreover, the cost of brain drain on Filipino society is 
significant and even after nearly three decades of this 
emigration policy, no lasting change can be observed. 
 
Writing in the same vein about the Philippine experience, Agunias (2008:37) observes that: 
The Philippine experience has shown that the connection 
between migration and development is not as direct as many 
policy makers would like to think. Tapping the global labour 
market seems to effectively ease immediate problems at home, 
such as unemployment and balance of payments crises. 
However, for many local observers, the Philippine 
government’s overseas employment strategy has yet to fully 
deliver when it comes to bringing about the kind of 
development that benefits all households, not just the migrants 
and their immediate families. 
 
What these observations suggest is that international migration though directly 
beneficial to the remitters and their recipients, has untoward consequences on the society at 
large. There is no agreement amongst scholars as to how remittances precisely reduce 
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poverty. This is because of the fact that for remittances to frontally attack poverty they must 
go beyond consumption to the realm of investment. There is no clear evidence in the work of 
Hertlein and Vadean to conclusively hold that remittances can reduce poverty in developing 
countries. As they admit, 
… it is impossible to come to a general conclusion about the 
impact of remittances on developing countries. Remittances 
play a different role in each country, depending on the given 
economic situation and the time frame in question. The short-
term economic impulses and improvements in household 
income brought about by remittances do not automatically 
translate into economic development and a lasting means of 
alleviating poverty among the general population (Hertlein and 
Vadean 2006:7).  
    
Maumbe and Owei (2006) acknowledge that the rise in remittances globally, 
including Africa, provides excellent opportunity for new solutions to the problem of poverty 
in Sub-Saharan Africa which various data suggest is widespread. Their work failed to 
pinpoint how remittances have stimulated action against poverty. DFID (2006:9) holds that 
“despite the limited availability of data for developing countries we know that poor people 
often choose to migrate as a way of improving their lives”. In other words, migration affords 
poor people a leeway out of their poverty. Having migrated, these poor folks are sucked into 
the global labour market where they earn competitive wages depending on their 
qualifications. DFID (2006:9) observes: 
For individuals and their families, migration can increase 
income, lead to new skills, improve social status, build assets 
and improve quality of life. For communities and developing 
countries, emigration can relieve labour market and political 
pressures, result in increased trade and direct investment from 
abroad, lead to positive diaspora activity such as money being 
sent home (remittances), promote social and political change 
and lead to the eventual return by successful migrants who 
invest in their country of origin.  
  
The central issue in remittances is the freedom of the remitter and the recipient to 
embark on wealth yielding or consumptive ventures. DFID’s (2006) report does not seem to 
factor this into their unqualified conclusion that remittances have a positive effect on poverty. 
Remittances are person-to-person flows and these persons determine both the destination of 
and use funds, after all, it is their money (More 2005). 
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Newland and Patrick (2004) have undertaken a study of six countries that are 
characterised by large out-migration namely, China, India, the Philippines, Mexico, Eritrea 
and Taiwan, seeking in the process to find out the role of the Diaspora communities in 
reducing poverty and expanding FDI in their countries. Though they recognise the 
importance of remittances but argue that: 
Remittances, however, are far from being the only vehicle for 
diaspora influence on the incidence of poverty in their home 
countries. For many countries, the diaspora are a major source 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), market development 
(including out sourcing of production), technology transfer, 
philanthropy, tourism, political contributions, and more 
intangible flows of knowledge, new attitudes, and cultural 
influence (Newland and Patrick 2004:2). 
 
While these other factors have effects, albeit indirectly on the incidence of poverty, 
remittances have a direct impact on poverty reduction as they tend to flow directly to poor 
households and are deployed basically to the satiation of basic needs such as food, shelter, 
education and healthcare. The satiation of these basic needs has a multiplier effect on the 
community. 
For China, the diaspora contribution was more in the area of FDI. For instance, about 
half of the £26 billion (US$48 billion) in FDI that flowed to China in 2002 originated from 
the Chinese diaspora and for India, inflows were more from remittances. Chinese direct 
investments were twenty times the volume of India’s, whereas Indian remittances were seven 
times the Chinese in the 1990s (Newland and Patrick 2004). They further observe a 
significant expansion in the earnings and employment opportunities of the middle class and 
argue that making a dent in India’s enormous poverty required a connection of the lowest 
income group to the modern economy. In all, Newland and Patrick (2004) argue that 
remittance-led pattern has a direct effect on national development because it puts income 
directly into the hands of the poor or the recipients in the short-run unlike investment-led 
model, which indirectly impacts on the poor through the prospects of continued job creation 
which benefit the poor in the long run even though that might not be the primary purpose of 
the business investment. 
Until recently, no connection existed between international migration and 
development in the development strategies of the Nigerian state. What was given cursory 
attention was urban-rural migration which successive governments attempted to stem because 
of negative labelling. In other words, the Nigerian state conceived of migration from the 
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prism of disruptive influence manifesting in social dislocation. As De Haas (2006:14) puts it, 
“… in most policy circles, migration, whether internal or international, is still primarily seen 
as a development failure rather than a constituent part of broader social and economic 
transformation processes”. 
De Haas (2006) periodizes the change in orientation amongst Nigerian policy makers 
about the potential contributions of migrants to national development to 1999 when Nigeria’s 
political system took the form of democratic governance. The signal for this recognition was 
exemplified by the launch of the “presidential dialogue” with Nigerians abroad in 2002. The 
aim of the presidential dialogue was to chart a route for Diaspora involvement in national 
development. De Haas (2006) attributes the inability to establish any precise link between 
remittances and development including the reversal of poverty in Nigeria to the 
discrimination of Nigerian policy makers to the value of remittances made by migrants. As 
De Haas (2006:17) puts it, “the Nigerian government and banks seemed mainly interested in 
large money transfers and major investments by Nigerians living abroad. Small-scale person-
person remittances were no major issue of interest”. 
There are certain categorisations in the literature that tend to underplay the effect of 
migratory pressures on African human capital formation. Ghosh and Ghosh (2001:41) set the 
parameters of brain drain thus: 
The phenomenon of migration of HQM from LDCs can justify 
the use of the term brain, but we should be cautious in using the 
term drain. In fact, all brain drain constitutes brain migration, 
but brain migration does not necessarily constitute brain drain. 
Brain drain is only a part of brain migration. 
 
Flowing from this observation, Ghosh and Ghosh (2001:42) identified four types of 
brain migration namely, brain drain, brain overflow, brain exchange and brain export. These 
categorisations are of little value to the explication of the African countries in terms of the 
loss of their vital human capital. Brain drain of Africa’s skilled professionals is patently 
unidirectional and lacks all the pretences of circulation and exchanges.  Brain exchange 
means that both the sending and receiving countries benefit from the specialised experience 
and knowledge of expatriate professionals – and not just from their remittances, considerable 
as these may be (Smith 2007:1). This is not so on account of the inequality that characterises 
interstate relations in the modern world capitalist system. Within the milieu of this interaction 
African countries occupy the periphery where they operate at the pleasure of the developed 
countries that characteristically occupy the centre of the system. In deference to 
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contemporary trajectory of development, migration has become important and selective. Two 
main trends appear to characterise contemporary international migration: first, the quality of 
migrants have assumed unparallel importance; second, less developed countries become more 
affected by brain drain as they serve as feeder zone (Kazlauskienė and Rinkevičius 
(2006:28). 
There is tendency to ascribe recency to the brain drain phenomenon as it affects 
Africa. Oyowe (1996:59) affirms that: 
Whereas Western Europe was the main loser, especially to the 
United States, up until the 1960s, the developing countries have 
emerged in recent years as the biggest suppliers of qualified 
professionals to the industrialised world as a whole. Today 
there are more than a million and a half skilled expatriates from 
the developing countries settled in Western Europe, the USA, 
Japan and Canada. 
 
 This view has been contested by scholars. Yaqub (2007:4) contends that:  
 
The brain drain phenomenon, from available evidence, is not a 
phenomenon that is of recent origin nor is it unique to countries 
of the underdeveloped world. It is indeed a phenomenon that 
has, at one time or the other reared its ugly head in the 
developed economies as well. What however makes the 
situation unique in a Third World setting is the fact that, when 
there is brain drain, the flow process is unidirectional, i.e., it 
goes from the Third World country concerned to the developed 
world. The problem, it must be emphasized, is not just its 
unidirectionness, but that it is flowing from the very countries 
that could ill-afford the process to those that could do without, 
which, nonetheless and given the robust nature of their socio-
economic conditions, welcome the émigrés. 
 
The contestation about the periodization of the brain drain phenomenon is a product 
of the fuzziness and confusion associated with the concept. As it is generally agreed, human 
capital, irrespective of historical epochs, is indispensable both in unleashing the forces of 
development and in sustaining development. The understanding of this fact is at the epicentre 
of the academic disputations about the nature, depth and effect of brain drain. Those who 
attach recency to the brain drain phenomenon appear to conceptualise brain drain outside the 
framework of historical epochs or mode of production and the prevailing means of 
production. Productive forces differ in each historical epoch. As Igwe (2002:335) elucidates, 
productive forces encapsulates “‘human plus material’ forces, that is, all the human labour, 
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instruments, techniques and processes of an epoch – everything, including its science, 
technology and infrastructure -  that determines the nature and level of its production”. There 
is a tendency in the literature to trace the adverse effects of brain drain phenomenon to the 
1960s. Such a recent periodization inheres from a narrow conceptualization of what brain 
drain represents. Carrington and Detragiache (1999) attach recency to brain drain syndrome. 
This is so because they view brain drain as the emigration of “highly educated workers, such 
as scientists, engineers, physicians and other professionals from developing countries to 
developed countries”. 
Brain drain is broader than that as it is traceable to Africa’s contact with Europe. The 
earliest form of brain drain was the infamous and obnoxious slave trade. As Babangida 
(1991:224) avers: 
For about four hundred and fifty years, Africans were caught, 
manacled and shipped across the Atlantic to create wealth for 
their captors in the sugarcane, tobacco and cotton plantations in 
the Americas. Terrible were the privations to which they were 
subjected. Those who did not die during the raids or during the 
middle passage and were finally landed in the Americas were 
sentenced to lives of servitude without any chance of 
manumission. 
 
A direct consequence of the pillage of Africa by the West was the foregone possibility 
of development. The human resources that were essential to trigger off development were lost 
to the Western World. The blood and sweat of these Africans contributed immensely to the 
consolidation of the fledgling western capitalist developmental trajectory. Coleman (1986:41) 
asserts that the same period that saw Africa tumbling down the cliff to economic subjugation 
and asphyxiation also marked the emergence of Europe from medieval stagnation and its 
transmutation through agricultural, industrial and intellectual revolutions. In analyzing the 
impact of earliest Western onslaught on Nigeria via slave trade, Babangida (1991:245) 
observes that “the chaos accompanying the slave trade retarded the African march towards 
development, progress and advancement in science and technology. In fact the period of the 
slave trade was one of retrogression”. In relation to Nigeria, Coleman (1986:40) asserts, “the 
total effect of the slave trade upon Nigerian society, institutions, and peoples will perhaps 
never be known”.  
Contemporary brain drain did not start in the 1960s but in the 1980s following the 
economic crisis that rocked the entire length and breadth of the developing world. The 
dissonance between supply and demand of vital human resources in the domestic economies 
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of the developed countries sustained and indeed, institutionalised it. The picture of the 
incremental bludgeoning of the brain drain phenomenon has been painted by the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
who estimated that: 
27,000 African professionals left the continent from 1960 to 
1974. The figure rose to 40,000 from 1975 to 1984. Again, this 
rose to 60,000 from 1985 to 1989. And since 1990, it is 
estimated that at least 20,000 professionals leave the continent 
annually….The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
estimates that over 300,000 professionals reside outside Africa, 
and 30,000 of them have doctorate degrees (cited in Yaqub 
2007:4). 
 
The developed countries (DCs) have not only incorporated brain drain as an integral 
part of their development strategy but also institutionalised it. Brain drain in the international 
arena is a zero-sum game as migratory trend is patently unidirectional. Also, the developed 
countries are selective in their choice of migrants. Overall, migrants are accepted based on 
their age and qualification. As Kazlauskienė and Rinkevičius (2006: 28) observe, 
  
It is estimated that in the OECD high-skilled migrant flow 
reach 70% of a whole migration during the period of 1990-
2000. The nymber (sic) of highly-skilled migrants has 
increased in all well-developed countries, especially in Canada 
and Australia, as they were first to introduce selective 
immigration policy. 
Almost all developed countries have immigration policies aimed at attracting and 
keeping highly skilled professionals into their economies: there were point-systems in 
Australia, Canada and UK; the H1-B Visas in the US, German Green card, European Blue 
Card, French immigration “choisie”. And these policies sought to achieve one goal: to 
maintain the level of its skilled personnel both now and in the future considering the fact that 
most European states would be in dire need of human resource supplementation as they 
continue to enjoy high life expectancy and low birth rate (Nyarko 2010:11). For instance, the 
French immigration “choisie” appeared to be a product of the proposition of the Ministry of 
Economy that the French labour market could face 750,000 recruitment needs each year after 
2015 (Bertossi 2008: 5). 
The bridging of the manpower needs of the developed countries results in a serious 
vacuum in the manpower pool of Nigeria and other African countries. Oyowe (1996:60) 
outlines the implication thus:  
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Indeed, Africa receives more advice per capita than any other 
continent. In 1988, there were more than 80 000 technical 
assistants, and today the figure is well over 100 000. These 
experts are believed to cost donors a total of $4bn annually to 
maintain, a figure which represents nearly 35% of Africa's total 
official development aid. This situation reveals a serious flaw 
in the operation of international development cooperation. 
 
Paradoxically, in spite of the human development crisis engendered by economic 
crisis and sustained by systemic rigidities, Nigerian leaders ostensibly designed plans to 
transform the country into an industrial country: a major shortcoming of such plans was the 
absolute lack of consideration of the importance of human capital in national industrial 
development. As Toyo (2002:537) observes, “foreign investment can help growth, but the 
question of what sort of growth it helps is not irrelevant. After all, it was attracted foreign 
investment that created import substitution industries which resulted in non-integration, 
frustrated growth, balance of payments problems, chronic debt, etc”. In other words, human 
capital development is indispensable if a country must develop in the direction that it desires. 
And such human capital must be a product of deliberate government policy. The success of 
the South East Asian economies aptly demonstrated this. Studies on the success of South East 
Asian economies demonstrated that these countries did spend a lot on education. Similarly, 
the examples of the US, Germany and other western countries as well as the former USSR 
and other socialist countries revealed that they consciously embarked on human capital 
development through high attention to primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational  education 
and this attention resulted in economic growth and development for them (Toyo 2002). Oni 
(1999) has argued that there is a structural link between a society’s human and institutional 
capacity building efforts and its national ability to engineer social and economic development 
however such a link is anchored on building local capability and the ability to respond to 
challenges which is only achievable through the process of learning and cooperation between 
institutions. 
Nigeria possesses the potential for rapid industrialisation but poor managerial capacity 
and weak technological institutions, shortage of financial capital, lack of entrepreneurship, 
poor management, underdeveloped technology, inadequate socio-economic infrastructures, 
shortage of technical manpower and foreign domination constitute major impediments 
(Ukaegbu 1991:1). Conventionally, industrialisation connotes the process by which 
inanimate energy or mechanical power replaces human energy in production. Modern 
industry is purely a product of industrialisation (Ukaegbu 1991:1). What this implies is that 
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industrialisation is at the epicentre of productive activities in the modern world system and 
actually determines national power. The preoccupation of industrialisation is the inducement 
of industrial development “to achieve high rates of economic growth, to provide for the basic 
needs of the population, to create more employment opportunities, to lead to an increasingly 
diversified economy and to give rise to desirable social, psychological and institutional 
changes” (Kirkpatrick, Lee and Nixson 1985:1). While Toyo (2002) recognises the 
indispensability of human capital (properly developed and trained) in unleashing economic 
growth and development in a country through industrialisation, Nnanna, Alade and Odoko 
(2003:5) have affirmed that Nigeria’s industrialisation crisis is rooted in the disparity between 
the availability of relevant factors of production and their efficient conversion towards 
improving the standard of living of the people as well as national economic indices. Toyo’s 
(2002) work was silent on what effects the massive exodus of trained personnel outside the 
shores of Nigeria had on the development quests of Nigeria. His work sought to puncture the 
pro-SAP arguments against government expenditure on education by demonstrating that 
developments around the world evolved from conscious human capital development. It did 
not examine the effect of losing such trained personnel (to the developed countries) on the 
home countries, in this case, Nigeria. 
Otu and Adenuga (2006) find that investment in human capital in the form of 
education and capacity building through training impacts positively on economic growth. 
They, therefore, argue that: 
Nigeria can only reposition herself as a potent force through the 
quality of the products from the primary, secondary and tertiary 
school systems, and by making her manpower relevant in the 
highly competitive and globalized economy through a 
structured, well-funded and strategic planning of her 
educational institutions (Otu and Adenuga 2006:23).  
 
However, the work of Otu and Adenuga (2006) did not factor the impact of lost 
human capital in the matrix of Nigeria’s development especially its industrialisation. As they 
observe, “the accumulation of human capital involves a sacrifice of current utility...” (Otu 
and Adenuga 2006:8). The Nigerian economy bears this sacrifice in the training of its human 
capital needs which it losses to the developed countries as well as stunted industrial base. It is 
not enough that the Nigerian economy is characterised by monumental contradictions: the 
loss is two-fold – loss associated with investments in human capital development and loss 
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associated with the contributions they would have ultimately made in Nigeria’s economic 
development which now develop other countries and economies. 
Scholars have tended to argue from both sides of the divide with regard to negative or 
positive effect of brain drain on national economies. While some scholars play down the 
effects of brain drain on host countries by arguing that Diaspora remittances constitute part of 
brain gain for the benefit of host countries, others argue that underdevelopment in the labour 
emigrating countries (especially Third World countries) is traceable to the aggressive 
poaching of the bright minds of these countries. Tomori and Adebiyi (2007) observe that this 
poaching is embarked upon in a magnitude that is hardly replaced. It is the hiatus in the 
production and consumption of human capital that creates a grey area for the deepened 
underdevelopment of the Third World countries. Rena (2008) quoting UNCTAD sources 
informs that one highly trained African migrant between 25-35 years represents a cash value 
of US$184,000 at 1997 prices. Contrasted with this was the discovery by Orozco and Millis 
(2007) that “the average amount of money sent home in the form of remittances was 
US$189.26 per transfer, with an average of 13 transfers per year”. These remittances have 
been identified as contributing to development by boosting investment and entrepreneurial 
activities (Tomori and Adebiyi 2007). The developmental potentials of remittances appear 
even more assured if the preliminary estimates of the magnitude of remittances are 
considered. According to Ratha, Mohaptra and Plaza (2008:29), “preliminary estimates 
suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise $1-3 billion by reducing the 
cost of international migrant remittances, $5-10 billion by issuing diaspora bonds and $17 
billion by securitizing future remittances and other future receivables”. Rena (2008) considers 
diaspora remittances as inadequate and incommensurate to what émigrés would have 
contributed to their home country if they had not travelled. As he puts it: 
Africa needs a large middle class to build a large tax base 
which, in turn, will enable the continent to build good schools 
and hospitals and provide constant electricity. What few people 
do not realize is that Africans who immigrate to the United 
States    contribute 40 times more wealth to the American than 
to the African economy. According to the United Nations, an 
African professional working in the United States contributes 






While remittances have proved to be a good source of capital, they have limitations. 
Analyzing data on remittances from over 113 countries, Raph, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005) 
established a counter-cyclical pattern demonstrating that remittances do not behave like 
capital flows used for economic development but are rather compensatory transfers for poor 
economic situations in the home country. But Ratha, Mohapatra and Plaza (2008) opine that 
remittances are a large and stable source of external financing that can be creatively 
leveraged for sub-Saharan Africa’s development goals. A major utilitarian value of 
remittances in the development schema is their potentiality to improve ratings and 
securitization structures. As Ratha, Mohapatra and Plaza (2008:23) argue, “hard currency 
remittances, properly accounted, can significantly improve a country’s risk rating. It may 
even encourage many poor countries that are currently not rated to obtain a credit rating from 
major international rating agencies”. 
Beyond remittances sent by migrants, many of them appear to be underemployed. 
According to Batalova, Fix and Creticos (2008:1), “more than 1.3 million college-educated 
immigrants are unemployed or working in unskilled jobs such as dishwashers, security 
guards and taxi-drivers representing one of every five highly skilled immigrants in the US 
labour force”. Breaking this figure down, Africans were undoubtedly disadvantaged despite 
their being highly educated: “about a quarter of long-term immigrants from Europe and 
Africa, and about a fifth of long-term Asian and Latin American immigrants reported having 
a PhD or professional degree compared to 10.9 percent of US natives”, yet immigrants from 
Africa were most likely to be unemployed (Batalova, Fix and Creticos 2008:13).  
There has been the tendency in the extant literature to regard the skills acquired by 
migrants as being beneficial to their home countries, but this is dependent on whether they 
return home at all. Tomori and Adebiyi (2007) observe that the patterns of international 
migration have changed from unidirectional and permanent to temporary, seasonal and 
circular. New information communication and technologies and dual citizenship are new 
trends which not only facilitate contacts between migrants and those they left behind but also 
enable migrants to enjoy certain levels of freedom and mobility. Tomori and Adebiyi 
(2007:297) recognise the effect of these new trends thus: 
Consequently, migrants become directly involved in the 
economic development of their countries of origin. In short, 
migrants are now being increasingly considered as agents of 
development, who can strengthen cooperation between home 
and host societies. They can contribute to development, not 
only through remittances, investment and entrepreneurial 
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activities, but also through the transfer of newly developed 
skills and knowledge... .  
 
Technology transfer is never accomplished in isolation. FDI is often denominated as a 
mechanism to achieving technology transfer. Kinoshita (1998) while asserting that FDI is 
instrumental to technology transfer to domestic firms in host economies identifies four 
channels through which FDI can possibly impact on productivity of domestic firms through 
technology transfer, namely:  demonstration or contagion-imitation effect, competition effect, 
training effect and backward and forward linkages effect. Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi 
(2004:3) identify other channels of international transfer of technology as including, trade in 
products, trade in knowledge, and intra-national and international movement of people. 
Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) explain that demonstration or contagion-imitation 
effect is manifested in foreign firms with more advanced technologies introducing same in 
the local market setting or where local firms, through direct contacts with foreign affiliates 
imitate both operational modalities and technologies in their operations. It is also depicted 
where foreigners are employed by domestic firms for the purpose of benefitting from their 
wealth of experience in terms of knowledge of new technologies acquired in previous 
employment (Yauri 2006). Kinoshita (1998) notes that where the entry of foreign firms lead 
to more intense competition in the local industry with the effect that firms deploy new 
technologies to stay afloat and /or dominate the local or international market, there is 
competition effect. Also, competition effect may most likely induce local firms to pre-
emptively introduce new technologies in order to maintain market shares. Yauri (2006) 
regards training, which is the accumulation of relevant skills necessary for a particular 
industry as a vital ingredient in the transfer of technology. Backward and forward linkages 
arise in situations where foreign affiliates engage in transactions with local customers and 
suppliers either to meet demand for higher quality, on-time delivery or to innovate more 
(Kinoshita 1998; Aremu 2005). Yauri (2006:37) adds, “backward linkage is encouraged in 
the presence of ‘local content requirements’ – which means that foreign firms have to 
purchase a certain percentage of intermediate inputs in a host country instead of importing 
from suppliers abroad”. 
Backward and forward linkages spawn foreign joint-ventures and diaspora 
involvement in FDI inflows. The increasing currency of the diaspora as agents of FDI inflows 
is anchored on the retreat and diminishing influence of official development assistance 
(ODA) as a pillar of development in developing countries. As observed by Ratha, Mohapatra 
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and Plaza (2008:4), “in one of the largest expansions in private capital flow to developing 
countries in recent decades, private medium and long-term capital flows nearly tripled in size 
from $195 billion in 2000 to $670 billion in 2006”. This enormous inflow spawned 
significant diversification in the composition of private flows to developing countries for 
FDI, portfolio bond and equity flows, bank lending and derivative instrument. 
Gueron and Spevacek (2008) acknowledge that diaspora groups have been engaged in 
the development of their home countries for many years. Their contributions have been 
enormous: 
These groups have been essential contributors and respond 
swiftly and effectively to the emerging needs of their homeland 
counterparts, through philanthropic remittances, emergency 
response following natural disasters, conflict, economic 
collapse... traditional technical assistance, business investments 
and trade (Gueron and Spevacek 2008:2).  
 
 Overall, Gueron and Spevacek (2008) believe that diaspora groups play a critical role 
in accelerating technology exchange and foreign direct investment in their home countries. In 
other words, “diasporans are helping to bridge the digital divide in their countries of origin by 
incorporating technology transfer into social, economic and political assistance activities” 
(Gueron and Spevacek 2008). Lowell and Gerova (2004) report that India represents an 
exemplary case of a diaspora which instigated significant investments back home from 
MNCs in the information technology sector. 
Technology transfers can only be effective where the rudiments of industrialisation 
are in place both as a deliberate government policy and as national desire. Such national 
desires drive the provision of vital infrastructure to support technology transfer.  The essence 
of technology is efficiency; that is, the application of scientific and technological knowledge 
for efficient productive activities. As Cypher and Dietz (1997:402) elaborate: 
 
Technology permits an outward shift of a nation’s production 
possibilities frontier (PPF) and creates the potential for greater 
output and income from the same level of goods and services 
with fewer resources. Technological progress reduces costs, 
increases productive efficiency, conserves society’s (and the 
world’s) resources, and establishes the capacity for a higher 




Nigeria’s story of industrialisation is a sad story of unsustainable industrialisation 
arising from both the domestic and international forces. Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa 
(2004:341) capture Nigeria’s industrial quest thus: 
Nigeria’s experience with external trade and industrialization is 
a classic case of tragedy.  Manufacturing value-added as a 
percentage of GDP was about five percent in 2000 (less than 
the proportion at independence in 1960), making Nigeria one of 
the 20 least industrialized countries in the world.  
Industrialization in Nigeria soared during the oil boom era 
(1973 - 1981 with manufacturing share of GDP reaching 11 
percent) but has had a precipitous decline to about five percent 
in 2000. 
 
Industrialisation is not merely a product of a wonderful blueprint alone. It is much 
more than that. The industrialisation policy which Nigeria adopted at independence was 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI). Ukaegbu (1991:2) points out that under ISI 
“industrial equipment and raw materials are transported into Nigeria, installed and used for 
routine production activities either by multinational corporations [MNCs], the state or 
indigenous private businessmen”. It is important to note that the objective of ISI was 
domestic manufacturing of goods that were hitherto imported.  The failure of ISI as an 
industrialisation strategy in the developing countries including Nigeria led to export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI):  that is, local production of manufactured goods for external markets.  
EOI strongly emphasizes that a state should pursue its comparative advantage  in selected 
sectors of the economy and promote exports from these sectors and also an interventionist 
strategies that limit domestic disruptions (Balaam and Veseth 2005:340).  Many pro-EOI 
analyses contend that EOI leads to rapid growth in manufactured exports.  Balassa (cited in 
Kirkpatrick, Lee and Nixson, 1984:198 – 99) argued that: 
… export-oriented policies lead to better growth performance 
than policies favouring import substitution.  This result  is said 
to obtain because export-oriented policies, which provide 
similar incentives to sales in domestic and in foreign markets, 
lead to resource allocation according to comparative advantage, 
allow for greater capacity utilization, permit the exploitation of 
economies of scale, generate technological improvements in 
response to competition abroad and, in labour-surplus 
countries, contribute to increased employment. 
  
But the weak domestic structures in the developing countries including Nigeria as 
well as the inequality in the global capitalist system combined to make even the export-
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oriented industrialisation unsuccessful.  This was especially so since the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) set up by governments to drive the EOI not only shared similar structural 
characteristics with MNCs but bartered their domestic industrial freedom by depending on 
the former for the supply of operational infrastructure (technology) (Ukaegbu 1991).  These 
industrialisation policies were adopted by Nigeria because of its acceptance of the prevailing 
orthodoxy that transfer of technology would enable it replicate industrial growth of the developed 
countries. Juma and Clark (2002:3) have identified two fundamental flaws that underpinned this 
belief: Firstly, that the developing countries could benefit from the experiences of the industrialised 
countries, that is, that the technological trajectory of the developed countries was actually replicable; 
and secondly, that there were no vested interests to undermine the success of such countries in 
assimilating imported technology.  
 Despite the potentiality of brain drain to transform to brain gain through brain 
circulation and exchanges, certain global restrictions have made it impossible for home 
countries to enjoy technological fallouts from their diaspora. These restrictions, under the 
auspices of intellectual property rights (IPRs), ensure rigidity in the diffusion of technologies. 
UNCTAD (cited in Juma and Clark 2002:2) has outlined the consequences thus, "since new 
and emerging technologies increasingly affect the volume, composition and direction of 
world trade, countries that are unable to gain access to these new technologies, and 
successfully absorb them, will find themselves progressively disengaged from the global 
economy”. As it is, Africa is unlikely to railroad itself unto the turf of technological progress 
as it lacks the critical mass of technological competencies necessary to participate at the 
global technology frontier (World Bank Report 2008:8). 
Most of the studies, while recognising the deplorable nature of healthcare delivery 
attributed the cause to several factors ranging from poor funding of the health sector to lack 
of infrastructural facilities. While there is a tangential recognition of inadequate health 
professionals as constituting a serious challenge to meeting goals 4, 5, and 6 of the MDGs as 
well as ensuring efficiency in the healthcare delivery system, there are no concrete linkages 
between continued deterioration in the health indices and unabated out-migration of qualified 
health professionals. This lack of linkage led us to hypothesise that sustained depletion of 
Nigeria’s health professionals through out-migration led to inefficient healthcare delivery. In 
evaluating internal and international migration, De Haas (2006:14) posits that the 
contributions of internal migration to national development have been more positive than that 
of international migration despite the negativity often ascribed to internal migration in 
dominant policy analyses. Two factors appeared to have led to this conclusion: one, while 
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internal migration is perceived as circulating the labour power of the skilled and semi-skilled 
professionals within the state, international migration enhances the loss of such skills to the 
home country. Two, it associates international migration with large-scale capital flight in 
terms of the loss of the migrant to the home country and its potentials for national 
development  Soludo (2007) identifies the Nigerian diaspora as a veritable growth reserve to 
sustain high growth through remittances, high skills and global networks. While some 
sections of the extant literature generally recognised the potentiality of the diaspora as a 
vehicle to impact positively on national development, others directed their searchlight on the 
consequences of the loss of human capital on national economies and yet others were 
preoccupied with the compensatory role of remittances as well as their proclivity towards 
rolling back poverty through micro-and macro-level investments. Most studies, viz Van Hear 
et al (2004); Nwajiuba (2005); De Haas (2006); Orozco and Millis (2007) recognise that 
Nigerian diaspora makes a substantial contribution, especially by way of remittances, to the 
homeland but could not connect such remittances and accruing investments to domestic 
incentives. Similarly, the contributions of Banjoko (2005) in terms of diaspora-led 
investments in Nigeria appeared inconclusive. Apart from a general and sweeping assertion 
that diaspora survey in 2005 showed that 92 percent of remittances were invested, there was 
no further evidence suggesting the direction and forces that shaped such investments. Most 
studies dealing with domestic investments were particularly concerned with the overall 
impetus to the attraction of investments and their effects on national economic development 
concentrating on the traditional agents of FDI inflow. Thus, studies that attempted to create a 
direct link between mass emigration, domestic investment incentives and attraction of 
investments through the instrumentality of the diaspora tended to be scarce. While extant 
studies dealt on major ramifications of technology transfer and intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) as well as the potentiality of the diaspora as a veritable vehicle to effect technology 
transfer in the event of reverse-migration, these studies tended to be narrow in their focus as 
they compartmentalised their inquiry to either issues that surround the appropriation and 
modification of technological and scientific knowledge towards technology growth and 
sustainability or IPRs as international regime of  embargo against the flow of knowledge. 
Most of these studies appeared to lack systematic connectedness in terms of how IPRs impact 
on the diaspora’s freedom to diffuse their knowledge. To appreciate this connection, we 
hypothesise that tighter regulation of intellectual property rights is inhibitive of the 
contributions of diaspora-led industrial investment to technology transfer. On a general note, 
this study focuses on the whole environment of migration and brain drain and specifically 
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attempts to weave a thread around brain drain and how Nigeria could erect policy 
frameworks to harness its diasporan assets. 
 
 
1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The nature of brain drain, its trajectories and effects on the capacity of the Nigerian 
state to engender development are not explicable within the context one set of factors. There 
are several sets of factors that motorise and sustain brain drain and they are domiciled both 
within the domestic and international arenas. In order to account for all these factors, this 
study shall adopt a synthesis of public choice theory and modern world system theory. The 
utilitarian value of adopting two theories is to account for the multi-dimensional nature of the 
brain drain phenomenon. None of these theories is encompassing enough to satisfactorily 
address the socio-economic and political forces that undergird brain drain. While the public 
choice theory applies the insight of political economy framework to elucidate the domestic 
forces that motorise brain drain through the actions and inactions of the elites, the modern 
world system theory illuminates the socio-economic forces that impel and sustain brain drain 
in the international arena. 
Pro-migration scholars have often tended to explicate brain drain within the 
framework of liberalism/neoliberalism. Pro-migration scholars view brain drain as a mutually 
beneficial exchanges in an interdependent world that spawns and sustains global prosperity 
and peace for both the industrialized, newly industrializing (NICs) and developing countries. 
They introduce brain gain as a counter to the phenomenon of brain drain. The perspective of 
the pro-migration scholars is liberalism. Liberalism contends that inter-dependence and 
economic linkage of advanced economies with less developed economies through trade, 
international aid and foreign investment will open the floodgate of export markets, capital 
and technology required for economic development. Gilpin (1987:266) captures the essence 
of the liberal perspective: 
 
Liberalism maintains that an interdependent world economy 
based on free trade, specialization, and an international division 
of labour facilitates domestic development. Flows of goods, 
capital and technology increase optimum efficiency in resource 
allocation and therefore transmit growth from the developed 
nations to the less developed countries. Trade can serve as an 
“engine of growth” as the less developed economy gains 
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capital, technology, and access to world markets. This is a 
mutually beneficial relationship since the developed economies 
can obtain cheaper raw materials and outlets for their capital 
and manufactured goods. Because the less developed 
economies have smaller markets, opening trade with advanced 
economies is believed to benefit them relatively more than it 
does the developed economies. Moreover, since the factors of 
production flow to those areas where they produce the highest 
rewards, a less developed economy with a surplus of labour and 
a deficit of savings can obtain infusions of foreign capital that 
accelerate growth. 
 
Applied to migration, the liberal scholars view brain drain inversely as brain gain and 
view the depletion of the human resources as beneficial to both divides of the world system 
as such depletions are considered adequately compensated by remittances. The postulations 
of the liberal theory are quite lofty but beg very important questions. Its shortcomings lie in: 
a) Neglect of the role of the predominant economic interest of the policy makers and 
how this interest shape the outcome of domestic policies; 
b) Neglect of power differentials within the market and unclear notion of the extent to 
which markets generate stable integration of the economy and society (Holton 
1992:240). 
c) Assumption that exchange is always free and occurs in a market between equals who 
possess full information and are thus enabled to gain mutually if they choose to 
exchange one value for another (Gilpin 1987:42-46). This assumption is wrong 
considering the position of the Third World economies in the global capitalist system. 
d) The persistence of global inequalities of wealth, income and power. While these are 
historical in origin as much as market-generated, their existence does mean that much 
of the world’s population cannot participate in market exchange on a par with others 
(Holton 1992:242).  
The theoretical framework upon which this study is anchored is a synthesis of public 
choice theory and modern world system theory and modern world system theory. While the 
public choice theory brings within its purview the internal dynamics that create contradictions 
in the economy and thus limit its expansionary capacity to enthrone full employment, the 
modern world system emphasises unequal relationship in the international arena and the 
exploitation of this inequality through the creation of relevant pull factors. Brain drain cannot 
happen in isolation. For pull factors to be effective, there must be push factors within the 
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domestic milieu. Conversely, for push factors to lead to the massive emigration of Nigerian 
professionals, there must be pull factors in the economies of the developed countries. 
Immanuel Wallerstein is the most well-known originator of the world system theory 
with important developments made by several scholars including Christopher Chase-Dunn 
and Shannon. This theory makes possible a comprehensive understanding of the external and 
internal manifestations of the modernization process in the world system as well as 
analytically sound comparisons between different parts of the world (Halsall 1997). The basic 
framework of the modern world system theory is the existence of different stages or levels of 
national development within a unified global economy. In other words, it connotes a single 
unit with parts, which are functionally complementary (Lind 1978:674). Wallerstein 
(1976:229) conceptualises the world system as a social system which has boundaries, 
structures, member groups, rules of legitimation and coherence. There is extensive division of 
labour in the world system: the range of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout 
the world system. This notion gives rise to the basic categories of analysis – core/semi-
periphery/periphery: the core regions of the Western economy occupy the central position 
and are the dominant players in the world system; the peripheral regions of the Third World 
occupy the fringes of the world system and lack economic independence and powers to chart 
their economic destiny independently and finally, in-between these two are the semi-
peripheral regions which possess some economic autonomy but still defer to and are 
dominated by the Western countries (Holton 1992:138-139). Wallerstein (1976:231) avers, 
The division of a world-economy involves a hierarchy of 
occupational tasks, in which tasks requiring higher levels of 
skills and greater capitalization are reserved for higher-ranking 
areas. Since a capitalist world-economy essentially rewards 
accumulated capital, including human capital, at a higher rate 
than “raw” labour power, the geographical maladministration 
of these occupational skills involves a strong trend toward self-
maintenance.  
 
Wallerstein (1976) traces the origin of contemporary world system to the 16th century 
following the crisis of the feudal system and the expansion of the capitalist economic system. 
Offiong (2003:47) observes that at the inception of the world system, the difference between 
the core and the periphery was relatively minor. The world system has constantly evolved, 
throwing up in the process three kinds of societies across human history: mini-systems 
(bands, tribes and small chiefdoms); single state world empire and; multi-polity world 
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economies. The latter categorization depicts the modern world system and its uniqueness lies 
in the fact that it was “the first and only fully capitalist world economy to have emerged, 
around 1450-1550 and to have geographically expanded across the entire planet, by about 
1900” (Wikipedia). Offiong (2003:47) elucidates further that by the end of the 16th century a 
European world-economy consisting of Holland, England, France, Spain, and Portugal 
emerged as the core, with Scandinavia, Eastern Europe and Central and South America in an 
extractive relationship with the core. Germany and Italy consisted of the semi-peripheral 
enclaves. There was a constant adjustment in the world system which led to the 
transformation of the entire Europe as the core and countries hitherto at the periphery being 
elevated to semi-peripheral status. Wallerstein (1976:231) asserts, 
 
The ongoing process of a world-economy tends to expand the 
economic and social gaps among its varying areas in the very 
process of its development. One factor that tends to mask this 
fact is that the process of development of a world-economy 
brings about technological advances which make it possible to 
expand the boundaries of a world-economy.  
 
World system theory argues that modern states are the political units of modern 
society’s interstate system and economy. In other words, the world system is anchored on 
capitalism which is a system based on competition. As Wikipedia points out: 
 
World system analysis argues that capitalism, as a historical 
social system, has always integrated a variety of labour forms 
within a functioning division of labour (world economy). 
Countries do not have economies, but are part of the world-
economy. Far from being separate societies or worlds, the 
world-economy manifests a tripartite division of labour with 
core, semi-peripheral and peripheral-zones 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/world-system_approach). 
 
Wallerstein (1976:229) attributes the flourishing of capitalism to the multiplicity of 
political systems. The capitalist world economy as envisioned by Wallerstein (1976) is a 
dynamic system which changes overtime. Brain drain serves the purpose of maintaining the 
status quo as the manpower necessary to maintain the dominance of the developed states are 
“imported” from the periphery whose economies are incapable of effectively employing 
them. This enables certain basic features to remain in place especially the positioning of the 
core regions. Shannon (1989:68) notes that “the periphery was consigned to a limited form of 
economic development directed toward meeting the needs of the core”. Thus through access 
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to resources (especially raw materials) and the great profits made in the course of 
international trade within the world system, the core enriched itself at the expense of both the 
periphery (to a greater extent) and the semi-periphery (to a lesser extent). The world system 
theory shares the basic assumptions of dependency theory especially with regards to the 
methods of incorporation of regions into the world economy. The regions of the world never 
initiated incorporation into the world economy but were sucked into it as a result of pressures 
from the core region to obtain more resources and greater profits. According to Offiong 
(2003:50): 
In this forced and super ordinate – subordinate relationship, as 
the core became progressively more developed, the periphery 
stagnated economically and politically because it could not 
extricate itself from the dependency situation. The semi-
periphery may be able to resist being relegated to the periphery, 
but usually finds itself economically weak to forge itself into 
the core. 
 
Wallerstein (1989:136) has also noted that the crucial characteristic in the relationship 
between the core and others was “the persistent long-term imbalance of trade”. It is this 
imbalance that has stymied the regions in their respective spheres and sustained the uneven 
development. Unlike the dependency theory with its bimodal system of cores and peripheries 
which does not sufficiently explain certain aspects of the world system, the modern world 
system develops a tripartite pattern that accounts for developments in the world system. With 
respect to the categorization of the former socialist economies, modern world system 
categorises it as external since they operated outside the framework of world economies but 
following the important changes in these economies they are now part of the modern world 
system (Chase-Dunn 1989; Shannon 1989; Wallerstein 1984). 
Since the inception of the modern world system, there has been competition amongst 
the core countries for dominance and hegemony over the periphery countries. To determine a 
leading core country even in the core region, Wallerstein (1976) asserts that three forms of 
economic dominance over a period of time establishes the dominance of such a core country. 
These are: 
a) Productivity dominance which allows a country to produce products of greater quality 
at a cheaper price in comparison to other countries. 
b) Trade dominance which entails favourable balance of trade for the dominant country. 
c) Financial dominance which ensures that more money flows into the country and that 
its bankers receive more control of the world’s financial resources. 
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Wallerstein (1976) identifies three periods in the modern world system as being 
dominated by a single core nation: the Spanish and Portuguese ascendency around the 1450 
with the conquest of the present peripheries; the British dominance of the 1800s and the US 
since the World War II. The US influence appears more pervasive not because of its recency 
but because of its overwhelming efforts especially in terms of protecting and maintaining the 
status quo of the world capitalist system. In outlining the hegemonic influence of the US, the 
Wikipedia asserts, “after World War II, the US accounted for over half of the world’s 
industrial production, owned two-thirds of the gold reserves in the world, and supplied one-
third of the world’s export” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/world-systemsapproach). 
On the other hand the public choice theory is a state-centred theory used to explain 
how political decision-making results in outcomes that conflict with, and undermine, the 
preferences and expectations of the general public. Public choice begins as the study of 
political agents using the conventional behavioral assumption of individual self-interest found 
in the study of economic agents (Boettke and Lopez 2002:111).) Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa 
(2004:343) explain further: 
 
The public choice model shares basic assumptions with 
pluralist thinking but views both societal interest groups and 
government officials as purely self-interested, with the latter 
predominantly concerned with maintaining power by attracting 
and rewarding supporters and favouring certain groups. Rent-
seeking via policy formation and implementation is a major 
feature of this process. In the public choice model the 
competition among the various interest groups is inimical to the 




The rational politics of pandering to the interest of the elite led to the trajectory of the 
Nigerian economy to monoculturalism and subsequent contradictions that undermined its 
development and thus laid the foundation for brain drain. The Nigerian state, with its coercive 
force and enormous financial resources has been an arena of fierce competition for patronage 
and fight for booties for personal and sectional interests. The key players have been the 
military and the bureaucracy. All military interventions and political contests have been 
largely instigated by the allure of power and the fortunes that go with it in a rentier system 
(Ake 1981:126; Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa 2004:344-5). In other words, the Nigerian ruling 
class uses the state power to build an independent power base founded on private fortunes. 
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Thus, its choice of specific policies and their implementation was directly related to the need 
to serve personal and sectional interests. 
Applied to migration and brain drain, this theory brings to the fore the primacy of 
economic factors in the course of production and reproduction of goods within the society. 
The contemporary manifestation of the social relations of production within the Nigerian 
state is the dominance of the state. The Nigerian state occupies the commanding height of the 
economy from where it immerses itself in the production process as well as being the overall 
regulator of the economy. The inefficiency of the state as a manager of business and the 
prebendal nature of politics led to distortions in the economy. So, the internal socio-economic 
and political contradictions in Nigeria are products of the failure of the state to satisfactorily 
discharge its duties. It is this failure that manifests in political instability, corruption, 
insecurity, mismanagement of the economy, bad leadership among others which act as push 
factors that impel brain drain. 
 
 
(i) Application of the Theory 
 
In this study, the public choice theory and the modern world system theory will be 
seamlessly applied to demonstrate that brain drain is both a manifestation of internal socio-
economic and political dynamics; and sundry forces in the international arena which 
accentuate the age-long exploitation that characterises relations in the modern world system. 
Consistent with relations in the global capitalist system where competition for economic 
supremacy (in an international division of labour) bestows advantages to the superior to the 
detriment of the subordinate, the core countries poach the labour power of the periphery for 
their continued advancement. As Halsall (1997) observes, the capitalist world system is based 
on an international division of labour that determines relationship between different regions 
as well as the types of labour conditions within each region. The dynamics of the capitalist 
world economy bestows clear advantage on the core regions and disadvantage on the 
periphery regions. 
What laid the foundation for the emigration of highly-skilled Nigerians was the 
bouquet of contradictions within its political economy as a result of the actions and inactions 
of the ruling class in the pursuit of their policy choices. Rather than expand the economy 
beyond the cash crop economy model it inherited from the erstwhile colonial masters, the 
emergent Nigerian leadership chose to lead the economy to monoculturalism as soon as oil 
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became an important international commodity with appreciated price.  Monoculturalism 
exposed the Nigerian economy to all manner of vulnerabilities.  It led to the reconfiguration 
of social relations of production around the Nigerian state, which created unhealthy rivalry 
among the elite and between the elite and the people. The effect of this was the stagnation of 
the economy and the reversal of the trajectory of national growth and development. At the 
international arena, the international division of labour created inequality among countries. 
The monocultural base of the Nigerian economy disarticulated its economy and constrained 
its inherent expansionary capacity. Contrarily, the robust economies the developed countries 
pulled the premium manpower of Nigeria.  
Migration is a product of several internal and external causes ranging from reaction to 
economic downturns, political instability and repression, civil or tribal wars and so on in the 
labour-exporting country to favourable immigration policies, availability of jobs, conferment 
of citizenship status, and award of scholarship among others in the labour-receiving country. 
The contradictions in domestic economies, inequality in the world system and differentials in 
the control of the global wealth dictate the trend of migration. For Nigeria, the complete 
picture of migration is that it is induced by the contradictions that characterise its economy, 
which are both internally- and externally-generated. In other words, internally, the surge in 
the number of Nigerian emigrants is locatable in the economic crisis that engulfed the country 
starting from the 1980s and the attendant IMF/World Bank pill of structural adjustment; and 
externally, by the nature of unequal exchange in the world capitalist system as well as the 
domestic policies of the developed countries. 
Both the public choice theory and modern world system theory are apt to the study of 
the brain drain question and its impact on Nigeria’s development. They offer explanations to 
the identified underlying factors that fuel brain drain in Nigeria as well as the strategies to 
reverse it. They hold as important the economic conditions that stimulate the ordering of the 
political economy of Nigeria as well as relations within the global system. Therefore, in 
looking at Nigeria, these theories pay due attention to the economic conditions that connect it 
to the world economic system and helps us to understand why brain drain is occurring ( its 
domestic and international underpinnings); who is the ultimate beneficiary of brain drain 
syndrome; how brain drain relates to and shares the essential qualities of the exploitative 
capitalist onslaught of the slave trade era; and, why Nigeria and other countries of the 







This study has, as its major preoccupation, the task of testing the following hypotheses: 
 
1) The sustained depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals through brain 
drain leads to inefficient healthcare delivery. 
2) Domestic investment incentives tend to boost diaspora-led investments in the 
Nigerian economy.  
3) The tighter regulation of the global regime of intellectual property rights is inhibitive 




1.8 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
The task of this section is to outline the processes and procedures employed in this 
study to gather, analyse and present the data which are at the core of this research enterprise. 




(i) Method of Data Collection  
 
Data represent the building blocks of evidence necessary to validate or invalidate 
research questions. Whatever the research design is – experimental, quasi-experimental or 
correlational – the use of data is what dictates the thrust of research. Every study has its own 
specialised data which are obtained through certain methods or techniques. For this study, the 
method of data collection is lived experiences of some Nigerian diaspora and secondary 
sources: identification and utilisation of relevant documentary evidence already assembled by 
scholars and recognised institutions. Secondary sources include amongst others: journals, 
textbooks, seminar and conference papers, working papers, manuscripts, official government 
reports and statistical bulletins. 
  The survey studies and statistical data generated by such institutions as the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Nigerian National 
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Planning Commission (NNPC) as well as the National Investment Promotion Commission 
(NIPC), United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and National 
Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) will also be invaluable to this 
study.  
 
(ii) Research Design 
Research designs are indispensable in the research enterprise as they are the roadmap 
depicting the building blocks and the systematic processes the research must pass through in 
order to validate or invalidate the hypotheses of the study. It is within the framework of the 
research design that the procedure involving how the data are to be collected, analysed and 
interpreted, measured and presented are outlined. Leege and Francis (1974:66) assert that 
“each research design is like a blueprint that tells us how to reach plausible answers to 
research problems”. There is an umbilical link between research and research design. Igwe 
(2002:383) notes this link thus: 
[Research is] a systematic enquiry to discover phenomena, the 
laws governing them and the diverse means of the application 
of the knowledge to practical situations. On the other hand, 
[research design is] the methodological and related processes 
employed in research especially with regard to theoretical 
framework, and the collection and manipulation of data.  
Therefore a research design is a plan of action which guides a researcher or prevents them 
from veering off course in the process of collecting, analyzing, measuring, interpreting and 
presenting data.  Leege and Francis (1974:66) note that there are three questions which a 
research design must satisfy satisfactorily: will the design provide plausible answers? Does 
the design permit control over extraneous sources of variance? And lastly, is the design 
practical and ethical? Black and Champion have detailed the functions of research design 
thus: 
i. It provides the researcher with a blueprint for studying research problems; 
ii. It dictates boundaries of research activity and enables the investigator to channel his 
energies in specific direction; 
iii. It enables the investigator to anticipate potential problems in the implementation of 
the study; and  
iv. It helps to provide some estimates of the cost of research, possible measurement 
problems, and the optimal allocation of resources (Cited in Obasi 1999:50). 
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The research design for this study recognises the peculiarity of the data relevant for the 
validation or otherwise of the research questions. To be able to roundly address these 
questions, this study adopted One-Group Time Series Research Design. This design is 
symbolised as: 01  02  03  X  04  05  06.  
One-Group Time Series Research Design enables a panoramic picture of the trends in the 
data within a period of time. The appropriateness of this design is denoted by the type of data 
generated for the validation or otherwise of our hypotheses: they are sourced from the 
repository of official database (national and international). This design allows for an 
observation to be made before and after introducing the treatment over a period of time. 
Brain drain is a unidirectional flow of premium human resources from one section of 
the globe (developing countries) to another (developed countries), although there is 
appreciable movement of professionals within and amongst countries of the developing 
countries. But this study focuses on the movement of human capital from the developing 
countries to the developed countries of the West. These human resources bridge the human 
resource gap in these developed countries and thus contribute in not only entrenching their 
dominance (developed countries) but also the underdevelopment of the origin countries 
(developing countries) in the modern world system. There are counter-views about how 
perniciously detrimental brain drain is in the development quest of developing countries: 
some studies outrightly hold that rather than view the emigration of professionals from the 
developing countries to the developed countries in purely negative terms that evidence 
abound about the beneficial impact of migration on origin countries especially through 
remittances, brain-circulation and foreign direct investment and technology transfer. 
This study is anchored on three hypotheses which seek to establish whether or not 
there is a link between sustained depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals 
through brain drain and inefficient healthcare delivery; domestic investment incentives and 
diaspora-led investments in the Nigerian economy; and, tighter regulation of the global 
regime of intellectual property rights and diaspora-led industrial investments towards 
technology transfer. These hypotheses are couched in relational terms; that is, dependent and 
independent variables. The usefulness of relational categorisation of variables lies in its 
general applicability, simplicity and special importance in conceptualising and designing 
research as well as communicating the results of research (Kerlinger 1973:35). The 
relationship amongst variables in our hypotheses is asymmetrical. As Rosenberg (1968:9-10) 
opines, “in this type of relationship, we postulate that one variable (the independent variable) 
is essentially ‘responsible for’ another (the dependent variable)”. Table 1.2 contains the 
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hypotheses that guided this study and denoted the relational connectedness of the variables as 
well as the trajectory of causality. 
 




Connector  Dependent Variable 
Hypothesis 1 The sustained 
depletion of the stock 






Hypothesis 2 Domestic investment 
incentives  
 
Tend to boost 
Diaspora-led 
investments in the 
Nigerian economy 
Hypothesis 3 The tighter regulation 






technology transfer  
 
Having established the relational connectedness of the variables in our hypotheses, it 
is appropriate at this juncture to proffer operational definitions and empirical referents of the 
constitutive variables in our hypotheses. These will not only guide the collation of the 
necessary data but also lead us to the validation or otherwise of our hypothetical statements. 
Operationalising concepts and variables used in the construction of hypotheses is 
critically important. Its importance lies in the fact that it establishes consistency in the 
understanding of what these concepts and variables represent. Obasi (1999:51) enumerates 
further importance of operationalising variables as including: the simplification of variables 
that otherwise would have been complex; the promotion of clarity, specificity and 
concreteness in research through the removal of abstractness and ambiguity; limiting an array 
of meanings that a variable would have assumed thus ensuring the manageability of research 
work and enabling hypotheses to be expressed and tested in clear, specific and purposeful 
manner.  What this implies is that misunderstanding often surrounding the exact meaning of 
concepts and variables due to their susceptibility to multiplicity of interpretations is 
minimised as their meanings are standardised. The operationalisation of concepts entails their 
metamorphosis from the level of abstraction to concreteness. Thus, concepts transform to 
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variables and these variables have indicators or parameters that set measurement criteria. In 
other words, operationalisation ensures that variables are assigned empirically observable, 
verifiable and measurable values (Obasi 1999:26).  Table 1.3 below specifies the meanings 











Table 1.3: Classification of Empirical /Operational Indicators or Referents 
 
Hypotheses Concepts 
Operational referents/indicators Hypotheses 
 
 
The sustained depletion of the stock of 
Nigeria’s health professionals through brain 






- Continuous reduction in number; 
- Decrement in stock;  
- Uninterrupted erosion. 
 





- Trained persons in health-related course or profession; 
- Personnel with basic academic degrees in health-related 
courses and qualified by relevant bodies. 
 
(iii)  Brain drain; 
 
 
- Outward movement of tertiary-educated and highly-skilled 
personnel from a country of origin to another country; 




- Sub-optimal  






- Provision of health service; 
- Prevention, cure and management of diseases (both 
communicable and non-communicable diseases) 
Domestic investment incentives tend to boost 







- Government provision of infrastructure such as good roads, 
power supply, land, investment fund and tax exemptions for 










- Investments made by either individuals or corporate bodies 
in countries other than theirs. 
- Finances or capital injected into an economy for the purpose 
of achieving returns. 
- Equity and portfolio investments by members of the diaspora 
designed to yield returns for personal financial gains. 
The tighter regulation of the global regime of 
intellectual property rights is inhibitive of 













- Rights relating to the control of patents, copyrights and other 
rights pertaining to ownership or control of ideas, 






- Investments spearheaded by the diaspora for the purpose of 
enhancing the production /manufacturing of goods and 



















- Country’s reported stock of health 
professional;  
- Country’s reported health indices 
- Rate of turn-out of health professionals 
by institutions; 
- Rate of emigration of health 
professionals; 
- Cross-country comparative availability of 
health professional; 
- Ratio of health professionals to 
population. 





- Government incentive package: Tax 
holiday, liberalization of economic 
sectors; 
- Representative domestic investment 
profile of the diaspora; 
- Reported rate and value of FDI inflows; 




- Intellectual property rights 
- Conditions for diffusion of new 
technologies.  
- Conditions for research and development 
- National and international restrictions to 




The measurement indicators help in the precise assemblage of relevant data to prove or 
disprove our hypotheses. Table 1.4 shows the measurement indicators of the hypotheses. The 
sources of data which this study utilised to examine the research questions are traditionally 
categorised as secondary sources. Secondary sources of data are undoubtedly useful as they 
represent a repository of data and facts about events as seen from the eyes of chroniclers and 
survey analysts. Whether sources of data are primary or secondary, the issue of reliability and 
validity of data is critically important. 
We recognise that there are likely threats to the validity and reliability of our research 
data. These threats include: subjective and value-laden exposition by previous commentaries, 
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arbitrariness in the choices of data to be collated by the investigator, absence of independent 
controls to assess characteristic errors, political control and manipulation of statistical data, 
and discrepancies in conclusions reached in the analysis of the same events by commentators/ 
researchers. 
The methodology which the study adopted in sifting through the corpus of data at its 
disposal is content analysis: it evaluated the data against the backdrop of empirical indicators 
earlier identified. Content analysis, as Igwe (2002:12) notes, is the “interpretative 
understanding of the substance of various forms of communications, whether written, spoken 
or symbolic”. Such interpretative understanding is anchored on “a careful definition of 
concepts, the establishment of categories and units for processes, actions, and actors, and a 
specification of how judgements are to be made in the classification of pieces of information” 
(Leege and Francis.1974:210-211). In fact through the instrumentality of content analysis, 
uniformity and consistency amongst the various data were established thus bestowing some 
sort of integrity upon them. And the errors likely to stem from the sources of data were 
reduced to the barest minimum by careful cross-comparison of data sources. 
 
 
(iii) Method of Data Analysis and Presentation 
 
The collection of data is only an aspect of the network of requirements for the 
validation or otherwise of hypotheses. The data so collected must be systematically analysed 
to demonstrate the relationship amongst variables. As Igwe (2002:103) observes ‘most 
research data are meaningless except classified”. The data will be analysed in the tradition of 
qualitative descriptive research with the application of one-group time-series research design. 
The analysis and presentation of the data will also be done within the ambit of the modern 
world system theoretical framework using statistical tables, simple percentages and charts. 
 
 
(iv) Logical Data Framework (LDF) 
 
Logical data framework distils and presents the research procedure in a format that 
eases comprehension of the research.  It is presented in tabular format. Table 1.5 shows the 




Table 1.5:   Logical Data Framework (LDF) 
 
S/N Hypothesis Variable Main Indicators 
 




The sustained depletion 
of the stock of 
Nigeria’s health 
professionals through 







of the stock of 
Nigeria’s health 
professionals 
through brain drain 
 
- Country’s reported 
stock of health 
professional;  
- Rate of turn-out of 
health professionals 
by institutions; 




availability of health 
professional; 




- WHO   documents; 
- WHO website; 
- UNICEF documents; 
- FMOH documents; 
- MDCN website; 
- Nigeria’s National Bureau 
of Statistics; 
- World Health Reports; 
- IOM 
publications/websites; 




papers and reports. 
 
 
- Documentary method; 
- Content analysis of 
secondary source 
materials such as official 
documents, longitudinal 
statistical compilations, 
books, journals, essays 
interviews, reports, annual 




framework of modern 




group time series 
design; 
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Financial Review journal, 
CBN briefs etc);  
 
- Documentary method; 
- Content analysis of 
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Nigerian diaspora; 
- Investments by 
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and affiliates. 
- NIPC publications; 
- Nigeria’s National Bureau 
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- World Bank/IMF; 




papers, and reports. 
 
statistical compilations, 
books, journals, essays 
interviews, reports, annual 
and periodic reports. 
 
application of one-
group time series 
design; 
- Statistical tables; 
- Figures; 
- Simple percentages; 









- Remittance inflows; 
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- World Bank publications; 
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1.10 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS/CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
 
 Several concepts were used in this study. Many concepts have multiplicity of 
meanings depending on the context of their usage and the meaning which the researcher 
attaches to them. In order to avoid the arbitrariness in allocating values to our concepts, there 
is need to standardise their meanings. The major concepts have been identified and set below 
with the meaning attached to them in the study. These are: 
 
i. Brain Drain:  The loss of tertiary-educated and highly-skilled persons through 
emigration from their country of origin to another country. This loss is usually to 
the detriment of the home country of the émigrés. It also denotes the rapid 
emigration of this class of human resources more than they can be replaced or 
reproduced. Brain drain involves the depletion of strategic manpower, which 
seriously affects skill formation and creates a growth-retarding backwash effect. 
 
ii. Remittances: Remittances represent the portion of migrant workers’ earnings sent 
home to their families, relatives and friends. Remittances have been a critical 
means of financial support from the diaspora to people in their home countries.  
 
iii. National Development: This implies dynamic process of structural 
transformation of the economy, polity and socio-cultural arena, which leads to 
growth, advancement, empowerment, and progress in all dimensions of human 
life and activity in a country. 
 
iv. Nigerian Diaspora: Diaspora generally refers to a group of people “dispersed” 
from their place of origin either by design or forcefully but who still share some 
sense of common identity and maintain ongoing links with their place of origin in 
diverse forms. Nigerian diaspora connotes people who originated from Nigeria by 
birth but who live outside the shores of Nigeria as citizens, permanent or 





v. Internal Migration: This refers to the movement of people within their country 
of origin. It could take the form of rural-urban migration; rural-rural migration or 
urban-urban migration.  
 
vi. International Migration: The movement of people from their countries of origin 
to other countries for various reasons. International migration is induced by both 
domestic and international forces ranging from socio-economic crisis to political 
instability on one side to socio-economic prosperity and political stability on the 
other. It could be voluntary or forced. An example of voluntary international 
migration is brain drain or the deliberate emigration of persons out of their home 
countries. Forced migrants consist of trafficked persons, asylum seekers or 
refugees. 
 
vii. Net Migration Rate: The difference in the number of immigrants and emigrants 
in a country within a defined period of time.  
 
viii. Population Movement: This connotes the physical movement by groups of 
people from one geographical area to another. Population movement could occur 
through three major mechanisms: voluntary, forced or induced. 
 
ix. Labour Migration: The movement of all categories of workers from their home 
countries to other countries where their services are in demand. 
 
x. Brain Gain:  This refers to the transference of the expertise and acquired 
knowledge of the diaspora into the domestic arena by returning migrants.  The 
home country is believed to generally benefit from the knowledge acquired by 
migrants when they return home. 
 
xi. Reverse-Migration or Return-Migration:  The return of migrants to their home 
countries and the deployment of knowledge, skills and expertise acquired in the 













 Although Nigerians had emigrated in the past, the circumstances and forces that 
shaped emigration then were different from those that motorise it contemporaneously. Apart 
from slave trade, Nigerian migrants in colonial and immediate postcolonial period tended to 
travel for personal development in terms of acquiring higher qualifications. But now, 
emigration is an antidote to the inadequacies of Nigeria’s domestic economy. Contemporary 
labour migration and brain drain in Nigeria are products of domestic and international forces. 
At the domestic arena, the interplay of political and socio-economic forces laid the 
foundation for labour migration and brain drain. In concrete terms, the economic 
uncertainties whose manifestations were locatable in unemployment, underemployment and 
lack of job satisfaction; the political instability and sundry ethnic conflicts, which have 
spawned various forms of marginalisation in the polity, all served as the necessary push 
factors that underpinned labour migration and brain drain out of Nigeria. Although labour 
migration and brain drain have drilled a large hole in Nigeria’s manpower formation, it is the 
brain drain phenomenon (the emigration of Nigeria’s highly-skilled professionals) that has 
had far-reaching implications on its development prospects as Nigeria’s vital sectors are 
shorn of the necessary skilled professionals to drive them.  
 At the international arena, the politics and economics of global competition for 
ascendancy led to the adoption of important domestic policies in the developed countries, 
especially the lowering of immigration hurdles for migrants. A combination of such factors as 
the quest to remain at the core of the modern world system, low fertility and ageing 
population as a result of high life expectancy and improved health services in the developed 
countries kept the doors of emigration open. This chapter evaluates the politics and 
economics of the emigration of Nigeria’s highly-skilled manpower and the effects which this 





2.2 THE DYNAMICS AND DIALECTICS OF LABOUR MIGRATION AND 
BRAIN DRAIN IN NIGERIA 
 
Labour migration and brain drain are not new phenomena in Nigeria’s political 
economy and architecture of development. Nigeria’s labour stock has played key roles in the 
global epochal phases through forceful and voluntary migrations. Nigeria’s contact with 
Europeans spawned the ground that led to the wholesale and organised depopulation of its 
human resources through the salve trade and continues through the brain drain syndrome 
(Igwe 2002:398). The nature of global political economy at the period that Europeans first 
came in contact with Nigeria (in the pre-colonial and colonial periods) required human 
capital to power Euro-American economic interests. The instrumentality of labour migration 
then was forceful slavery and migrants composed of virile young men and women whose 
physical strength was paramount in the production chain. The shift in economic policy of 
Europe underpinned the anti-slavery campaign and the imperialism that followed.  
The divergence of views about who exploits and who is exploited in the milieu of 
labour migration inhered from the misunderstanding of the forces at play in the production 
chain, especially the changing nature of labour processes in the course of production. As Ake 
(1981:11) observes, “the productive forces express the overall productive capabilities of the 
society. They tend to develop all the time”. It is this constant development that determines the 
quality of labour that is relevant in each epoch. The contemporary brain drain is a product of 
the advances and changes in the global production system. These changes dictated the type of 
labour power needed to motorise production. Two contradictory scenarios created the 
trajectory of brain drain: one, the seeming incapacity of the developed countries to raise the 
necessary manpower to drive production; and two, the incapacity of such countries like 
Nigeria to adequately utilise and compensate its highly skilled manpower. 
The Western Europe used to be the main losers especially to the US until recently 
when the developing countries took over as the biggest suppliers of qualified professionals to 
the industrialised world as a whole (Oyowe 1996:59). These migrant professionals 
unwittingly contribute to the ever-present disparities between the world’s rich and poor 
states. Between 1960 and 2000, the total global migrant stock increased from 92 to 165 
million. The greatest growth in the number of migrants was largely driven by people 
migrating from the developing countries to the developed countries, which increased from 14 
million to 60 million over the period (Ozden et al 2011). Currently there are over 215.8 
million immigrants, refugees or asylum-seekers and migrant workers outside their countries 
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of birth or citizenship. As a result their sheer number, if these migrants were to assemble in a 
common geographical location, they would be among the world’s ten largest countries 
(Martin 1994: 241; IFAD 2007:2; World Bank 2011:18). 
Yaqub (2007:4) asserts that brain drain is neither a phenomenon that recency could be 
ascribed to nor its damaging effects restricted to Nigeria. Brain drain negatively affects every 
country that is a victim, whether the country is classified within the developed or 
underdeveloped section of the world as it involves the international transfer of resources in 
the form of human capital from one country to another (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 
2003:1). Dilworth (2009) corroborates that brain drain equally threatens developed countries 
as exemplified by the erosion of Canada’s economic prospects and competitiveness as a 
result of the mass emigration of skilled Canadians in search of the satiation of sundry 
personal expectations ranging from higher salaries, lower taxes to more opportunities. The 
difference between the developed countries and their underdeveloped counterparts lie their 
different abilities to engender appropriate policies to cushion the effects. Cervantes and 
Guellec (2002) have pointed out that the developed countries have put in place various 
frameworks to discourage brain drain from, and encourage brain flow to, their countries. In 
2000, the British government in collaboration with the Wolfson Foundation, a research 
charity, launched a £20 million scheme aimed at attracting the return of Britain’s leading 
expatriate scientists and top young researchers to the United Kingdom. In the same year, 
(2000) the US Congress announced an increment in the number of temporary work visas 
granted to highly skilled professionals under its H1B visa programme from 115,000 to 
195,000 per year until 2003. The aggressive policies put in place by the developed countries 
to attract and retain both skilled labour and professionals in their economies have been to the 
detriment of developing countries. On the other hand, the brain drain flows from the 
underdeveloped countries have been patently unidirectional. To underscore the pervasiveness 
and counterproductive nature of brain drain, Yaqub (2007:4) laments:  
The problem, it must be emphasized, is not just its 
unidirectionness, but that it is flowing from the very countries 
that could ill-afford the process to those that could do without, 
which nonetheless and given the robust nature of their socio-
economic conditions, welcome the émigrés. What makes the 
loss of the under developed countries more painful is that they 
are never likely to experience any net gain whenever brain 
drain occurs in any developed country.  
 
The point being made here is that while the emigration of skilled and talented workers 
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to the developed countries translates into gain in the receiving country, it is a monumental 
loss to the developing country with the effect that the grim development challenges facing 
these countries are made grimmer. Nigeria’s manpower dilemma is attributed to brain drain. 
For instance, between 2000 and 2005, Nigeria reportedly lost 21,988 health workers to brain 
drain. (http://www.andnetwork.com/app?service/0/Homes/$StorySummary$0.$DirectLink$2 
&sp=127830). There is no doubt that educational attainment of the population plays a 
critically important role in national development trajectories. This point underpins the various 
immigration strategies of the West aimed at attracting the very best educated personnel from 
Africa and elsewhere. Therefore, despite the seeming inadequacy of skilled and professional 
manpower in Nigeria, the few that underwent training using up scarce state resources for their 
training were mopped up by the developed countries. The implications of this are: first, 
investments in education in Nigeria may not lead to faster economic growth if a large 
proportion of its educated populace leave; secondly, efforts to reduce specific manpower 
shortages may be futile unless there are incentives that discourage emigration. 
These manifestations of the effects of the brain drain do not constitute the entire 
picture. Other negative effects of brain drain which have stymied Nigeria’s vision to translate 
its potentials to actual greatness include the disappearance of a critical mass of professionals 
to spearhead the coordination of researches, the delivery of public services (notably health 
and education) and the manning of political institutions; and fiscal losses due to foregone 
revenues from public investment in the human capital of those who emigrate (Batista, 
Lacuesta and Vicente 2007:3). 
There is little doubt that brain drain has been quite extensive with regards to the 
number of émigrés and the effects that emigrations have had on the Nigerian economy. The 
UK National Health Service in acknowledgement of “proxy vandalisation” of Africa’s health 
sector rescinded its policy of active staff recruitment from sub-Saharan Africa in 2001. Both 
the British Medical Association (BMA) and the Royal College of Nursing considered the 
move of the UK National Health Service as a “strong moral lead” worthy of emulation by 
other developed countries (Clemens and Petterson 2006:2). In spite of the open admission of 
human resource vandalism by the developed countries, they have continued to evolve soft 
policies to attract highly skilled personnel. According to Clemens and Petterson (2006:5-6), 
OECD countries of UK, US, France, Australia, Canada, Portugal, Belgium and Spain account 
for 94.2 per cent of all African-born, university-educated people in 2000”. 
It is not only in the health sector that the debilitating effects of brain drain manifest; it 
permeates every sector of the economy. The brain drain phenomenon in Nigeria inhered from 
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the causative agency of economic stagnation. Yaqub (2007:2) notes that: 
  
The sudden collapse of the [Nigerian] economy refracted 
equally and most dramatically into the universities, among 
other services provided in the social sector of the economy. The 
consequence of this development led to.... the worst aspects of 
the phenomenon of brain drain whose impact has been with the 
universities, virtually since then till date. 
 
The institutions (universities, research institutions and other citadels of learning) 
which would have been in the forefront of capacity building were themselves swallowed in 
the eddy of economic and political contradictions that enveloped Nigeria in the 1980s (Yaqub 
2007:2). It was not just the remunerations of the academics that were rendered inadequate by 
the plummeting Naira (Nigeria’s currency), budgetary allocation to the universities shrank 
making it practically impossible to procure basic teaching tools and materials as well as 
engage in researches as grants were not forthcoming. 
Oni (2000:2) underscores the importance of education in the overall schema of 
development when he asserts that the advancement of the developed countries has been 
dependent on aggressive development of both human and institutional capacity. Universities, 
research centres, industries, foundations and the government play a critical role in the 
institutionalisation of capacity-building. The pervasiveness of poverty as well as economic 
stagnation in Africa and the recent rapid economic development of countries of South East 
Asia are contrastingly reflective of their deliberate policies on human capital building and 
sustenance. Therefore, the poaching of developing countries’ manpower not only eroded the 
basis of their development but stymied their development prospects. The prevalence of this 
trend led to the conclusion in extant literature that developing countries have been 
unwittingly subsidising the manpower needs of the developed countries (Yaqub 2007:4). 
All over the world, investment in education especially at the tertiary level constitutes 
a critical component of national development efforts. While Africa and indeed Nigeria make 
efforts at human capacity building they lack the requisite conducive economic environment to 
retain them within the country. Citing relevant data records, Obasi (2006:5) informs that: 
 
The estimates by the UN Economic Commission for Africa and 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) show that 
27,000 African professionals left the continent from 1960 – 
1974. The figure rose to 40,000 from 1975 to 1984. Again, this 
rose to 60,000 from 1985 to 1989. And since 1990, it is 




The same trend characterised Nigeria. It was estimated that prior to 1996 over 21,000 
Nigerian medical doctors were practising in the United States alone. Other estimates put the 
number of Nigerian doctors working in OECD countries at 4,611 and nurses at 13,398 
(Oyowe 1996:; Hovy 2010:10-11). What this means is that Nigeria’s capacity to compete 
globally is undermined since its army of skilled work force is sucked into the developed 
countries and is thus used to satisfy their manpower needs. And since knowledge is power, 
their continued domination of the world to its detriment is assured except a policy is evolved 
to harness them. As Udoh (2011) has observed, “Nigerians have excelled in health-care 
delivery system, in engineering, in information technology, in law and politics, in virtually all 
the professions that have cutting edge or best practices here in the United States and 
elsewhere”. But, this world-wide success of the Nigerian diaspora appears not to reflect in 
Nigeria’s domestic arena. The absence of the Nigerian diaspora in national development 
calculations has thrown up certain socio-economic contradictions. One, Nigeria’s investment 
in manpower development continues to service the developed economies; and two, non-
integration of highly-skilled diasporan human resources for domestic development creates the 
paradox of penury in plenty. At the core of the alienation of the Nigerian diaspora in national 
development is the absence of policies and platforms to facilitate vital cross-pollination of 
ideas necessary to engender development through their input.  
The isolated effects which the brain drain has on Nigeria are: the exacerbation of its 
underdevelopment and the stifling of the prospects of economic development. This is so 
because informed projections postulate that “every year there are 20,000 fewer people in 
Africa to deliver key public services, drive economic growth, and articulate calls for greater 
democracy and development (Sriskandarajah 2005b). And Nigeria constitutes a large chunk 
of this figure. Considering the multiplicity of factors that underpin brain drain, it is difficult 
to evolve a universal strategy to roll it back. Generally, migration or brain drain has both 
positive and negative attributes. It is only when it is properly contextualised that its overall 
effects could be determined. And such contextualisation must have within its purview the 
complete picture to enable a valid conclusion. As Sriskandarajah (2005b) opines:  
 
… Brain drain can only tell part of the story about migration’s 
overall impact on an economy or society. When all other 
impacts of migration – such as remittances, inward investment, 
technology transfer, increased trade flows, and charitable 
activities of Diaspora communities – are taken into account, the 




The effects of brain drain on countries are not uniform but according to their special 
circumstances. Several peculiar domestic factors determine whether out-migration is 
pernicious or benign.  Such countries as India, China, Philippines and Mexico which have a 
large pool of skilled personnel consider overseas outlets for their citizen as desirable and, 
therefore, have institutional frameworks to harness and facilitate emigration. Under this 
circumstance therefore, these countries are merely deploying their excess human resources 
abroad to fetch higher value for both the individual and the country. The same scenario does 
not conduce to the Nigerian situation. Brain drain poses critical development challenges as it 
symbolises the shearing off of Nigeria’s limited human resources. While conceding to 
Sriskandarajah (2005b) that brain drain is not always negative as some migrants often return 
with greater skills, remit money back home or in some cases motivate citizens to acquire 
higher skills and education, yet the logic of brain drain is premised on the well-being of 
recipient countries. Whatever the sending country gains is incidental and therefore of inferior 




3.3 NIGERIA’S DOMESTIC MILIEU AND KEY DRIVERS OF BRAIN DRAIN  
 
The brain drain phenomenon in Nigeria is not attributable to, nor driven by, a single 
factor. Several factors act as push factors. The periodisation of brain drain in post-
independence Nigeria coincided with the manifestation of certain systemic contradictions 
such as structural defects, institutional distortions and infrastructural inadequacies. These 
factors combined to limit the capacity of the Nigerian State to meet its obligations to the 
people. The structural defects that characterised the Nigeria economy consisted of unhealthy 
ethnic rivalry, skewed federal system and undiversified, monolithic and monocultural 
production bases, which oscillated from the production of agricultural produce and 
exploitation of solid minerals in the 1960s to exclusive reliance on oil as the country’s major 
export earner since the 1970s. The institutional distortions which plagued the Nigerian state 
included weak institutional capacity for economic policy management and coordination 
among the tiers of government, debt overhang and erosion of national economic sovereignty, 
macroeconomic policy inconsistencies, political instability, public sector dominance in 
production and consumption, incapacity to manage ethnic tensions and the frequent eruption 
of violence, and corruption.  The infrastructural inadequacies which limited the capacity of 
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Nigeria and thus worsened the health of its economy included constant power outages as a 
result inadequate generation and poor distribution of electric power; bad road networks across 
the country, moribund rail system, poor healthcare delivery system and collapse of social 
services (Nwozor 2006:154). All these contradictions underpinned the push factors that 
prepared the ground for the sustained mass emigration of Nigeria’s highly-skilled manpower. 
On their own and separately, the already identified systemic flaws in the Nigerian economy 
did not automatically result in the mass emigration of highly-skilled Nigerians. It was the 
greater interplay of these factors, with their constriction on the capacity of this category of 
Nigerians to practice their professions and enjoy good life therefrom, that induced brain 
drain. 
The internal dynamics which motorised brain drain in the Nigerian state can be 
categorised into four phases: the first phase was the period of high-level political turmoil that 
pitched the nascent political class in the struggle for supremacy and control of state apparatus 
of power. The struggle for state power amongst the political elite unleashed violence and 
political instability that reverberated around the country. Ake (1981: 126) attributes the 
underlying motive for the ensuing struggle for political power to the high premium attached 
to its acquisition as a result of its manifold utilitarian value. Therefore, political power in the 
post-independence Nigeria became the easiest way to accumulate wealth as well as the means 
to acquiring larger-than-life profile through the exclusive power it confers on power brokers 
and government functionaries to dispense state patronage. An interesting feature of the 
Nigerian state is its synonymousness with the ruling class and the use of the state to prosecute 
the class war in favour of the ruling class. It was this struggle that snowballed into the 
Nigerian civil war with millions of fatalities. The humanitarian crisis resulting from the war 
and the fear of state reprisal opened the gate for the mass emigration of Nigerians, especially 
from the war-ravaged section. Indeed, despite the Nigerian government’s avowed official 
policy of reconciliation, reconstruction, and rehabilitation, otherwise referred to as the “three 
R’s” and the declaration of “victor, no vanquished”, the unofficial policy of the Nigerian state 
was a surreptitious stigmatisation and marginalisation of the people of Eastern Nigeria 
particularly, the Igbo ethnic stock. The Igbos were not only estranged from the mainstream of 
Nigeria’s socio-economic and political sphere, they were immobilised economically as their 
life savings were punitively seized by the Nigerian state in exchange for twenty pounds 
irrespective of the worth of the their savings (Ukaogo 2010:12). The effect of this was the 
evolvement of new migratory orientation. 
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The second phase was the post-oil boom period, which was characterised by reversal 
in Nigeria’s economic fortunes and contractions in government budgetary allocation. Three 
issues defined this phase. One was the crystallisation of the trajectory of the Nigerian 
economy to monoculturalism. Prior to this phase, Nigeria enjoyed a relatively high standard 
of living as it depended on a bouquet of primary commodities such as groundnut, cocoa, 
rubber, palm oil, timber and such solid minerals such as coal and tin. The good run of oil 
prices as a result of OPEC intervention led inexorably to the abandonment of multiple 
streams of foreign exchange earnings through primary commodities to total dependence on 
oil. Two, the expansion in Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings in the period of oil boom was 
not judiciously invested. Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings rose exponentially from a few 
hundred million Naira to N4.733 billion in 1975 and N15 billion in 1980 (Nwozor 2005:141). 
It was estimated that between 1973 and 1981, Nigeria earned over US$ 60 billion from oil 
(Ikpeze 2004:6). Expansion in Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings led to expansion in elite 
accumulative tendencies. As Olukoshi (1990:84) avers, “the huge amount of petrodollars 
accruing to the state led to an unprecedented expansion in public expenditure. From N8.258 
billion in 1975, state expenditure rose dramatically to   N13.281 billion in 1979 and N23.695 
billion in 1980”. So, despite Nigeria’s phenomenal earnings, it became indebted to 
multilateral financial institutions, Western countries and consortia of banks in Europe and 
America. The genesis of Nigeria’s debt entrapment was the first jumbo loan it borrowed in 
1977 and a second one in 1978. The jumbo loans were immediately filtered away as a result 
the skewed expenditure pattern that was overly consumptive. Gen. Obasanjo’s regime 
contracted the loans in tranches of N600 million (US$1 billion) and N734 million (US$1.456 
billion) (Nwozor 2005:139). Pockets of indiscriminate borrowings by both the federal and 
state governments in an effort to keep up with, and bridge the yawning gap, between 
Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings and the burgeoning recurrent expenditure profile led to 
economic crisis. Three, Nigeria’s indebtedness robbed it of its economic sovereignty and led 
to the active intrusion and control of its economy by the international financial institution 
(IFIs) especially, the IMF and the World Bank. 
The third phase was the era of economic and social turbulence occasioned by the 
imposition of economic reforms. As a result of Nigeria’s unsustainable debt profile, its 
capacity to meet its international financial obligations was compromised, thus, unleashing the 
IFIs on its economic sphere with all manner of reform packages. According to Nwozor 
(2005: 139), Nigeria’s debt rose to US$8.9 billion in 1980 and US$29.00 in 1992. Three 
factors combined to create contradictions in the Nigeria economy: one, the ever-expanding 
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debt profile with its equally expanding debt service obligations; two, the slump in the 
international price of oil; and three, the unhealthy and unsustainable expansion in public 
expenditure. To address the gradually unfolding scenario for economic crisis, the IFIs 
recommended economic stabilisation strategies whose inefficiency in stopping the further 
deterioration of the Nigerian economy gave way to austerity measures. By 1986, Nigeria 
introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which had far-reaching detrimental 
effects on its economy. Apart from its economic backlash on all sectors of the Nigerian 
economy, SAP spawned social turmoil, which was a reaction to its effects on the standard of 
living of the people. In the two decades preceding the implementation of the SAP 
conditionalities, the Nigerian state had devoted substantial resources to the social sector 
especially in the areas of health, education and infrastructural development. Government at 
all levels invested in primary, secondary and tertiary health facilities and collaborated with 
UNICEF, WHO and other international organisations in the provision of healthcare services 
in such areas as preventive health and disease control and eradication. In the education sector, 
substantial success was recorded in the levels of school, numbers of schools and the high 
quality of their products as the government initiated universal free primary education as well 
as expanded access to education. But SAP’s emphasis on drastic reduction in social services 
spending created contradictions and reversals in the gains had been recorded in social service 
delivery. UNICEF alarmingly demanded for a SAP with a human face. In the same vein, the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) proposed an African Alternative Framework to 
Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation with 
emphasis on adjustment within a longer term developmental perspective, human resource 
development and the maintenance and improvement of social services (Adepoju 1993:4). In 
1987/88, UNICEF published two volumes dedicated to drawing attention to the negative 
effects of SAP, especially the deepening of poverty in the countries implementing it. 
UNICEF pointed out two factors which had prevented sustained growth namely, deflationary 
nature of most adjustment programmes, which reduced demand, depressed employment and 
real incomes; and, the direct negative effects of some macro-economic policies, particularly 
those relating to cost-recovery programmes, abolition of subsidies on essential commodities, 
cuts in social expenditure and the liberalisation of exchange controls, on vulnerable groups, 
such as the poor and those on fixed employment (Zack-William 2000:69). The most 
detrimental conditionality of SAP was the devaluation of the Nigerian currency, the Naira. 
Through the instrumentality of the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), the 
Nigeria Naira, which was supposed to be devalued by 60 percent, had a free fall and was 
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instead devalued by as much as 500 percent. The implication of the unprecedented 
devaluation of the Naira was its direct impact on Nigeria’s debt profile. Since Nigeria must 
pay its debt obligations in Dollars, it meant that it must source for more funds to meet the 
same obligations it had hitherto met (Gana 1990:99). The SAP era saw the reversal of the 
little national progress made in the preceding decades. In deference to SAP conditionalities, 
the Nigerian state drastically reduced or stopped budgetary allocations to social services. 
Such sectors as health and education were worse hit as their infrastructure began to decay and 
thus, became unsupportive of world class services. An unfortunate effect of SAP was the 
desiccation of the middle class whose salaries seemingly became inadequate to cater for its 
needs. Lack of conducive operational environment in the face of grossly inadequate salaries 
and the absence of redemptive policies to redress the fallout of SAP created the conditions for 
the redefinition of the boundaries of patriotism by Nigeria professionals. 
The fourth phase coincided with the era characterised by political instability, political 
intolerance and ascendancy of autocratic rule with sit-tight tendencies. The economic 
contradictions characterised by the erosion of Nigeria’s sovereign control over its economy 
combined with the hostile political climate to deepen the distrust and lack of faith amongst 
Nigerian professionals to continue to remain at home. Hagher (2011:122) captures it 
succinctly. 
The middleclass was wiped out by Babangida’s anti-people 
decrees. University lecturers and professionals could no longer 
feed their families and lived in fear as the military and the 
dreaded SSS [State Security Service] became a state instrument 
of coercion and brutalization. 
 
The re-interpretation of patriotism in this phase consisted in the survivalist search for 
greener pastures despite the development challenges that faced, and still face, the country. 
This phase was marked by widespread human right abuses, the height of which was 
symbolised by the state execution of world-acclaimed environmental rights activist, Mr Ken-
Saro Wiwa; the imposition of wide-ranging sanctions on Nigeria by the international 
community; the designation of Nigeria as a pariah state with far-reaching implication on 
opportunities for Nigerian professionals; and, the stultification and truncation of political 
rights of Nigerians as exemplified by the annulment of June 12 1993 presidential election. 
Ken-Saro Wiwa’s statement before he was extra-judicially executed by the General Sani 
Abacha regime in November 10, 1995 captures the far-reaching implications of the 




We all stand on trial, my lord, for by our actions we have 
denigrated our country and jeopardized the future of our 
children. As we subscribe to the subnormal and accept double 
standards, as we lie and cheat openly, as we protect injustice 
and oppression, we empty our classrooms, degrade our 
hospitals, and make ourselves the slaves of those who subscribe 
to higher standards, who pursue the truth, and honour justice, 
freedom and hard work (cited in Nigerian Times 2005). 
 
The internal dynamics within the Nigerian political economy created specified conditions 
that acted as push factors for emigration. They include among others: 
a) Internal economic crisis;  
b) Religious and ethnic crisis; 
c) War and civil unrest; 
d) Political instability; 
e) Private and public corruption that 
f) Lack of basic infrastructure. 
 
The introduction of SAP with the devaluation of the Nigerian currency worsened the 
inherent contradictions in the economy. At the core was its incapacity to provide meaningful 
economic bases to sustain the means of livelihood of its teeming highly-skilled manpower. In 
the private sector, most companies’ warehouses were filled with unsold inventories, and 
being unable to maintain profitability, they began to rationalise their workforce and in 
extreme cases, closed down. The story was the same in the public sector as the government at 
all levels not only downsized their work force but also imposed embargo on employment. 
The Federal Government underpinned its labour policy on the philosophy of lean workforce. 
The combined effect was massive unemployment and institutionalisation of poverty. Poverty 
levels in Nigeria rose from 27.2 percent in 1980 to 46.3 percent in 1995. By 1996, the level of 











Table 3.1:  Trends in Poverty Level (1980 - 2004) 
(Percentage)  
 
Year Poverty Level Estimated Total Population Population in Poverty 
1980 27.2 65 million 17.7 million 
1985 46.3 75 million 34.7 million 
1992 42.7 91.5 million 39.1 million 
1996 65.6 102.3 million 67.1 million 
2000 70.0 115.2 million 80.6 million 
2004 54.2 129.9 million 70.4 million 
(Source: NBS 2009:73; CBN 2004:106) 
 
Unemployment and high level of poverty effectively dismantled the Nigerian 
middleclass, thus, destroying the last bastion of solidarity against mass emigration. One by 
one, highly-skilled Nigerians began to leave the shores of country until the core sectors of its 
economy including the health and education sectors became empty. Even those who were not 
affected by the rationalisation policy had to contend with low wages and salaries whose 
purchasing capability had been grossly eroded. The devaluation of the Nigerian currency, 
which was at par with the United States Dollar prior to the introduction of SFEM, meant that 
workers’ salaries were effectively devalued. Nigeria’s budgetary allocations to the health and 
education sectors plummeted sharply that professionals in these sectors were in a quandary 
about how to discharge their statutory obligations. While the budgetary allocation for health 
fell short of the five (5) percent of national budget advocated by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), as per capita allocation to health was US$0.62, the education sector 
fared worse (Adepoju 1993:56). 
The devalued salaries of University academics and lack of funding to the education 
sector combined to create a sense of occupational despair. For one, academics were no longer 
able to access journals and other publications necessary to stay on top of researches. The 
same thing applied to health professionals. For another, these professionals, being integral 
members of the society with roles and responsibilities, were unable to meet their societal 
obligations (Hagher 2011:122; Ihonvbere 1994:84). And lastly, the traumatising existential 
conditions characterised by disequilibrium between needs and means further eroded whatever 
was left of the dignity of a broad section of professionals including academics. Many entered 
the survivalist race by engaging in seemingly undignifying jobs like converting personal cars 
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to taxis, and in the academic, churning out half-baked compilation of handouts and forcing 
students to buy same (Yaqub 2007:7). 
The failure of the Nigerian state to address the economic crisis that was steadily 
expanding its cross-class pauperisation from the 1980s created unrest in the polity. Industrial 
unrest between trade unions and government on the one hand, and between trade unions and 
the organised private sector (OPS) on the other, became a new weapon of negotiation for 
better conditions of service. The response of the military regimes was equally a hard-line 
stance of intolerance. Hagher (2011:121) has attributed the factors that engendered mass 
social action against the Nigerian government to the people’s perception of the government 
as insincere, widespread corruption, mass poverty and nepotistic empowerment of political 
allies and cronies in mockery of greater good. Despite the sustained social action by 
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), National 
Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and other unions, neither the condition of the 
people nor that of the state improved substantially. 
The high level of political instability and the culture of impunity, which pervaded the 
polity induced fear amongst the professionals. The academics were haunted and hounded by 
the military juntas as a grand strategy to cow them. They were understandably feared and 
hated by the military oligarchs because of their strategic importance in interest articulation 
and aggregation within the polity. The academics (under ASUU) and indeed other 
professionals under other civil organisations and unions were rightly recognised as the 
melting cauldron of ideas that might be antithetical to the dominant interest of the military 
and their allied political class. In actuality, ASUU and other organisations checkmated the 
seeming excesses of military regimes in terms of inappropriate and anti-people policies. 
Ihonvbere (1994:82) explained the anti-intellectualism of successive Nigeria governments 
thus, “Nigeria has, never really been blessed by leaders who have experienced, and who 
understand, the true value of education and dynamic role of higher institutions in the process 
of national mobilization, development and emancipation”. The premise for this assertion was 
the fact that until the election of late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2007, no Nigeria 
leader (military or democratically elected) was a university graduate. The unhealthy political 
environment which manifested in the usurpation of the university autonomy, the withdrawal 
of academic freedom, the contraction of the political space and the proliferation of anti-
human rights decrees facilitated mass exodus. The broad issues of legitimacy which 
successive military regimes had to contend with imbued them with crude survivalist 
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disposition that found scapegoat in academics. Other push factors within the education sector 
have been identified as: 
 
Unprecedented massacre of students; the unparalleled detention 
of students and academics; the frequent imposition of vice-
chancellors and unrepentant support  for corrupt, inefficient, 
and unpopular vice-chancellors; massive cuts in university 
funding; the abolition of research grants, scholarships and 
bursaries to faculty and students; frequent and confused 
changes to the school calendar; the attempt to monitor teaching 
and research to put it in line with the conservative and 
reactionary policies of the IMF and the World Bank; the 
deterioration of libraries, infrastructures, research facilities and 
laboratories; and the incorporation of academics into 
programmed system of subservience to imperialism, corruption, 
manipulation, and waste (Ihonvbere 1994:83-84). 
 
Added to the growing incapacity of the education and health sectors as a result of 
poor funding and crisis of autonomy were issues relating to career/job satisfaction and career 
growth. Yaqub (2007:6) explains that in the face of eroded purchasing power of the 
academics as well as absence of research grants and empty libraries, the academics whose 
career progression depended on researches and number of publications faced added 
challenge, unlike their counterparts in the non-academic sector. This condition gave rise to 
two scenarios: brain drain and brain waste. Yaqub (2007:7 - 8) captures the response thus:  
 
The culmination of the shortages in funding and the 
simultaneous expansion in student enrolment who had to 
contend with a variety of shortages in accommodation, 
classrooms, inadequately stocked libraries, etc., led to lower 
morale among the staff and those who felt that enough was 
enough exited from the academics, either to overseas 
universities or found a niche in the domestic economy. 
 
Insecurity and constant security crisis around the country also acted as a push factor. 
Insecurity in Nigeria has always manifested in a number of ways especially, in the form of 
ethnic rivalry, religious intolerance or bigotry and political crisis. Apart from the Nigerian 
civil war which had the imprimatur of ethnicity and driven by the quest for separate 
statehood, Nigeria’s socio-political landscape is littered with intra-and inter-ethnic “wars”. 
The Ife – Modakeke and the Aguleri – Umuleri, among many others in almost every part of 
Nigeria, formed examples of intra-ethnic wars. Conflicts (inter-ethnic, religious and political) 
seem ubiquitous in Nigeria, but more so in Northern Nigeria where it has assumed the rule 
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rather than the exception. For instance, there are constant pockets of religious crisis and inter-
ethnic conflicts pitching the Tiv and Jukun whose territories stretch to and covers Benue, 
Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states; the Zango and Kataf in Kaduna state; the Tiv and Azara 
in Nasarawa state; the Bassa and Igbirra in Nasarawa state; the Hausa-Fulani (Jasawa) and 
indigenous tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom in Plateau state, amongst others. There is 
also undefined terrorist war engaged by the Boko Haram Islamic sect in Northern Nigeria that 
has led to the premature death of thousands of people. These conflicts have had far-reaching 
effects. They created and still create: one, insecurity in the polity; two, serious humanitarian 
crisis as a result of the displacement of the people. According to Albert et al (2003:224), not 
less than 18,910 persons excluding children, were displaced in the Ife – Modakeke conflict 
between 1997 and 1998. Three, they engendered and sustained tension which was, and still is, 
antithetical to meaningful socio-economic activities. Armed with the international reportage 
of these conflicts, many highly-skilled Nigerians also joined other categories of labour-
migrants to seek for greener pastures abroad through the normal channel, or through 
application for asylum or refugee depending on the easiest options. 
Political instability also acted as push factors. Nigeria’s political development is filled 
with tension and instability. Since Nigeria’s independence, its political terrain has been 
volatile: it recorded six successful military coup d’états since 1966; countless unsuccessful 
coup attempts; and, four republics depicting distinct democratic transitions, some of them 
violently truncated (1966, 1983 and 1993). Throughout the military era (1966 – 1979; 1984 - 
1999), various military regimes intensified the political tension with arbitrariness, 
intimidation and official recklessness. At every point, opposition to government policies was 
greeted with arrest, torture and even death. As Babawale (2007:20) avers, “protests in 
response to harsh economic realities by workers and students in 1988, 1989, 1991 and 1992 
were met by official repression”. The most prominent event that intensified the emigration of 
Nigerian professionals was the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election which was 
presumed to have been won by the Late Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). The annulment was interpreted both in class and ethnic terms. The 
strategies employed by the Abacha regime to safeguard its seeming tenuous hold on power 
included, the promulgation of decrees outlawing legitimate demands, demonization of 
opposition, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, extrajudicial execution and hired assassination. 
Both the intelligentsia and other high-skilled professionals who had formed a vanguard 
against political injustice became targets of government sponsored assassination plots. The 
dangers to personal safety led many to flee into exile and others to permanently relocate. 
151 
 
3.4 INTERNATIONAL IMPETUS TO MIGRATION AND BRAIN DRAIN 
 
The impetus for brain drain in Nigeria is locatable in the systemic contradictions in 
the domestic economies and the international incentives from the developed countries. This 
impetus for outward migration has been conveniently compartmentalised into pull and push 
factors by scholars (Dovlo 2003:4, Dzimbo 2003:1-3). The push factors depict domestic 
contradictions that created the necessary excuse for highly skilled professionals to emigrate 
and the pull factors, on the other hand connote the conducive circumstances in the developed 
countries that attract and integrate skilled personnel in their economies to maintain their lead 
in the global area. Dzvimbo (2003:3) asserts that while economic, political and environmental 
considerations shape push factors, it is only economic considerations that induce pull factors. 
The point being emphasized, therefore, is that the policies put in place in the developed 
countries are first and foremost stimulated by such economic permutations that continue to 
guarantee their supremacy in the global economic system. But those compartmentalisations 
do not tell the entire story nor convincingly account for complex circumstances that drive 
brain drain. Indeed there are other forces that shape brain drain outside the framework of 
orthodox typologies of pull and push factors. These include suction factors and global 
systemic factors. 
No doubt, the economy of Nigeria is such that its absorptive capacity in spite of its 
potentials is limited. The implication of this is that the likelihood of not realising one’s full 
potential in one’s profession as a result of systemic inadequacies is more real than imagined. 
Brain drain is intricately linked to the nature of capitalist relationship in the world system. As 
Ghosh (2001:42) puts it:  
 
The problem of brain drain was generated and intensified by 
the deliberate neo-colonial policy of developed capitalist 
countries. The exploitation by these countries continues 
unabated, but in a different fashion. In the pre-industrial 
revolution period, the developed countries took away resources 
from their colonies in the form of physical capital; while in the 
post-industrial revolution period they have been draining the 
human capital resources from LDCs. 
 
Pull factors refer to those conditions that attract high quality manpower (HQM) from 
labour-exporting to labour-receiving countries. Expectedly, the factors that push the HQM 
from developing countries are the same factors that pull them to the developed countries. In 
other words, these pull factors are not products of fortuitous circumstance but of capitalist 
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calculations that are motorised by exploitation. These pull factors have been identified to 
include: 
(a) Better economic prospects;  
(b) Higher salary and income; 
(c) Better level of living and way of life; 
(d) Better research facilities;   
(e) Modern educational system and better opportunity for higher qualifications;  
(f) Relative political stability; 
(g) Intellectual freedom (substantial research funds, rich scientific and cultural 
tradition); 
 (h) Better working conditions and employment opportunities; 
(i) Technological gap (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emigration; Shinn 2002; 
Nunn 2005:8). 
The compartmentalisation of the factors that instigate brain drain into push and pull 
factors does not completely appreciate the complexity of the global and capitalist system and 
the unending war of ascendancy that characterise relationship within its fold. These push – 
pull categorisation appears to gloss over the main underlying cause of inequality in the global 
system, and which is the core reason for the unidirectional nature of brain drain. While the 
typologies of brain migration advanced by Ghosh (2001:41) may be useful in the general 
examination of labour movements, it is brain drain that best exemplifies and appropriately 
situates the mass exodus of skilled personnel from Nigeria and Africa to the developed world. 
Ghosh (2001:41) has grouped the various brain migrations into: brain drain, brain overflow; 
brain exchange and brain export. While the brain migration from certain countries of the 
Third World especially Philippines, Mexico and India might be accorded any or all of these 
typologies, African experience in terms of brain movement to the developed countries is 
essentially brain drain.  
The pull – push factors must be extended to fully appreciate the forces that shape and 
sustain brain drain. The various domestic policies put in place in developed countries to 
attract and retain sorely needed external manpower constitute strong forces that induce brain 
drain. We choose to categorise these forces as suction factors. The intention of western 
policies is to “suck out” skilled professionals from Africa for their domiciliation in the 
developed countries where their skills would contribute to the expansion of their global 
dominance. Other strategies include: 
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(i) Scholarships (doctoral and post-doctoral fellowships); 
(ii) Reducing the immigration bars /favourable immigration laws and policies;   
(iii) Positive labour conditions including favourable tax deals and unrestricted 
remittances. 
There are also global systemic factors that keep Africa and other Third World 
countries at the fringes of the global capitalist system. They use such mechanisms as: 
(i) The Debt peonage; 
(ii) Economic reforms;  
(iii)  IFIs (especially IMF loans and conditionalities); 
(iv) Technological gap (aided by intellectual property rights). 
The relevance of these new typologies is that they capture the surreptitious and 
deliberate policy thrust of Western countries as they directly impact on the trajectory of brain 
drain. The greatest analytical weakness in the bifurcation of the forces that shape brain drain 
into push/pull categorization is that it only explains what is, that is, the obvious manifestation 
of the effects of brain drain without addressing the complex interplay of “behind the scene” 
manipulations that induce and sustain it. Dzvimbo (2003:2) has also criticised push – pull 
framework as focusing principally on personal variables and failing to offer explanations to 
the variance in size and direction of migration flows as well as “why sources of migration  
concentrate in certain regions and the distinction between macro and micro-structural 
determinants of migration”. The suction factors and global systemic factors generally address 
these concerns raised by Dzvimbo (2003:2). 
Since the 1980s, the developed countries had systematically evolved new policies that 
dismantled the restrictive and discriminatory immigration laws that tended to shut out the 
Third World in their countries. The need for this “lenient” review had nothing to do with 
philanthropism or to assuage the threatening economic crisis that was encroaching on the 
Third World economies especially Africa. Rather, it was informed by the need to harvest the 
expected fallouts from the economic crisis that characterised African and Third World 
economies. All over the developed countries, different models of immigration policies were 
put in place: there were point-systems in Australia, Canada and UK; the H1-B Visas in the 
US, German Green card, European Blue Card, French immigration “choisie”. The idea 
behind these myriad immigration policies was to cushion labour shortages arising from 
higher rate of life expectancy in the midst of low birth rate in developed countries.  




Africa has, and is projected to continue to have, a relatively 
young population, while that of Europe is projected to become 
much older over time. While large numbers [of] Africans will 
be looking for work, large numbers of Europeans will be in 
need of services and support during their old age (Nyarko 
2010:11). 
 
The increasing rate of population growth in Africa and its youthful composition made 
Africa a vestibule of abundant labour power. But for African labour to be deployed willingly 
and voluntarily, the domestic conditions must be made unconducive. It is only when domestic 
conditions are unconducive that emigration can take place as exemplified by the reaction of 
Africa’s middle class to the economic crisis that spawned the contemporary wave of 
emigration. That explains why the structure of the modern world system has defied attempts 
at restructuring to evolve a new international economic order; the uncompromising and hard-
line stance of IFIs on economic reforms and the increasing contraction of ODA flows to 
African countries. 
The reforms in the immigration policies of western countries represented attempts to 
proverbially kill two birds with a stone: one, ensure the influx of the right calibre of skilled 
people to fill vital vacancies as well as maintain a sizeable pool of unskilled personnel; and 
two, attract foreign capital for investment through emigrants.  The EU Blue Card scheme 
appears a quintessential futuristic stratagem of the European countries to put in place a 
structure to address human capital deficits in their economies. The EU Blue Card scheme is a 
European Union work permit that confers privileges on high-skilled non-EU citizens to reside 
and work in the EU countries. Currently, Denmark, Ireland and UK are excluded from this 
treaty having not acceded to it. The EU Blue Card represents a one-track as well as liberal 
procedure for non-EU citizens to apply for a work permit that has a duration of between one 
and four years with options for renewal. The Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 
stipulated 19 June 2011 as date for the commencement of the implementation of this 
immigration policies (Official Journal of the European Union 2009:L155/29). The 25- Article 
Directive specifically set out the parameters for the qualifications of the target of the scheme. 
Article 2 which dealt with definitional issues specified that the beneficiary of the EU Blue 
card would be a person possessing higher education qualification with the required adequate 
and specific competence in accordance with national employment law (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2009:L155/21). Part of the high points of the Blue Card is that it is 
renewable with possibility of permanent residency. Holders of the Blue Card are expected to 
enjoy the same social and labour rights as the citizens of the receiving country, rights of 
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family unification as well as geographic mobility (that is ability to move from one country to 
another within the EU). The EU Blue Card does not pretend that it keeps the interest of the 
human capital-exporting countries within its purview. It only made a perfunctory plea that: 
 
In implementing this directive [EU Blue Card scheme] member 
States should refrain from pursing active recruitment in 
developing countries in sectors suffering from a lack of 
personnel. Ethical recruitment policies and principles 
applicable to public and private sector employers should be 
developed in key sectors, for example the health sector, …and 
education sector, as appropriate (Section 22 of Council 
Directive 2009/50/EC) 
 
There was no documented strategy of actualising this besides the provision in Section 
24 of the Council Directive 2009/50/EC that: 
 
Specific reporting provision should be provided for to monitor 
the implementation of this directive, with a view to identifying 
and possibly counteracting its possible impacts in terms of 
“brain drain” in developing countries and in order to avoid 
“brain waste”.   
  
The inherent deception in the assertion of the EU is the fact that the Blue Card scheme 
was, first and foremost, birthed as mechanism to attract high-level skill. And there is no 
established threshold over and above which countries could not engage third country high-
skilled personnel. Countries are at liberty to recruit according to its needs.  Since 2008, the 
UK introduced and operated points-based system (PBS), a departure from the work permit 
and highly skilled migrant scheme it operated prior to this period. Points-Based system (PBS) 
structures the immigration services into tiers. These tiers represent the categorisation of 
people according to their academic attainment and skills acquired in the course of their 
professional practice. Canada was the first country to adopt a points-based immigration 
system, having done so in 1967 (Weiner 2007).  
The system works in such a way that visa applicants only need to score certain 
number of points based on academic qualification, job experience, profession, available 
funds, language, age and so on, to be considered eligible to migrate to Canada and be given 
work permit. According to Weiner (2007), all an applicant needs is to score some 67 points 
based on the criteria already enumerated above. Points-based systems (PBS) have been 
adapted in other countries such as Australia and UK with certain modifications. While an 
applicant who could invest US$100,000 in government-sanctioned projects in Australia 
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received additional points that would enhance their chances, in UK graduates of the top 50 
business schools around the world automatically qualified for work permit. The UK PBS is 
structured into five tiers: the first tier is classified “highly skilled” and covers such 
professionals as scientists or entrepreneurs, the second tier is categorised as “skilled” 
consisting of nurses, engineers, teachers etc; Tier 3 contains “low skilled” workers, Tier 4 
covers “students” and Tier 5 consists of “temporary migrants and workers”, for example, 
working holiday makers and artistes for scheduled performances. It also covers youth 
mobility schemes. The US diversity immigrant visa (Green card lottery) which makes 
available 50.000 permanent resident visas annually has also kept the door open for vital 
human resource needs of the US. 
The danger in the immigration policies of the developed countries to Africa is two 
fold: the mindless exploitation of the human resources of the African continent as well as the 
encouragement of capital flight. Both of these effects have serious implications for African 
and Nigerian development. Migration Watch UK (2010) has noted overall increment in the 
number of immigrants from non-EU countries by 20% (http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/ 
pressReleases/03-June-2010). Although there was no breakdown of the 20 percentage 
increment in the immigration population to enable an appreciation of African contribution, 
the point is that the immigration policies of the developed countries were fashioned to poach 
vital African human resources. This, therefore, has complex and far-reaching implications for 
Africa’s development.  
Beside the EU Blue Card, France adopted “immigration choisie” policy to sieve the 
influx of immigrants in order to tailor them to its needs, ensure mandatory integration for 
long-term residents and co-development (Chou and Baygert 2007:2). The concept of co-
development indicates partnership with third countries. Such partnership is in the mould of 
encouraging reverse-migration. As Sarkozy, the then France’s Minister of Interior explained, 
“young foreign graduate students who obtain their masters degree in France will be able to 
enhance their education with a first professional experience in France before their return to 
their country of origin” (cited in Chou and Baygert 2007:6). These needs consisted of the 
lacuna in the manpower needs of France. According to the proposition by the Ministry of 
Economy, the French labour market could face 750,000 recruitment needs each year after 
2015 (Bertossi 2008: 5). 
Immigration choisie (chosen immigration) passed through the instrumentality of two 
laws in 2006 and 2007 and represented a migration policy that tended to choose the “good” 
migrants as well as shape migratory flows (Bertossi 2008:5). The “good migrants” targeted 
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by this immigration policy are only good because of their utilitarian value in filling shortages 
in the labour market for certain sectors. Year after year, Africans constituted the highest 
percentage of beneficiaries of the US Diversity (DV) lottery. Out of 96,690 shortlisted 
winners for 2008 edition of the DV lottery, Africa was allotted 52,824 representing 54.63 
percent. The same trend was recorded in the 2010 DV lottery where Africa netted 52.63 






































Migration has been implicated as constituting a drain-pipe for the erosion of human 
resources vital for national development in developing countries. One of the sectors in the 
Nigerian economy that is seriously affected by emigration is healthcare delivery. While 
qualified personnel constitutes one of the major ingredients of  instituting and maintaining an 
efficient healthcare delivery system, there are other factors such as funding, infrastructure and 
health education that are vital components of a functional healthcare delivery system. 
Migration is associated with increased global wealth. This wealth is generated by the 
corps of highly-skilled and semi-skilled professionals. What has remained contentious is the 
distribution of this wealth within the global system. While the multi-skilled Nigerian diaspora 
creates wealth for, and makes enormous contributions towards development in their host 
economies, their home country seemingly holds the short end of the stick. However, there 
appears to be a trickle-down effect on Nigeria through the investment potentials of its 
diaspora. But the conditions that created the avenue for emigration must either be ameliorated 
or eliminated for the restoration of confidence in the home economy. 
Despite the fact that the targets of migrant-receiving countries are the highly-skilled 
and semi-skilled professionals, their skills are, nevertheless, honed to higher standards in the 
process of their sojourn abroad. Ordinarily, part of the trickle-down effects of emigration 
ought to be the transposition of these skills in the home economies to aid industrialisation. 
But the continued underdevelopment of Nigeria and the absence of the Nigerian diaspora in 
the country’s development agenda have demonstrated the untenability of this assumption. 
  This chapter examines the selected sectors of the Nigerian economy from which we 
derived our hypotheses. It evaluates how inadequate personnel through the brain drain have 
undermined efficiency in Nigeria’s healthcare delivery system and the trend of diaspora-led 
investment initiatives as well as the remittance portfolio within the ambit of extant domestic 
investment incentives. It also interrogates the interface between the diaspora and the 




4.2 BRAIN DRAIN AND HEALTH- CARE CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA 
 
The Nigerian health sector is one of the major sectors adversely affected by the mass 
emigration of health professionals. The Nigerian health sector is virtually bereft of the 
optimal number of relevant crop of qualified health personnel to drive healthcare delivery to 
the teeming population. This is so because many qualified health personnel have emigrated 
abroad.  As it is, Nigeria is one of the major health-staff-exporting countries in Africa. 
According to Uneke et al (2008), between April 2000 and March 2001 about 347 Nigerian 
nurses emigrated legally to Britain. The corresponding period that is, between April 2001 and 
2002, 432 nurses emigrated to Britain. While Nigeria is denied of the vital services of its 
health professionals, the West and the oil-rich states of the Middle East are the prime 
beneficiaries (Mbanefoh 2007:2). As the health sector is an integral part of the Nigerian 
society, and, therefore, subject to its vagaries, the depletion of its human resources is induced 
by the same set of push, pull and suction factors generated internally and internationally. 
The effect of the human capital loss in Nigeria’s health sector is locatable in the 
increasing inability of the country to subdue its numerous health challenges which contribute 
to low life expectancy. The medical brain drain is not peculiar to Nigeria. Indeed it is the rule 
rather than the exception in the whole of Africa. The depth of the problem is such that Dr 
Lalla Ben Barka apocalyptically predicted that “in 25 years, Africa will be empty of brains” 
(cited in Mbanefoh 2007:5).  
 
 
Table 4.1:   Basic Demographic, Health and Socio-Economic Indicators of Nigeria  
 
Indicators     Estimated / Site  
Area      923,968sqkm  
Population      140 million (2007) 
No. of LGAs     774 
No. of States      36 
Crude Birth Rate    40.6 per 1000 
Rate of Natural Increase    45 per 1000 
Population Doubling Time   23 years 
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Population Growth Rate %   3.2% (2007)    
Life Expectancy at Birth   52years (1992); 54.0 (2007)    
Literacy Rate     64.2 (2007) 
Per Capita GDP (USD)   1,256.6 (2007) 
Food Energy Intake    Adult Equivalent 2100 Cals. 2900 Cals. 
Poverty Incidence    65.6 (1996); 54.4 (2004) 
Population in Poverty    67.11 Million (1996); 68.70 (2004) 
Under Five Mortality Rate   137 per 100,000 Live Births 
 
Source:   NBS 2009: 201; CBN 2007:xliv 
 
Nigeria is home to over 140 million people with population growth rate of between 
2.8 and 3.2 percent as at 2007. More than half of Nigerians are categorised as poor with 
official incidence of poverty put at 54.0 percent (CBN Annual Report 2007: xliv). What the 
interpretation of these statistics immediately reveals is that the unfortunate economic status of 
over half of Nigeria’s population imperils their access to adequate healthcare services. The 
imperilment is deepened by the skewed interplay of increasing population and decreasing 
healthcare providers as a result of sustained emigration. Going by the WHO recommendation 
of 20 physicians per 100,000 people or one physician to 5,000 people, it has been impossible 
for Nigeria, in the face of the mass exodus of its medical personnel, to meet this ratio of 
medical well being. Before the advent of medical brain drain, the doctor-population ratio was 
a far cry from the WHO ideal. Mbanefoh. (2007: 3) informs that as at 1979, Nigeria had a 
doctor-population ratio of 1:24,607.  Nigeria would have surpassed the WHO threshold if not 
for brain drain. Going by the number of physicians in good standing, that is, those who 
renewed their annual practicing licence, the 2007 doctor/population ratio was 1:10,000.  
Table 4.2 showcases the global critical shortages of doctors, nurses and midwives as at 2006. 
Africa was worst-hit, as it still required 139 percentage increase in its present stock to reach 
acceptable limits. The trend since then had deteriorated, with greater increase in the demand 
for African physicians and decaying infrastructure for training them. Out of 46 African 
countries evaluated, 36 of them, including Nigeria, had critical shortages requiring urgent 
attention. Indeed, globally, Africa is the worst-hit as it accounted for 36 out of 57 countries 
designated by the WHO as suffering from critical shortage of health professionals. 
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Table 4. 2: Estimated Critical Shortages of Doctors, Nurses and Midwives,  
(By WHO Region) (2006) 
 
NA= Not applicable; Source: World Health Report 2006:13 
 
 
By 2010, the ratio of doctor-population in Nigeria ought to have met the WHO 
standard or at least be close to it considering the enormous resources Nigeria had earned from 
oil but this is not the case. Nigeria is still very far from meeting the WHO doctor-population 
benchmark. The reason lies in the brain drain that mops up medical professionals and the rate 
of population growth, which ranged between 2.8 and 3.2 percent with very high migratory 
flows made it impossible for the wide gap in the ratio to be narrowed. As Mbanefoh (2007:3) 
opines:  
Medical professionals, particularly the doctors, have remained 
a scare commodity in the health systems in Africa. Filling 
vacancies created by the emigration of experienced doctors 
tend to be difficult due to their increased demand by the 
developed nations and rich Arab countries. 
 
The scarcity of health professionals in Nigeria and Africa and the wide gap in the 
doctor-population ratio are not because these professionals are not produced or are 
inadequately produced, but because they are readily snapped up by the DCs. The major 
reason in the hole in the manpower formation in the health sector is the state-centred neglect 
of the sector. Since 1980s, the DCs have variously implemented variants of “quality – 
WHO Region Number of 
Countries 
In Countries with Shortages 
Total With 
Shortages 





Africa 46 36 590,198 817,992 139 
Americas 35 5 93,603 37,886 40 
Southeast Asia 11 6 2,332,054 1,164,001 50 
Europe 52 0 NA NA NA 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
21 7 312,613 306,031 98 
Western Pacific 27 3 27,260 32,560 119 
World  192 57 3,355,728 2,358,470 70 
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selective immigration polices”. These policies not only enabled them to substantially relax 
the quotas for highly skilled personnel but also attract and retain targeted skilled 
professionals for national development (Docquier and Rapoport 2007:4). 
The Nigerian health system consists of orthodox, alternative and traditional systems 
of healthcare delivery. For various reasons, these three systems are patronised by Nigerians in 
their pursuit of good health and longer life. The Nigerian government recognises and 
regulates the activities of these systems (AHWO 2008:9). Within Nigeria’s orthodox health 
system it operates a three-tier hierarchical healthcare system comprising primary, secondary 
and tertiary tiers. Lambo (1983:19); FMOH (2004:9-10) differentiate these tiers thus: the 
primary tier occupies the base of the hierarchy and represents the first point of contact 
between the patient and the healthcare delivery system. The institutional outlets for the 
dispensation of primary healthcare services are private and public health clinics, centres and 
dispensaries and maternities. The secondary tier covers referral healthcare institutions and 
includes general, cottage and mission hospitals. The tertiary tier includes teaching and 
specialist hospitals. Lambo (1983:191) identifies the major challenge of healthcare service 
delivery as the shortage of skilled health personnel especially doctors. 
In 2006, the problem seemed to have deepened with the shortage of health workers a 
key problem plaguing Nigeria’s healthcare sector. In WHO’s 2006 classification of countries 
with critical human resource shortage, Nigeria was included amongst the 57 countries so 
designated (WHO Report 2006:12). Sub-Saharan Africa was hit most by this shortage as 36 
of the countries in the region made the list. WHO estimated that for all these countries 
designated as suffering from human resources shortage in their healthcare delivery system to 
reach the target levels of health worker availability, an additional 2.4 million professionals 
would be required globally (WHO Report 2006:12). 
The explanation of the shortage in the levels of health worker availability in Nigeria is 
not so much a matter of institutional incapacity, as there has been consistency in the 
admission of prospective students into health teaching institutions, but principally a product 
of brain drain. Using the University College Hospital Ibadan (UCHI) as a case study to 
buttress the debilitating and rippling effect of brain drain on Nigeria’s health sector, 
Mbanefoh (2007:4), records that between early 1980s and 1987, the UCHI lost almost 40 
percent of its senior doctors, with the Department of Surgery worst hit. For instance, out of 
23 lecturers in 1984, 18 of them had left by 1989 leaving only five lecturers to man the 
department. Flowing from this development student intake plummeted from 274 in 1984 to 
124 in 1989. The ripple effect of this seeming mass exodus of health professionals has 
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continued to bog down advances in healthcare delivery in Nigeria.  
As at 2007, there were 24,879 healthcare facilities in Nigeria with combined bed 
spaces of 97,567. Also there were 55,376 registered physicians (comprising 52,408 Nigerians 
and 2,968 non-Nigerians) and 219, 089 registered nurses and midwives (NBS 2007:34). 
These numbers of physicians and nurses represent registrants in the professional 
organizations of these medical disciplines and not necessarily those manning these hospitals. 
AHWO (2008: 9) affirms that out of the total number of Nigerian doctors (52,408) on the 
medical register as at December 2007, only 14,000 doctors paid their annual practicing 
licensing fee for that year. Similarly, only a fraction of nurses and midwives paid their annual 
practicing fees. This means that only 14,000 doctors were eligible to practice according to 
statutory requirements. AHWO (2008: 9) has contended that this number represents the 
actual human resources available to Nigeria’s health sector as “... the medical and indeed the 
nursing register has never been pruned of those doctors that died or have migrated out of the 
profession or into foreign countries”. Currently Nigeria has 23 fully accredited and five 
partially accredited medical schools. Accreditation of medical schools in Nigeria is the 
exclusive preserve of the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria (MDCN) which derives it 
powers vide Medical  and Dental Practitioners Act Cap 221 (now Cap M8) Laws of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990 (http://www.mdcnigeria.org). There are also 86 approved 
schools of nursing, 77 approved schools of midwifery, 12 laboratory schools, 6 schools of 
physiotherapy, 5 schools of radiography, 9 schools of pharmacy, 19 schools of pharmacy 
technology, 40 schools of health records, 13 schools of community health officers, 43 schools 
of dental technology, 6 schools of dental therapy and 3 schools of optometry (AHWO 
2008:10). 
Despite these institutional frameworks to produce health professionals, the rate of 
production has been slow and the rate of poaching aggressive and high, especially Nigeria 
doctors and nurses. Between 2001 and 2005, the combined graduate turn-out by the country’s 
medical schools was 8,840 doctors. Within the same period a total of 1,677 pharmacists were 
produced (NBS 2009:285). 
Notwithstanding the lofty policies of Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Health about 
strategies to promote healthcare delivery system, several challenges face it. The core of this 
challenge is human resources needed to push these policies through. The unconducive 
working environment and low prospects of professional satisfaction in Nigeria and the 
tempting remuneration package abroad have combined to deepen Nigeria’s healthcare 
delivery dilemma. The Secretary-General of the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), Dr 
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Kenneth Okoro in an interview with a Nigerian tabloid averred that “the health sector remains 
deplorable without any significant progress. The indices for health remain poor”. He blamed 
this state of affairs on poor motivation of available human resources which fuels brain drain 
(Thomas 2008).  
Table 4.3 shows the current nominal and regional distribution of health workforce. It 
is important to note that these figures represent the total names as contained in the registers of 
these various professional bodies and not necessarily the practitioners on ground. The 
regional distribution reflects where they are domiciled; that is, the branch of the professional 










Worker Categories  
 
Number 
Regional Distribution  (Percentage) 
North-Central North-East North-West South-East South-South South-West 
Physicians  52,408 9.73 4.06 8.35 19.59 14.37 43.9 
Nurses  128,918 16.4 11.65 13.52 15.29 27.75 15.35 
Radiographers  840 14.3 3.66 5.97 15.0 18.3 43 
Pharmacists  13,199 19.94 3.8 7.79 11.74 12.39 44 
Physiotherapists  1,473 10.8 2.73 8.32 8.58 7.93 62 
Medical Lab Sctst. 12,703 6.82 1.72 3.6 35.26 23.89 29 
Env. & Health W 4,280 9.39 11.27 18.94 12.36 15.69 32.08 
Health Records 
Officers 
1,187 13.34 4.85 11.6 14.64 29.9 26 
Dental 
Technologists 
505 14.08 5.92 5.92 12.96 16.62 44.5 
Dental Therapists 1,012 13.19 10.29 21.88 10.19 12.99 31.5 
Pharmacy 
Technician 
5,483 6.17 9.12 18 8.58 11.8 46 
 Source: AHWO 2008:23 
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The bleak state of Nigeria’s health sector is deepened by lack of qualified health 
professionals to drive the healthcare delivery system. Human resources are the key 
components and driving forces of healthcare system and not just the funding and 
infrastructures. Adequate funding and relevant infrastructures only assist the human resources 
to actualise set goals. That is why the progressive funding of Nigeria’s health sector has not 
yielded the desired result. Again, no matter the amount of remittances sent by Nigerian 
doctors to the country, healthcare system will remain comatose and life expectancy 
projections will continue to go downhill because the remittance receipts can never take the 
position of healthcare providers.    
There is no doubt that the Nigerian healthcare delivery system is facing a serious 
crisis. The explanation for the crisis is not domiciled in a single factor but in a combination of 
factors that interact in a complex way to coalesce into forces that push away healthcare 
managers. Dovlo (2003:1) captures these factors to include: 
 
… the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the re-emergence of old 
communicable diseases such as TB [tuberculosis] and Malaria, 
and the apparent paradox of increasing levels of disorders 
linked to changing lifestyles and degenerative diseases. In 
addition are perennial problems affecting health systems that 
stem from the economic difficulties in our countries leading to 
very low funding of health services and deterioration of health 
services infrastructure. 
 
The economic crisis that affected African economies including that of Nigeria in the 
1980s prompted the active intervention of the IFIs in these economies. The intervention of 
these IFIs in Africa’s domestic economies was the watershed in the crisis that eroded the 
health sector. The reform package of SAP had conditionalities that spawned the ground for 
the underfunding and subsequent collapse of the health infrastructure.  
The emphasis and insistence of the IFIs on the removal of subsidies on social services 
including health and the acquiescence of the Nigerian government led to the drastic reduction 
in budgetary allocation to the health sector and the reversal and crisis that subsequently 
engulfed the sector. The budgetary allocation to the health sector plummeted from N350.4 
million in 1986 to N235.4 in 1987 when the federal budget reflected the effects of SAP (CBN 
Statistical Bulletin 2004:217-224). The underfunding of the health sector, as other social 
services in accordance with the IMF conditionalities, had rippling effects on both institutional 
capacity and human resource retention in the health sectors. As Mbanaefoh (2007:3-4) avers, 
“the resultant under-funding meant that facilities for teaching, research and service delivery 
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were inadequately provided and maintained, researches were under-funded and personnel 
were poorly remunerated. The professionals became restive”.  
It was this restiveness that acted as a push factor to the mass emigration of Nigeria’s 
medical professionals which destabilised the health sector leading to serious reversals in the 
modest gains recorded in the eradication of communicable and non-communicable diseases 
before then. As Orubuloye and Oni (1996:303) observe, 
 
In the first five years of the structural adjustment program, 
1986 -1990, government allocation of resources to the health 
sector ranged from just US 42 cents to US 62 cents per capita, 
an amount which was grossly inadequate to treat an attack of 
malaria, or a mere 1.6 to 1.9 percent of the total federal 
government expenditure during the 1980 – 90. 
 
The drastic reduction in budgetary allocation to the health sector meant that the 
provision of infrastructural facilities as well as distribution of routine drugs in hospitals 
which had hitherto been free were no longer feasible. According to UNICEF sources (cited in 
Orubuloye and Oni 1996: 303-304) infant mortality rate (IMR) in Nigeria rose from its 1988 
level of 104 per thousand to 114 per thousand in 1992 and childhood mortality degenerated 
from 174 per thousand to 191 per thousand during the same period. The reversal was despite 
the national health policy introduced in 1988. The National Health Policy (NHP) had lofty 
ideals which were embodied in its quest to improve the health of Nigerians in a sustainable 
manner based on primary healthcare (PHC) (Nnamuchi 2007:3). The goal of PHC to improve 
the health of all Nigerians through sustainable health system that is promotive protective, 
preventive, restorative and rehabilitative of socially and economically productive and 
fulfilling life to every individual not only fell short of expectations but remained elusive as 
Nigeria was demonstrably unable to meet WHO benchmarks in almost all departments of 
health well-being (Nnamuchi 2007: 3). The dearth of qualified doctors to spearhead both the 
implementation of new policies of the federal government and the consolidation of existing 
national health policies owing to mass emigration of qualified doctors undermined progress 
in the health sector. The effect was that “the overall availability, accessibility, quality and 
utilization of health services decreased significantly or stagnated in the past decade” (Uneke 
et al 2008). 
The overall sectoral implication was that the health sector budget got its financing 
from charges on patients to augment what the government had provided. In essence, the 
government no longer provided the capital outlay it had previously provided. But the socio-
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economic realities in terms of the level of poverty prevailing in the country and the long 
tradition of free Medicare (introduced during the oil boom era) created certain rigidities that 
were unsupportive of such projections. The devaluation of the Nigerian currency unit, which 
was at par with the US Dollar prior to SAP, by as much as 500 percent instead of 60 percent 
originally planned meant that the prices of every thing in the country skyrocketed. The 
import-dependent nature of the Nigerian economy led to a contentious scale of preference 
between personal and family daily survival costs and costs of Medicare (Gana 1990: 97). The 
effects of this development were such that: 
 
Most government hospitals were almost deserted, as the 
number of people attending them dwindled rapidly, partly 
because most government hospitals have been reduced to mere 
consulting clinics for lack of equipment and drugs. Many 
patients were attempting home cures or had turned to the 
traditional medical system or to the faith healing churches. 
(Orubuloye and Oni 1996: 303).  
 
The underfunding of the health sector directly facilitated the conditions that induced 
job dissatisfaction, unavailability of requisite medical equipment vital for diagnoses and 
treatment and unconducive operational environment as well as the mass emigration of high-
quality medical personnel critical for Nigeria’s health sector development.  
Even though the crisis in the government healthcare system led to the proliferation of 
private medical practice and the establishment of private hospitals and clinics (Orubuloye and 
Oni 1996: 304, Nnamuchi 2007:4), it did not lead to improvement in the healthcare indices of 
the country. The reason for the relatively low impact of the proliferation of private hospitals 
and clinics on the healthcare indices of Nigeria inhered from three interrelated scenarios: one, 
the physicians that operated the government healthcare facilities were the same ones that set 
up and operated those private clinics and in most cases, one physician serviced several 
clinics; two, these clinics were more of economic stop-gap measures to augment the salaries 
of physicians, which like the Naira, had been eroded by the logic of devaluation; and three, 
the setting up of hospitals and clinics was motivated by capitalist consideration of profit. 
Therefore, only patients with the wherewithal were able to access their services. Most of the 
private hospitals and clinics are unofficial extensions of government health institutions in 
more ways than one. Most of these doctors are employees of government health institutions 
and unethically use their positions to canvass for, or recommend, their private hospitals as 
referrals for diagnosed sicknesses that equipment for their management are either sabotaged 
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or unavailable in government hospitals. On most occasions, institutional sabotage to protect 
their private healthcare business interests partly explained the lack of changes in public health 
institutions in spite of billion of Naira in budgetary allocation to the health sector. But again, 
it is not the provision of diagnostic and other equipment in the health sector that spawned and 
sustained the crisis in the sector (although they are intervening variables) but the dearth of 
medical personnel as a result of their mass emigration to the developed economies.  
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 Table 4.4a:   Characteristics and Trends Analysis of Health Expenditure in Nigeria, 1998 – 2002  (N Million) 
Description 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total Health Expenditure (THE) 157,081.13 179,891.20 215,209.13 256,283.42 278,732.15 
General Govt. Expenditure (GGE) 23,502.13 29,882.85 40,391.25 69,765.96 60,211.87 
Federal 15,199.00 16,866.03 22,781.25 45,078.14 34,538.73 
State 6,162.13 6,486.68 13,552.27 20,417.09 20,660.43 
Local 2,141.00 6,530.14 4,057.73 4,270.73 5,012.71 
Private Expenditure 113,028 125,096.40 139,918.84 172,248.41 201,416.28 
Firms 4,308 6,313.96 10,046.77 14,646.75 17,817.91 
Household 108,720 118,782.40 129,872.07 157,601.66 183,598.37 
Donors 20,551 24,911.96 34,899.04 14,296.05 17,104.00 
Growth Rate of Nominal THE - 14.52 19.63 19.09 8.76 
Exchange Rate (N/US$1.00) 21.8861 92.6934 102.1052 111.9433 120.9702 
 HE: Ratios 
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Source:    NHA 2005: 26 
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Table 4.4b: Characteristics and Trend Analysis of Health Expenditure in Nigeria:  2003 - 2005 (N Million) 
Description 2003 2004 2005 
Total Health Expenditure (THE) 661,662.16 788,723.91 976,687.60 
General Govt. Expenditure (GGE)  123,681.76 208,207.86 254,174.42 
Federal  47,026.82 115,068.86 130,760.24 
State  48,022.77 56,963.53 78,778.28 
Local  28,632.19 36,175.47 44,635.90 
Private Expenditure   537,980.38 580,516.05 722,513.18 
Household  489,785.11 518,409.62 656,545.51 
Firms  20,323.11 26,068.46 29,670.97 
Development Partners 27,872.16 36,037.98 36,296.70 
GDP (Billions) 5,403.01 9,913.52 11,411.07 
Population (Thousands)  128,569 132,273 136,683 
Growth Rate of Nominal THE 37.38 19.20 23.83 
Exchange Rate (N/US$1.00) 129.3565 133.5004 132.1 
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Source:   NHA 2009: 16; CBN Statistical Bulletin (2004:402); CBN Annual report 2006:xl) 
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Source:    NHA 2005: 26 
 
What the data on Nigeria’s Total Health Expenditure (THE) (see Table 4.4a and b 
and Figure 2 above) from 1998-2005 show is consistent upward trend. However, the 
depreciation of the Nigerian currency obviates the supposed gains of the nominal upward 
trend in health budgets. From N157.1 billion in 1998 THE rose by 14.52% in 1999 to 
translate to N179.9 billion. Between 1999 and 2000, THE again grew by 19.63 percent to 
come up to N215.2 billion in 2000 and also appreciated between 2000 and 2001 by 19.09 
percent to settle at N256.3 billion in 2001. However, the growth rate of THE slowed down 
between 2001 and 2002 as it grew by 8.76 percent to settle at N278.7 billion in 2002. There 
was exponential rise in the growth rate of THE as it grew by 137.38 percent. Thus, in 2003, 
THE came up to N661.67 billion. Between 2003 and 2004, THE grew by 19.20 percent 
representing N788.72 billion in 2004. The growth in THE continued in 2005 with the rate 
being 23.83 percent or N976.69 billion. There are two problems with the trend of health 
expenditure: one, the government share of THE is abysmally low. What this means is that 
government is a fringe player in the health sector; two, the consistent depreciation of the 
Nigerian currency against the dollar means that, in actuality, the budgetary allocation to the 
health sector is still too low to sustain health professionals. 










General Government Expenditure Total Health Expenditure
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Figure 3: Compositional Analysis of Health Expenditure in Nigeria,  
1998-2005 (N Million) 
 
Source:    NHA 2005: 26 
 
 
Figure 4a Contributions of Government Tiers to THE 
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Figure 4b Contributions of the Private Sector to THE 
 
Source:    NHA 2005: 26 
 
 
Figure 3 above showcases the compositional analysis of health expenditure in 
Nigeria. One basic fact in the analysis is the consistent growth in the health expenditure of all 
the tiers. The highest chunk of THE was through private expenditure.  
Figures 4a and 4b capture the composition of the contributions of both the three tiers 
of government and the sub-sectors within the private expenditure category. As the graph 
depicts, while the federal government made the highest contribution to the GGE, the 
individual households (comprising the people) contributed the highest to the private 
expenditure portfolio. 
To address the shortfalls arising from government expenditure on health, a new 
insurance policy was introduced under the auspices of National Health Insurance Scheme 
(NHIS) Act in 1999. The NHIS, therefore, was a strategy to introduce a new source of 
healthcare financing that would reduce the cost burden on individuals as well as improve the 
quality, availability and affordability of health services in Nigeria. It thus encompasses both 
government and private sector employees as well as the informal sector. Even though the 
NHIS has not finally covered all sectors and the entire country, it promises to be a veritable 
source of health financing and it is estimated that 5.3 million Nigerians are already benefiting 
from it (Muanya 2010). 
 Since 2003, the contribution of NHIS to THE has been growing. Health Insurance 
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representing 20 percent increment. Between 2004 and 2005, HIE grew by 14 percent above 
the 2004 figure which translated to N 21.34 billion (FMOH 2009: xix). The contributions of 
NHIS and plans to expand its reach have positive prospects. But its evaluation so far shows 
that despite its contributions which eased off considerable burden off the shoulders of the 
poor, the health indicators have not displayed its impact. 
Healthcare delivery depends on a highly trained, balanced and motivated workforce to 
drive the translation of policies to concreteness in order to advance national health indices. 
While efforts have been made in Nigeria to train medical personnel to man national, state, 
mission and private hospitals, clinics and dispensaries, their final destinations for professional 
practice are the various health facilities in the developed countries. 
 
 




Distribution of Health Training Schools in Nigeria 
 




Partial & Fully Accredited 
Medical Schools 
28 7 8 6 3 1 3 28 
Accredited Sch. Of Dentistry   8 1 2 4 0 1 0 8 
Approved School of Nursing 76 19 18 20 10 7 2 76 
Approved School of Midwifery   77 17 17 17 10 6 10 77 
Medical Lab. School  12 4 5 1 0 1 1 12 
Rehab. Therapy 6 1 0 4 0 0 1 6 
School of Radiology  5 2 1 1 0 1 0 5 
School of Pharmacy  9 1 2 4 1 0 1 9 
School of Pharm. Technology  19 2 3 4 4 0 6 19 
School of Health Records  40 3 10 10 7 2 8 40 
CHOs Schools 13 1 3 3 2 1 3 13 
CHEWs Schools  43 6 5 7 9 6 10 43 
Dental Technician  4 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 
Dental Therapy 6 1 1 2 0 1 1 6 
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Optometry  3 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Total  349 69 76 85 46 27 46 349 
 
1South-east; 2South-south; 3South-west; 4North-central; 5North-east; 6North-west 
Sources:  Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria  
(http://www.indenigeria.org/medschools.htm); AHWO 2008: 25; Pharmacists Council of 
Nigeria (PCN) 
(http://www.pcnng.org/universities%20acredited%20for%20pharmacy%20education%20in%
20Nigeria.htm). Nursing & Midwifery Council of Nigeria (NMCN) 
(http://www.nmcnigeria.org/socs.php). 
 
Table 4.5 above shows that Nigeria has adequate health training institutions which 
are well distributed within the regions of the country to cater for high, medium and low-
skilled health care providers necessary to achieve efficient healthcare delivery system. There 
are a total of 349 health training institutions in Nigeria distributed across the six geopolitical 
zones of the country. There are twenty-eight medical schools out of which 23 are fully 
accredited and five are partially accredited by the MDCN. Partial accreditation means that 
there are certain inadequacies and deficiencies in the affected medical schools that might 
compromise the quality of the school’s medical graduates. Once these inadequacies and 
deficiencies are satisfactorily addressed in accordance with minimum standards set by the 
MDCN, the status of such medical schools is revaluated and full accreditation awarded. 
There are nine schools of pharmacy and 153 schools of nursing and midwifery. These 
training institutions have been producing vital human resources. 
 
Table 4.6:   Training Output (Graduation into the Professions) 




Physicians 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 
Nurses & Midwives 3,138 3,199 3,419 3,272 Na 
Pharmacists  517 242 248 717 534 
Radiographers 8 23 15 18 Na 




Source: NBS 2009: 200 
 
Table 4.6 shows the training output of major health professionals. Consistent output 
of health professionals between 2002 and 2006 indicates that personnel need in the health 
sector ought to have been at the threshold of the benchmark set by international health bodies 
with regard to the ratio of health professionals (especially physicians) to patients. Figure 5 
below shows the trend in the output of selected health professionals. Between 2002 and 2006, 
the country produced a fixed number of physicians. The training output of nurses and 
midwives as well as pharmacists shows fluctuation. For nurses and midwives, their output 
rose from 3,138 in 2002 before it nosedived to 3,272 in 2005. The same trend is observable 
for pharmacists; their training output declined from 517 in 2002 to 242 in 2003 and rose to 
717 in 2005. It however declined to 534 in 2006. Also, community health practitioners 
recorded consistent appreciation. 
Figure 5 Trends of Training Output of Selected Health Professionals 
  











2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Physicians Pharmacists 




9,322 7,112 6,382 6,624 8,505 
Dental Therapists 39 40 34 36 39 
Optometrists  106 129 33 61 124 
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The data in the Table 4.7 below show that Nigeria has an appreciable stock of human 
resources for its health sector. Nigeria’s quoted stock is impressive and comparable only to 
Egypt and South Africa as its 2005 stock translated to 39 doctors and 124 nurses per 100.000 
populations (AHWO 2008: 21). This was far better than sub-Saharan Africa’s average of 15 
doctors and 72 nurses per 100.000 population. But the posted figure of 52,408 doctors 
represented the number of physicians in the Books of MDCN.  
 
Table 4.7:   Nominal and Actual Distribution of Health Workforce 2007 
 
 




In Good Standing (i.e. 
Renewed Annual 
Practising Licence) 
   
Physicians (Nigerians) 52,408 14,000 
Physicians (Foreigners)  2,968 2,968 
Nurses  128,918 Na 
Midwives 90,489 Na 
Dentists (Nigerians) 2,356 Na 
Dentists (Foreigners) 215 215 
Dental Technologists  505 350 
Dental Therapists  1,012 936 
Pharmacists  13,199 6744 
Pharmacists Technicians  





Medical Lab Technicians  2,936 Na 
Medical Lab Assistants 7,044 Na 
Physiotherapists 1,473 1,276 
Occupational Therapist 29 18 
Radiographers 840 600 
Optometrists  1,415 205 
Chartered Chemists  1,503 1,503 
Environment & Pub. Health   Workers  4,280 1,500 
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AHWO (2008: 9, 21) has contended that the MDCN does not have any systemic 
mechanism in place to prune out of its register those physicians who have either emigrated, 
gone to other sectors or not practicing at all. Therefore, the closest one can get to establishing 
the number of active physicians in the system is to rely on the list of those who are up-to-date 
in the payment of their annual practising fees. Going by this list, the current stock of 
physicians in Nigeria is 14,000 (AHWO 2008: 9). Figure 6 shows the nominal and actual 
stock of selected health professionals. While the nominal stock of physicians was 52,408, the 
actual number of practising physicians based on the renewal of annual practising licence was 
14,000, that is 26.71 percent. Ditto for pharmacists whose figure of 13,199 and 6744 
respectively translated to 51.09 percent. The professional registers of the medical laboratory 
scientists and physiotherapists also showed the differences in the nominal and actual stock as 
43.67 and 86.63 respectively. 
 
Figure 6: Nominal and Actual Composition of Selected Health Professionals, 2007 
 
  
















Pharmacists Medical Lab. 
Scientists 
Physiotherapists
Register Total In Good Standing (i.e. Renewed Annual Practising Licence)
Public Analysts  500 313 
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There are intervening variables which might have accounted for, or constituted a clog 
in the wheel of progress in engendering healthcare delivery in Nigeria. These intervening 
variables include underfunding, poverty, lack of relevant health infrastructure like hospital 
diagnostic, laboratory and research equipment, lack of access to healthcare services and 
corruption. So, the degeneration of the infant mortality situation in Nigeria from 104 per 
thousand in 1988 (just two years after the commencement of SAP conditionalities) to 114 per 
thousand in 1992 as well as that of child mortality from 174 per thousand to 191 per thousand 
during the same period or the current healthcare situation could have been caused by any or 
combination of these rival variables. 
Undoubtedly, the underfunding of the health sector had debilitating effects on it. But 
the resilience of the system towards survival led to the emergence of the private sector as a 
replacement to government as the bulwark of healthcare delivery services. Despite the 
comparatively exorbitant charges by the private sector in healthcare services, they were well 
spread within the country to cater for the people. The federal government also came up with a 
National Health Policy in 1988, and revised in 2004, to cater for the people and thus cushion 
the effect of SAP on the populace through the instrumentality of primary healthcare 
(Nnamuchi 2007: 3). Nigeria’s health policy was in response to the global agreement earlier 
reached in Alma Ata Conference in the USSR between 6th and 12th September 1978. While 
recognising and affirming the fundamentality of access to basic health services and the 
unacceptability of the gross inequality in the health status of the people within the global 
capitalist system, Article V of the Declaration argues that: 
 
Governments have a responsibility for the health of their people 
which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health 
and social measures. A main social target of governments, 
international organisations and the whole world community in 
the coming decades should be the attainment by all peoples of 
the world by the Year 2000 of a level of health that will permit 
them to lead a socially and economically productive life. 
Primary healthcare is the key to attaining this target as part of 
development in the spirit of social justice. (Declaration of Alma 
Ata 1978). 
 
It took Nigeria ten years to put together a healthcare policy that essentially 
incorporated primary healthcare (PHC) strategies for healthcare delivery in the country. The 
PHC approach was envisaged to be intersectoral involving everybody. As Hall and Taylor 
(2003: 18) have outlined: 
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PHC envisaged universal coverage of basic services such as 
education on methods of preventing and controlling prevailing 
health problems; promotion of food security and proper 
nutrition; adequate safe water supply and basic sanitation; 
maternal and child health, including family planning; 
vaccination; prevention and control of locally endemic 
diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and 
injuries, and provision of essential drugs. The emphasis 
changed from the larger hospital to that of community-based 
delivery of services with a balance of cost-effective, preventive 
and curative programs.  
 
The implementation of PHC in Nigeria with its reach to all the 774 local governments 
in Nigeria did not bring down the infant and maternal mortality rate and other preventable 
diseases (FMOH 2004: 2).  The failure of PHC manifested in either a total lack of services at 
the community level, or services of poor quality. The reaction of people consisted of losing 
confidence in the entire PHC framework which necessitated the bypassing of the primary-
level providers and the distortion of the in-built referral system (Hall and Taylor 2003: 19). It 
is lack of qualified personnel to man these PHCs that created the crisis of confidence on their 
capacity to provide basic health services. And the effect was that these PHCs were bypassed 
leading to the overstretching of the secondary and tertiary level health facilities whose 
capacity was also marred by human resource insufficiency. The result was that Nigeria 
ranked 187th of the 191 member-nations assessed on the basis of health systems performance 
(WHR 2000:154). 
There is evidence that health financing has been on the rise but there is no evidence 
on commensurately corresponding effect on health indicators. This is because of the 
weakness of the Nigerian currency vis-à-vis the United States dollar in the foreign exchange 
market. This explains the abounding evidence about reversals in health indicators across 
several health departments. In 1991, the life expectancy at birth was 53.8 and 52.6 years for 
females and males respectively but dropped to 48years for females and 47 years for males in 
2005 and was 47.7 years in 2007 (Nnamuchi 2007:8; HDR 2009). Total Health Expenditure 
(THE) increased nominally from N157.1 billion in 1998 to N278.7 billion in 2002 and grew 
astronomically to N661.662 billion in 2000 and to N976.69 billion in 2005. Figure 7 shows 
the growth rate of nominal THE. The nominal growth rate of THE is characterised by 
fluctuations. It grew from 14.52 percent in 1999 to 19.63 percent in 2000 and fell to 8.76 
percent in 2002. It rose sharply to 37.38 percent in 2003 and fell to 19.20 percent in 2004 and 




Figure 7: Growth Rate of Nominal THE 
 
Source:    NHA 2005: 26 
Even though poverty has a negative effect on access to quality healthcare delivery 
services, health indicators in Nigeria tend to demonstrate that it is far from being the cause of 
the healthcare crisis in Nigeria. Donor agencies have targeted and offered free medical 
assistance for many diseases. In 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation 
launched a US$131 million Insurance Health Fund targeted at cushioning health bills of 
thousands of low-income Nigerians by granting them access to inexpensive basic healthcare 
services (IRIN 2006). The reduction of the incidence of poverty from 70 percent to 54.4 
percent in 2004 and beyond has not translated into positive health indicators. While 
communicable diseases accounted for 72 percent of death, non-communicable diseases 
accounted for 21 percent of deaths in Nigeria. (FMOH 2005: 2). 
Table 4.8 shows that healthcare facilities have been on the increase with the three 
tiers of government competing amongst themselves and with the private sector. Between 
2003 and 2007 the number of hospitals in Nigeria increased from 23,618 to 24,879. In the 
corresponding period, health centres and dispensaries similarly increased from 20,610 to 
22,345. Similarly, the number of hospital beds increased from 73,230 in 2003 to 97,567 in 
2007 which means that within the period under review there was increment in the capacity of 
health institutions to admit and closely monitor patients. Interestingly, more deaths were 
recorded. Total deaths in health institutions increased from 41, 283 in 2003 to 52, 986 in 
2005 before it fell to 43,763 in 2007. The seeming increment in the number of physicians 
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increment in the production of physicians as recorded by the MDCN. The data demonstrate 
link between increase in nominal health expenditure and increment in health facilities.  
The seeming incommensurateness in the effects generated by increased government 
funding of the health sector and the state of healthcare delivery inheres from the manpower 
crisis that besets the sector in Nigeria. As Yayehyirad and Hailemariam (2010:2) observe, 
“…many low-and middle-income countries face acute shortages and maldistribution of 
skilled health workers, impeding the likelihood of meeting health systems objectives and 
attaining national and international health and development goals”.  
 
 
Table 4.8: Public Health Institutions and Personnel 
2003 – 2007 
 
Description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of Hospitals 23,618 23,641 24,522 24,753 24,879 
Number of Health Centre 
and Dispensaries  
20,610 20,653 21,222 21,325 22,345 
Number of Hospital Beds 73,230 73,680 85,523 86,235 97,567 
No. of Physicians 
(Nigerians & Aliens) 
40,159 41,935 42,563 55,376 55,376 
No. of Nurses and 
Midwives  
136,751 158,920 169,923 219,089 219,089 
Patients Treated in 
Medical Institutions 
698,712 728,522 734,263 859,564  916,451 
Total Deaths in Medical 
Institutions 
41,283 43,674 52,986 49,986 43,763 
 




But despite all these seeming landmark progress, the Nigerian healthcare delivery 
system is still very far off the track in meeting world parameters of well-being for its citizens. 
According to (FMOH 2009: xix), “… the Nigerian health system operates in a reactive, fire-
fighting way rather than a proactive way. It is not surprising, therefore, that Nigeria’s health 
outcomes relating to preventable diseases like malaria and vaccine-preventable diseases are 
very poor… .” The major plague that has atrophied the capacity of Nigerian health system 
and prevented it from meeting world health standards is the brain drain syndrome. Apart from 
eroding the health system of the vital healthcare manpower to drive the system, the lack 
which it engendered created room for the invasion of quacks and unqualified persons. As has 
been reported by Yahya (2006: 24) with regard to the immunisation programmes in Northern 
Nigeria:  
 
…Community members expressed considerable concern about 
the age and competence of vaccinators. Numerous people 
across Bauchi, Kaduna and Kano States expressed alarm in that 
girls ranging between the ages 9 and 14 were selected to 
administer OPV [Oral Polio Vaccine] to babies. This was 
discouraging to many otherwise willing parents, who rejected 
the polio vaccines on the grounds that vaccination is a task for 
qualified health professionals… . To a number of parents, the 
employment of such girls for the task of immunization was 
disrespectful on the part of the health authorities and a 
relegation of a very important service. 
 
It is the brain drain in the health sector that brought about this state of affairs. For, if 
the stock of Nigeria’s qualified health personnel were to hold fort in the health sector, the 
kind of scenario painted in the preceding quotation would not have arisen. Dovlo (2004:2-3) 
acknowledges that there was substantial progress in the healthcare system of sub-Saharan 
Africa in the period following independence but this progress was stymied about two decades 
ago as a result of the poaching of its health professionals. In fact there was a resurgence of 
“old” communicable and non-communicable diseases as well as “new” epidemics in 
HIV/AIDS and such diseases of the “epidemiological transition” as cardiovascular ailments.  
While the emigration of health professionals created and sustained crisis in Nigeria’s 
health sector, it had a positive effect on developed countries’ health system. Emeagwali 
(2009) has contended that considering the depth of the erosion of Africa’s medical personnel 
by the developed countries especially the US, it is safe to conclude that “African medical 
schools are de facto serving American people, not Africa”. It is not only the US that benefits 
from or poaches Africa’s health professionals but the entire DCs. Nnamuchi (2007: 23) puts 
it in perspective thus:  
 
... the number of physicians employed in the United States far 
exceeds that of any other country in Africa estimated at more 
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than 21,000... . In 2003 there were only 34,923 and 127,580 
physicians and nurses in Nigeria compared to 133,641 
physicians and 704,332 nurses in the United Kingdom (UK) in 
1997. The population of Nigeria in 2003 was 122,790,463 
whereas 58,808,266. people lived in the United Kingdom in 
1997 meaning that UK, with less than half the population of 
Nigeria at the relevant period, had nearly four times the number 
of physicians and five and half times the number of nurses in 
Nigeria. 
 
Table 4.9a: Registered Doctors in the UK by Registration status and Country of 












Nigeria 1248 324 350 - 
 
Source: Dovlo 2004:7 
a. Persons allowed unrestricted rights to practice in the UK. 
b. Persons with specialist qualifications who are fully registered to practice their 
specialty. 
c. Persons registered for specialist training purpose research, etc for a limited period 
or activity 
d. A temporary measure to allow for certain restricted professional activities. 
 
 
Table 4.9b:   Nigerian Doctors Registered with the American Medical Association 
2003 
 
Specialty  Number Percentage 
 Internal medicine and Sub-specialties  1,269 44 
Surgery & Surgical Sub-specialties  332 12 
Family/Gen. Practice  281 10 
Paediatrics  427 15 
Psychiatry  187 7 
Obstetrics & Gynaecology  161 6 








     Source:  AHWO 2008: 31-32 
 
 
Tables  4.9a and b show 2003 data of the population of Nigerian doctors trained and 
qualified in Nigeria that were registered in the UK and the US respectively. The registration 
status showed 1,248 full registration, 324 specialist registration and 350 limited registration 
in the UK. Table 4.15b shows that 2,855 Nigerian doctors were registered with the American 
Medical Association. Only 281 or 10 percent of them were in family /general practice, the 
rest were specialists in various fields of medicine.  1,269 or 44 percent were specialists in 
internal medicine and other sub-specialties; 427 or 15 percent were specialists in paediatrics; 
332 or 12 percent in surgery/surgical sub-specialties; 187 or 7 percent specialised in 
psychiatry, 161 or 6 percent in obstetrics and gynaecology; 90 or 3 percent in pathology; 35 
or 1 percent in radiology; 32 or 1 percent in preventive medicine and 41 or 1 percent in other 
areas of medical specialisation. These figures are enormous drain on the total health 
personnel stock of Nigeria.  
Nigeria is generally recognised, on account of its share of emigrating health 
professionals, as a major health-staff exporting country. According to Nigeria’s former 
Minister of State for Health, Mrs Halima Alao, the country lost 21,988 health workers to 
brain drain between 2000 and 2005. As at 2003, out of a total of 35,000 registered doctors, 
10,000 migrated. Similarly, 20 percent of 10,364 registered pharmacists and 9,917 nurses and 
midwives out of 210,306 left the shores of Nigeria for the developed countries 
(http://www.andnetwork.com/app?service/0/Homes/$StorySummary$0.$DirectLink$2&sp=1
27830). 
Despite the fact that the calculation of the stock of Nigerian physicians was put at 
55,376, the truth is that this number is greatly exaggerated. According to the records of the 
MDCN, the active number of doctors with valid practicing license servicing Nigeria’s over 
140 million populations was under 14,000. This number included physicians who, even 
though had emigrated to other sectors especially politics, still found it prestigiously important 
that their names are circulated in the current registers of medical practitioners. In actuality, 
Radiology 35 1 
Preventive Medicine  32 1 
Others 41 1 
Total  2,855 100 
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therefore, the human resource crisis in the health sector as a result of brain drain is deeper 
than at first appears or projected by international organisations. A study of the data on 
training output and emigration rate of Nigerian doctors shows a negative relationship. For 
instance between 2002 and 2006, the output of Nigeria’s 28 colleges of medical schools was 
at constant figure of 2,300 doctors per annum (NBS 2009: 200). On the other hand, the 
emigration rate based on request for certificate of good standing from physicians on their way 
out of Nigeria varied from 2,341 in 2005, 2985 in 2006 and 3567 in 2007 (AWHO 2008: 31). 
Not only is the number of physicians on their way out of Nigeria’s health system on the 
increase, the rate of emigration far outstripped the rate of producing physicians. 
The seeming intractability of communicable and non communicable diseases as well 
as their resurgence and renewed spread and the crisis facing the realisation of the health 
aspect of the MDGs are rooted in the human resource crisis in the health sector which was 
induced and sustained by brain drain. Brain drain has also, constrained the capacity of 
Nigeria’s medical schools so much that instead of training output increasing, it has remained 
constant, and with renewed resurgence in the trend of emigration as our data have shown, 
there is danger of further contraction.   
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the migratory trends of Nigerian doctors and nurses 
respectively. Table 4.16 specifically shows a breakdown of Nigerian doctors who had 
requested for a certificate of good standing from the MDCN. Between 2005 and 2007 there 
was consistent increase in the volume of this request. Thus, from 2,341 requests in 2005, it 
rose to 3,567 in 2007. The data reveal that major destinations of these doctors were the 
countries of the developed world with the UK as the preferred destination.  
 
Table 4.10:  Nigerian Doctors Who Requested for Certificate of Good Standing and 
Their Destination 
Country 2005 2006 2007 
United Kingdom 979 1,236 1,236 
Ireland 714 851 851 
USA 122 189 189 
Denmark 9 16 16 
Brazil - - 4 
South Africa - - 538 




Source: AHWO 2008:31 
 
Table 4.11 shows data in relation to nurses seeking employment outside the country. 
In 2004, a total of 5,517 nurses sought employment outside Nigeria after having been fully 
trained. This figure rose to 5,695 in 2005 before plummeting to 1,977 in 2006. It picked up in 
2007 to 3,194. Like the doctors, their preferred destinations were the countries of the 






Canada 136 176 176 
United Arab Emirates 5 5 5 
Singapore 6 6 10 
Australia 49 86 86 
Germany 7 12 12 
Poland 1 3 3 
Italy 2 6 6 
Netherlands 5 11 11 
Malaysia 2 4 4 
Guyana - - 6 
New Zealand - - 3 
Nepal - - 2 
Ghana - - 8 
Russia - - 4 
Libya - - 2 
Ukraine - - 7 
Liberia - - 2 






Table 4.11: Nurses Seeking Employment Outside Nigeria from 2004 – 2006 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
United Kingdom 2,500 2,600 750 94 
USA 2,100 2,050 650         1,233 
Ireland 750 855 450 510 
Australia 55 60 75 - 
Canada 50 60 12 130 
British Columbia 10 11         3 - 
New Zealand 20 21         5 - 
South Africa 15 16         6 - 
Ghana 8 10         7 - 
Botswana 4 5       10 - 
African Boards  * - -          - 87 
Other Boards ** - -          -          1,140 
Prince Ward Island 5 7          9 - 
Total 5,517 5,695 19,77 3194 
Source: AHWO 2008:30 
 
*African Boards (An addition of figures for Ghana, Botswana, South Africa, and 
other African Countries. This clarification was started by the Nursing Council from 
the 2006 data generation year) 
* *Other Boards (An addition of figures for Australia, New Zealand, British 










4.3: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF DIASPORAN INVESTMENT IN 
NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT 
   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally believed to be a fundamental source of, 
and a mechanism to, achieving economic growth and development through external 
investments. The contemporary conceptualisation of FDI has transcended the narrow 
precincts earlier erected around it, to wit, that FDI refers to investment by multinational 
companies (MNCs) with headquarters in developed countries”: (Thirlwall 1994, cited in 
Oyeranti 2003:11). Such a conceptualisation that exclusively links FDI to MNCs identified 
the components of FDI narrowly as comprising: (a) new equity from the  foreign company in 
the home country to the company in the host country; (b) reinvested profits earned from the 
company and; (c) long- and short-term net loans from the foreign to the host company 
(Oyeranti 2003:12; Ukaeje 2003:20). MNCs, no doubt, drive FDI by commanding valuable 
FDI resources but there are other actors outside the sphere of over 65,000 TNCs in the world 
today (Balaam and Veseth 2005:377). 
FDI, also referred to as FPI, (as they are used interchangeably) contemporaneously 
refers to investment made to create enterprises abroad or acquire substantial stakes in existing 
enterprises by foreign owners outside their countries. The characterisation of an investor has 
transcended the traditional IMF and OECD boundaries of a government, individuals, groups, 
incorporated or unincorporated enterprises, existing or new MNCs (Ukaeje 2003:   ). The 
whole essence of FDI is the deployment of international capital to domestic economies for 
the achievement of two objectives for both the host country and the investors: for the host 
country, FDI unleashes development and for the investor, profit. While FDI, as a major 
component of international capital flow, had been projected as a desirable mechanism for 
economic development, African leaders chose not to adopt it as a post-independence strategy 
for economic development despite the challenges of industrialisation and balance of payment. 
The reluctance of the emergent African leaders to adopt FDI strategy was fuelled by certain 
empirical considerations: the rapacity of international capital and its forceful subjugation of 
the domestic economies as exemplified by the domination of German economy and 
elsewhere by American and European finance capital shortly after the World War II 
(Nkrumah 1968: 45). About the United States of America, Nkrumah (1968:59) avers, “the 
Marshall plan was used to push American imperialist penetrations into the fragmented 
German industries and financial institutions, into which it bought heavily.” Therefore, Africa 
leaders, including those of Nigerian, interpreted FDI as a strategy for neocolonisation. And 
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by popular conceptualisation, neo-colonialism was an anathema, a reversal of the gains of 
nationalism and pan-Africanism. Neo-colonialism was seen as the entrapment of newly 
independent states of the Third World bloc by erstwhile colonialists through the MNCS and 
their subsidiaries (Balaam and Veseth 2005:336). In other worlds, even though countries 
under neo-colonialism might have political independence, yet their economic sovereignty 
would be compromised to their detriment as neo-colonialist control occurred through 
economic and monetary means (Nkrumah 1968: ix).      
The core of post-independence economic thinking was anchored on the notion that 
foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less 
developed plots of the world (Nkrumah 1968: x). In other words, rather than international 
capital acting as a propeller to unleash the forces of development, it actually tended to create 
a neo-colonial state that was incapable of independent development. Okongwu (1986:45) 
argues that “we must realise that as our [Nigerian] economy is the largest in Africa ..., it is 
not in the progressive short-term self-interests of the advanced countries to assist us [Nigeria] 
towards self-reliant development.  
The dominance of this type of worldview amongst Nigerian leaders made mixed 
economic ideology attractive and, indeed, underpinned the elevation of the state to the 
epicentre of economic activities. The state was not only prominent in the economic sphere 
but also took charge of, and formulated, policies and programmes as well as transformed 
itself into an engine of industrialisation. The private sector which ordinarily should have been 
at the helms of affairs in the economic sphere was relegated to the background. The 
dominance of the Nigerian economy by the state made the acceptance of the economic 
philosophy of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) easy to buy into. It accepted the 
prescription that mass production of standardised manufactured goods model was the fastest 
means through which countries would attain industrial modernity. (Dibua 2006:155-6). As 
Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa (2004) admit, “following political independence in 1960, the 
successive governments [in Nigeria] adopted the import-substitution industrialisation and five 
year development plans (as was the case in most developing countries) and with financial 
assistance by international institutions”. 
 The paradox of ISI and development plan models adopted by Nigeria was that while 
the original motive was to achieve development without compromising the economic 
sovereignty, the result was the gradual erosion of every prospect of independent development 
and the suction of these economies into the capitalist system. ISI as an industrialisation 
strategy did not effectively utilise domestic comparative advantage to produce competitively. 
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In fact, goods produced under ISI were very expensive, indeed more expensive than foreign 
goods of comparable quality and depended upon protection from foreign competition for their 
survival (Kirkpatrick, Lee and Nixson 1984:197).  
The seeming failure of ISI in Nigeria especially in producing competitively priced 
good, promoting linkages between different sectors of the economy, transferring technology 
and instituting a certain direction in Nigeria’s quest for industrialisation exposed its inability 
to resolve its development dilemma. As a matter of fact, ISI deepened Nigeria’s 
underdevelopment. Ake (1981:92) affirms that “... the attempt to industrialize by import 
substitution led to very heavy importation of inputs, which created debt burdens and balance 
of payments problems, and this in turn encouraged the intensification of primary production 
to pay for imports”.  
The economic crisis that enveloped, distorted and plunged the Nigerian economy into 
the brink of collapse led to the active intervention of IFIs with emphasis on liberalisation in 
its key sectors. Liberalisation, therefore, entailed the dismantling of the hitherto restrictive 
and protective frameworks in the Nigerian economy. The new development orthodoxy which 
was anchored on neoliberal policies projected trade and financial liberalisation as being 
essential to creating an open economy necessary to promote foreign investment and export-
oriented economy considered essential for development. The economic success recorded in 
African countries such as Indonesia Malaysia and Thailand was linked to their adoption of 
these neoliberal policies (Keating 2001:6). 
The change in the negative perception of FDI was occasioned by the constraints of 
economic crisis and the inescapable conditionalities imposed by the IFIs as basis for debt 
rescheduling and new loans (Wei and Balasubramanyam (2004:1).Thus, over the course of 
the 1990s, Nigeria had significantly broken down its protectionist walls and opened up its 
economy at the instance of the IMF and World Bank for foreign investment (Moss, 
Ramachandran and Shah 2005: 337). FDI policy was considered an attractive strategy 
because of its potentiality to augment capital constraints in the domestic economies. FDI 
presupposed the retreat of state domination in the economic sphere and ascendancy of the 
private sector. Generally, prior to SAP, the Nigerian economy was dominantly public sector-
driven. Certain domestic contradictions including lack of vision amongst Nigerian leaders, 
rent seeking, corruption and undiversified, monocultural economic base stymied it in such a 
way that it lacked the necessary verve to sufficiently enthrone industrialisation. Decades of 
economic craftsmanship have failed to place Nigeria on the path of economic progress. As it 
is, the Nigerian economy are still characterised by:  
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Primary production, low share of world  trade, low 
manufactured output and exports, low savings and investment, 
dominance of ODA and low private capital inflow, rapid 
population growth, dominance of public sector vis-à-vis a weak 
private sector, heavy external debt burden     (CBN Briefs 
2002/2003: 35). 
  
These features made earlier attempts at industrialisation in Nigeria a failure and 
economic development impossible. It is instructive to note from the experience of Nigeria 
that development is not achievable through decrees or “legal fiat”. In spite of Nigeria’s legal 
frameworks to Nigerianise economic development by whittling down the dominance of 
foreign investors in its economy, it could not achieve appreciable progress in its economic 
indices as exemplified by its records of balance of payment crisis and presence of the IMF 
and World Bank in its economy. 
  Although there appears a balance of argument amongst analysts with regards to the 
role of FDI in kick-starting and sustaining economic development, the thrust of neoliberal 
basis for SAP entrusts FDI with positive complementarities. Successive Nigerian government 
since 1986 had keyed into, and held, FDI as the cornerstone of economic development. For 
instance, by 1999 Nigeria had signed six bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and eleven 
double taxation treaties (DTTS) and a host of domestic legislations aimed at encouraging the 
inflow of FDI (Yauri 2006:24). There appears a convergence of opinions amongst proponents 
and opponents of FDI: it could reasonably be inferred that there are certain fundamental 
requirements, economic and political, that drive foreign investment outside the considerations 
of the safety of investments and the quantum of return on investment. These include market 
size, labour costs, availability of high skill, level of external debts and political risks, level of 
infrastructural development and social factors (Ebajemito et al 2004:48-50; Yauri 2006:25-
30). The Nigerian economy, in the main, lacked the bulk of these fundamental requirements 
and this was implicated as the reason for the low inflow of FDI during the SAP era. Since 
SAP, the structure of the Nigerian economy has remained virtually the same: monocultural, 
overdependence on oil, debt-ridden (until debt relief of 2005) and dependence on 
international capital for development. The apparent lack of by dynamism in the Nigerian 
economy created a sub-optimal operating environment which inhibited the inflow of foreign 
investments. As Ebajemito et al (2004:45) affirm: 
 
Owing to the unattractiveness of the Nigerian investment 
climate, characterised by high production costs; inadequate 
infrastructure; financial sector distress; pervasive corruption; 
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high rate of crime; spiralling inflation; political instability; and 
macroeconomic imbalance, limited foreign resources came into 
Nigeria, either in the from of foreign direct or portfolio  
investments or through official sources such as aid-in-grant. 
 
 Despite these shortcomings associated with the Nigerian economy and the attendant 
SAP reforms, the volume and spread of FDI envisaged by proponents of SAP did not 
materialise.  In fact, the trend of FDI in Nigeria as in other parts of Africa was the deepening 
of the monocultural orientation of these economies by investing in enclave projects. For 
instance, all the investments going to Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Chad 
were oil related, with the bulk invested in offshore facilities and those to Ghana, Zambia, 
Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and Tanzania were in large mining projects (Moss, 
Ramachandran and Shah 2005:340, Yakub 2005:54). Therefore, the FDI into Nigeria lacked 
the necessary ingredients of production-oriented investment to positively impact on its 
economic development. 
  But the failure of FDI to impact on Nigeria’s economic development was not so 
much as explained in terms of the failure of SAP as the subsisting rigidities in the Nigerian 
economy. The perception of the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) was the reconstruction 
of the Nigerian economy to make it not only attractive but supportive of investment. This was 
evident in the administration’s shuttle diplomacy to the capital cities of major capitalist 
countries and its accompanying economic and trade policies. Both the economic and trade 
policies enunciated by former President Obasanjo were designed to give credence to the 
economic posture of the administration. They reflected neo-liberalism and intended to 
objectify foreign capital inflow, progressive liberalisation of the import regime to enhance 
competitiveness of domestic industries, integration of Nigerian economy through the 
establishment of liberal market economy, promotion and diversification of exports amongst 
others (Ekekwe 2008:37). The continuing economic crisis that bedevilled Nigeria especially 
the debt overhang gave former President Obasanjo little room for independent economic 
tinkering. Thus, from open hostility and opposition to the duo of WTO and IMF, Obasanjo 
embraced their catechism of neo-liberalism. And the product was the NEEDS, an adjustment 
framework introduced in 2003 as a medium-term strategy to enthrone economic 
development. NEEDS was SAP by another name as it incorporated the basic ingredients of 
SAP. The goal of NEEDS was to convert the Nigerian economy into a market-oriented 
economy that is private-sector-led, highly competitive and open. FDI was a central strategy 
of NEEDS especially with the new economic thinking that accorded it superiority over and 
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above foreign aid and loans as mechanisms of attracting international capital. Aremu 
(2003:4-5) asserts that:  
 
... the present regime [Obasanjo regime 1999-2007] has placed 
so much emphasizes (sic) on encouraging FDI to strengthen 
Nigerian economy (characterized by low savings) so as to meet 
the required investment demand. It is the belief of the 
government that inflow of sizeable amount of FDI would result 
in higher factor productivity... . 
 
This belief was translated into state policy as exemplified by single-minded 
implementation of NEEDS reform and shuttle diplomacy embarked by former president 
Obasanjo who travelled all around the world in the quest to attract FDI. Obasanjo’s trips 
abroad were principally a public relations strategy to disabuse the negative perception of the 
international community about Nigeria as well as market its many investment opportunities. 
Adjunct to this was the strategy to reach out to the Nigerian diaspora.  President Obasanjo 
held constant and routine interaction and dialogues with the Nigerian communities in every 
country he visited. He hoped to achieve three objectives by these dialogues with the Nigerian 
diaspora. The first was to inform them of the state of Nigeria in terms of developmental 
strides recorded so far. The second was sequel to the first point above and it was to enlist 
their support and co-opt them as foot ambassadors in the task of disabusing negative 
international perception about Nigeria. The third was to motivate them into availing 
themselves of the investment opportunities at home. 
 Considering the number of Nigerians abroad and the anecdotal evidence of their 
diversity in terms of occupation of strategic corporate and political positions all over the 
world, the  Nigerian diaspora constitutes an important constituency to drive the FDI 
campaign. This realisation flowed from positive international experiences of such countries 
as Israel, India,   China, and Mexico amongst others in converting their diaspora to engine of 
FDI inflow. It is instructive to note that foreign investors are not terrestrial beings operating 
outside the precinct of human civilization; they are rational beings who are influenced by 
certain considerations, especially perceptions of the diaspora about their home countries. The 
confidence of the diaspora in the economies of their home countries as exemplified by their 
own investments often boosts foreign investment. For instance, the confidence of the Chinese 
diaspora in the Chinese economy since its adoption of market-based economic reforms 
boosted foreign investment. It is estimated that Chinese diaspora accounts for about 15 
percent of foreign investments in China presently (Balaam and Veseth 2005:371).  
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The outcome of former President Obasanjo’s dialogues with Nigerians in the diaspora 
was the formation of an umbrella organization known as Nigerians in the Diaspora 
Organisation (NIDO) in 2001. The organisation was formed to “streamline the process of 
reengagement of the diaspora communities by the Nigeria government as well as to instil 
ethical consciousness and civic responsibility that will enhance socio-economic advancement 
of Nigerians and humanity in general” (www.nidoamericas.org/about.php).. 
Nigeria’s all out preoccupation with FDI can be periodised to coincide  with the 
economic crisis that ravaged the Third World countries including Nigeria in the 1980s and for 
which the Bretton wood institutions of IMF and World Bank recommended the structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) as a panacea. SAP came with a bouquet of conditionalities 
which the IMF and World Bank assured would, if simple-mindedly implemented, open the 
floodgate of foreign investment. The core of SAP conditionalities was the dismantling of the 
state’s overbearing influence in the economy. Prior to the economic crises of 1980s, the 
economies of most African countries including Nigeria, was dominated by the state with the 
private sector at the fringes. The ascendency of the state in the economy was the fallout of the 
belief of the emergent African leaders that state aloofness to, and the conferment of 
unregulated control of the economy to private capital including foreign capital would not 
only erode its sovereignty but reverse their nascent independence. Rather than be seen as an 
instrument to achieve economic development, African leaders perceived FDI as a mechanism 
to consolidate exploitation and convert the new states into neo-colonies (Nkrumah 1968:x). 
Nigeria’s reaction to this radical view was a cautious recognition of foreign capital in its 
development plan. 
Nigeria’s first Development Plan (1962:68) which was christened “open door plan” 
was anchored on the infusion of foreign investments and substantial external finance. The 
second National Development Plan however dispensed with this “open door” policy and 
pursued national self-reliance as state policy which entailed economic nationalism directed 
at: 
The progressive elimination of foreign dominance in the 
national economy, not merely in terms of nominal financial 
ownership, but really in terms of the level of managerial and 
technological control. The validity of this statement derives 
from the fact that the interest of foreign private investors in 
Nigerian economy cannot be expected to coincide at all times 
and in every respect with national aspirations. A truly 
independent nation cannot allow its objectives and priorities to 
be distorted or frustrated by the manipulations of powerful 
foreign investors (FGN 1970:33).  
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While the first National Development Plan anchored the realisation of the plan on 
external finance input of 50 percent, the second National Development Plan scaled it down to 
25 percent. And out of the projected total expenditure of N4.9billion, the second plan 
proposed public sector investment of N3.3billion and private sector investment of N 
1.6billion (Obi and Obikeze 2005:73). The quest for national self-reliance in the development 
programme of Nigeria made the reordering of the economy imperative. Nigerian policy-
makers, under the influence of monumental receipts from favourable oil prices, took a second 
look at the composition and ownership structure of investments in the Nigerian economy and 
concluded that it ran in the face of its new policy direction of national self-reliance. This 
incongruence between subsisting reality and desired policy thrust necessitated a 
reorganisation in the national economy that eventually neutralised the dominance of foreign 
capital. The new economic policy found protection and strength in the political ideals of 
patriotism and nationalism: the government erected legal frameworks that supposedly put the 
economic destiny of Nigeria in the hands of Nigerians.  
The Nigerian government anchored its economic reclamation project of Nigerianising 
investments on the erection of legal frameworks. Thus, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
(NEP) Acts of 1972, 1977 and 1987 respectively were designed to give legal concreteness to 
its economic nationalism. Usoro (1983:137) describes the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Act of 1972 as the “most radical and effective measure in the transition from foreign 
dependency to national economic self-reliance.” The NEP Acts classified all enterprises into 
three schedules: enterprises in schedule I were exclusively reserved for Nigerians; foreigners 
could invest up to 40 percent in the equities of enterprises in schedule II and up to 60 percent 
in enterprises in schedule III which comprised enterprises employing high level technologies. 
But starting from the 1980s, there was considerable shift of perspective in many developing 
countries about the place of FDI in development. Nwozor (2008:11) identifies three factors as 
spawning this shift namely; the economic crisis that engulfed the majority of these countries 
including Nigeria, the debilitating external debt and the growing importance of the IMF and 
World Bank with their new orthodoxy about the ingredients of economic development. 
The economic crisis of the 1980s which made the Nigerian economy not only 
insolvent but incapable of meeting its domestic and international obligations necessitated the 
adoption of adjustment measures. The major thrust of SAP was the rolling back of the state 
and the bringing in of the private sector as the pivot of the economy. To this end, SAP 
evolved a set of policy measures aimed at opening and diversifying the economy. These 
policy measures included the devaluation of the national currency, commercialisation and 
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privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), deregulation and liberalisation of vital 
sectors of the economy monopolised by the government and overhauling of the tariff 
structure. The implementation of these measures meant the dismantling of the protectionist 
architecture earlier erected. Apart from being a major condition for rescheduling Nigeria’s 
debt burden, it was envisaged that it would pave the way for the influx of foreign investors. 
The point was made by the IMF/World Bank and held as infallible economic truth by the 
Nigerian government that FDI was superior to foreign loan and that what was needed for an 
unfettered influx of FDI was the religious implementation of SAP. Proponents of SAP argued 
that even though greatness abounded in Nigeria on account of its abundant human and 
material resources, the key tool needed to ignite the spark necessary for development inferno 
- international capital - was lacking. In other words, what Nigeria needed to boost its 
development programme was access to the international capital market as well as foreign 
private investment markets (Aremu 2005:4). SAP dictated certain things which Nigeria must 
do, certain sacrifices it must make and a certain path it must take if the Nigerian economy 
must attract FDI.  
The path it must take in addition to adopting the policy measures of SAP was the 
dismantling of its protectionist regimes and the opening up of the economy. This was 
necessary because the logic of indigenisation was in total opposition to the logic of FDI. The 
domestic restrictions imposed on the ownership and control of investments through the 
Indigenisation Acts of 1972 and 77 were antithetical to foreign investments. Notwithstanding 
the lofty objectives of indigenisation policy which included the creation of opportunities for 
greater participation of Nigerians in the economy as well as railroading foreign capital into 
higher technology areas, Vision 2010 Committee report (1997:63) rightly concludes that 
“while successful in part, indigenisation did not generally shift control to Nigerians and it 
significantly reduced foreign direct investment and interest in Nigeria”. 
Apart from the Indigenisation Acts, there were other impediments to the free inflow 
of foreign investments, foreign capital and also repatriation of dividends. Sofowara 
(2003:141) lists these impediments to include: the Exchange Act of 1962 and the Securities 
Exchange Acts of 1988 and the Domiciliary Account and Second-Tier Foreign Exchange 
Decrees of 1985 and 1986 respectively. The seriousness which Nigeria attached to FDI led to 
the adoption of certain specific policies. These policies spanned the abrogation of anti-
investment legislations, the creation of conducive investment environment in terms of 
infrastructural facilities and the institutionalisation of investment incentives. The Nigerian 
government overhauled its legislations by dismantling those legislations that constituted 
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bottleneck to free inflow of FDI. Thus, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (NEP) Acts No. 
34 of 1987 and that of No. 7 of 1995 were promulgated to abrogate NEP Acts of 1972 and 
1977. NEP Act No. 34 of 1987 permitted public companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange to issue for subscriptions non-voting paid up shares to Nigerians and foreigners 
alike (Sofowora 2003:141). In addition to this, the Nigerian government set up such 
legislations as: 
a. The Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25 of 1988 and Decree No. 28 
of 1999 (to transfer the control of the economy to the private sector) 
b. The Companies and Allied Matters Decree of 1990 (modalities for company 
registration and conversion of SOEs and public system). 
c. The Nigerian Investment Promotions Commission Decree No. 16 of 1995. 
d. Foreign Exchange Monitoring Decree No. 17 of 1995 (which repealed under its S.37, 
the Foreign Exchange Control of 1962 and its amendments namely, the Exchange 
Control (Anti-Sabotage) Decree No. 7 of 1984, the Foreign Currency Domiciliary 
Account) Decree No. 1 of 1985 and the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market 
(SFEM) Decree No. 23 of 1986. 
e. Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC Act of 1995) to provide and 
oversee the regulatory framework for investment transactions. Aremu (2003:61) 
underpins the importance of this institutional capacity to the competitive investment 
environment globally especially amongst developing countries and the inevitable need 
to adopt promotional strategies to lure foreign investors.  
f. Investment and Securities Act 1999 which repealed the Securities and Exchange Act 
1988; the Lagos Stock Exchange Act, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Issue of 
Non-voting Equity Shares) Act 1990 and Part xvii of the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act 1990. 
The subsisting economic crisis in Nigerian in 1999 led the government to adopt a new 
adjustment programme tagged NEEDS. NEEDS was the same thing as SAP in every essential 
features except just in name. Like SAP, NEEDS laid emphasis on the restructuring of the 
domestic economy as a necessary condition for the attraction of FDI. The restructuring was 
hinged on the liberalisation of key sectors of the economy and the privatisation of SOEs. The 
Nigerian government believed that sizeable inflow of FDI results in higher factor productivity 
(Aremu 2005:5) and therefore anchored NEEDS on the correlational logic that the more open 
and far removed the state is from the epicentre of the economy, the more the FDI inflows.  
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Former President Obasanjo (1999-2007) travelled uncountable number of times to 
major capital cities of the advanced economies to woo foreign investors. In an address to the 
54th session of the UN General Assembly, President Obasanjo announced that: 
Our administration has initiated policies aimed at revitalizing 
the economy in order to create an enabling environment for 
investment and economic growth. We have also put in place 
appropriate legal framework for the protection of foreign 
investments and repatriation of legitimate profits. 
Other measures we have taken include: 
(i) a vigorous anti-corruption campaign. 
(ii) the promotion of transparency and 
accountability in public life. 
(iii) the abolition of decrees and regulations which hindered 
the inflow of foreign investment. 
(iv) the privatization of key state enterprises such as 
electricity and telecommunications. 
(v) the generation of opportunities for employment and 
income savings for domestic investment. 
(vi) legislation and measures to redress obvious cases of 
neglect and injustice done to ethnic minorities, 
particularly in the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta 
region and to deal with the problems of the 
environment. 
(vii) investigation of past of human rights violation with a 
view to promoting and protecting fundamental 
freedoms. 
(viii) strengthening the capacity of the law enforcement 
agencies to promote law or order as well as security or 
deal more effectively with the problem of drug 
trafficking (Selected Speeches of Obasanjo Volume 1 
2000:192). 
Despite the subsisting shortcomings in the resolution of certain factors necessary to 
make Nigeria’s investment climate competitive, the Nigerian government has shown 
remarkable commitment to attracting FDI through the diaspora. There has been progressive 
provision of the relevant infrastructure needed to make Nigeria investment-friendly and 
indeed an investor’s haven.  
The unprecedented burgeoning of the remittance flows worldwide is not an isolated 
occurrence rather it is attributable to new levels in the migration of highly skilled personnel 
from the developing to the developed countries. In other words, remittance flows are tied to 
the migration flows. IFAD (2007:8-16) estimates that there were about 150 million migrants 
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in 2006 comprising of over 50 million migrants from Asia/Oceania axis, 30 million migrants 
apiece from Africa, Latin America /Caribbean and Europe (transition economies) and 10 
million from the Near East.  The combined estimated remittance flows from these migrants to 
their families in the developing economies in 2006 were US$300 billion. The driving force 
behind this huge remittance outlay was the relaxation of hitherto strict immigration policies 
as well as policies on remittance outflows. Table 4.12 shows the breakdown of the global 
migrant population in 2006. While Asia/Oceania topped the migrant population data by 
accounting for 32 percent, Africa came second with 21 percent. Europe, Latin America and 
Near East accounted for 20, 19 and 8 percent respectively. But despite Africa’s high migrant 
population, it only accounted for 13 percent of global remittances.  
 
Table 4.12: Regional Distribution of Migrants and Remittance Stock,  
2006 
 









Africa1  32,808,000 21 38,611 13 
Asia/Oceania2  50,830,000 32 113,055 38 




30,403,000 19 67,905 23 
Near East5 12,594,000 8 28,449 9 
1Includes Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western Africa; 2IncludesCentral, 
Eastern, Southern, South-eastern Asia and Oceania; 3Includes Central Europe, Russian 
Federation and Eastern Europe; 4Includes the Caribbean, Central America, Mexico and South 
America; 5Includes the Caucasus, Middle East and Turkey. 
Source: IFAD (2007: 8-16) 
 
The relaxation of financial policies which enabled migrants to remit money to their 
home countries is part of the overall strategies of the developed countries to keep the brain 
drain channel open. Contemporary migration is dictated by two interrelated needs: needs of 
the individual and needs of the state. The individual migrant’s motivation is ultimately 
encapsulated in the quest for self-survival in the face man-made threats spanning economic, 
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political, socio-cultural spheres as well as natural disasters. Similarly, the motivation of the 
state to encourage migration is locatable in the twin quest for self-survival and ascendancy in 
the comity of states. This policy shift in the immigration policies of the developed countries 
was in response to several domestic challenges that had far-reaching implications for their 
position in the world capitalist system. The first was the challenge to maintain their labour 
power in line with domestic expansionary pressures; the second was the challenge of aging 
population in an ever-expanding world; the third was the challenge of maintaining the 
international status quo and the fourth was the challenge of maintaining prevailing 
international comparative economic advantage.  
The inequality that exists among countries within the modern world system and 
manifesting in differentials in life opportunities and quality of life in these economies 
provides a veritable basis for the unidirectionality of migration. In other words, attracting 
labour to the developed countries does not constitute a problem as higher wage levels in the 
developed countries, act as sufficient inducement. There appears to be contentions about the 
correct interpretation of the overall benefits of migration (from the developing countries to 
the developed countries). These contentions are products of variegated representations of the 
locus of the effects of migration of skilled personnel. There exists a tapestry of interpretations 
which either labels migration as a veritable symbiotic tool of mutual development or 
condemns it as a parasitic exploitation of the human capital stock of the Third World 
countries occasioned by weak domestic capacity, which by itself was inflicted by the 
developed countries. Migration has been identified as possessing pacifist attributes. As 
Schmid ( nd ) argues “in many Latin American and Caribbean countries, emigration seems to 
have helped to alleviate tensions between population trends and job creation as well as those 
arising from socio-political, ethnic and religious conflicts or from acute forms of 
environmental degradation”. In other words, rather than being classified as brain drain, 
migration of Third World citizens was depicted as a safety-net to douse the inevitable tension 
from mismatch between expectations and actual opportunities in their economies. A variant 
of the positivist argument with regard to brain drain is the benefits derivable by home 
countries because of the specialised skills acquired by their citizens in the diaspora. The 
argument has been encapsulated in the phrase – brain gain. Spatafora (2005:70) sets out this 
argument thus: 
On the positive side, migrants often find better opportunities in 
their destination countries: they may also learn skills and gain 
experience that will prove valuable if they repatriate. Further, 
emigration may encourage the development of commercial 
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networks, promote trade and investment flows, and lead to 
significant diaspora philanthropy. 
 
No doubt, the increasing global mobility amongst population has not yielded equal 
benefits to all concerned. While the labour exporting countries of the developing world 
contend with brain drain which seriously undermines their capacities to face the challenges of 
development, the labour-receiving countries of the developed world, on the other hand 
consolidate their edge in global competitiveness under the auspices of this imported labour. 
The loss to the Third World is the gain of the developed countries. Based on statistics, it is 
estimated that there are more African scientists and Engineers in the USA than in the entire 
continent. Similarly, there are more Nigerian doctors in other parts of the western world 
contributing to the health care of these nations than in Nigeria (Woldetensae 2007:3). 
Attention has shifted from the negative effects of migration to its positive impacts. 
Beyond the prospects of brain exchanges and brain gain associated with the return of highly 
skilled Africans to settle in their home countries, emphasis is placed upon the burgeoning 
atlas of remittances. Remittances are portrayed as being more than compensatory for 
whatever loss the emigrating countries might have suffered (Spatafora 2005:84). Worldwide 
remittances have been on the rise. From an estimated US$25billion in 1990, remittances have 
grown beyond imagination to US$268 billion in 2006 and US$337 billion in 2007 (Taiwo 
2007:180). The monumental increase in the volume of remittance portfolio has been 
attributed partly to increased migrants’ interest in sending money home as a result of the 
winds of globalisation which substantially blew off certain traditional barriers that had 
hitherto constituted a stumbling block and partly to improved reporting system (Englama 
2007:8). But outside of these factors, a major determining factor that directly impacted on the 
increased remittance flows was the relaxation of immigration policies in the developed 
countries. Not only did it regularise and legitimise the status of hitherto illegal immigrants, it 
opened the door to new migrants with favourable set of advantages including the freedom to 
remit a certain percentage of their earnings. The effect was a corresponding increase in the 
population of migrants which is currently estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 150 
million people (IFAD 2007:2). Although some scholars have dichotomized and attributed the 
factors that contributed to the increased volume of remittances worldwide to overflowing 
domestic conditions such as salary levels of the migrants and general living condition in the 
host country as well as conditions in the home countries such as black market premium on 
exchange rates and stable or unstable economic and political conditions (Taiwo 2007:19), 
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such factors as liberalisation of population mobility with its attendant consequence of mass 
exodus of skilled personnel in search of greener pastures consolidated it. It is this increased 
migrant population, owing to the international commodification of labour that significantly 
contributed to the rise in the remittance portfolio. IFAD (2007:2) has reported that the value 
of remittances has remained unchanged as migrants typically send out remittances in volumes 
of US$100, US$200 or US$300 at a time. Prior to these changes that liberalised the 
bottlenecks associated with international financial transactions, migrants had utilised informal 
channels as a means to remit money. Internationally-supported financial liberalisation helped 
to reverse this trend and thus spawned the ground for the utilisation of official mechanisms 
by migrants to remit money to their home countries. The increasing predilection to use 
official sources to remit money and improvement in financial reporting system enabled the 
collation of remittance information. It is however still generally held that the informal 
channels still account for substantial percentage of remittances. According to Taiwo 
(2007:18), out of US$337 billion recorded in 2007 as value of worldwide remittances, 
informal and unreported remittances were estimated at US$86 billion representing 25.52 
percent and formal channel for US$251 billion or 74.48 percent.  
There are no diametrically opposed conceptualisations of what constitutes 
remittances. Remittances are simply inflows (financial and otherwise) which results from a 
country’s émigrés. The constituents of remittances include monetary and non-monetary items 
that migrants earn while working abroad and later sent to recipients in their home country. In 
other words, remittances are the totality of transfers sent to host countries by migrants. In its 
computations of total remittances, the IMF recognises and includes the sum of three items or 
components: workers’ remittances (current transfers made by migrants who are employed 
and resident in another economy and therefore constitutes part of current transfers in the 
current account); compensation of employees (comprises wages, salaries and other benefits 
earned by non-resident workers for work performed for residents of other countries. This 
forms part of the income component of the current account) and migrants’ capital transfer 
(includes financial items that arise from the migration of individuals from one economy to the 
other and forms part of the capital account) (Taiwo 2007:31-32).  
Remittances can be classified into three distinct categories namely: financial, social 
and in-kind. Financial remittances cover the bulk of inflow of cash and other financial 
transactions which migrants send either through formal or informal channels. Another 
category of remittances is social remittances which comprise the whole gamut of socio-
economic assistance in such areas as health, education, building of infrastructure etc rendered 
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by the migrants in the diaspora to their local communities either directly or through 
hometown associations. Englama (2007:6) considers social remittances as important as 
financial transfers since the acquired values and norms inculcated by migrants are transferred 
to their home countries and thus contribute to development. Remittances-in-kind refer to 
goods that are sent home by the diaspora to their home countries. These transfers take the 
form of clothes and clothing items, medicines, toiletries, electronic equipment, automobiles 
and other consumer goods. This aspect of remittances is acknowledged to constitute a very 
large chunk of transfers under the informal channels. 
The importance currently attached to remittances inhered from the recognition of their 
increasing relevance and dominance in the portfolio of foreign financial inflows to 
developing countries’ economies. Remittances have been increasing in leaps and bounds in 
contradistinction to other external sources of capital flows to the developing countries. 
Remittance inflows increased in geometric proportions and thus far outstripped the inflow 
from other sources such as official development assistance (ODA), FDI and portfolio equity. 
IFAD (2007:6-7) notes that a majority of the countries in the developing regions from Asia 
and Oceanic, Latin American countries, Europe, Near east to Africa showed annual 
remittance inflows of more than US$1 billion with a further number of countries receiving 
more than US$500 million. Of all the regions of the world, Latin America and the Caribbean 
are the highest recipients and destinations of remittances. 
The global remittance environment is fraught with challenges. The key challenge 
appears to be the mechanism through which remittances could be transmitted to recipients in 
the home country in the face of ineffective and often non-existent institutional capabilities. 
Migrants have risen to the occasion by evolving several media outside of official channels. 
Often the decisions to exploit either the formal or informal channel are rooted in several 
socio-political and economic considerations. Englama (2007:7); Tomori and Adebiyi 
(2007:300) have identified such factors that influence the choice of remittance channels 
among migrants as: the cost of transactions, speed, security of funds, geographic 
proximity/accessibility, individual socio-economic characteristics of their household 
members, levels and type of economic activity in the sending and host countries, differential 
interest and exchange rates and the relative efficiency of the banking system. Formal channel 
constitutes all the officially recognised institutions empowered to carry out financial 
transactions such as the banking system and pseudo-banking and financial institutions. A 
major feature of the formal channel is the documentation of transaction: such documentations 
enable the collation of the pattern of remittance flows as well as the volume of remittances. 
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Informal channel, on the other hand, constitutes extra-legal means through which migrants 
remit money to designated recipients. Informal channel is an alternative means of remitting 
money and involves the circumvention of the officially recognised institutions for financial 
transactions. Cash transfers within the ambit of the informal channel utilises personal 
relationships through business people, courier companies, friends, relatives or oneself to get 
money across to designated recipients (Tomori and Adebiyi 2007:305; Osili 2007:104). 
Englama (2007:7) attributes the continued patronage of informal channel to several factors 
including constraints caused by banking and foreign exchange regulations, low outreach and 
insufficient protections to recipients by extant laws. 
The danger associated with informal channel as a means of inter-state cash transfers 
has generated more than a cursory interest amongst frontline western states since the 
September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon in 
the United States and sundry terrorist attacks on major European states and tourist 
rendezvous worldwide that recorded heavy western patronage. Informal channel provides an 
escape route for money launderers, drug barons and terrorists. In spite of the pervasive 
influence of informality within the global remittance environment, there are many agencies, 
money transfer companies and financial institutions jostling for patronage as a window 
through which remittances could be sent. Their ineffectiveness, so far, to continuously bridge 
or narrow the gap between the use of formal and informal channels by prospective remitters 
is associated with diverse factors ranging from high transaction costs, monopolistic 
operations of the MTOs, underdeveloped or inadequate ICT backbone to facilitate seamless 
operations and domestic regulations. There is no worldwide uniformity in the rates or cost of 
remittance transfers. The determination of each region’s transfer cost is based on such factors 
as the state of ICT, the population of migrants, the volume of remittances, domestic 
regulations, geographic proximity and other socio-economic considerations. 
 
Table 4.13:  Regional Remittance Transaction Costs, (2006) (US$ Million) 
 
 Africa Asia & 
Oceania 




Cost range of 
sending US$ 200 
8-12% 3-12% 6-12% 6-8% 7-12% 
Source: IFAD 2007 
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Table 4.13 shows lopsidedness in the remittance transaction costs. The Latin America 
and Caribbean region enjoy the lowest transaction costs in the world which average 7 percent 
to send US$200. Contrarily, Africa pays the highest transaction costs of 10 percent to send 
US$200. The costs of sending remittances to Asia and Oceania, Europe and Near East 
average 7.5 per cent, 9 per cent and 9.5 per cent respectively to send US$200. 
A juxtaposition of the volume of remittance transactions and average transaction costs 
and further analysis reveals that higher volume regions enjoy relatively lower transaction 
costs. This shows that the higher the volume the most likely it is for a reduction in the 
transaction cost. But this pattern did not seem to be true for Africa when examined against 
the posting of Near East region. While the worth of Africa’s total remittances was US$38.6 
billion, that of the Near East was US$28.4 and yet transaction costs to send money to Near 
East was lower (9.5 per cent) than Africa (10 per cent). IFAD (2007:9) links Africa’s 
disproportionate remittance transfer costs to two major challenges: high rates of informality 
and a regulatory environment that favoured monopoly. As it explains: 
 
Most African countries restrict outbound flows of money unless 
used for trading and money transfers to banking depositary 
institutions. As a result, informality emerges as a solution to 
remit. Another effect, however, is the persistence of 
monopolies on transfers by banks and the few money transfer 
operators (MTOs) (IFAD 2007:9). 
 
The over-regulation of foreign exchange transactions by African countries created, 
sustained and propagated informality to such an extent that it is, more or less, institutionalised 
as the need to remit money must be met. For instance, Nigeria’s Foreign Exchange Act 
established a very low limit of N5, 000 (less than US$35 in current exchange rate) as the 
unrestricted allowance for outbound transfers. This limitation was essentially a strategy to 
restrict transfers (Orozco and Millis 2007:7). 
Despite the legion of international MTOs within the global remittance environment, 
each region is peculiarly monopolised by an MTO. For instance, 70 percent of the US$10.3 
billion volume of remittances to Western Africa in 2006 was handled by one MTO (Western 
Union) whose grip on this sub-region was enhanced by its exclusive agreement with agent 
banks. The issue of monopolisation of regions is directly related to subsisting regulatory 
environment and the openness or otherwise of foreign exchange transactions. As IFAD 
(2007:7) points out: 
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Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, half of the 
licenced money transfers are handled by banks whereas in 
Central Asia, Africa, the Southern Caucasus, Eastern Europe 
and parts of South-eastern Asia, the share rises to almost 100 
percent, because regulations only permit banks to make such 
transfers. 
 
The dominant player in Nigeria’s remittance market is the Western Union which 
accounts for nearly 80 percent of transfers even though there are three other players (Orozco 
and Millis 2007:16; IFAD 2007:9). Western Union dominates both inbound and outbound 
transfers through its exclusive agreement with banks. Out of twenty four (24) banks operating 
in Nigeria, fifteen are agents for Western Union, five for Money Gram and one for Coinster 
and Vigo Corporation (Vigo is a subsidiary of Western Union) apiece. Apart from the 
exclusivity clause in Western Union’s operations, its dominance in the remittance market is a 
product of several factors such as remitters’ perception of efficiency, accessibility, reliability 
and payment in originating currency. Based on Western Union’s 2006 Annual report, it 
maintains and provides worldwide money transfer services to approximately 270,000 agent 
locations in over 200 countries. Similarly, MoneyGram, another major player in the 
remittance market, operates 125,000 locations across over 170 countries (Englama 2007:7). A 
survey by Orozco and Millis (2007:9) regarding remitters’ preferred money transfer channels 
showed that 78.26 per cent of transfers were done through the Western Union and 15.78 per 
cent through the Money Gram. The rest MTOs shared among them the remaining 6.36 
percent. 
There is no uniformity in the effect of remittances within the developing world 
because of the differing perception of migrations amongst countries of the developing world. 
These differing perceptions underscored the policies adopted or not adopted to harness 
remittance inflows. Philippines, Mexico and India, have well-laid out policies which not only 
encourage their nationals in the diaspora to remit money back home through special 
incentives but also have frameworks to harness these remittances and transform them to 
agents of development. Mexico, for instance, has a framework that adds value to its 
remittance inflows in such a way that a dollar remittance produces about US$2.90 in GDP 
and an increase of about US$3.20 in economic output (cited in Taiwo 2007:20). Contrasted 
with Nigeria, remittances were not considered a source of foreign exchange that could 
contribute to national development until 2002. Prior to this period, Haas (2006:15) notes that 
“Nigeria has never pursued a migration or a remittance-led development strategy, as has been 
the case in countries with far higher rates of out-migration”. The major reasons for lack of 
209 
 
policy initiatives in the area of harnessing positive fallouts of migration especially 
remittances include: dearth of data on remittances owing partly to policy somersaults and 
pervasiveness of informality in remittance transfers; dearth of data on the actual population of 
Nigerian migrants and the perception of government which tended to see migration as a drain 
on its human resources and by extension its developmental agenda. However, the current 
policy initiatives about remittances can be periodized at the inception of democratic rule in 
Nigeria in 1999. 
One of the greatest attractions associated with remittances and for which it is 
considered superior to other sources of external finance such as ODA and private capital 
flows, loans is its human face. Remittances are a product of benevolent philanthropism. In 
other words, motivations to send remittances are powered by the considerations for the 
recipients’ improvement. Another attraction of remittances is that it is not so much a product 
of international political permutations as they are deployed to serve more or less 
microeconomic purposes. Another attraction of remittances is that its flow is more or less 
stable as it is often transferred in manageable volumes of between US$200 and US$500 per 
remittance and do not exhibit the fluctuations often associated with private capital flows 
(IFAD 2007: 2; Spatafora 2005:72).  
But the truth is that even though the volume of remittances has been on the increase, 
its flow cannot be ascribed with stability as factors in the host and home economies as well as 
the international arena impact upon it. Therefore any framework which sees remittances as a 
stimulus for development must recognise their volatility as a source of foreign finance. 
Beyond that, remittances can never compensate for the loss of human capital.  A “balance of 
trade” approach to immigrants reveals that developing countries generally have deficits 
which connote that they are disadvantaged. A corollary to this development is the high cost to 
these economies to replace emigrants. Even for a developed country like Canada, which is a 
net receipt of skilled immigrants, the emigration of ts skilled personnel, especially to the US 
has been dubbed a brain drain and roundly believed to be “real and costly” to the Canadian 
economy (De Voretz and Laryea 1998:23).  
Remittances, until recently, were not factored into the foreign exchange projections of 
African countries especially Nigeria. Indeed, none of Nigeria’s developmental models 
recognised or incorporated migration or remittance-led development strategy. Instead the 
prevention of migration was the major preoccupation of government policies as migration 
was closely associated with socio-economic dislocations (Haas 2006:15). The position of 
government was not completely out of sync considering that out-migration was the response 
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of a cross-section of Nigerians to the socio-economic contradictions that confronted the 
country beginning from the 1980s. Tomori and Adebiyi (2007:302) aver that international 
migration was not a recent phenomenon in Nigeria as it pre-dated its independence. The 
difference between migration of yore and contemporary migration was the motive: while the 
motive for pre-1980s migration was to acquire academic and associated laurels, 
contemporary migration is associated with economic survival occasioned by domestic 
economic crisis. As has been aptly delineated: 
 
The turning point seems to be the collapse of the petroleum 
boom in the early 1980s and the attendant economic hardship 
faced by Nigerians. Subsequently, they started seeking 
employment opportunities in other countries, while many who 
did not necessarily study outside the country began to leave 
(Tomori and Adebiyi 2007:302). 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) did not collate data on remittances nor were they 
factored into the country’s development dynamics until 2002 when there was a conscious 
policy shift on the part of government to appropriate the gains associated with remittances for 
national development. Prior to this period, Nigerian policy thrust only recognised reverse-
migration as the only positive aspect of migration. This position inhered from the perception 
that emigrants were drain on the country’s resources, a position that has undergone 
metamorphosis as a result of the recognition that migrants are carriers of the development 
germ. In other words, migrants transfer knowledge to their home country. 
In spite of the attributes of remittances and their potentiality to be a positive force in 
the march to development, they have not been seen to impact on Nigerian economy. The 
most obvious reasons are their stagnation at the micro-level, their consumptive preoccupation 
and the lack of policy framework to adequately harness them for productive and investment 
purposes. Therefore there must be conscious efforts to dismantle the consumptive 
preoccupation of remittances and make them investment-oriented, that is, make investments 
the primary target of remittances.  
Nigeria is generally regarded as a mobile country owing to the number of its citizens 
that are “dispersed” abroad. Despite lack of agreement amongst scholars about the number of 
Nigerians in the diaspora, we estimate that about 7.25 million Nigerians, or 5 percent of its 
population, are outside the shores of Nigeria. The yearly increment in the volume of 
remittances from the Nigerian diaspora is a product of two factors: increased stock of 
émigrés; and, improved disposition to remit money due to positive reforms in the domestic 
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money transfer environment. The emergence of Nigeria as a major remittance recipient in the 
world opened new possibilities about the relevance of the diaspora in the schema of Nigeria’s 
quest for FDI. Table 4.14 shows the UNDP estimation of Nigeria’s emigrant population. This 
figure is considered too low. Other estimations put Nigeria’s emigrant population at between 
5 and 17 million. Considering Nigeria’s position on the global top ten remittance receiving 
countries, the UNDP figure appears incongruent. 
 
 






      
 
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2009. 
 
The official recognition of the potentials of Nigerians in the Diaspora as veritable 
agents of economic development was a relatively recent phenomenon, indeed a legacy of the 
democratic dispensation that started in 1999. Following years of “pariahdom” as a result of 
international sanctions imposed on Nigeria, foreign investors more or less blacklisted the 
country. Several factors such as Nigeria’s poor human rights records, authoritarian regimes 
and extrajudicial killings as well as negative and offensive international media attention as a 
result of pervasive corruption created the basis for international opprobrium. As such, the 
Commonwealth, the UN and other leading members of the OECD countries had imposed one 
form of sanction or the other on Nigeria. And as at the time President Obasanjo came into 
power in 1999, Nigeria was riding under the weight of these sanctions as exemplified by its 
economy which was on the brink of collapse.  
Apart from Nigeria’s peculiar domestic problems that necessitated its being 
blacklisted in the comity of nations, certain global conditions drastically slowed down the 
inflow of FDI to developing countries including Nigeria. The quest for growth and 
development in the face of contracting FDI and Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
created the room for creativity in expanding the sources of FDI. Atkinson identified eight 







new sources of international funding of domestic investment and these included increased 
remittances from emigrants. Others are global environmental tax, currency transaction tax, 
creation of new special drawing rights (SDRs), international finance facility, increased 
private donations for development, global lottery and global premium bond (Awolaja 2005: 
53-56). 
 
Table 4.15a:  Contributions of Remittance Flows to Nigerian Economy 
(US$ Million) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
2008 2009 
Remittances  2,262.3 6,461.5 10,541.6 17,919.5 
 
19,176.7 19,992.3 
Population (million) 129.9 133.5 140.0 144.5 
 
149.1 153.9 
GDP Current Market 
Prices 
 (N Billion) 
11,673.6 14,735.3 18, 709.6 20,657.3 
 
24,296.3 24,712.7 
GDP current Market 
Prices 
(US $Billion) 
87.4 88.37 144.49 176.77 
 
191.80 170.31 
Exchange Rate (N/$) 133.5 132.15 128.65 125.83 
 
118.92 148.90 
GDP Growth Rate 6.6 6.5 6.0 6.5 
 
6.0 6.7 
Annual Growth  Rate of 
Remittances 
113.1 185.6 63.1 70.0 7.0 4.3 
 
Sources: CBN Annual Reports 2005:xxxiv; 2007:228; 2008:251; 2009:xxxix, 26. 
 
 
Table 4.15b: World Bank Data on Nigeria’s Remittance Flows 
(US$ Million) 
 
Nigeria 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010e 
Inward Remittance Flows  
 
2,273 3,329 5,435 9,221 9,980 9,585 9,975 
e: estimate. Source: World Bank 2011:195) 
Tables 4.15a and b showcase Nigeria’s remittance flows. The difference in the 
CBN’s computation and that of the World Back inheres from differences in computational 
methodology. The sets of data in both Tables have one thing in common: since 2004, there 
has been steady and consistent increase in remittance flows to Nigeria which puts Nigeria in 
the bracket of top ten remittance recipients in the world.
Former President Obasanjo’s shuttle diplomacy to secure Nigeria’s reintegration into 
the mainstream of international system 
covering his designation as president
second phase was as president between May 1999 and May 2007. It was in the first phase of 
his shuttle diplomacy he encountered the Nigerian diaspora in city after city and thus 
recognised their potential as a source of national development. The idea to harness diaspora 
contributions to national development crystallised at this period and was motorised by the 
logic of home-bias investment –
home countries despite economic adversity than foreign investors as well as the logic of 
investment ambassadorship - that foreigners would develop confidence in the domestic 
economy if they see substantial investments of the citizens in the local economy. 
 
Figure 8: The Trend of Nigeria's Remittance Flow 







had two phases. The first phase was the period 
-elect and that was between February-May 1999 and the 















Figure 9: Annual Growth Rates of Remittances, 2004-2009 
 
 
Sources: CBN Annual Reports Various Years. 
 
Figure 8 shows the trend of Nigeria’s remittance inflows. From US$2,262.30million 
in 2004, the total stock of Nigeria’s remittances rose to 19992.30 million in 2009 representing 
a percentage increase of 883.72 in five years. Figure 9 breaks down the annual growth rate of 
remittance inflow to Nigeria. 
Notwithstanding that millions of Nigerians are scattered all over the world and 
regularly maintained family and cultural linkages, it was in 2000 that the Nigerian 
government developed more that a passing interest in their potentiality as a source of FDI and 
national development. Yet, the Chinese, Jewish, Filipino, Indian and Mexican diasporas have 
over the years established themselves as catalysts for national development (Balaam and 
Veseth 2005:371). For instance, Israel since 1951 and India since 1991 have been raising 
hard currency financing from their respective diaspora through bonds and have raised 
between them between US$ 35-40 billion (Ketkar and Ratha 2007:2).  
International experience has shown that there are three basic aspects to the potentiality 
of the diaspora to contribute to FDI. The first is direct investment in terms of taking 
advantage of the divestment of government interest in SOEs, that is, privatisation exercise or 
outright establishment of businesses, the second is remittances to home countries and the 
third is bonds and sundry financial instruments. The recognition of the relevance of the 
diaspora to nation-building led to certain government policies that put the necessary 





















challenges to attracting diasporas-specific private sector investments. These challenges 
included: countries’ weak institutional link with their diaspora; the diaspora investors’ lack of 
access to finance in both host origin countries and absence of information on investment 
opportunities. 
The area that Nigerian diaspora has demonstrated consistency is in sending 
remittances: As has already been noted, there has been progressive increment in the volume 
of remittances sent by the Nigerian diaspora. There is a thin line, indeed an interconnection, 
between remittances and investments by the diaspora. In other words, there is no clearly 
defined dichotomy between remittances and FDI as remittances often fulfilled the demands 
for investments. Therefore, the calculation of the contributions of the Nigerian diaspora to its 
FDI stock must necessarily include remittances. This is so because remittance inflows have 
been deployed to all manner of uses ranging from family up-keep to community development 
and economic investments (Englama 2007: 12; Nwajiuba 2005:11). 
Even though Nigerians in the diaspora have been mobilised under the auspices of 
Nigerian National Volunteer Services (NNVS) and Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization 
(NIDO), these organization have not been solidly entrenched as a platform to systematically 
organise the attraction of FDI. Efforts at sending remittances or investing in Nigerian 
economy have been on personal scale. Nigerians in the diaspora make sole or joint efforts 
outside the umbrella of these organisations. The limited success in organising the Nigerian 
diaspora is attributable to three factors: one, the relative newness of these organisations and 
their lack of capacity to mobilise the Nigerian diaspora; two, the informality that 
characterises the Nigerian economic environment; and three, the levity with which data 
gathering and storage is treated. There is no specific knowledge in government circles about 
the exact number and the geopolitical distribution of Nigerians in the diaspora to facilitate 
effective mobilisation. The lack of precise data in Nigeria has made the collation of data by 
government agencies, especially the NIPC saddled with the responsibilities of encouraging, 
promoting and coordinating investments in Nigeria, a Herculean task. The NIPC is a one-stop 
agency empowered to act as the coordinating and approving centre for the establishment of 
businesses with foreign involvement in the country 
(www.nipc.gov.ng/important/%20document/2004%20/ANNUAL%20REPORT%20OF%20T
HE%20NIPC.doc). 
The NIPC was established as a successor to the Industrial Development Coordination 
Committee (IDDC) and has within its purview several tasks which include amongst others: 
the coordination and monitoring of all investment promotion activities; the initiation and 
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support of measures to enhance the investment climate in Nigeria for both Nigerian and non-
Nigerian investors; promotion of investments in and outside of Nigeria through effective 
promotional means; the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of information about 
investment opportunities and sources of investment capital, and advise on request; the 
availability, choice or suitability of partners in joint-venture projects and other relevant 
information necessary to advance and extend the frontiers of investments generally in Nigeria 
(NIPC Act 1995).  
Many Nigerians who have braved all odds to invest in the country are not captured by 
the NIPC this is so because of the informality that characterises investments by diaspora 
Nigerians. They merely use existing channels of family and consanguineous ties to make 
their investments. This is despite the elaborate investment incentives packaged to stimulate 
investments. The NIPC has a bouquet of investment incentives to encourage and stimulate 
FDI in all sectors of the economy. These investment incentives include amongst others: 
companies income tax, pioneer status, tax relief for research and development (R&D); capital 
allowances, in-plant training, investment infrastructure, investment in economically 
disadvantaged areas, labour intensive mode of production, local value-added, reinvestment 
allowance and minimum local raw material utilisation. Despite the elaborate investment 
incentive package, many Nigerians in the diaspora still invested informally and outside these 
frameworks. However, several diaspora Nigerians have made investments traversing several 
sectors ranging from ICT, telecommunications, agro-allied businesses, pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, medical services, energy sector and oil and gas (Aniebonam 2006:4; Keshi 
2008). Through the efforts of Nigerian diaspora, massive investments in various sectors of 
the Nigerian economy were made. A list of representative Nigerian diaspora-led investments 
has been compiled below. Table 4.16 shows a representative compilation of diaspora-led 
investments in the Nigerian economy. Nigerian diaspora invested massively in estates and 











Table 4.16: Representative Diaspora-led Investments 
 




Afrihub ICT Capacity Building sited 
in Nigerian Universities such as 
University of Nigeria, Nsukka and 
Enugu Campuses; Nnamdi Azikiwe 







American Hospital Centre, Abuja Dr Ifeanyi Obiakor 
 
Health 
3 The NetPost Cyber Centre Project, 




4 The Port Harcourt Specialist Hospital 
Centre, Port Harcourt 
Dr Charles Okorie Health 





6 The DubCom Cyber Centres, 
Aba/Umuahia 
Mr Dan Eke ICT 
7 The Breej Pharmaceutical Special 





HoneyDrop Food Processing Project Dr. Jide Adejide 
Agro-
allied/Manufacturing 
9 Geometric Power Ltd Prof. Barth Nnaji Energy 
10 




11 Transnational Corporation of Nigeria 
(Transcorp) 
(The diaspora was instrumental in 
setting up this corporation) 
Tom Isegholi and 
Nicholas Okoye 
(formerly with 
Merill Lynch &Co. 
Inc. New York 




Sources: Aniebonam 2006:4; Keshi 2008; Okele, Medrano and Cordahi 2008:40. 
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According to NIPC (2006:62), between 2004 and 2006, the NIPC registered a total of 
178 new foreign investments in Nigeria. A breakdown shows that while 2004 recorded 63 
new firms, 2005 had 41 firms. The number however appreciated to 74 in 2006 representing 
17.5 percent and 80.55 percent increase over 2004 and 2005 registrations respectively (see 
Table 4.17). These investments generated, in monetary terms, US$424.12 million worth of 
FDI inflows in addition to 17,090 jobs in the Nigerian economy. The manufacturing sector 
generated the most jobs. Out of 10,958 jobs in 2005, it accounted for 6,749. Similarly, it 
created 1,866 jobs out of a total 6,132 jobs generated in 2006.   
 
Table 4.17:   NIPC Business Registration/Business Permits by Sectors 
    
Investment Sector 









Services 19 14 18 930 1380 
Manufacturing  18 12 16 6749 1866 
Transport 3 4 6 383 120 
Agro/Agro-allied 7 04 3 624 220 
Construction/Engineering 4 2 4 1400 821 
Communications 5 2 6 200 56 
Oil and Gas 5 2 11 22 616 
Chemicals/Petrochemicals 3 1 3 650 235 
Infrastructure - - - - - 
Solid Minerals - - 3 - 638 
Tourism - - 2 - 108 
Power - - 2 - 72 
Total 63 41 74 10,958 6,132 
 





Apart from economic diplomacy embarked upon by the Obasanjo regime (1999-
2007), there were conscious efforts, under the auspices of NEEDS, towards domestic 
economic reforms. Nigeria’s economic reforms lay the foundation for the processes that 
underpinned the provision of socio-economic infrastructures germane to attracting and 
retaining, as well as imbuing the economic system with the necessary verve for the influx of 
FDIs. The role of the Nigerian diaspora in investment is enormous: they utilise two fronts – 
remittances and direct investment. 
It is estimated by the CBN that as much 25 percent of remitted funds are channelled to 
investment with the rest deployed to sustaining recipient families and developing 
communities (Okele, Medrano and Cordahi 2008:40). Since Nigeria’s political reforms that 
enthroned democratic governance, with attendant socio-economic reforms, there have been 
evidences of diaspora interest, and indeed active investment, in key sectors of the Nigerian 
economy. Although the various data on FDI both from the CBN and the NIPC do not have 
specific breakdown about the exact percentage of diasporic FDI, the increasing  influence of 
diaspora investment as a percentage of FDI is inferable from the burgeoning remittance pool 
as well as the general appreciation of the FDI stock. It is important to note that most diaspora 
investments are outside the sphere of official data since they invested either personally or by 
proxy through relations, investment agencies or financial institutions. Most Nigerian banks 
set up a plethora of products to harness diaspora resources for investment in Nigerian equities 
listed locally and globally as well as liquid government and corporate bonds, trusts and 
mutual funds. Such banks as Bank PHB, United Bank for Africa (UBA), Oceanic Bank, 
Fidelity Bank, Diamond Bank and a host of other Microfinance Banks introduced specially 
tailored products and dollar-denominated accounts and investment advice for diaspora 
customers. Despite the generally small sums of money sent in each transaction tranche, the 
consistency of remittances has kindled the interests of Microfinance Banks creating 
possibilities of remittances serving as collateral for small business start-up capital for 
individuals thus expanding the horizons of FDI (Okele, Medrano and Cordahi 2008:14).  
The Nigerian diaspora has since its crystallisation into NNVS and NIDO been 
mobilising Nigerians for nation-building especially in the areas of attracting FDI and 
generally investing in the Nigerian economy. since 2004, these organisations have been 
organising annual Nigerian Diaspora Day (NDD) with the sole objective of fostering and 
maintaining linkages Nigeria and its diaspora and among Nigerians in the diaspora. There has 
been an incremental and gradual awareness as demonstrated by the attendance of over 600 
delegates from 23 countries in the July 2008 edition of the NDD in Abuja (Okele, Medrano 
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and Cordahi 2008:14). As part of their confidence-building strategies, NIDO (Europe) 
initiated and sponsored a US$200million open-ended Nigerian Diaspora Investment Fund 
(NDIF). The Nigerian government also set up the National Resources Fund (NRF) with N80 
billion. The idea behind the fund was to boost FDI by providing an easy access to any 
Nigerian citizen interested in participating in the country’s industrialisation but lacks the 
funds to do so. The fund is principally a resource base to encourage the Nigerian diaspora as 
well as stimulate confidence in the economy.  The ever-increasing volume of remittances 
with between 17 and 25 percent deployed to economic investments demonstrates that the 
Nigerian diaspora has become a catalyst to attracting FDI. The positive disposition of the 
Nigerian diaspora towards investing in Nigeria as well as the various reforms aimed at 
strengthening the economy’s capacity have contributed in expanding the frontiers of FDI 




4.4: BRAIN DRAIN AND THE QUEST FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN 
NIGERIA 
 
There is a consensus among scholars that technology (its development, acquisition 
and application) underpins the trajectory of development, indeed, it conditions the perception 
and classification of countries as it is the epicentre of enhanced productivity and economic 
growth. Technology incorporates both the totality of man’s know-how and the products that 
emanate from the application of this know-how. Technology is knowledge applied to the 
production process. The relevance of technology in the modern world capitalist system is its 
utilitarian value in terms of its deployment of associated knowledge to the production of 
goods and services (Balaam and Veseth 2005:220). What differentiates countries is the 
quality of their knowledge and the products that emanate from their storehouse of know-how 
and their overall effect on rolling back the limitation of nature. Igwe (2002:439} contends 
that there is rudimentary technology in every society. That is, every society or state did 
develop some form of technology to cater for its needs both in the ancient   and modern times 
but the level and sophistication of technological know-how determine societies’ prosperity 
and power. 
 Notwithstanding the argument of the origin of scientific inventions and attendant 
technological advancement, the major feature of technology is its non-static nature and 
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seemingly perennial trajectory toward improvement.  Such search for improvement has 
translated into the invention and deployment of advanced, sophisticated and complex 
technologies with an attendant outward shift of the production possibilities frontiers. As 
Cypher and Dietz (1997:42) have observed, “technology progress reduces costs, increases 
productive efficiency, conserves society’s (and the world’s) resources, and establishes the 
capacity for a higher standard of living for greater numbers of persons”. Often, the 
acquisition of the new technologies is a product of sustained research and development that 
have cost component of in terms resources and time. Technologies confer advantages on both 
the firm and country that developed it. For one, it elevates such a country to a position of 
strength in the comity of states as it broadens its national power. It is the advanced 
technologies of the developed countries that distinguish and confer power on them. Similarly, 
it is the lack of sophisticated technologies that underpins the classification of certain states as 
belonging to the Third World. As Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2005:46-47) opines, technology is a 
key factor in the contemporary calculation of national power since states deploy technology 
in their interaction with other nations both for ascendancy and balance of power. Secondly, 
technologies ensure and consolidate development. All the indices of development, be it the 
economy, quality of life, socio-political organisation, military power and so on are anchored 
on advances in technological acquisition. Thirdly, technology bestows monopolistic 
advantages on firms and countries with the attendant high level profits that set them apart 
from other firms and countries. The primacy of technology in the ensemble of indices of 
power and development led Ogbonnaya Onu to assert that “science and technology 
knowledge have become so important that today, they have replaced capital as societies’ most 
important   resource. This is true whether in an industrial or post- industrial society” (cited in 
Biereenu-Nnabugwu 2005:43). No doubt, science and technological knowledge constitutes a 
very important driving force in contemporary development. But rather than replace capital, 
technological knowledge actually complements it in a symbiotic, cyclical manner: capital 
creates science and technological knowledge through research and development; this 
knowledge in put into the production process which create further capital.  
Dichotomisation in the global capitalist system is dictated by the technological 
capacity of countries. The first and second worlds are technologically advanced with 
ideology as the iron curtain demarcating them. According to Igwe (2002:445)  the first world 
consists of western Europe,  the US and Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan while the 
second world was supposed to be made up of the former Soviet Union and East European 
states which were socialist, developed  and somewhat pseudo-imperialistic like the West in 
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terms of global ambitions. Instructively, the indices that place them at the commanding 
height of the modern world system such as higher-level capitalist development, military 
power and high standard of living are motorised by their diverse technological attainment. 
The Third world which comprise Africa, Asia and Latin American continents are generally 
characterised by negative indices manifesting in underdevelopment, fragile economies, 
political and economic instability, widespread poverty and very low standard of living. 
Essentially, the Third World countries possess very low technological base which not only 
places them at the fringes of the modern world system but also make them dependent on the 
sophisticated technological achievements of the first and second worlds.  It was the desire to 
bridge the great gulf created by extreme concentration of technological achievements in the 
West that underpinned the call for technology transfer. This was especially so since major 
schools of economic thought identified technical progress as the primary source of economic 
growth in industrial countries (Ocampo and Martin 2003:113).  
There are contentions about both the desirability and possibility of technology transfer 
as a mechanism of achieving industrial development in the Third World. Igwe (2002:439) 
argues that certain objective and subjective conditions underpin technological development 
and that it is essential that technology “must have an indigenous base, appropriate to the 
direct and immediate needs of people and propelled by a free political atmosphere and 
patriotic leadership”. This suggestion is a recipe for stagnation if not retrogression into the 
deeper recesses of the periphery. Again, technology is not in a steady-state but is 
evolutionary: that is, technological development is incremental and as such undermines the 
argument that technology should have indigenous base. Such an argument is an inadvertent 
endorsement of the developmental trajectory of the modernisation theory and its stage of 
development. This thinking seemed to have motorised the ISI and EOI in the Third World 
including Nigeria with its abysmal failure to enthrone real technological development. ISI 
and EOI adopted the technology transfer rhetoric of the genre that gave primacy to the 
purchase of simple technologies that established simple assembly and processing plants.  
Technologies that tend to address narrow or local needs have no utilitarian value on 
the turf of contemporary globalised world. Advances in technology acquisition are no longer 
for the purpose of addressing domestic or local issues but for possible active participation in 
the production domain. This, therefore, requires adaptation and value-added modification. 
Igwe (2002:439) has argued that “technology can be consciously copied and improved upon 
through a careful study of the form, the careful analysis of its internal organization or 
structure, and their scrupulous reconstitution or synthesis”.  
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But technology transfer is not that simple. Almost all firms and countries are secretive 
about their technologies and jealously guard against their replication or adaptation. In 
contemporary modern world system, there are restrictions and prohibitive prices for 
technology transfer. As Ocampo and Martins (2003:13) opine, “technology transfers are 
subject to the payment of innovation rents, which are increasingly protected by the 
universalisation of strict regulations concerning intellectual property rights.” The payment by 
Third World for technology transfer has been enormous as demonstrated by ISI and EOI. 
Oftentimes, the technologies transferred are those whose relevance is at its twilight or those 
that do not allow the developing countries within the precinct of the most dynamic areas of 
activity.  
  One of the central problematiques in the search for Third World development has 
been the technology transfer dilemma. This dilemma is exemplified by the selectivity of the 
West in the transfer of technology. This should be expected considering that unregulated 
transfer of technology by any country or bloc is akin to committing economic suicide. 
Therefore the West determines what technology to transfer and when and how thus leading to 
relatively slow and irregular spread of technical progress from countries of the West to the 
rest of the world (Ocampo and Martin 2003:114). Technology transfer constitutes a veritable 
mechanism through which the technological progress recorded in the West could trickle 
down to developing countries. It implies “a continuous process that involves planning, 
decision-making about technological options and choice of the most appropriate technology 
in the light of local characteristics and available resources, and the utilisation and 
development of this technology with the aim of achieving particular goals and objectives at 
some time in the future“(Cohen 2004:218). Technology transfer does not happen in isolation: 
It is a conscious policy of government and firms. In other words, both firms and government 
spearhead technology transfer of various types and varieties for various reasons. Essentially, 
technology transfer involves two main processes: one, physical movement of technical 
element across national boundaries for production activities; and two, the actual implantation 
of the technology in the host country (Adeniki 2004)  
  The Nigerian state has, since independence, favoured technology transfer through 
the FDI. Interestingly, the FDI inflow in Nigeria is market-seeking; that is, these investments 
seek to serve the domestic markets. What this mean is that technologies transferred are 
limited in their utilitarian value as they are not adaptable to produce for the international 
market. Hence, Nigeria’s exports comprise mainly oil and raw materials.  
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  The core argument of the neoliberal theoretical framework which underpinned the 
economic reforms in developing countries is the centrality of FDI in technology transfer. It 
contends that MNCs are agents of technology transfer through FDI. FDI is typically 
conceptualised as a gap-filling strategy that augments domestically available supplies of 
saving, foreign exchange, government revenue, technology and managerial resources for the 
purpose of achieving development. Kinoshita (1998:2); Torlak (2004:5-6) have identified 
four channels through which FDI stimulate technology transfer as demonstration or 
contagion-imitation (the imitation of the operational modalities of foreign affiliate by the 
local firm and the adoption and adaptation of their technologies); competition (the entry of 
foreign firms and the stimulation of intense competition that ultimately lead to more efficient 
utilisation of existing and new technologies and resources); training (the training of local 
workers and the broadening of their knowledge base on existing and new technologies) and 
backward forward linkages (collaboration with local firms). Yauri (2006:40) contends that 
there is positive correlation between FDI and technology transfer as FDI often comes with the 
advantage of technology. The argument of the anti-FDI School is that it leads to transfer of 
economic control and wealth to external powers which not only could undermine independent 
domestic development but spawns marginalisation of the FDI hosts. In other words, 
technologies purported to have been transferred only strengthens the peripherality of the 
Third World countries in the global capitalist system. The successes recorded in Southeast 
Asian countries which is attributable to FDI as a result of economic reforms modified 
perception of the link between FDI and technology transfer. 
But truth is that FDI is not the only mechanism through which technology transfer 
could be effected. Ikiara (2003:8) has identified other charnels as including: 
i. importation of machinery and intermediate inputs (or trade in   general) international 
movement of labour, for example reverse brain drain and movement of consultants; 
“arms length” transaction or technology licensing; 
ii. govt efforts such as education provision and investment on high-tech projects; 
iii. contract manufacturing for developed country markets; 
iv.  Expert-guided tour of factories apprenticeship; 
v. illegitimate means such as industrial espionage. 
It is also known that ideological and strategic reasons had, in the heydays of the cold 
war, stimulated technology transfer for the purpose of containing the perceived expansionary 
policies of adverseness. But the MNCs are the main agency of technology transfer either 
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through internalised method (FDI through affiliates) or externalised method (joint ventures, 
franchising, capital goods sale, licences, technical assistance,   international subcontracting) 
(Ikiara 2003:8; Aremu 2005:42). 
Nigeria, as already noted, has always sought to participate in the global investment 
regime. But the major challenge that faced successive   regimes was the identification and 
application of effective mix of policy measures that would roll back disincentives to foreign 
investment (Aremu 2005:11). This challenge was as result of the need to balance the need for 
FDI and technology acquisition and the country’s economic sovereignty. The second 
National Development Plan (1970-74) which was motorised by economic nationalism 
outlined the direction of government  policy as” progressive elimination of foreign 
dominance in the national economy, not merely in terms of nominal financial ownership, but 
really in terms of the level of managerial and technological control “(cited in Aremu 
2005:116). Thus the Industrial Inspectorate Act of 1970 was strengthened with the National 
Office of Industrial Property (NOIP) Act 90 of 1979. NOIP was vested with wide-ranging 
powers which included the protection of the Nigerian economy from being a dumping ground 
for obsolete and undesirable technologies and the stimulation of free flow of technology into 
preferential or priority areas of the economy; improvement of the adaptation and absorption 
of imported technology into Nigeria and the development of indigenous technology 
capabilities. In assessing NOIP whose nomenclature changed to National Office for 
Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) in 1979, Aremu (2003:124) avers that “it 
is difficult to point out how much technology, in its real meaning of core technology had 
been negotiated and attracted”. 
   The whole concept of technology transfer is built on the overriding motive of profit. 
Every party to technology transfer is motivated by what is in it for it. MNCs engage in 
technology transfer simply because it could enhance their productivity and thus more profit. 
Ikiara (2003:9) avers that investors including MNCs can prevent technology transfer if it is 
not consistent with their profit-maximizing strategy and the cost of preventing it is low. An 
important point in the whole question of technology transfer is that the availability of a crop 
of competent personnel to man the entire processes is an irreducible minimum requirement 
Even though Nigeria’s first Development Plan (1962-68) recognised this when it anchored its 
technological and industrial development on foreign experts. Subsequent Development Plans 
sought to anchor development on Nigerians. This led to the liberalisation of education with 
the goal to educate Nigerians to fill the gap. Indeed, the Nigerian state provided the 
framework of universal primary education, unity school and tuition-free, broad-based tertiary 
226 
 
education. The result of these efforts is the massive production of all grades of manpower for 
national development. The economic crisis of the 1980s and introduction of SAP under the 
auspices of IMF deepened the contradictions   in the Nigerian economy leading to mass 
emigration. The mass emigration of highly skilled Nigerians created a big hole in the 
manpower pool which was necessary to consolidate technology transfer. The relevance of 
human capital in technology transfer is exemplified by the outsourcing of Nigeria’s 
technological needs as demonstrated by the building and commissioning   of Nigeria’s space 
projects through the Russians. 
On the one hand, the thrust of the politics surrounding technology transfer is 
encapsulated in the seeming mutually exclusive and conflictual quest by the developing 
countries to better their technological base in the milieu of inequalities, exploitation and 
underdevelopment/development crisis that characterise the modern world capitalist system. 
And on the other hand, the quest by the developed countries to regulate the transfer of 
technology in such terms and conditions dictated by them. The politics of technology transfer 
epitomises the grim battle between the developed and developing countries. And the battle 
centres on the liberalisation or restriction to the transfer of technology with both sides 
favouring contradictory and antagonistic positions. As Magic 92003:1) captures it, 
 
Developed countries believe it is in their interest to protect the 
valuable technologies and intellectual property of their 
transnational companies (TNC) from being used or worse yet, 
copied, without compensation. In their view, underdeveloped 
and developing countries engage in exactly those practices. 
Thus, developed countries continue to push for a commitment 
from developing countries towards stronger protection of 
intellectual property. 
 
Superior technological infrastructure constitutes a major parameter that distinguishes 
states within the modern world capitalist system. The ascendancy of the industrialised 
countries inhered from their control of modern technology. The history of the control of 
technology in the modern world dates back to the era of industrial revolution in the late 18th 
century in Britain. Industrial revolution depicts the era of incipient industrialisation 
characterised by the discovery and institutionalisation of new and efficient methods of 
engaging in productive activities. Industrial revolution was a watershed in the sense that it 
spawned the trajectory of British economy from dependence on agricultural goods to 
manufactured goods through the instrumentality of new industries that were set up for such 
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purposes. British technological advancement in those early days of industrial revolution 
bestowed it with superiority but the spread of this revolution to other European countries not 
only narrowed the technological gap but in some cases stripped Britain of its superiority. 
It may be inferred from the early experiences of Britain that contemporary restrictions 
to the diffusion of technological knowledge is to maintain the technological gap necessary for 
the continued ascendancy of the developed countries in the global arena. Ake (1981:28) notes 
that the spread of industrial revolution to other European countries had far-reaching effect on 
British economy. British superiority was overthrown as the technological gap between them 
and other European countries was narrowed. Again, by further developing and applying the 
new advances in science and technology to the benefit of industrial development, the mass 
appeal surrounding British goods was deflated. The laissez faire associated with 
technological innovations and exchanges in those early days led to proliferation and thus 
created surpluses in production and the need for new markets which underpinned the 
“scramble for Africa”. 
Following discrimination against British goods by America, France, Germany, Russia 
and Austro-Hungary, Britain became anxious to promote free trade. The anxiety of Britain to 
promote free trade was equally matched by the determination of other European countries to 
protect their own infant industries. Ake (1981:29) records that: 
 
Against such threats Britain became very anxious to promote 
free trade, to find new markets and new outlets for investment, 
but most importantly she became very anxious to defend her 
empire and the commercial privileges she enjoyed by her 
connection with them. At the same time, Britain’s competitors 
were also in an aggressive and expansionist mood. ...When 
propaganda gave way to action, Africa found itself the focal 
point for the action; the scramble for Africa began. 
 
Africa is a latecomer to technology acquisition and deployment. Indeed, Africa is a 
victim of technology. Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism through which Africa, 
including Nigeria, has suffered humiliation are the products of the superior technological 
endowments of Europe and the US. Also, Africa’s continued underdevelopment is made 
possible by its lack of technological capability. The Global Economic Prospects (2008:7) 
captures it with a note of pessimism thus: 
 
The bulk of technological progress in developing countries has 
been achieved through the absorption and adaptation of pre-
existing and new-to-the-market or new-to-the-firm 
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technologies, rather than the invention of entirely new 
technologies. Given the still wide technology gap, this is likely 
to remain the case for the vast majority of developing countries.  
 
Since the dawn of independence in the 1960s, Africa, in league with other Third 
world countries has been canvassing for the reconfiguration of the global capitalist system for 
a greater technologically-driven role for them. The crux of the agitation by Third World 
countries was the reordering of the international economic system to “make it more equitable 
through commodity agreements, common fund, special preferences to less developed 
countries for their manufactures and easier access to them for technology and capital 
(Echezona 1998:236). 
The new International Economic Order (NIEO) (as the agitation was termed) 
principally sought the liberalisation of development in the face of the failure of the policy of 
agricultural production expansion and import substitution industrialization to enthrone 
“viable self-sustaining socio-economic systems” or the elimination of the constraints on 
Africa’s external trade (Ake 1981:162). The NIEO has not materialised because the diffusion 
of technology which would have spearheaded it and brought about a restructuring of the 
international trade was not allowed to happen by the West. So, the Third World still occupies 
the fringes of the international economic system.  
The failure of international coalition approach to change the circumstances of the 
Third World led to individual efforts. Countries began to adopt stylised strategies to 
industrialise their national economies since the modernisation of economies is dependent on 
industrialisation. The imperativeness of the quest for modernisation is underscored by the fact 
that: 
In the present international situation, the major manufacturing 
countries have a much stronger bargaining power than the 
countries that export mainly raw materials. Whereas the 
industrial exporters do not depend mainly on the raw material 
exporters for markets for their goods, the raw material 
exporters depend almost totally on the industrial countries for 
markets for their exports. (Toyo 2002:7). 
 
In other words, any country that desires to possess a strong bargaining power must 
industrialise. But the achievement of industrialisation within an economy is not purely a 
product of desire or wish but a product of technology acquisition, know-how and finance 
capital. Import substitution and export-oriented industrialisation strategies represented an 
attempt by the Third World to attract the necessary technologies for the expansion of 
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domestic economies. Although export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) differed in two 
important respects from import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) namely: its purview 
extended beyond the domestic market; and it required less imported intermediate inputs, both 
are preoccupied with the whole question of industrialisation, self reliance, a better balance of 
trade, savings in foreign exchange and the diversification of the economy (Ake 1981:146-
149). 
The type of technology transfer that both the ISI and EOI achieved was not the type 
that could motorise independent industrialisation necessary to make a mark in the global 
setting. As a matter of fact they deepened the foreign exchange dilemma of developing 
countries including Nigeria as more and more foreign exchange was deployed to importing 
inputs germane to their sustenance (Ake 1981:147, Ajayi 2007:147). Until 1960, issues 
pertaining to technology including invention, innovation and deployment to productive uses 
fell within the domain of national policy concerns. But issues of technology have since 
transcended national boundaries and now occupy the international stage. Taylor and Smith 
(2007:28) identify three reasons as undergirding this development namely: the cruciality of 
technology to economic growth and development; the impact of technological gap and the 
cost of technology transfer between the developed and developing countries. 
As has already been noted, at the core of the inequality in the international economic 
systems is where a country stands technologically. Countries that are categorised either as 
advanced, developing or underdeveloped countries are those whose technological base depict 
modernity or at the threshold of modernity or relatively stagnated at the infant and 
rudimentary stage. But the increasing creativity of some developing countries in initiating 
and adapting the technologies of the West led to a rethinking of the whole question of 
technology diffusion. Tandon (2000:59) describes this era of new changes in the perception 
of the developed countries as “the era of hard economics, much like the era of mercantilism 
at the dawn of capitalism”. 
The types of technology necessary for the advancement of industrialisation are not 
products of chance but evolved through a painstaking process of research and development. 
Often, states spend so much money in supporting research and development and therefore 
guard their outcome jealously. This is so because it is the intellectual input in researches that 
produce technologies. The need for the recognition of the knowledge associated with 
technologies spawned the whole issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). In other words, 
IPRs connote governmental legal backing and protection accorded creative intellectual efforts 
that manifest in new technologies, products and services (Maskus 2000:27; Balaam and 
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Veseth 2005:22). IPRs have found building blocks in patents, trademarks, copyrights and so 
on. The Paris Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1886 constituted the earliest 
international efforts at protecting intellectual property rights. While the Paris Convention 
preoccupied itself with evolving protectionist framework for industrial property including 
patents, utility models, trademark and industrial designs, the Berne Convention pursued 
international copyright protection for literary, scientific and artistic works (Magic 2003:2). 
The setting up of constitutional framework under the auspices of the United Nations 
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967 gave the issues 
surrounding intellectual property rights essence and direction. This organisation set the 
parameters that were later harnessed into, and formed the core of the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement that was adopted at the Uruguay round of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The developed countries have used the instrument of 
IPRs to ensure their dominance as well as delineate the boundaries of technology diffusion. 
IPRs have enabled them to determine the direction of technological cooperation and the 
nature of monopolisation of knowledge power products. As Baalam and Veseth (2005:222) 
opine, 
 
With the rapid pace of technological change, new products and 
new processes are especially valuable to individuals, business 
firms and nations because of the wealth and power that derive 
from them. To gain the maximum advantage, however, one 
needs to control access to new knowledge and technology - to 
keep others from using the products of research and innovation 
without paying in full for the right. 
 
IPRs short-circuit the possibility of developing countries “copycatting” existing 
technologies as a form of technology transfer. As Pugatch (2004:16) observes, “patents, 
copyrights, trademarks and other forms of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) create a 
temporary monopoly on varying types of knowledge, allowing their owners to restrict, and 
even prevent, others from using the knowledge”. And that is why the developed countries 
mount serious pressure on the developing countries to ensure a strict implementation of the 
provisions of the IPRs.  
What the international restrictions embedded in TRIPs have been able to do is to 
ensure that Africa and other developing countries do not cross the technology Rubicon and, 
thus, become technologically-advanced. The IPRs mechanisms such as patents, copyrights 
and so on have been used as inhibitors to technology transfer as they create two scenarios: 
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deliberate overpricing of patents to beneficial technology which undermine the cost-benefit 
advantage of domestic production and the remote-controlling of the nature of technologies to 
be transferred to the developing countries. Thus, these patents become tools in the hand of the 
industrialised countries and they use it to exert control over the direction of economic growth 
in the developing countries. 
The argument has been canvassed that the domestication of international regime of 
IPRs as well as the strengthening of the domestic legal framework would enhance technology 
transfer through FDI. In other words, the influx of new technologies necessary for 
development responds to domestic erection of legal frameworks aimed at protecting such new 
technologies. But the truth is that the international regime of IPRs is principally and 
exclusively designed with the best interest of the developed countries as its central objective. 
Whatever benefits that trickle down to the developing countries are marginal and are merely 
incidental to these technological transfers. As Magic (2003:4) has argued, 
 
In principle, TNC [transnational corporation] will engage in 
such investing when it will provide an advantage not found in 
the home market of the TNC. However, as TNC move more 
production to developing nations where labor and infrastructure 
are cheap, they need stronger patent rights to ensure that their 
technology and knowledge do not leak into other companies in 
those countries. 
 
The politics associated with politics technology transfer is part of the broader politics 
of development that characterise North-South relations. TRIPs represent a gridlock, a 
veritable checkmate on the diffusion of technology that could help the developing countries 
achieve economic independence. TRIPs incorporate minimum standards of protection for 
copyright, trademarks, patents, trade secrets and contracts and provide a twenty-year 
protection window for all inventions, products and processes in just about every area of 
technology including pharmaceutical, agricultural and biogenetical resources (Magic 2003:2, 
Tandon 2000:65-66). 
So what TRIPs and IPRs have successfully done to the prospects of technology 
transfer to Africa was its blockage. Therefore contemporaneously, 
 
It is thus much harder now than during the 1950 to 1990 period 
for Third World countries to develop on the basis of borrowed 
(or copied) technology. This was the time when Japan and 
many South-East Asian countries industrialised on the basis of 
this “borrowed” technology. Africa, being the last in the march 
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towards industrialisation, is thus even more disadvantaged than 
the Asian NICs that were able to secure some benefits for 
themselves during a more lax intellectual property regime 
(Tandon 2000:65). 
 
A broader implication of IPRs to the African continent is that millions of its 
professionals that were sucked into the brain drain syndrome would be lost to it. The pro-
migration scholars in their defence of brain drain introduced the concepts of brain gain and 
brain circulation by which they contended that host countries generally benefitted from the 
knowledge acquired by migrants. It is true as Barton (2007:7) argues that “the skilled person 
[African] contributes more to the global economy and society when he or she can work with 
the best facilities and complementary resources”, but it is not true that access to the product 
of such endeavour percolates freely to every segment of the world system. This is so because 
the provisions of TRIPs are so painstakingly drawn that they outlaw such possibilities. 
The rights to patents, trade secrets, invention and copyrights reside with the 
companies or countries that employed the African migrant scientist, technologist, engineer, 
pharmacist or biogenetics. Article 34 of the Annex in the Uruguay agreement dealing with 
TRIPs outlawed “reverse engineering” which was the strategy used by such South-East Asian 
countries like Taiwan and South-Korea to domesticate western technology. Reverse 
engineering refers to dissembling, reassembling and manipulation of technological principles 
of a device, machinery or system through the analysis of its structure, function and operation 
with a view to replicating same for the purpose for which the one being copied was built 
(Tandon 2000:65; http://en.wikipedia-org/wiki/reverse-engineering). 
But despite the predilection of the developed countries to jealously guard the secrets 
of their technology, a more pertinent issue in the global politics of technology transfer is the 
preparedness of developing countries to absorb relevant technologies. The economic state of 
developing countries is vital in either inducing or repelling technology transfer. Whether one 
is looking at market channels of technology transfer (trade in goods and services, FDI, 
licensing and joint ventures) or non-market channels (imitation, temporary migration, 
departure of employees), technology transfer is my only possible if the basic infrastructures 
are in place in the developing countries. As Global Economic Prospects (2008:4) opines, “the 
level of the technological achievement observed in a country is positively correlated with 
income levels”. The income criterion is misleading because income distribution in the global 
capitalist system is a product of a country’s position. On the contrary, it is not income the 
powers technological development or expands the absorptive capacity of African economies 
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but their productive forces. Technologies that do not have counterpart domestic infrastructure 
or mechanisms for their adoption and adaptation within the domestic arena, are in the main, 
irrelevant to that economy and cannot be transferred no matter how pivotal they are in 
engendering development. 
The major problem that confronts Africa is how to change its reputation as a new 
consumer of technologies to a net inventor. But the first strategy would be to encourage a 
shift from public-sector domination of research and development (R&D). Barton (2007:21) 
observes that “in developing nations, even the most scientifically sophisticated ones, there is 
generally relatively less private-sector research, as compared to public-sector research”. What 
this implies is that the private sector in the developing countries especially Africa has been 
moonlighting contentedly under the canopy of imported technologies and has not been 
pushful enough to spearhead R&D necessary for either innovation or invention of 
technologies. There is no technological invention that is associated with Africa and yet 
thousands of African (especially Nigerian) scientists and engineers hold sway in the 
laboratories of major TNCs and research institutes in the developed countries. There are no 
intellectual property rights that are greater than the brain drain that Africa including Nigeria 
suffers and from which the capacity of the West is buoyed up. Global Economic Prospects 
(2008:123) recognises that notwithstanding the possibility that emigrants from the developing 
countries might not be maximally engaged in their home countries due to limited 
opportunities, yet their emigration poses constraints to domestic innovation and technology 
adoption. It is imperative that TRIPs should incorporate the compensatory package for 
African brains that populate the West and help in driving its technological ascendency. 
Nigeria’s preoccupation with technology transfer coincided with its post-
independence desire for industrialisation. The realisation of the centrality of technology to 
motorise development and the reality of Nigeria’s low technological status led to the quest for 
technology transfer. The Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief), Act, 1958 was the 
legal tool evolved by the Nigerian state to protect and soften the ground for foreign investors 
(Aremu 2003:50). The Industrial Development Act of 1958 provided such reliefs “pioneer 
status” which accorded tax holiday privileges to companies and accelerated depreciation rate 
in capital assets. 
There are two phases in the institutional responses to the challenges of technology 
transfer. The first phase was in line with the laissez-faire thrust of the Nigerian economy and 
spanned 1958 – 1981. This era was characterised by massive importation of capital goods and 
services. The second phase involved active state involvement and spanned 1981 – the 
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present. This phase was heralded by a state policy encapsulated in the 1976/77 budget which 
was anchored on the belief that “the modernisation of our [Nigeria’s] economy would involve 
a substantial transfer of technology ... through mutual partnership with foreign private and 
public enterprise “(cited in Biereenu-Nnabugwu 2005:55). 
Nigeria’s quest for technological development through the mechanism of technology 
transfer was supported with both legal and institutional frameworks. During the colonial era, 
the promotion of industrial development was pursued under the auspices of two agencies of 
government: the Nigeria Local Development Board and the Dept of Commerce and Industry 
whose functions consisted in the promotion of industrial development. Ikpeze, Soludo and 
Elekwa (2004) have argued that the lack of progress in industrialisation and attendant 
technology transfer during colonial era was as a result of overriding motive of Britain in 
accordance with the logic of capitalist exploitation: 
 
Britain’s national interest lay not in the economic or industrial 
development of Nigeria but in the development of basic 
infrastructure (rail and road networks) to facilitate the 
evacuation of primary products and the distribution in Nigeria 
of manufactured goods imported from the metropolitan 
economy (Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa 2004). 
 
But the National Development Plans that were initiated and implemented in the 
periods following independence sought to develop Nigeria’s technological base through the 
instrumentality of FDI. The first National Development Plan (1962-1968) relied, and rightly 
too, on foreign technologies to power the developmental quest of the country. This was 
inevitable for three reasons: Nigeria had no indigenous technological base upon which to 
anchor further technological development; it lacked a crop of technical personnel to man its 
quest for technological advancement and Nigeria believed that the path that would actualise 
its industrial and technological expectation was the path of core industrial projects (CIPs) 
notably, iron and steel, paper, fertilizer, petrochemicals, oil refineries, machine tools, 
liquefied natural gas, aluminium smelting and others. The capital outlay to operate these 
CIPs, was enormous and clearly outside the financial muscles of indigenous private investors. 
As a result of government’s categorisation of CIPs as the backbone of modern states it 
acquired substantial stakes in the companies that were formed to operate in these sectors. 
In 1970, through the instrumentality of the Industrial Inspectorate Act, the Nigerian 
government created the Industrial Inspectorate Division as an integral part of the existing 
Federal Ministry of Industry. It was mandated to, among other things, investigate existing, 
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new and proposed industrial establishments especially their capital formation as well as the 
actual valuation of their buildings, plants and other machinery. It was also mandated to obtain 
and keep detailed records of all industrial plants and equipment in the country. (Aremu 
2003:54).  
The negativities associated with technologies (such as inappropriateness of 
technologies to local needs, rising cost of imported technologies and the aggravation of 
dependency status of the country) led to the establishment of National Office Of Industrial 
Property (NOIP) through the NOIP Act of 1979. Aremu (2005:121) notes that NOIP was 
expected to “stimulate flows of technology into preferential or priority areas of the economy, 
ensure that the imported technologies were obtained on fair terms and conditions; improve 
the process to adapting and absorbing imported technology into Nigeria; and develop 
indigenous technological capabilities”. In order to strengthen the mandate of NOIP, its name 
and scope of operations were enlarged through Decree No. 82 of 1992, now referred to as 
NOTAP Act Cap 268, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1994. The name thus changed to 
National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP). The change of name 
was necessitated by the need to streamline NOTAP’s core functions and functions of other 
government agencies especially the Office of Registry of Patents and Trademarks in the 
Ministry of Commerce (http://notap.gov.ng), Okongwu 2006:3). The mandate of NOTAP is 
quite broad, covering almost every aspect of technology transfer. The major functions of 
NOTAP include among others. 
(a) Registration of all contracts for the transfer of foreign technology to Nigerian 
companies; 
(b) Development of negotiating skill of Nigerians to ensure best contractual terms and 
conditions in any agreement for transfer of foreign technology; 
(c) Monitoring the execution of registered Technology Transfer Contracts; 
(d) Dissemination of technology information; 
(e) Collation and documentation of R&D results and inventions; 
(f) Promotion of innovation and IPR awareness among researchers and investors; 
(g) Commercialisation of useful R&D results and inventions (http://notap.gov.ng). 
NOTAP has made tremendous impact in terms of establishing and maintaining 
credible data on the trajectory of technology transfer. According to Okongwu (2006:5) 
between 1983 and June 2006, NOTAP registered 2,400 technology transfer contracts out of 
over 3,000 submitted. As part of creating a link between invention and adaptation, NOTAP 
set up fifteen Intellectual Property Technology Transfer Offices (IPTTOs) in Nigerian 
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universities, Polytechnics and research institutions. The aim of this collaboration was to 
create a synergy between NOTAP and traditional inventing institutions and industries. 
IPTTOs were designed to be a platform for the development of a robust intellectual property 
rights portfolio through patenting, copyright, and technology licensing aimed at developing 
patent culture. It also concerned itself with the establishment of formal systems of incentives 
and rewards to researchers within the framework of partnerships 
(http://www.notap.gov.ng/content/establishment-Ipttos). NOTAP as a principal agency for 
technology acquisition and transfer has links with other agencies such as Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission (NIPC), National Information Technology Development Agency 
(NITDA), Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC), National 
Biotechnology Development Agency (NABDA) among others to ensure the streamlining of 
indigenous technological development and international acquisition, adaptation and transfer 
of relevant technologies for national development. 
 
Table 4.18:  Legal Frameworks for Technology Rights 
 
S/N  IP Legislation Nodal Agency 
 
1 Patents Patents & Design Act 1970 (Cap 
344, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 1990) 
Commercial Law Department, 
Trademarks, Patents and 
Designs Registry, of the 
Federal Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. 
2 Designs Patents & Design Act 1970 (Cap 
344, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 1990) 
3 Trademarks Trademark Act 1965 (Cap 436, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1990) 
 
4 Copyright Copyright Act 1988 (Cap 68, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria 1990) 
 
Nigerian Copyright 
Commission (NCC) under the 
supervision of the Federal 





Administered as part of 
Trademarks under Section 43(1) of 
the Trademarks Act CAP 
436(Certification Trademarks), 
Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 
1990 
Commercial Law Department, 
Trademarks, Patents and 
Designs Registry, of the 
Federal 
5 NOTAP Act No.70 of 1979 (Cap 268 Laws 




Human capital occupies a commanding position in the schema of industrialisation.  It 
is the human capital that mobilises other factors of production. So without human capital, it is 
nigh impossible for the conversion of other factors of production into wealth. Human capital 
constitutes a major part of the vital wealth of a country. Education and training are the most 
important investments that give human capital its worth.  It is possible to categorise human 
capital and attach value to it based on the quality of education and training it has received. 
The centrality of human capital in state development is such that no country can achieve 
sustainable development in the absence of relevant corps of human capital.  Becker (1993:12) 
asserts: 
Moreover, few if any countries have achieved a sustained 
period of economic development without having invested 
substantial amounts in their labor force, and most studies that 
have attempted quantitative assessment of contributions to 
growth have assigned an important role to investment in human 
capital. 
 
Africa has invested enormous resources in the development of its human capital but 
has lost same to the developed countries.  It is estimated that since 1990 about 20,000 skilled 
professionals leave sub-Saharan Africa each year with total estimated stock of Africans in the 
Diaspora as at 2006 put at 32.8 million (Plyushteva 2005: 3  IFAD  2007:8). 
There is no doubt that there are accruable mutual benefits from the exodus of skilled 
professionals of African extraction to the developed countries. But what has pitched both 
opponents and supporters of migration in endless debate is the degree of dispersion of the 
benefits of migration to home and host countries. The Eurocentric rationalisation of migration 
especially the North-South migration trend centred on remittances, technology transfer and 
reverse-migration: that is, migration favours home countries through remittances from the 
diaspora (which potentially contributes in reducing poverty and providing investible funds 
even though at the subsistence level), reverse-migration with attendant improved skills and 
transfer of technology. Most of the supposed gains of emigration to the home countries are at 
best probabilistic, that is, there is no rational basis to believe that the home country would 
actually benefit from its diaspora. The fraction of skilled professionals that would ever come 
home is that whose skills and knowledge are in the non-essential sectors of their economies. 
Those in strategic sectors of the developed economies ordinarily hold citizenship rights and 
perceive themselves as citizens of these host countries. Their links with their home countries 
are mere evocative emotions that would never be strong enough to make them relocate even 
if the host countries would allow them and the conditions at home conducive enough. The 
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Nigerian-born American supercomputer icon Philip Emeagwali spoke forthrightly on the 
farfetchedness of reverse-migration. His view appeared representative of the existential 
dilemma of the emigrated skilled Africans (http://emeagwali.com/interviews /brain-
drain/education-in-africa-brain-drain-problem-worldnet-africa-journal.html). 
It would be inconsiderate and indeed difficult for the established migrant to give up 
their career and the allure of potential opportunities that the developed economies offer for 
the uncertainties that characterise Nigeria. Considering the arbitrary manner that underpinned 
the emergence of the Nigerian state and the predilection to micro-loyalties based on ethnicity, 
there is acute absence of macro-patriotism. Therefore, the absence of such a broad-based 
patriotic platform was a recipe for self-considerations over and above state interests. Often 
the feeling of guilt which the average migrant feels is not about the loss which the state 
suffers on account of their emigration but about their limited contributions to the progress of 
their family, community and ethnic group.  Emeagwali’s experience mirrors it thus: 
 
On the day I left Nigeria, I felt sad because I was leaving my 
family behind.  I believed I would return eight years later, 
probably marry an Igbo girl, and then spend the rest of my life 
in Nigeria.  But 25 years ago, I fell in love with an American 
girl, married her three years later and became eligible to 
sponsor a Green Card Visa for my 35 closest relatives, 
including my parents and all my siblings, nieces and nephews 
(Emeagwali, 2009:1). 
 
The whole argument of brain gain is erected on the shifting sand of neoliberal 
idealism that is anchored on claims of reverse-migration, remittances, diaspora network that 
promotes the attraction of FDI, and in skills and knowledge multiplication in the home 
countries as a result of prospects of positive earnings abroad. Out-migration has only 
spawned a situation worse than “motion without movement” or “running on the spot” as far 
as African development is concerned.  The assumption of brain gain theorists that migrants 
would always go back to their home countries with spill-over benefits is tenuous and has no 
basis in the logic of market forces.  The nature of global capitalist system cannot support a 
sustainable wholesale grafting of skills from the developed countries as has been 
demonstrated my decades of brain drain. Despite examples of Mexico, China, India and Israel 
where there are substantial collaboration between the home countries and diaspora networks, 
there is no concrete evidence directly linking the developmental strides of these economies to 
reverse-migration.  The only pointer to the contributions of migrants, to their home countries 
is the ever-rising volume of remittances. But as Emeagwali (2009) has pointed out, 
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Money alone cannot eliminate poverty in Africa, because even 
one million dollars is a number with no intrinsic value. ... 
Under the status quo, Africa would still remain poor even if we 
were to send all the money in the world there.  …money cannot 
bring electricity to our home, but engineers can.  Money cannot 
cure sick people, doctors can. 
 
But these African skilled professionals are domiciled in the developed countries with 
only tangential relevance to the host country. In a regional analysis of the root of differences 
in the growth of Asian economies, Hasan (2001:6-8) identified sustained human capital 
investment as a major determinant of the economic ascendancy of East Asian countries.  In 
other words, these economies achieved development because they had the privilege of using 
the human capital they produced. Africa and indeed Nigeria on the other hand appeared to 
have been investing in their human resources for the benefit of the developed countries.   
In a recent study, Erosa, Koreshkova and Restuccia (2007:2) affirm that human 
capital accumulation strongly amplifies total factor productivity (TFP) differences across 
countries.  What this implies is that the depletion of Africa’s human capital as exemplified by 
brain drain accentuates its underdevelopment.  Since the 1980s, there have been massive 
policy changes aimed at increasing both the quality and quantity of migrants.  Between 1990 
and 2000, the number of foreign born individuals (immigrants)  legally residing in OECD 
countries multiplied by 1.4 with a larger increase for highly skilled migrants than for low 
skilled migrants (Docquier and Rapoport  2007:3).   
The engine of economic growth in the contemporary global system is technology.  It 
is the differential in technology acquisition and adoption that underline the differences 
between developed and developing countries.  And the most important drivers of 
technological progress are: ideas, knowledge and experience encapsulated in human beings. 
Berdugo, Sadik and Sussman (2005:2) posit that “since technology adoption is the main 
channel for growth in follower countries, and since different levels of technology account for 
differences in income per capita, a search for the explanation of why some countries are poor 
has to focus on delays in technology adoption”. There are several factors that account for the 
delays: first is the skewed global capitalist system that makes these follower countries the 
enclave for the production of primary produce; the second is adjunct to the first and has to do 
with domestic incapacity of these countries as a result of severe contradictions in their 
domestic economies; and, third is the human capital flight that eroded their human capital 
capacity to engineer these technology options. The relevance of this last point is appropriately 
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recognised by Berdugo, Sadik and Sussman (2005:3) who posit that “technology adoption 
requires the acquisition of an appropriate human capital”. 
Every sector of the Nigerian economy is adversely affected by the emigration of its 
skilled professionals especially the health, manufacturing and education sectors.  The 
education and health sectors have suffered sustained depletion since the 1980s. For instance 
between 1980 and 1990 which was the peak of IMF-instigated SAP, the country lost over 
10,000 academics from its tertiary institutions (Onsando 2007; Utile 2008:7).  The same 
predicament was the lot of the health sector. 
The brain drain in the health and educational sectors was given impetus by the 
progressive decay in the system which made it impossible for health professionals and 
academics to meaningfully and optimally discharge their duties.  It is doubtful whether 
Nigerian policy makers really value the country’s investment on health and education and 
their associated impact on Nigeria’s economic development.  As Oni (2000:4) observes “even 
though the Nigerian government recognises the development of science and technology as a 
matter of national policy the existing research centres and universities are faced with 
problems which affect their performance”.  The combined effect of this is mass exodus of 
highly skilled personnel. Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007:40) estimate that 5 million 
Nigerians live in the US.  Other OECD countries host many more millions of highly skilled 
Nigerians. The depth of absorption of Nigerians in the developed countries and the emphasis 
on their remittances over and above their return creates a monumental dilemma to the 
industrialisation quest of Nigeria. Hernandez-Coss and Bun (2007:40) inform: 
 
The United States issues approximately 6000 green cards to 
Nigerians each year.  Each of these green card holders tends to 
migrate with approximately three dependants. The UK issues 
approximately 26000 visas annually to Nigerians.  
Approximately 50 percent of these Nigerians in the United 
States and UK do not return to Nigeria.   
 
The various favourable immigration policies in other OECD countries have also 
opened the door for massive immigration of skilled professionals from the developing 
countries including Nigeria.  Despite the argument of the new growth models that migration 
possesses positive attributes that engender development in the source country, the African 
experience is to the contrary.  Onsando (2007) has observed that 
 
To acquire the scientific knowledge and technology required 
for a technological regime, Africa will have to strengthen its 
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capacity to use wisely a mix of channels, including, copying, 
imitating, duplicating, intelligence gathering, resource 
engineering, licensing, partnering networking with the 
Diaspora, overseas studies, technical assistance and 
international and regional cooperation. 
 
Brain drain has compounded the dependency of Africa and created severe 
contradictions in its political economy especially developing appropriate technologies for 
industrialisation.  Instead of being in the forefront of technology-based industrialisation, 
Africa stands, plate in hand, for crumbs from its poached human capital. African stands, plate 
in hand for crumbs, from its poached human capital.  Agrawal, Kapur and McHale (2008:1) 
have pointed out the limitations of the supposed gains of brain drain:  
(a) International diffusion may be slow due to the localisation of knowledge 
spillovers; 
(b) Rich-country innovation may not properly address the needs of poorer 
countries; and, 
(c) Domestic knowledge production may be necessary to create the capacity to 
absorb foreign technology. 
But the point is that the permanence of migration as exemplified by the issuance of 
permanent residence permits and citizenship rights adulterates the nationalistic fervour of 
migrants.  Other factors such as lack of policy framework to harness the diaspora, policy 
inconsistencies, monocultural economic base as well as retrogressive and dismal economic 
outlook which circumscribe economic growth discourage sustained migrant efforts at 
contributing to home country. 
Nigeria’s industrial sector does not operate to its full capacity in spite of the enormous 
human and material endowments of the country.  Modern industrial sector generally derives 
its essence from the deployment of science and technological breakthroughs to the 
achievement of improved productivity.  Ukaegbu (1991) conceives industrialisation as “the 
process by which inanimate energy or mechanical power replaces human energy in 
production”.  This conceptualisation is too simplistic and does not capture the whole essence 
of industrialisation especially its impact on the population as well as the placement of the 
country in the comity of countries.  Industrialisation is much more complex than being the 
“process of replacement” of the means of converting raw materials to finished goods.  
Ukaegbu’s (1991:1) conceptualisation is synonymous with modernisation.  As a matter of 
fact, industrial policies and practices in Africa including Nigeria were pursued on an ad-hoc 
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basis and in the most uncoordinated manner that any expectation of dividend from such 
policy thrusts was misplaced. Industrialisation is a fundamental objective of economic 
development and is what differentiates countries and pigeonholes them either in core, semi-
periphery or periphery of the modern world system.  
Kirkpatrick, Lee and Nixson (1985:1) observe that industrialisation induces industrial 
development with the overall objectives “to achieve high rates of economic growth, to 
provide for the basic needs of the population, to create more employment opportunities, to 
lead to an increasingly diversified economy and to give rise to desirable social, psychological 
and institutional changes”.  For Africa, the achievement of these conditions is critical to its 
integration into the global capitalist system and its eventual exit from the periphery of the 
modern world system. But Africa’s quest for industrialisation is constrained by several 
challenges. UNIDO’s Director General, Kandeh K. Yumkella, identified these challenges to 
include among others, “limited industrial skills and technological capabilities, weak support 
from institutions, inadequate financing and underdeveloped internal and regional markets 
(http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=78818tx). A key omission to the legion of hindrances to 
Africa’s capacity to industrialisation is the erosion of its human capital base through brain 
drain. 
Nigeria’s quest for industrialisation has been an up-till task owing to a number of 
drawbacks including the absence of sustained national policy framework. As a matter of fact, 
industrial policies and practices were pursued on an ad-hoc basis and in the most 
uncoordinated manner that any expectation of dividend from such policy thrusts was 
misplaced.  Ukaegbu (1991:1) has identified other draw backs as shortage of financial capital, 
lack of entrepreneurship, poor management, underdeveloped technology, inadequate socio-
economic infrastructures, shortage of technical manpower and foreign domination . Even 
though industrialisation connotes “extensive organisation of an economy for the purpose of 
manufacturing”, the sustainability of the economy through manufacturing and associated 
productive activities depends on domestic capacity.  Industrialisation is entrenched when it 
has a high percentage of local content in its composition. 
Local content lacks in the core sectors of the Nigerian economy owing to dearth of 
skilled personnel.  It is not as if Nigeria does not have the corps of competent and skilled 
personnel to kick-start and sustain its industrial drive, the point is that they have been 
depleted as a result of brain drain. There is no doubt that the Nigerian economy is beset with 
many contradictions which have combined to inhibit the achievement of not only 
industrialisation but also economic progress.  Ebi (2004:3-4) outlines the shortcomings of the 
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Nigerian economy as consisting in “slow growth arising from low productivity and the 
uncompetitiveness of the private sector, … infrastructure deficiencies, weak institutions, rent 
seeking and inconsistent macroeconomic policies”. Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa (2004:341) 
paint the scenario thus: 
 
Nigeria’s experience with external trade and industrialization is 
a classic case of tragedy.  Manufacturing value- added as a 
percentage of GDP was about five percent in 2000 (less than 
the proportion at independence in 1960), making Nigeria one of 
the 20 least industrialized countries in the world.  
Industrialization in Nigeria soared during the oil boom era 
(1973 - 1981 with manufacturing share of GDP reaching 11 
percent) but has had a precipitous decline to about five percent 
in 2000. 
 
The Nigerian story is that of unsustainability as a result of wasted opportunities.  The 
SAP reform which was introduced in 1986 as a policy option to arrest the imminent collapse 
of the economy had the unsavoury effect of eroding the human capacity of the country and by 
extension marked its rapid deindustrialization.  In other words, SAP contributed immensely 
in reducing the industrial capacity of Nigeria as demonstrated by declining capacity 
utilisation in the real sector, import dependence, reliance on a single commodity and poor 
performance of major infrastructural facilities amongst others (Federal Ministry of 
Information 2000:128)   
 Industrialisation is a process which does not start and stop with the formulation of an 
industrial blueprint or vision.  It goes beyond that: not only does it encapsulate such decisions 
as the growth of the industrial sector as a whole, the choice and growth of separate industrial 
activities and the choice of projects within particular industries (Kirkpatrick, Lee and Nixson 
1984:201); it also involves an efficient blend of the factors of production. The Nigeria 
economy is brimful with abundant human and material resources. But the mere possession of 
these resources does not automatically translate to industrialisation.  The state of Nigerian 
economy shows that this is not so.  Nnanna, Alade and Odoko (2003:5) have affirmed that 
Nigeria’s industrialisation crisis is rooted in the disparity between the availability of relevant 
factors of production and their efficient conversion towards improving the standard of living 
of the people as well as national economic indices. 
Despite the identification of other intervening factors as contributing to the stagnation 
of the industrialisation of the Nigerian state, the mass emigration of educated Nigerians has 
had more pernicious effect on the prospects of Nigeria’s industrialisation.  For as Ukaegbu 
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(1991:1) has argued, “the claim that inadequate physical infrastructures such as 
transportation, electricity, telecommunications and water supply hinder industrialization is to 
ignore the fact that these infrastructures are the products, and not the agents of 
industrialization”. In their study of the relationship between human capital and economic 
growth, Otu and Adenuga (2006:23) find that investment in human capital impacts positively 
on economic growth and therefore conclude that: 
 
Nigeria can only position herself as a potent force through the 
quality of the products from the primary, secondary and tertiary 
school systems, and by making her manpower relevant in the 
highly competitive and globalized economy through a 
structured, well-funded and strategic planning of her 
educational institutions. 
 
Indeed, Nigeria has been investing in its human resources through such policies as 
free compulsory Universal Basis Education (UBE) which grants access to every child to 
obtain primary education and tuition-free tertiary education.  But the investments of the 
country in human capital development are enjoyed by the West who poach and lure these 
skilled and trained personnel with better offers than the home country economy could ever 
afford.  This has been to the detriment of the home country as these vital human resources are 
lost to it. 
The type of industrialisation adopted by Nigeria since its independence in 1960 was 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI).  Ukaegbu (1991:2) points out that under ISI 
“industrial equipment and raw materials are transported into Nigeria, installed and used for 
routine production activities either by multinational corporations [MNCs], the  state or 
indigenous private businessmen”. It is important to note that the objective of ISI was to 
produce within the country manufactured goods that were previously imported.  The failure 
of ISI as an industrialisation strategy in the developing countries including Nigeria was 
exemplified by inefficiency as demonstrated by the production of manufactured good at 
higher cost than competing imports and the dependence of these goods on the maze of 
protection erected around them against foreign competition (Kirkpatrick, Lee and Nixson 
1984:197). 
Since the failure of ISI, emphasis shifted to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI):  
that is, local production of manufactured goods for external markets.  EOI thus is a product of 
an amalgamation of two theoretical traditions:  the liberal and mercantilist traditions.  It 
strongly emphasizes that a state should pursue its comparative advantage  in selected sectors 
245 
 
of the economy and promote exports from these sectors and also an interventionist state that 
evolves policies that limit domestic disruptions (Balaam and Veseth 2005:340).  Many pro-
EOI analyses contend that EOI leads to rapid growth in manufactured exports.  Balassa (cited 
in Kirkpatrick, Lee and Nixson, 1984:198 – 199) argued that: 
 
… export-oriented policies lead to better growth performance 
than policies favouring import substitution.  This result  is said 
to obtain because export-oriented policies, which provide 
similar incentives to sales in domestic and in foreign markets, 
lead to resource allocation according to comparative advantage, 
allow for greater capacity utilization, permit the exploitation of 
economies of sale, generate technological improvements in 
response to competition abroad and, in labour-surplus 
countries, contribute to increased employment.  
 
But the weak domestic structures in the developing countries including Nigeria as 
well as the inequality in the global capitalist system combined to make even the export-
oriented industrialisation unsuccessful.  This was especially so since the industrial sector was 
the exclusive precinct of the MNCs and the countermeasures of state-propelled industrial 
enterprises was enmeshed in the characteristic ineptitude and state bureaucratic bottlenecks 
that undermined their capacity.  Ukaegbu (1991:2) has argued that “there is hardly any 
difference (within developing countries) between the structure and operations of 
multinational and state industrial enterprises because the latter depend on the former for the 
supply of operational infrastructure (technology).  Therefore, both have a similar structural 
characteristic”. 
But whether based on ISI or EOI, a fundamental hindrance to progress in Nigeria’s 
industrialisation quest is the weak R&D tradition and the absence of competent corps of 
skilled professionals to spearhead and man the industrialisation process.  Without proper 
human resources, the prospect of industrialisation hangs in the balance and remains a mere 
subject of speculation.  For instance, the Africa Union (AU) Action Plan for the Accelerated 
Industrial Development of Africa which was adopted in 2008 is yet to spawn the 
industrialisation revolution that Africa needs in order to attain full integration into the global 
economy.  There appears to be a tacit agreement amongst analysts to squarely locate the 
cause of Africa’s non-industrialisation in its domestic contradictions rather than on the 
skewed global capitalist system which has not only peripheralised these economies but 
created the conducive environment for the core countries to prey on it for its continued 
survival and ascendancy. Like the UNIDO Director-General, K.K. Yumkella, the Secretary 
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General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon in a massage on the Africa Industrialisation Day 2009 
reiterated this mainstream orthodoxy when he downplayed the centrality of human capital 
depletion of African countries in their industrial stagnation. Ban Ki-Moon asserts that: 
 
Africa’s pursuits of industrialization is hindered by many 
challenges including armed conflict, inadequate infrastructure, 
weak governance and institutions, limited financing and 
technological capabilities, and domestic policies that stifle 





All these negativities are not as perniciously detrimental to Africa’s quest for 
industrialisation as the dearth of relevant skilled personnel to power both industrial planning, 
execution and consolidation.  The mass exodus of skilled Africans including Nigerians has 
made industrial planning and execution problematic.  Apart from ISI, Nigeria relied on 
development planning as its strategy to enthrone comprehensive development. Development 
planning is an aspect of economic planning which Todaro (1981:430) conceptualises as “a 
deliberate governmental attempt to coordinate economic decision-making over the long run 
and to influence, direct and in some cases even control the level and growth of a nation’s 
principal economic variables in order to achieve a pre-determined set of development 
objectives”. Nigeria’s first national development plan (1962-1968) recognised the 
indispensability of qualified personnel to power development and in its acute unavailability 
locally and therefore  projected that development within this period would rely on experts 
from abroad. Indeed, the plan relied on external sources for its human capital needs.  This of 
course, constituted the major rigidity that compromised the realisation of the goals of the first 
development plan apart from the Nigerian civil war.  
The subsequent development plans – namely the Second National Development Plan 
(1970-74); the Third National Development Plan (1975-80) and the Fourth National 
Development Plan (1981-85) were wholly formulated and implemented by Nigerians. The 
point being highlighted here is the indispensability of indigenous human capital for the quest 
for domestic industrialisation and development. The reversal in the gain recorded in human 
capital development as a result of development planning came through SAP.  During this 
period, especially between 1973 and 1981 which was the oil boom era, industrialisation 




Apart from the skewed global capitalist system which placed the Nigerian economy in 
a disadvantaged position, certain domestic policies especially indigenisation policy and the 
ascension of the state to the commanding heights of the economy facilitated the reversal of 
the gains of industrialisation. The indigenisation policy which was promoted by the Nigerian 
military govt on the grounds of economic nationalism sought to reserve certain categories of 
industrial activities, mostly service and manufacturing, for Nigerians. And the dominance of 
the economy by the state created distortions that asphyxiated the prospects for industrial 
revolution.  According to Schatz (cited in Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa 2004): 
 
For the most vigorous, capable, resourceful, well connected and 
lucky entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs (including 
politicians, civil servants, army officers, etc) productive 
economic activities, the creating of real income and wealth has 
faded in appeal.  Access to and manipulation of the government 
spending process has become the golden gateway to fortune. 
 
 
This state of affairs robbed the country of genuine entrepreneurs vitally germane for 
economic development. Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa (2004) in the face of this, described the 
trajectory of Nigerian capitalism as an unhealthy transition from “nurture capitalism” to 
“pirate capitalism”. In other words, government became the epicentre of economic activities 
accounting for 50 percent of GDP and 70 percent of modern sector employment in the 1980s 
and the military operators of government saw it as an opportunity to satisfy two conditions – 
the consolidation of their illegitimate government by unwholesome satiation of aggrieved 
elites and the empowerment of new sets of nouveaux-riche.  The result, as Kohli (2004:359), 
observed was that “the Nigerian state was thus a very poor entrepreneur, wasting resources 
and appropriating others for personal use. ... so instead of real industrialization, the Nigerian 
state created a house of cards that crumbled just as soon as it was built”. 
As already noted, Nigeria’s immediate post-independence economy was dominated 
by foreign companies and the indigenisation policy was a strategy to hand back the initiative 
for industrialisation as well as the reins and economic independence to Nigerians.  
Notwithstanding the distortions associated with the implementation of the indigenisation 
policy as exemplified by massive corruption, it gave impetus to the gradual metamorphosis 
and emergence of Nigerian entrepreneur-industrialist who veered from trading and commerce 
to manufacturing (Kohli 2004:355).  But a combination of certain domestic factors including 
unaccountable government, poor planning, political interference, scarcity of managerial and 
technical personnel, heavy dependence on foreign technology, expertise, and inputs and 
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corruption amongst others created a detrimental economic environment that choked out the 
prospects for industrialisation. 
Notwithstanding these rigidities in Nigerian economy, the effect of SAP on the 
economy with the usurpation of policy autonomy of the Nigerian state was the creation of 
deeper contradictions in its economy.  With SAP’s emphasis on the devaluation of Nigerian 
currency (the Naira) and the liberalisation of the economy, the Nigerian economy, like other 
African countries under the spell of SAP, strongly focused on import liberalisation at the 
expense of industrialisation. The rationalisation for import liberalisation was anchored on the 
logic that it would provide corrective signals and incentives to the manufacturing and other 
sectors, increases the level of competition and technical efficiency, and stimulate factor 
productivity (Wangwe and Semboja 2004). The erosion of the industrial capacity of Nigeria 
and other African countries attests to the farfetchedness of this policy.  In fact import 
liberalisation spawned the process that effectively led to the de-industrialisation of Nigeria. 
The argument of Lewis (1994:447) corroborates it thus, “the SAP has failed to induce a 
significant response. Non oil sectors of the economy have displayed an anaemic performance, 
and adjustment has fostered de-industrialisation in import intensive activities”. As Wikipedia 
has explained de-industrialisation “is a process of social and economic change caused by the 
removal or reduction of industrial capacity or activity in a country or region, especially heavy 
industry or manufacturing industry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/deindustrialisation). The 
effect of de-industrialisation was the inducement of out-migration amongst highly trained 
personnel who had become more or less redundant in the Nigerian economy. 
The period following SAP reversed the gains of industrialisation in Nigeria. The 
steady decline in the economic prospects of Nigeria had two interrelated effects: it contracted 
the economic space with the result that the manufacturing and industrial capacity as a whole 
was eroded. This erosion meant that highly trained personnel could not be wholly absorbed or 
adequately compensated thus leading to out-migration. The out-migration in turn robbed the 
industrial sector of the requisite manpower necessary to power industrialisation.  The 
comparative effect has been recorded by Kohli (2004: 359) thus, “whereas manufacturing has 
contributed some 8 percent of the GDP in 1980, by 1995 its share had declined to 5 percent.  
Industry as a whole (including manufacturing, mining, construction, and so on) also declined; 
the average growth rate between 1980 and 1995 was close to 1 percent”. 
What this meant therefore was that since 1980 there had been a steady decline in the 
contribution of the industrial sector to the GDP, an indicator that all was not well with the 
industrialisation efforts of Nigeria and by extension its quest to join the league of newly 
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industrialising countries.  Kohli (2004:398) has argued that high rates of investment alone 
cannot solve some critical problem of growth and industrialisation.  According to him, 
“during periods of high oil prices, Nigeria was ‘Investing’ at a very high rate, as high in terms 
of aggregate figures as in parts of East Asia.  And yet we know that sustained 
industrialisation did not result” (Kohli 2004:398).  
But the investment of the Nigerian state was flawed because of the kind of 
industrialisation it undertook and the dearth of managerial and technical personnel to drive it. 
No doubt, the absence of a conducive operational environment (being product of favourable 
industrial policies) in addition to other factors already mentioned constituted an alternative 
explanation to the stagnation and lack of growth in Nigerian industrialisation. But the fact 
that policies do not operate in isolation or outside the sphere of competent corps of skilled 
personnel, it means that a further explanation is relevant.  Granted that what created the initial 
condition for the out-immigration of relevant skilled personnel originated from policy failure 
but the emigration of these highly trained personnel created a lacuna that has stymied the 
prospects of growth in the level of Nigeria’s industrialisation. 
The current state of Nigeria’s industrialisation depicts failure. This failure becomes 
even more dismal if Nigeria’s level of industrialisation is juxtaposed with other developing 
countries with comparable indices at the point of its independence in 1960. Presently, there is 
no basis for comparison between the level of Nigeria’s industrialisation and those of the 
countries of the South East Asia which shared almost the same set of indices in the 1960s: 
they have exited the common classification of developing countries and ascended the bracket 
of newly industrialising countries.  Toyo (2002:55) ascribes the extraordinary success of the 
South East Asian countries to a number of factors especially their attention to technological 
development as well as favourable disposition of the West towards them as a result of their 
capitalist ideological preferences. The difference between Africa especially Nigeria and the 
South East Asian countries was the level of commitment to the building blocks of modern 
industrialisation. Toyo (2002:540) asserts: 
 
It is not as if intelligence resided exclusively in South East 
Asia. The point really is not that the HPAEs [High Performing 
Asian Economies] pursued the policies better but that they used 
the policies to serve a more valid long-term growth strategy and 
therefore, adopted variants of these policies that produced 
better growth results.  In the case of education, they had the 
communist challenge and example but anyone interested in a 
rapid industrialisation drive will want to educate those who will 
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serve that cause directly or indirectly, since modern industry 
calls for literacy. 
 
Under SAP the IFIs were singularly opposed to social spending including spending on 
education. The slash in budgetary allocation to the education sector had two detrimental 
effects:  it led to the decay of infrastructure in the sector and the massive out-migration of 
university teachers. The report of the Presidential Committee on Brain Drain set up by the 
Babangida military regime in 1988 revealed that Nigeria lost over 130,000 highly trained 
personnel including over 10,000 academics in the wake of SAP-induced distortions (Utile 
2008; Onsando 2007). The implication of the emigration of highly skilled personnel from 
Africa is that R&D, a vital component of the industrialisation drive is not given the push 
necessary for breakthroughs in terms of invention and position modification of extant 
technologies.   Africa as a whole is estimated to have about 20,000 scientists which translate 
to 3.6 percent of the world total.  Most of these scientists have emigrated to the West for 
several reasons already enumerated especially better career prospects and attendant higher 
earnings. The effect on Africa is that its share of contributions to the world’s scientific output 
had fallen from 0.5 to 0.3 percent (Onsando 2007). 
The trajectory of development in the contemporary world system is intricately linked 
to the state of technology as well as technological progress. As the Global Economic 
prospects (2008:53) asserts, “technological progress is at the heart of human progress and 
development”.  What this implies is that the differentials in the domiciliation of modern 
technologies determine the categorization of countries in the modern world system. Both the 
neoclassical and endogenous growth theories agree that the prevalent poverty in developing 
countries inhered from  these differentials in the access to, and command of, technologies 
(Mayer 2000:1). Technology transfer is all about buying into the technological superiority of 
the West with a view to appropriating some of these technologies within the domestic 
economies for increased productivity. Enhanced productivity is thus a function of technology. 
It is this mindset that underpinned the quest of developing countries to narrow the 
technological gap between them and the developed countries through the transfer of relevant 
technologies. Mayer (2000:3) has argued that improved access to modern technology alone 
does not necessarily lead to increased productivity as there is a complex interplay of several 
factors in the process of converting transferred technologies to optimal use. Other factors 
relevant in the absorption and efficient usage of transferred include human capital tailored to 
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man this new technology as well as relevant economic policies and institutional arrangements 
(Mayer 2000:3). 
Nigeria has been in the vortex of the quest for technology transfer since its 
independence in 1960. Basically, technology is embodied in products, intermediate inputs 
and processes (Global Economic Prospects 2008:59). In other words, technology transfer is 
not a straightforward, simple and uncomplicated procedure but involves a complex interplay 
of several factors ranging from socio-economic, environmental, political, intellectual, 
infrastructural, human capitals and the locus of the interest of the developed countries 
amongst other factors. To this extent, technology transfer is not the sale or lease of goods or 
machineries but the “transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for 
the application of a process or for the rendering of a service” (Konde 2008:3). The Nigerian 
economy has depended so much on foreign technology for its domestic sectoral needs. Such 
importations do not constitute technology transfer. For instance, according to the Director 
General of NOTAP, Engr. Umar Bindir, the Nigerian banking sector and other companies 
spent over N25 billion between 2000 and 2009  to acquire foreign software and other forms 
of ICT products (http://www.balacingact-africa-com/news/en/issue-no-470/computing/nigeria 
-citizens-spends-n25-billion-on-software-imports-says-notap). The acquisition of these ICT 
products does not necessarily translate to technology transfer. It could have become 
technology transfer if Nigeria had acquired the franchise and developed the capacity to 
reproduce them either for the domestic market, the African region or the international 
community. Ikiara (2000:8) has contended that: 
 
Technology transfer can occur directly to local firms involved 
in joint venture with the MNC or indirectly, as a spillover 
benefit to unaffiliated local firms. There are four interrelated 
channels through which spillovers occur: vertical linkages 
between affiliates and their suppliers and customers in the host 
country, horizontal linkages between the affiliates and domestic 
firms in the same industry, labour turnover from the affiliates to 
domestic firms, and internationalization of R&D. 
 
Technological progress in the modern world system is dictated by the developed 
countries through research and development. Research and development are driven by and 
anchored on relevant skilled personnel. All over the world, Nigerians add value to the various 
sectors of the developed economies. It is expected that the concept of brain circulation would 
enable Nigerians in the diaspora to bring home the knowledge they have acquired. But certain 
global frameworks especially within the auspices of IPRs have made this difficult, if not 
252 
 
impossible. And this is despite the acknowledgement of the developed countries about the 
indispensability of technology transfer in the integration of developing countries’ economies 
into the world capitalist system (United Nations 2004:3). 
These global frameworks have inhibited the maturation of the bold step of Nigeria to 
productively harness its scientist and technologists for technological takeoff. Following the 
recognition of the potential relevance of the diaspora and the subsequent establishment of 
NIDO and NNVS, the focus of the Nigerian government was to embark on brain gain project 
that would harness the millions of Nigerians in the diaspora for national development. And 
key expectation was to expand the frontiers of Nigeria’s technological base through the 
expertise and knowledge of these diasporans. As recorded by Akwani (2007:2): 
 
In July 2005, the first an annual Science and technology 
conference between Nigerians in the Diaspora and those at 
home designed to map out the modalities of the ‘brain gain’ 
project, took place in Abuja. President Obasanjo [1999-2007] 
described the conference as a “first step toward a national 
objective [of harnessing the talents of Nigerians in the 
Diaspora] as the engine of change and accelerated development 
in Nigeria.  
 
NOTAP, since its inception, has been involved in technology transfer, registering and 
participating in the negotiation processes leading to their acquisition. But technology transfer 
has been at the level of companies. Worldwide governments and companies especially MNCs 
have been the major sponsors of R&D. Such sponsorships involve huge capital outlays that 
make the outcome of R&D of utmost importance. Balaam and Veseth (2005:223) have 
argued that: “… unless firms can legally deny the use of newly created knowledge to other 
firms, rapid imitation will eliminate the profits from innovation necessary to recoup the 
original investment in research and development (R&D) that created the knowledge. The 
efforts to develop new technology would not be rewarded”. 
The developed countries have therefore strengthened both domestic and international 
laws to create a safety belt for inventions. Such safeguards, under the auspices of IPRs, have 
had negative effects on developing countries as they made the processes of technology 
transfer very difficult, selective, costly and exploitative. The contemporary international 
emphasis on IPRs, means that inventors and innovators have exclusive rights over their 
inventions in terms of openness and restrictions to their purchase, use and adaptation. It has 
been argued by Balaam and Veseth 2005:223) that IPRs are indispensable in keeping the 
production line of creativity operational. As they put it: “without intellectual property rights, 
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insufficient resources would be devoted to R&D, and far fewer new and lower-cost products 
would be available to consumers”. 
Despite the value attached to IPRs as a boost to creativity they do not yield the same 
dividend to both developed and developing countries. IPRs stand as a framework to ensure 
that the global loopholes that allowed for technology knowledge seepages were effectively 
plugged as the diffusion of technology knowledge tended to narrow the gaps between and 
among nations.   IPRs confer on firms and countries the key to control or liberalise access to 
new knowledge and technologies vital to bridge or expand the divide between development 
and underdevelopment in the modern world system. The developed countries have tended to 
negatively brand developing countries whose domestic legal frameworks to protect 
intellectual property rights are ineffective according to their standards. Robert Gilpin (cited in 
Balaam and Veseth 2005:225) captures it thus: 
 
The increased significance of technological diffusion and the 
increasingly arbitrary nature of comparative advantage as well 
as military security concerns are causing the United States to 
make the protection of its high technology industries an 
important priority. In addition to its own efforts to slow down 
the outflow of industrial know-how, the U.S. has placed the 
international protection of intellectual property rights on 
agenda of trade negotiations. 
 
The importance attached to IPRs is linked to the recognition of the role of technology 
as the driver of wealth and power and the need to ensure that there is no further extension of 
the frontiers of world’s technological countries. The US and other developed countries use 
their global advantage to institutionalise IPRs as a cardinal feature of the world order. The 
overall implication of IPRs is the deepening of the Third World development dilemma. 
Balaam and Veseth (2005:224) capture a part of this dilemma thus, “the losers are the people 
of Third World countries who pay monopoly prices for many goods and services and who 
receive the benefits of technological transfer only on terms dictated by firms of the developed 
world”. The other part is that IPRs circumscribes the possibility of African and Nigerian 
scientists and technologists in the diaspora from bringing their knowledge to bear upon any 
national project towards technological innovation or adaptation. 
NOTAP is bestowed with several core responsibilities which essentially drive the 
technology transfer. Apart from registering, licensing and monitoring transactions for the use 
or transfer of trademarks and patents, NOTAP is also preoccupied with the task of seeking to 
protect Nigerian users or licensees of foreign marks or patented technology in any technical 
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agreement (Adewepo 2002:174; Okongwu 2006:4). Although non-registration of technology 
contracts does not render such contracts invalid, the idea behind NOTAP was for both 
Nigerians (home and in the diaspora) MNCs and foreigners to officially document the 
technologies being introduced into the Nigerian economy. The guidelines on the transfer of 
technology operated by NOTAP and other related agencies did not envisage individual or 
wholesale diaspora contributions. To that extent therefore, the Nigerian diaspora does not 
feature in the radar of NOTAP as a veritable source of technology transfer. Table 4.19 shows 
that between 1999 and 2009, NOTAP brokered and registered a total of 1,237 (one thousand 
two hundred and thirty seven) technology agreements spanning such sectors as engineering, 
agro-allied, solid mineral and chemical and services sectors. The services sector recorded the 
highest number of registered technology agreements (570), followed by the solid mineral and 
chemical sector (256) and the engineering sector (233 agreements). The least was the agro-
allied sector with 178 agreements. 
Table 4.19:  Number of Technology Agreements Registered Per Industrial Sector  
(1999 – December 2009) 
Year Agro SMC Eng Serv Total
1999 22 17 20 11 70
2000 17 24 13 13 67
2001 14 29 23 21 87
2002 14 18 18 29 79
2003 20 26 13 31 90
2004 9 24 13 37 83
2005 14 29 39 64 146
2006 20 34 24 71 149
2007 19 23 28 100 170
2008 15 16 27 81 139
2009 14 16 15 112 157




Table 4.20 shows the breakdown of technology agreements submitted per industrial 
sector. In 1999, 88 technology agreements were submitted. Although the number plummeted 
to 69 in 2000, it however, rose progressively from 113, 121 and 153 in 2001, 2002, and 2003 





Table 4.20: Number of Technology Agreement Submitted Per Industrial Sector  
(1999–2005) 
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2000 21 20 16 12 
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13 17 27 46 103 
2005 
 
15 42 53 103 213 
 
Source Okongwu 2006:13 
  
The service sector had the highest agreement followed by the solid mineral and 
chemical sector. The sector with the least technology agreement was the agro-allied. The 
engineering sector had the third highest agreements. An interesting observation is that the 
trend of technology agreements in Nigeria in the period under review did not suggest a 
serious trajectory towards development. The services sector which recorded the highest 
agreements cannot, in real terms, boost the economy in the absence of a virile productive 
sector. The low technology agreements in the agro-allied sector despite its potentialities as 
well as its pivotal importance as an engine of development are suggestive of skewness in 
technology acquisition. It also portrays lack of policy in the hierarchisation of technologies 
for national development.  
Table 4.21 shows technology collaboration by source. The data show that the bulk of 







Table 4.21:  Technology Collaboration (By Source) 
 




1999 28 0 29 13 
70 
 
2000 14 18 18 17 
67 
 
2001 26 8 29 24 
87 
 
2002 22 12 27 18 
79 
 
2003 18 10 34 28 
90 
 
2004 29 7 29 18 
83 
 




Source: Okongwu 2006:23 
 
These technologies transferred were sourced from major OECD countries although 
such countries as India and South Africa featured in recent times. As a result of CBN policy 
in bank recapitalization and the upgrading of ICT backbones, Nigerian banks reportedly spent 
over N25 billion in the 2000s to acquire foreign software and other forms of information and 
communication technologies (http://www.balacingact-africa-com/news/en/issue-no-
470/computing/nigeria-citizens-spends-n25-billion-on-software-imports-says-notap). The 
acquisition of these technologies also attracted technology transfer fees running into billions 
of Naira.  
Table 4.22 approved technology transfer fees between 2000 and 2006 for major 
sources of ICT providers for Nigeria’s banking sector on account upgrading and 
modernisation of the sector. India is quite dominant as it accounted for 54.84 percent of total 





















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
USA 49.68 49.68 - 40.12 8.38 23.44 1.60 172.90 3.88 
 
UK 66.14 66.14 66.14 32.93 10.31 111.32 112.18 465.16 10.44 
 
Other EU 16.15 9.83 33.33 23.95 19.49 41.84 271.49 416.08 9.34 
 




- - - 11.11 140.45 - 10.23 161.79 3.63 
Others - 54.00 123.39 123.39 119.47 94.75 58.34 573.34 12.87 
 
Total 270.57 372.33 668.66 776.68 754.67 742.77 870.02 9455.70 100.00 
 
Source Okongwu 2006:37 
 
The strong showing of India as a source of technology transfer was a result of its 
global importance as software providers as well as the fact that what the Nigerian banking 
sector required was mainly software. This explained the total technology transfer fees of N2, 
666.43 million between 2000 and 2006 ahead of other sources. 
Technology transfers have cost the Nigerian economy enormously. Table 4.23 shows 
that between 1999 and August 2006, Nigeria spent over US$2.4 billion to procure foreign 
technologies to boost its development. Within the same period, NOTAP calculated that it 









Table 4.23: Cost of Technology and Financial Savings 
 
Year *Cost of Technology *Financial Savings 
 N $ N $ 

































*Exchange Rate calculated from CBN’s posted yearly exchange rate average 
**Covers up to August 2006 
Source: Okongwu 2006:30 
 
 
The real savings which NOTAP would have recorded was the mobilisation of 
Nigerian diaspora as a source of technology transfer considering their presence in major 
sectors of the OECD countries. Ironically, instead of African and Nigerian diaspora being 
factored into the domestic development models, they are sidelined in favour of technical 
assistance leading Kapur (2001:282) to argue that brain drain repatriation is not only more 
cost-effective but also more efficient mechanism for technical assistance. But Nigerian 
diaspora have not featured, in any direct manner, in the technology transfer framework of 
Nigeria. The reason is not far-fetched as three factors, more than others, appeared to have 
259 
 
made it difficult for technology transfer through the diaspora. First is the international 
development in the form of WTO’s TRIPS. The TRIPS Agreement of 1994 which obliged 
member-states to provide intellectual property protection in its laws also established 
minimum standards for the availability, scope and use of seven forms of intellectual property 
namely, copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout 
designs for integrated circuits and undisclosed information (trade secrets) ( Ibigbami and Orji 
2009:7). Second is the nature of R&D. because of the capital intensive nature of R&D, only 
TNCs and states appear to fund big-time researches that actually translate into vital 
technologies necessary to drive the development prospects of developing countries. In the 
United States, for example, publicly-developed technology comprising the government, 
universities and non-profit institutions) account for 34 percent or US$95 billion of research 
while industries and businesses account for 66 percent or US$181 billion of research (Barton 
2007:8). What this implies is that these funders control the outcome of research and they do 
so to advance their advantages. Nigerian scientists and technologists involved in these 
researches cannot independently transfer their knowledge to their home countries without 
breaking the various provisions of the IPR Agreement. For instance, Keshi (2008:4) marvels 
that: 
In July 2007, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua [2007-2010] 
challenged the Nigerian Diaspora professional’s (sic) in IT and 
Health to work in tandem with the Federal Ministries of 
Science and technology and health to fashion out how they can 
be meaningfully engaged in the acceleration of IT development 
in Nigeria as well as improve the health system. Almost six 
months after, not a response yet from the Diaspora. 
 
Obviously, the Nigerian diaspora just like the diaspora of other developing countries 
cannot transpose their know-how onto the domestic turf without clearing with their funders or 
meeting certain conditions. Third, even where such transference of knowledge could be 
possible, many developing countries, including Nigeria lack the necessary domestic 
infrastructure to appropriate and adapt such knowledge for technology development 
purposes. From available data, technology transfers to Nigeria have been mainly on the 
platform of trade agreements based on patents (importation of technologies). The nature of 
the technologies under this cadre is that they are “unprotected” technologies, that is, they are 
technologies whose utilitarian value is no longer treasured by the developed countries for 
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Prior to 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic rule after decades of military 
dictatorship, migration and diaspora issues were not within the purview of the country’s 
policy radar in any systematic way. The contemporary government attention to these issues 
arose fortuitously. In the course of former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s shuttle diplomacy, 
to reintegrate Nigeria into the comity of nations following years of international ostracism 
and to canvass for foreign direct investment, he encountered appreciable number of Nigerians 
in every major capital city of the world. These encounters excited government’s interest and 
translated into the formation of umbrella organisations and other institutional frameworks to 
harness the potentials of the Nigerian diaspora. The Nigerian government has made some 
progress in the efforts to leverage the diaspora into national development but a lot needs to be 
done. This chapter evaluates the progress made in terms of policy frameworks, legislative 
backing and the short- and long-term programme of action by the Nigerian government to 
mainstream its diaspora into national development. It also examines the experiences of 
several countries and how their experiences could be domesticated for national development. 
 
 
5.2 MIGRATIONAL TRENDS AND MIGRATION POLICY FRAMEWORKS IN 
NIGERIA 
 
Migration in Nigeria is characterised by the movement of people internally and 
internationally. Internal migration consists of rural-urban and forced migration. Oftentimes, 
the final destination of rural-urban migration is abroad. Rural-urban migration connotes the 
voluntary movement of people from the rural areas to the urban centres, for a legion of 
reasons, but often in search of a better life. Forced migration is the product of forced 
displacement resulting from such factors as ethnic and religious conflicts, conflicts arising 
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from crude oil mining and refining, effects of natural disasters, and peasant and pastoralist 
conflicts over access to non-renewable resources.  
Prior to the current democratic dispensation, which started in 1999, Nigeria did not 
have any coherent policy on migration, whether internally, covering rural-urban population 
movement, or externally, covering the emigration of its human capital abroad. Migration in 
Nigeria’s policy environment was narrowly conceived in terms of rural-urban drift, and 
strategies to address them consisted of piecemeal policies aimed at discouraging people from 
drifting to urban centres because of the pressure on their infrastructural facilities. Apart from 
the incapacity of most urban areas in Nigeria to accommodate the pressures from rural 
migration, the fact that rural migrants consist of able-bodied young men and women 
undermine rural economies and deepen the contradictions in the prospects of rural 
development. 
The traditional challenge to the Nigerian government in relation to rural-urban 
migrational trend has been how to strike a balance in the net-migration in order to maintain 
the urbanity of the cities. As Wosu and Anele (2010:210) opine, “the concentration of the 
urban populations of many young persons, children alike, and women from rural 
communities engenders urban nuisance and growth of large urban agglomerates”. Several 
factors underpin the movement of people to urban areas. The first is the failure of government 
to enthrone an integrated development model. The implication is that there is a sharp line 
between urban and rural areas in terms of levels of development. The most obvious 
manifestation of this division is the near absolute lack of socio-economic infrastructures in 
the rural areas and their concentration in the urban areas. The second factor is government’s 
neglect of agriculture which is the mainstay of rural economies. Since the discovery of oil in 
Nigeria and the global appreciation of its price in the 1970s, agriculture, which used to be the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy, through such cash crops like cocoa, rubber, groundnut, 
palm oil and so on, was abandoned in preference for quick oil money. Despite the importance 
of oil in the Nigerian economy as attested by its contribution of 95 percent to the country’s 
foreign exchange earnings and about 80 percent of budgetary revenues, agriculture remains 
the main source of revenue as about between 60 and 70 percent of the population depend on 
it for their livelihoods (http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/economy_of_Nigeria; Oni et al 2009:5). 
The trajectory of the Nigerian economy to monoculturalism based on oil and the total 
abandonment of agriculture deepened poverty, not just in the rural areas but throughout 
Nigeria. According to NBS (2009:73), rural poverty rose from 28.3 percent in 1980 to 63.3 
percent in 2004.  
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 Table 5.1: Rural-Urban Spread in Poverty level (1980-2004) 
 
(Source: NBS 2009:73) 
 
Table 5.1 above shows the rural-urban spread of poverty in Nigeria between 1980 and 
2004. Rural poverty increased from 28.3 percent in 1980 to 51.4 percent in 1985. It fell to 
46.0 percent in 1992 before rising to 69.3 percent in 1996. Since 2004 when Nigeria’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) conducted its national living Standard Survey, rural 
poverty has been 63.3 percent. 
The neglect of agriculture by the government and attendant dwindling of agricultural 
productivity, as a result of anti-people land policies, scarcity of land, impoverished soil, 
declining crop yields, poor harvests, soil erosion, lack of storage facilities, and lack of 
government subsidies to procure improved seedlings and other agricultural inputs among 
others, motorised rural-urban migration. Abbass (2011:4) elaborates that, “ 
 
With agricultural pursuits becoming more and more unbearable 
and unaffordable by the rural peasantry... . [T]hey pathetically 
abandoned farming by selling and mortgaging their farmlands 
to move out of rural environment for urban life to earn wage 
labour or engage in other lumpen-proletarian work. 
  
The high level of rural poverty, which is associated with the failure of agriculture, has 
been the major push factor in rural-urban migration in Nigeria. Rural poverty is linked to the 
incapacity of the agricultural sector to sustain wealth creation in comparison to the wealth 
generated by oil and associated sectors in the urban areas. For instance, while Nigeria has a 
total land area of 98.3 million hectares, of which only 71.2 million hectares are cultivatable, 
only 34.2 million hectares (or about 48 percent of the cultivatable area) are cultivated with 
less than 1 percent irrigated (FMARD 2001). The failure of the Nigerian state to place 
agriculture in its proper place in the economy and the attendant collapse of the rural economy 
motivated emigration from the rural areas to both the urban centres and abroad. As 
Mohammed-Lawal and Atte (2006:2) corroborate, “Nigerian agriculture, to a large extent, 




27.2 46.3        42.7 65.6 54.4 
17.2 37.8        37.5 58.0 43.2 
28.3          51.4       46.0             69.3          63.3 
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still possesses the characteristics of a peasant economy that was prominent in the pre-
independence period”.  
Undoubtedly, the Nigerian government had made efforts in the past to revamp the 
agricultural sector and position it as an alternative source of wealth generation but these 
efforts did not frontally impact on rural-urban migration. The evaluation of various 
government efforts to develop Nigeria’s agricultural potentials adjudged them, without 
exception as failures (Iruonagbe 2009:31-32). As Nwaka (2005:6) contends, “programmes for 
rural development aimed at improving agricultural productivity and export earnings, and 
ensuring self-sufficiency in food, were marred by organizational bottlenecks. … Vast 
amounts of resources were misallocated or otherwise misappropriated in projects of doubtful 
priority”. It could be argued that part of the reasons why these various government efforts, 
such as Gowon’s National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP); Obasanjo’s 
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN); Shagari’s Green Revolution (GR); Babangida’s 
Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI); the River Basins Development 
Programmes and a host of others, failed  in terms of reversing the trend of rural-urban 
migration was that they did not factor into them specific modalities to address it. Thus, 
despite the implementation of these programmes, the seeming unidirectional influx of young 
people into urban areas continued.  
One of the greatest challenges of internal migration in Nigeria is the paradox of being 
least urbanised and yet experiencing the phenomenon of over-urbanisation as a result of the 
fact that urban growth is not driven by industrialization but by escape from the mire of 
poverty in the rural areas. (http://www.onlinenigeria.com/populartion/?blurb=135). Other 
challenges associated with rural-urban migration include such negativities as: the 
depopulation of the rural areas; rural underdevelopment; the distortion of the urban setting 
through overpopulation, the loss of the necessary manpower for rural development; 
congestion of urban centres resulting in extreme pressures on social amenities; continued 
skewness in the rate of development between the urban and rural areas and high rate of 
crimes (Iruonagbe 2009:39-41). Although rural-urban migration has been in the front burner 
of government policy consideration as a result of the aforementioned negativities, there is no 
existing government policy to either contain it or incentivize reverse-migration. This is in 
spite of the availability of data generated through the 1991 Post-Census Enumeration Survey 
(PES) on internal migration and Urbanisation Survey of 1993 (Afolayan et al 2009:47).  
The greatest migration challenge to Nigeria is international migration and its 
associated brain drain. There are two angles to international migration: immigration and 
264 
 
emigration. While a lot of Nigerians emigrate, so many foreigners, from diverse countries, 
head to Nigeria. The expansion in the Nigerian economy as a result of oil wealth and its 
afrocentric foreign policy in the 1970s were the twin pull factors that attracted so many 
immigrants, the majority of who emigrated from neighboring ECOWAS countries. While the 
Nigerian economy blossomed, there was no problem with immigration into Nigeria, and it 
did not matter to policy makers whether migrants were legally admitted or came through 
extra-legal means. Indeed, the buoyancy of the Nigerian economy and the seemingly infinite 
demand for skilled labour, which the domestic economy could not match, led to the influx of 
both skilled and unskilled labour from all parts of Africa and the world. It was reported that 
about 77 percent of West Africans, including professionals who resided in Nigeria during that 
period did so illegally (Makinwa-Adebusoye 1995).  
However, the reversal in Nigeria’s economic fortunes and the attendant budgetary 
constraints urgently required certain domestic policies to be formulated and implemented. As 
part of the country’s austerity measures, its policy, with regard to the large pool of 
immigrants in the country, was to expel those it categorised as illegal aliens. This category of 
immigrants was estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 1.5 to 2.7 million people. The mass 
expulsion of illegal aliens from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 did not constitute a clear-cut policy 
on immigration. Rather, it was an ad hoc measure birthed by two different circumstances: in 
1983, it was driven by the economic recession that hit the country as a result of decline in oil 
revenues; and, in 1985, it was as a result of change of government (Miller 1999:27). 
Although mass expulsion had been variously used by states to address illegal migration, they 
are no longer fashionable. As Miller (1999:27) contends; 
 
Mass expulsions of aliens almost invariably violate 
international norms espoused by the International Labour 
Organisation and the branches of the United Nations concerned 
with human rights. While states do have a right to return illegal 
migrants, long-term, legally admitted alien residents and 
citizens have a different status in international law and in 
democratic settings. 
 
What countries have done in recent times is to evolve immigration policies that 
address a wide range of immigration issues. Migrants have, in contemporary world setting, 
been granted enormous rights ranging from refugee and asylum status and protected by 
international laws. The trend now is that long-term resident aliens cannot be arbitrarily 
deported or be made to leave a country against their will (Miller 1999:28).  
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The earliest Nigerian government’s response to the mass emigration of Nigerians can 
be periodised to 1984 when the then government of General Muhammadu Buhari (1984-
1985) embarked upon series of enlightenment campaigns in the mass media urging Nigerians 
to remain at home for national development. In a way, what motorised this campaign was the 
quest to create a façade of patriotism as basis to secure legitimacy for the regime. Despite the 
crushing economic condition in Nigeria and apparent limited opportunities available, the 
regime painted a picture that the country could be fixed if only Nigerians would remain at 
home to build and defend it. The media campaign demonised emigration and painted the 
Nigerian migrants as unpatriotic “Andrews” who were unthinkingly checking out, leaving the 
country to its peril (Hagher 2011:122). Beside the jingles relayed mainly through the state-
owned media houses - the Nigeria Television Authority (NTA), the Federal Radio 
Corporation of Nigeria and the Daily Times, there was no conscious government policy to 
further address mass emigration. It was only in the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida 
(1985-1993) that further tangential policy was adopted. The regime, in 1992, approved dual 
citizenship for Nigerians. At the time, this dual nationality law was cynically perceived as an 
elitist law birthed by the exigency of legitimising the nationality of elite children born in 
foreign countries.  
 
Table 5.2:  Stakeholders/Institutional Actors Managing Diverse Migration Issues in 
Nigeria 
 
S/No. Institutional Actor Area of Migration Responsibility 
 
1 National Commission for 
Refugees (NCFR). 
Established by Decree No. 
52 of 1989 (now Chapter 
N21, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 
2004) 
- The Commission is mandated to: lay down 
general guidelines and overall policy on issues 
relating to refugees and asylum seekers; to 
advise the government on policy matters in 
relation to refugees in Nigeria; to manage 
internally displaced persons and act as a focal 
agency for migration management and 
resettlement of internally-displaced persons. 
- National migration policy 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
- Consular matters, including protecting the 
interests of Nigerians abroad; pilgrimage 
arrangements; repatriation of destitute 
Nigerians; issuance of passports, travel 




3 Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MIA) 
- The ministry’s statutory responsibilities include: 
the formulation and implementation of policies 
and programmes on the following: the 
registration of voluntary organisations; the 
issuance of expatriate quota allocations; the 
granting of Nigerian citizenship; immigration 
and visas; seafarers’ identity cards/certificates; 
passports and travel documents; permit for 
foreign participation in business; the movement 
of aliens within the country and the repatriation 
of aliens. 
4 Nigerian Immigration 
Service (NIS) (An Agency 
of the Ministry of internal 
Affairs) 
- Performs most of the migration responsibility of 
MIA. It also undertakes: the registration of 
expatriates for naturalisation; external border 
management and the control of travel 
documents. 
5 Ministry of Labour and 
Productivity (MLP) 
- Sets up Labour Migration Desk in 2006 to 
facilitate favourable terms of employment for 
Nigerians desiring to travel abroad as well 
resolve contending labour issues involving the 
diaspora; facilitates offers for Nigerians to travel 
and work legitimately abroad; mechanism to 
facilitate bilateral and multilateral agreements 
on employment; assists in ensuring safe and 
unhindered remittances. 
6 Ministry of Justice - Oversees all the legal matters including 
government migration obligations under 
international conventions, bilateral and 
multilateral agreements; handling of extraditions 
etc.  
7 National Population 
Commission (Established 
by Decree No. 23 of 1988) 
- Periodically conducts national census and 
surveys; oversees continuous registration of 
births and deaths; collect, collate and publish 
data on migration statistics obtained through 
internal migration surveys and entry and exit 
cards from the Nigerian Immigration border 
posts. 
8 National Agency for the 
Prohibition of Trafficking 
in Persons and Other 
- To coordinate all laws on the trafficking on 
persons and related offences, including 
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Related Matters (NAPTIP) 
(Established 8 August 
2003). 
eradication, suppression and facilitation of 
investigation into human trafficking.  
9 Central Bank of Nigeria of 
Nigeria 
- Collect, collate and publish remittances; make 
policies guiding the operations of MTOs, 
commercial banks, bureaux de change. 
10 National Planning 
Commission 
- Data Management 
- National migration policies 
11 National Assembly - Makes laws for the protection and harnessing of 
migrants for national development  
Sources: Compiled from Afoloyan et al 2009; Adepoju 2009 
 
 
Subsequently, there was inaction on migration and Nigerian diaspora until the fourth 
democratic dispensation that commenced in 1999. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo, in 
the course of his shuttle diplomacy, encountered many Nigerians in every capital city he 
visited in search of foreign investors. The seeming ubiquity of Nigerians around the world 
ignited the perception that they represented a reserve army of human resources potentially 
relevant to the country’s development drive. This realisation underpinned the subsequent 
policies that the Nigerian government engineered into existence to address migration and 
diaspora issues. But, beyond this realisation, other emerging scenarios, such as, the desperate 
and dangerous manner of emigration of irregular migrants, and increase in smuggling and 
human trafficking rings, helped to stimulate the need for a national policy (Afolayan et al 
2009:69). The Nigerian government, in 2005, through the office of the Special Assistant to 
the President on Diaspora Affairs collaborated with the International Organisation of 
Migration (IOM) to produce a national policy on migration (Afolayan et al 2009:69). After 
exhaustive sessions, including a national stakeholders’ conference where policy makers and 
relevant migration practitioners made their inputs, a National Policy on Migration was 
developed. However, policy summersaults, constant readjustment in the assignment of 
government functions among government parastatals, and lack of continuity arising from 
changes in the composition of government functionaries affected the securement of approval 
from the Federal Executive Council and the presidency. The expectation, since 2007 when 
the policy document was finalised and submitted to the federal government, that it would 
soon come into effect has not materialised as at 2011. The major problems with the policy 
are: the seeming ambivalence of the government about the government parastatal to manage 
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it and the jostling among government parastatals to oversee its implementation. While in 
2005, the Office of the Special Assistant to the President on Diaspora Affairs initiated and 
collaborated with IOM to finalise the policy, by 2009, the government issued a presidential 
directive mandating the National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) to coordinate matters 
relating to migration and internally displaced persons in Nigeria (Afolayan et al 2009:70). 
This move provided the excuse for delay as the Commission began the process of revisiting 
it. As has been consistent with governance in Nigeria, the failure of former President 
Obasanjo, who initiated the Programme, to complete it had put the entire policy in serious 
jeopardy of abandonment as several contending interests would and in fact did appear on the 
horizon, jostling to be the implementers of the migration policy (Odiogor 2010). By 17th 
March 2011, a one-day migration policy conference was held in Abuja where two key draft 
migration policies namely, the National Migration Policy and the National Policy on 
Internally Displaced Persons were presented to the Honourable Minister for Special Duties 
through the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, Mrs Rabi Jimeta (mni) by the 
Commissioner of the National Commission for Refugees for onward submission to the 
Federal Executive Council for adoption (http://migrantrights.info/?p=491 ) .  
Nigeria’s National Policy on Migration represents a pioneering national effort in 
evolving a master plan to address the multi-variegated issues relating to migration. The major 
promise of the policy once it becomes operational is that it provides the necessary platform to 
evolve an integrated plan of action as well as the budgetary requirements to leverage on the 
benefits of migration and deal with the strictures associated with it (Odiogor 2010). The 
migration policy covers a lot of area including migration and development; migration and 
cross-cutting social issues; national security and irregular movement; and forced 
displacement; the human rights of migrants; organised labour migration; internal migration; 
national population; migration data and statistics; funding for migration management and the 
establishment of an agency or commission to oversee its over all implementation (Afolayan 
etal 2009:70; Adepoju 2009:25).  
There is also a new development. Recently, a draft National Labour Migration Policy 
(NLMP) was handed over to the Nigerian government through the Minister of Labour and 
Productivity, Chief Emeka Worgu by the duo of IOM’s Chief of Mission, Mr Martin Ocaga 
and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) representative, Mr Dennis Zulu. Prior to 
this, Nigeria did not have a reference document guiding labour migration or modalities for 
gainful employment in destination countries. The utilitarian value of the National Labour 
Migration Policy is embedded in its capacity to provide the basis for the evolvement of a 
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conducive policy framework that is promotive of regular labour migration, protective of 
national economic interests and supportive of the aspirations of the migrant worker through 
the initiation of valid contracts and obtainment of better welfare deals for them (Vanguard 
2011). Another important value of the National Labour Migration Policy, in conjunction with 
the Migration Policy is its envisaged capacity to ensure the shoring up of the skill of the 
Nigerian youth and job seekers to compete in the international labour market as well as 
regulating the exportation of skill in such as way as to ensure that emigration does not lead to 
manpower crisis in critical sectors of the economy (Vanguard 2011). As at 2011, none of 
these national policies has become operational as the two chambers of National Assembly are 




5.3 NIGERIA’S DEVELOPMENT VISIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
BRAIN DRAIN   
 
The origin of Nigeria’s post-colonial attempts at envisioning the trajectory of its 
development can be properly situated at the early years of independence when development 
planning was first conceived, packaged and implemented. Since 1962 when the first post-
independence Development Plan was flagged off, Nigeria had stuck to development planning 
as its core strategy of streamlining competing developmental models, interests and aspirations 
until the economic crisis of the 1980s. Between 1962 and 1985, Nigeria had four 
development plans viz: First Development Plan 1962-1968, Second Development Plan 1970-
74; Third Development Plan 1975-80 and Fourth Development Plan 1981-85. Despite 
differing opinions about the impact of national planning on the overall scorecard of Nigeria’s 
development efforts, it can never be denied that these plans had far-reaching positive effects 
on Nigeria’s economic development.  
Right from the period preceding the formulation of the first development plan, it was 
obvious that Nigeria lacked the relevant crop of competent personnel to spearhead its post-
independence development. Indeed, the first development plan recognised the 
indispensability of the assistance of foreign personnel to midwife and sustain the agenda of 
the plan (Obi and Obikeze 2005:70). In addition to initiating industrialisation and other 
developmental projects, the various development plans also embarked upon massive human 
capital development. The good run of the Nigerian economy during this period ensured the 
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absorption and adequate compensation of the developed human capital. In other words, the 
developmental strides that were made through these development plans as exemplified by the 
springing up of all manner of industrial concerns ensured that people so trained were 
immediately absorbed. The concern then was not about the emigration of Nigeria’s premium 
human capital.  
The onset of economic crisis in the 1980s created contradictions that made the human 
resources that were hitherto adequate for domestic needs superfluous as industrial concerns 
lost their capacity for growth. The contraction in the Nigerian economy introduced untoward 
consequences. As Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwa (2004) affirm: 
 
Nigeria’s structural defects, which had been papered over by 
the oil boom, came to the fore. Foreign exchange difficulties 
became acute, and the entire manufacturing sector (based on 
ISI strategy [import-substitution industrialisation] and heavy 
dependence on imported inputs) was in serious trouble. 
 
What this meant was that the industrial concerns found it very difficult to meet their 
business obligations in terms of capacity utilization, foreign exchange for vital spares and raw 
materials, welfare package for workers and so on. While some companies closed down, 
others operated at substantially reduced capacity with attendant downsizing of their 
workforce.  
The response of the Nigerian government to the intruding economic crisis that 
threatened its economic survival was the adoption of the SAP package. The failure of SAP to 
transform the economy as exemplified by worsening economic condition of the country and 
its citizenry opened the floodgate of contending policy measures in the 1990s (Sampson 
2007:71). The seemingly intractable economic crisis principally induced massive emigration 
of such professionals as engineers, medical doctors, nurses and other health personnel, 
scientists and so on. A deviation from the traditional development planning model was 
introduced on 27th November, 1996 when the then Head of State, the late General Sani 
Abacha (1993-1998) set up a 248-man committee to fashion and formulate a vision that 
would accord concreteness to: 
 
The conviction that the country’s poor economic and political 
performance is neither representative of her potential nor in 
consonance with the aspirations of her citizens and their 
determination that their nation should occupy her rightful place 




The Vision 2010 Committee worked for 10 months through 53 sub-committees and 8 
clusters of sub-committee and covered 13 critical success factors. In addition, the Committee 
dealt with 17 economic issues, 17 special issues and 6 general issues which were envisaged to 
anchor the robust transformation of Nigeria by 2010. Despite representation made by several 
bodies about the bran drain phenomenon and the enormity of its negative impact on the 
development of Nigeria, the Vision did not elaborately confront this problem from the 
perspective of devising strategies to harness the country’s brain in the diaspora. It only 
devised preventive measures anchored on providing more jobs and creating more latitude for 
the constructive engagement of the youths in national development. Although this flaw could 
have been rectified in the course of implementing this vision, it did not see the light of the 
day as a result of the death of its initiator the late General Sani Abacha in 1998. 
Therefore, prior to 1999, Nigeria did not have any development plan or vision to serve 
as a compass for the trajectory of its development. It could not have evolved such an 
integrated plan because of the contradictions threatening to asphyxiate its economy: huge 
debt burden, macro-economic instability, crisis in the oil producing region, crashing oil prices 
and so on. These contradictions circumscribed the economic sovereignty of Nigeria as 
exemplified by the insistence of IFIs that certain minimum domestic reforms must be 
implemented. But between 1999 and 2003, the government of then President Obasanjo 
(1999-2007) unveiled its economic direction which, first of all, aimed at resolving the 
contradictions that bedevilled the Nigerian economy and secondly to enthrone: 
 
One of the leading economies in Africa: an economy that 
experiences rapid and sustained growth at not less than 6-10% 
per annum at the end of the present Administration’s tenure. 
The creation of a national economy that is highly competitive, 
responsive to incentives, private sector-led, broad-based, 
diversified, market-oriented and open, but based on internal 
momentum for its growth (FGN 2000:8-9). 
 
These economic directions paved the way for NEEDS. NEEDS (2003-2007) guided 
the reform framework that drove Nigeria’s macro-economic stability. Vision 2020 is a 13-
year plan to consolidate the gains purportedly made in the implementation of NEEDS. Vision 
2020 is a roadmap to transforming Nigeria from where it is now (classified as low income 
country) to a higher pedestal of being amongst the top 20 developed countries. As Vision 
2020 document asserts, its major objective is to set the machinery in motion such that “by 
2020 Nigeria will be one of the 20 largest economies in the world able to consolidate its 
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leadership role in Africa and establish itself as a significant player in the global economic and 
political arena” (http://www.nv2020.org/?Concept). A pertinent question is how Nigeria can 
achieve this national dream with the bulk of its bright minds in every sphere of human 
endeavour domiciled in the western countries where they are already integrated. 
The institutional framework for Vision 2020 is quite elaborate and comprises the 
National Council on Vision 2020 (NCV 2020) which is at the apex. The NCV 2020 which is 
under the chairmanship of the president is made up of 27 members and provides leadership 
and direction necessary to salvage the entire nation (http://www.nv2020.org/framework#nsc). 
Other organs of the institutional framework include: National Steering Committee composed 
of 70 members, Secretariat of the National Steering Committee, National Technical Working 
Group for V2020, Stakeholder V2020 Development Committees and Economic Management 
Team. 
Vision 2020 recognises that the achievement of the core goal of elevating Nigeria to 
the top 20 bracket in the world in 2020 is dependent on the enhancement of economic 
development performance through such indicative parameters as: 
(a) Stable polity by 2020; 
(b) A sound, stable and globally competitive economy with a GDP of not less than 
US$900 billion and a per capita income of not lees than US$4,000 per annum; 
(c) Adequate infrastructural services to support the economy;  
(d) Modern and vibrant education system which provides opportunity for education to 
every Nigerian and which meets the manpower needs of the economy;  
(e) Responsive health sector that supports and sustains life expectancy of not less than 70 
years and which also reduces to the barest minimum the burden of infectious diseases;  
(f) A modern technologically-enabled agricultural sector that utilises the vast agricultural 
endowments of the country to ensure national food security and become a source of 
foreign exchange earnings. 
(g) A vibrant and globally competitive manufacturing sector that contributes significantly 
to the GDP with a manufacturing value-added of not less than 40 per cent 
(http://www.nv2020.org/?Iparameters) 
Interestingly, the Vision 2020 recognises the debilitating effect of brain drain in the 
actualisation of the Vision and incorporated the Nigerian Diaspora in the various arms of the 
institutional framework. The centrality of human capital in driving development plans and 
visions was underscored by Remi Omotoso thus; “human capital development is very key to 
achieving any goals that our New Vision Plan will set for the sustainable socio-economic and 
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political development of Nigeria” (cited in Oyebode 2008). The Report of the Vision 2020 
National Technical Working Group on Human Development (2009:4) attributes the 
disconnect between recent development plans and visions such as SAP, NEEDS 1 and 2, 
Vision 2010 and the realisation of their broad goals and economic growth to the constraints 
arising from human capital challenges. That is, the non-attainment of proposed development 
goals was accentuated by the loss of relevant human capital to the developed countries 
through emigration.  
Recognising the threat of brain drain to human capital formation in the country and its 
devastating effect on the pursuit of development, the Report of Vision 20-2020 National 
Technical Working Group (2009:26) avers that the strategy to ensure the availability of a 
pool of human capital would entail devising interventions that “train, engage, motivate and 
retain professionals in their chosen disciplines”. Oyebode (2008) has noted that going by the 
extent of brain drain and attendant human capital challenges in the country, the Vision 20-
2020 might fall short of its laudable projections of: GDP US$900 billion and per capita 
income of US$4000 per annum and 13 percent annual growth anchored on investment profile 
of US$40billion per annum. This is in spite of the decision of the federal government to 
allocate N100 billion for human capital development. Oyebode (2008) describes this amount 
as “a mere drop in the bucket because of the deep-rooted rot in the system, as well as the 
mass exit of highly needed manpower in the university system to drive the human capital 
development. 
The implication of the unfolding reality is the impossibility of autochthonous 
development that can take the country to the top 20 bracket as Vision 20-2020 has projected. 
There are two options to achieving the type of development encapsulated in Vision 20-2020: 
the immediate and total mobilisation of Nigerians in the diaspora outside the existing 
framework of trickle-down syndrome or the elongation of the timeframe of the vision to 
enable the training of new crop of professionals. In either of these options, the systemic 
negativities and contractions that spawned the ground for the post-SAP massive emigration 








5.4: LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR DIASPORA 
ENGAGEMENT IN NIGERIA      
        
Prior to the formulation of the various national policies on migration, Nigeria’s 
policies on immigration and emigration depended on disparate laws that addressed various 
aspects of migration. The Table 5.3: below contains various legal instruments ranging from 
national laws to regional and international agreements and conventions in connection with 
migration, which Nigeria has ratified. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Sundry Legal Instruments for Migration in Nigeria 
 




The 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution 
Grundnorm of all laws 





Immigration Act (1963) 
(Chapter 171, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990 
Provides for the 
conditions for entry, stay 
and departure of foreign 





The Act is under 
consideration for 
amendment in the 
National Assembly 
to comply regional 
and international 
laws. 
Draft National Policy on 
Migration 
General migration issues Nigerians  Yet to be passed 
into law 
Draft National Labour 
Migration Policy (NLMP) 
Labour issues Nigerian and 
foreign 
workers 
Yet to be passed 
into law 
Labour Act (Chapter 198, 
Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1990) 
Guides labour policies 







On The Protection Of The 
Rights Of All Migrant 
Workers And Members Of 
Their Families (Ratified by 
Nigeria in 2009)  
Labour migration   International  
Trafficking in Persons 
(Prohibition) Law, 
Enforcement and 
Administrative Act No. 24 
of 14 July 2003(Amended 
Trafficking in persons. 
The 2005 Amendment 
extended the powers of 








in 2005). (Sets up National 
Agency for the Prohibition 
of Trafficking in Persons 
and Other Related Matters 
(NAPTIP)) 
child labour and the 
forfeiture of assets and 
proceeds of convicted 
traffickers. 
Child Rights Act 2003 Prohibition of child 
labour; exploitation of 





ECOWAS Protocol on Free 
Mobility of Persons, Goods 
and Services, May 1979 
Phase I: Right of Entry 
and Abolition of Visa 
[Protocol A/P1/5/79]; 




 (iii) Phase III: Right of 
Establishment 
[Supplementary Protocol 
A/ SP2/5/90]  
(B) Facilitating  
Measures:  
(i) ECOWAS Travel 
Certificate & ECOWAS 
Passport;  
(ii) Establishment of 
National Committees: on 
Free Movement of 
Persons & Vehicles, for 
example 
(iii) Introduction of 
Brown Card Motor 
Vehicle Insurance 
Scheme 













Approach on Migration, 
January 2008 at 33rd 
Summit of Heads of State 
and Government of 
ECOWAS 
   
(Adapted from Afolayan et al 2009; Afolayan 2010) 
 
Interestingly none of the legal instruments and agreement (both bilateral and 
multilateral) dealt with harnessing the diaspora for national development. No successive 
Nigerian government considered the brain drain phenomenon serious enough to evolve a 
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national policy to either stem its tide or integrate the Nigeria diaspora in the national 
development grid until recently. The earliest government effort was the promulgation of 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (Amendment) (No.3) Decree73 of 1992, which 
recognised dual citizenship. This provision was subsequently included in the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution under chapter III, Sections 28 and 29. The decree amended Cap 62 of the Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) to allow dual nationality. The dual citizenship provision 
created flexibility in the relations between Nigerians in the diaspora and the country. As 
opined by Sekoni (2011), the dual citizenship policy strengthened relationship between 
Nigerians in the diaspora and their homeland communities and underpinned the current 
impressive remittance outlay. Between Babangida’s dual citizenship policy and termination 
of military rule in 1999, no policy was enunciated with respect to the massive emigration of 
Nigerians or how to involve the diaspora in national development. In a way, it could be 
argued that the collapse of the Nigerian middle class, and the subsequent emigration of 
members of this class, provided the needed breathing space for the illegitimate military 
regimes to worry less about their legitimacy problem and continue with their arbitrary rule. 
This position is strengthened by government’s inaction in the face of burgeoning number of 
Nigerian asylum seekers and refugees all over the developed countries. Of course, 
government could not be expected do much as they were fleeing from unfavourable 
government policies especially, the abridgement of their fundamental human rights. The 
period under the late General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) appeared to have exacerbated the 
push factors for emigration. Under Abacha’s regime, the army hounded the press, suppressed 
academic freedom, killed political opponents and imprisoned those antagonistic to its 
dominant interests (Hagher 2011:122). The Nigerian diaspora not only provided logistic 
support to end military rule, but became the underground railroad for mass migration (Hagher 
2011:122).  
The Nigerian government’s interest in the diaspora as agents of development was 
ignited by several factors. One was the example of diaspora influence and development 
impact in such countries as China, Mexico, India, Philippines and so on. Two was the effect 
of years of Nigeria’s designation as a pariah nation and the need for reintegration. Three was 
the reluctance of the Western business interests to invest in Nigeria as a result of negative 
rating by rating institutions. And finally, the ubiquity of Nigerians around the world and their 
seeming influence in their host countries. In actuality, the conscious recognition of the 
diaspora as a veritable resource for national development, and official efforts to tap into them 
for the benefit of the country, started with former President Obasanjo in 1999. Before then, 
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available institutional frameworks concerned themselves with general migration management 
issues, internal displacement and refugee issues. Table 5.4 below contains the various 
institutional actors in diaspora management in Nigeria. Each institution is involved in 
diaspora issues to the extent of responsibilities assigned to it by its enabling laws.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Specific Institutional Frameworks for Diaspora Engagement in Nigeria 
 
S/No Institution Objectives 
 
1 Nigerians in the Diaspora 
Organisation 
(NIDO) 
- Encourage the participation of Nigerians in 
Diaspora in the affairs of the country;  
- Provide a forum to organisations for the 
exchange of views and experience;  
- Through Networking, enhance the image of 
Nigeria in all its ramifications; 
- Partner with Nigerian stakeholders in pursuance 
of national development;  
- Build a database of Nigerians with professional 
skills and make such database available for the 
benefit of government, the private sector and 
Nigeria’s partners.  
2 Nigeria National Volunteer 
Services 
 (NNVS) 
- In addition to building a culture of volunteerism 
and harnessing abundant human resources at 
home and in the diaspora towards national 
development, the NNVS was mandated, among 
others: 
• to act as the national focal point and liaison 
with NIDO,   especially for the fulfillment of 
its objectives; 
• tap into the huge reservoir of skills, 
knowledge and experiences of Nigerians 
who live abroad for national development; 
• utilize the skills, knowledge and experiences 
of Nigerians living in Nigeria who, during 
their career in the private sector or after 
retirement from the public service are willing 
and able to offer their services in volunteer 
work; 
•  provide and impart special skills that are 
required and not available at certain levels of 
government or private sector; 
• provide experienced staff to local 
Government Councils in the fields of 
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administration, bookkeeping, accountancy 
and other areas of specialization;  
•  mobilize specialized skills and channel such 
skills towards the needs, objectives and 
programmes of recipient organizations; and 
• strengthen the capacity of local communities 
and community based organizations. 
 
3 Office of the Senior 
Special Assistant to the 
President on Diaspora 
Affairs 
- Serves as a two-way communication channel 
between Nigerians in Diaspora and the 
government of Nigeria; 
- Coordinate the activities of various institutions 
involved in migration and diaspora affairs; 
- Reports to the president on diaspora issues  
4 House Committee on 
Diaspora Affairs (House of 
Representatives) 
 
- To promote the exchange of ideas between home 
country and Nigerians in the Diaspora; 
- To collect and maintain data on Nigerians in 
Diaspora from Consulates, Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Education, Justice, the Population 
Registers, Censuses, Employment Agencies and 
Statistics divisions of International 
Organizations and International Census Bureau 
for Domestic Planning and Uses; 
- To initiate policies needed to recognize and 
harness the potentials of Nigerians in the 
Diaspora in support of development and growth 
in both home and host countries; 
-  To encourage and monitor Diaspora networks 
and organizations and assist in the realization of 
their agenda and promote institutional change to 
help public servants collaborate effectively with 
Diaspora representatives;  
- To participate in dialogues within Government, 
regional and local authorities on Diaspora 
matters in their home and host countries. 
5 National Universities 
Commission (NUC)  
Sets up the Linkages with Experts and Academics in the 
Diaspora Scheme (LEADS). The major aims of the 
LEADS are: 
- To attract experts and academics of Nigerian 
extraction in the Diaspora on short term basis to 
contribute to the enhancement of education in 
the Nigerian University System; 
-  To create appropriate engagement-positions and 
job satisfaction for Nigerian academics and 
experts, so that they are not attracted away or 
wasted internally; 
- To encourage healthy staff movements, 
interaction and collaboration across and between 
Nigerian Universities and other sector of 
education and National development; 
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- Among other benefits, to encourage experts in 
industry to participate in teaching and research 
in Nigerian Universities. 
 
Federal Ministry of 
Science and Technology 
- Annual Science and Technology  Week;  
- African University of Science and Technology 
Abuja;  
- Technology Village 
7 Diplomatic Missions - Render sundry services to the diaspora 
especially the renewal of their travel documents. 
8  Vision 20: 2020 - Mobilise and sensitise Nigerians in the Diaspora 
to participate in nation-building;  
- Measures to check and reverse brain drain and 
foster brain gain: 
− provide adequate, well-paying jobs to serve 
as an incentive  
− expedite action on the Local Content Bill in 
the petroleum industry, in order to create 
adequate opportunities for all citizens 
− improve infrastructure, ensure political 
stability, as well as security of lives and 
property  
− control emigration of highly skilled 
personnel for the purpose of knowledge 
transfer for brain gain 
 
9 Labour Migration Desk  
(LMD)(Established in 
2006) and National 
Electronic Labour 
Exchange (NELEX) 
(Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Productivity) 
The basic functions envisaged, for the LMD are:  
- To work towards providing cogent advice on the 
formulation of coherent, comprehensive, 
consistent and transparent policies and 
procedures to effectively manage labour 
emigration and immigration in Nigeria;  
- Ensuring coherence between labour migration, 
employment and other national policies, in 
recognition of the wide social and economic 
implications of labour migration and in order to 
promote full, productive and freely chosen 
employment;  
 Establishing mechanisms to ensure co-ordination 
and consultation among different line 
departments of the Government of Nigeria 
involved in the process of labour migration;  
- To undertake and/or contract, analysis of the 
national labour market in order to detect, assess 
and predict labour shortages, at the national 
level, for both skilled and less-skilled 
employment and establish whether labour 
migration can provide a solution;  
- Taking initiatives in developing procedures for a 
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wide-ranging dialogue and cooperation on 
labour migration issues and policies in 
consultation with social partners, civil society 
and migrant worker organisations;  
- Providing assistance to projects and programmes 
generating, or increasing, opportunities for 
decent work for women and men migrants and 
liaising with donor agencies and governments;  
- Developing and supporting the implementation 
of initiatives that create productive employment 
and decent work for all migrant workers guided 
by international labour standards and other 
relevant international instruments and 
multilateral agreements concerning migrant 
workers;  
- Monitoring and evaluating the Private 
Employment Agencies through appropriate 
regulatory frameworks;  
- Ensuring that effective enforcement mechanisms 
for the protection of migrant workers’ human 
rights are in place and providing training on 
human rights to all involved in migration 
through awareness raising campaigns; and  
- Providing the Minister and the Permanent 
Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Productivity, who have key roles to play in the 
articulation of migration policy, with briefs on 
the management and administration of labour 
migration to ensure that migration is taken into 
account along with the larger labour and 




In the course of Obasanjo’s foreign trips, he encountered the Nigerian diaspora and 
initiated presidential dialogues with them. The series of dialogue was possible because they 
had already been organising themselves in groups through home town associations (HTAs), 
professional and interest groups and ethnic associations (Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007:10-
11). The presidential dialogue achieved two objectives: one, it broadened the horizon of 
diaspora engagement in national development; and two, it officially acknowledged the 
potential relevance of the diaspora in national development. As De Haas (2006:17) points out 
“it is not so much the engagement of Diaspora groups that is new, but rather the interest of 
the Nigerian government in their political contribution to national development”. Following 
the Nigerian government’s interest in mainstreaming the diaspora into national development, 
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further discussions led to the formation of supranational diaspora organisations. The essence 
of the presidential dialogue and the decision to aggregate diaspora assets under an umbrella 
was to streamline and focus them toward the greater needs of national development.  
The organisation of Nigerians in the diaspora, prior to this period, lacked coherence as 
the arena was filled with thousands of community, professional, religious, ethnic and cultural 
organisations jostling for space and domination like children in “a disjointed polygamous 
family” (Nweke 2010). The “discovery” of the Nigerian diaspora by the Obasanjo 
government led to several important developments. Firstly, before now, the Nigerian 
Diaspora had been sending remittances, but mainly informally. Government was to totally 
blank on diaspora remittance portfolio as the CBN Annual Reports did not keep a tab on, or 
reflect, the actual volume of formally remitted funds or projected an estimate of informal 
volume of remittances. This omission was in sync with general government indifference to 
migration issues, especially the “gain’ aspect of the brain drain phenomenon. It was only in 
2002 that CBN began to document remittances. This led Nigerian banks to broaden their 
service base by acting as agents to global MTOs especially, the Western Union, and 
MoneyGram. Although the transaction cost of sending remittances was comparably high due 
to infrastructural incapacity, and exclusive agreements between Nigerian banks and MTOs, 
many Nigerians in the diaspora began to increasingly embrace formal channels to remit 
money. This was demonstrated by the astronomical increment in the recorded remittance 
inflows to Nigeria by the CBN. Remittances rose from US$2.3 billion in 2004 to US$ 17.9 
billion in 2007, and since then, the CBN has sharpened extant policies on collection and 
reportage of remittance inflows in the country (Afolayan et al 2009:16).  
Secondly, following the series of dialogues entered into by the presidency and various 
groups of Nigerians in the diaspora, an umbrella organisation known as Nigerians in the 
Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) was established in 2000 with initial branches across Europe, 
the United States and Canada, but has now expanded to Asia and Africa. NIDO serves as a 
platform for the mobilisation of all Nigerians in the diaspora, especially professionals. NIDO 
was originally under the supervision of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. But it was later moved to the office of the president with an administrative 
secretariat. The reasons for the change in the institutional supervision of NIDO and its 
operational modalities could be a product of three factors: one, government’s positive 
reappraisal of its strategic importance as an engine of foreign investment mobilisation; two, 
to shield it from unnecessary politics and politicisation; and three, to extricate it from the 
bureaucratic bottlenecks of the Nigerian civil service, which could undermine its 
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effectiveness. Apart from serving as a platform for global mobilisation, the Nigeria 
government intended that “NIDO will facilitate a systematic and institutionalized relationship 
between Nigeria and its Diaspora and be a focal point in the overall strategy of involving the 
Diaspora in national development in the fields of education, science and technology, 
investment and culture and tourism” (African Diaspora Policy Centre 2011:9).  
Thirdly, the President also strengthened the administration of Diaspora affairs with 
the creation and appointment of a Special Assistant on Diaspora Affairs. The Special 
Assistant oversees every issues pertaining to the Diaspora. As explained by the Senior 
Special Assistant to the President on Diaspora Affairs, Mrs Bianca Ojukwu: 
 
The high commissions/embassies are the primary interface of 
the government of Nigeria with her citizens in the countries in 
which they are based. Each country has its own peculiar issue 
concerning Nigerians in the country… . My Office reports 
directly to Mr. President. We complement the laudable services 
offered by our embassies and will also complement the work of 
the Diaspora Commission [when it is created]. Because of the 
critical importance Mr. President places on Nigerians in 
Diaspora, we are strategically resourced to ensure [that] his 
objectives on matters relating to Nigerians in Diaspora are 
carried out. My Office will also step in to fill gaps left by other 
bodies because of one reason or the other (CANUK Newsletter 
2011:6). 
 
Fourthly, another institution set up to engage the diaspora is the Nigeria National 
Volunteer Service (NNVS). It was established in 2003 to reinforce bonds with the Nigerian 
Diaspora through volunteerism. The NNVS is under the direction of the Office of the 
Secretary to the Government of the Federation (OSGF) and it branches are spread in 36 states 
of Nigeria. The aims of NNVS include: mobilising and harnessing the skills and experiences 
of the diaspora for national development through such strategies as capacity building 
temporary visits, technical missions and sabbaticals to Nigerian institutions (De Haas 
2006:17; African Diaspora Policy centre 2011: 9).  
Fifthly, apart from the executive arm of government, the legislative arm is also 
proactively involved in diasporan affairs. Nigeria’s House of Representatives established a 
standing Committee on Diaspora Affairs as part of the national efforts to mobilise the 
Nigerian diaspora for nation-building. The key functions of the Committee include: putting 
diaspora issues in the front burner of national discourse; initiating policies and setting agenda 
for the effective harnessing of the potentials of Nigerian diaspora; intervening in issues 
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concerning the diaspora through the appropriate agencies; and, overseeing the 
implementation of government policies concerning the diaspora. The achievements of the 
Committee, since its establishment in the sixth legislative assembly, according to its 
Chairman, Hon. Abike Dabiri-Erewa, include among others: the successful intervention in 
human rights cases involving Nigerian diaspora in Libya, Indonesia and China; and the 
proposal of a bill seeking to put in place a legal framework for the establishment of Nigerian 
Diaspora Commission (http://www.voteabikedabiri.com/feat.php?page=accomplishment).   
The recent attempt at evolving a legislation aimed specifically at addressing issues 
relating to the Nigerian Diaspora is the proposal of a bill called “Nigerians in Diaspora 
(Establishment) Commission Bill” in 2009. The bill, according to its explanatory 
memorandum, seeks to establish a commission to:  
 
Provide for the engagement of Nigerians in diaspora in the 
policies, projects and participation in the development of 
Nigeria and for the purpose of utilising the human, capital and 
material resources of Nigerians in diaspora towards the overall 
socioeconomic, cultural and political development of Nigeria 
(http://www.diasporacommittee.com/nigeria-diaspora-bill.pdf). 
 
The proposal for the establishment of Nigerian Diaspora Commission has been as a 
subject of controversy. Its major criticism is its perception as mere duplication of functions. 
In a stakeholders’ meeting in Abuja in March 2010, the Nigeria’s National Planning 
Commission, through its Secretary Dr Sylvester Mony, considered the proposal to set up a 
Diaspora Commission as a needless duplication of bureaucracy and another drain pipe for the 
country’s scarce resources. He was quoted to have argued that:  
 
We have the infrastructure, the network and therefore, whatever 
it takes to harmonize the Nigerians in the Diaspora. I don’t see 
how the proposed Commission can function outside the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What we need is to strengthen or 
create a department in the Ministry to provide excellent service 
to them (Akogun 2010). 
 
There is also a groundswell of support for the bill and its proposal for the establishment 
of a Diaspora Commission but the apprehension is that the Commission might eclipse and 
undermine the novelty of NIDO and its acclaimed ingenuity in harnessing the Diaspora 
(Nweke 2010). There is the contention that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nigeria 
Embassies are inappropriate to be saddled with diasporan affairs. This argument is anchored 
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the well-known inefficiency and graft scandals associated with them. It is believed that their 
involvement would undermine efforts at mobilising the diaspora and effectively lead to 
reversals it diaspora issues (Akogun 2010). The bill has, so far, remained in the works and 
has not been passed into law. Undoubtedly, there is need to set up a diaspora commission as a 
strategy to ensure an enduring institutional framework to harness the diaspora, whose skills 
are imperatively relevant to Nigeria’s socio-economic and political development. 
Sixthly, in 2007 the National Universities Commission (NUC) set up a programme to 
harness Nigerian academics abroad. The initiative, called the Linkages with Experts and 
Academics in the Diaspora Scheme (LEADS), is a programme that specifically aims at 
utilising the skills and expertise of Nigerians in the Diaspora to engender positive 
transformation and instil international best practices in the higher education sector. LEADS 
targets seven areas namely: Information and Communications Technology (ICT); 
Management Science and Business Administration; Mathematics; Medicine and Dentistry, 
Mining Engineering, Natural Sciences and Oil and Gas Engineering. LEADS is designed to 
suit prospective visiting experts and academics as it is divided into three tranches of 3, 6 and 
12 months. The major objectives of LEADS as set out by the NUC include: 
a) To attract experts and academics of Nigeria extraction in the Diaspora on short term 
basis to contribute to the enhancement of education in the Nigerian University 
System; 
b) To create appropriate engagement-position and job satisfaction for Nigerian 
academics and experts, so that they are not attracted away or wasted internally; 
c) To encourage healthy staff movements, interaction and collaboration across and 
between Nigerian Universities using these experts and academics in the Diaspora and 
other sectors of education and national development; and, 
d) To encourage experts in industry to participate in teaching and research in Nigerian 
universities (http://www.nuc.edu.ng/pages/pages.asp?id=54) 
Since the establishment of LEADS, about 19 scholars have participated and rendered 
services to various Nigerian Universities. The NUC has spent about N 23.5million so far on 
the scheme and has recorded impressive results, which include the attraction of Nigerian 
experts and academics in the Diaspora back home and subsequent relocation of some of 
them; enrichment of curriculum review process in accordance with global best practices; the 
enhancement of reunion and reintegration of experts to their heritage and community life; the 
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enhancement of skills acquisition in rare areas of expertise especially in the installation and 
operation of hi-tech gadgets amongst others (http://www.nuc.edu.ng/pages/pages.asp?id=54). 
Finally, the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology instituted Annual Science and 
Technology Conference in 2005 as a window onto the Diaspora. The Conference is primarily 
designed as a forum for Nigerians in the Diaspora and those at home to map out modalities 
for collaboration for national development (Akwani 2007). Apart from describing the 
Conference as an important first step towards the national objective of mainstreaming the 
Diaspora into national development, the then Nigeria President Olusegun Obasanjo declared 
25 July every year as the Diaspora Day. Thus, Science and Technology Conference has 
become institutionalised as an integral part of the Diaspora Day. Since 2006, Nigeria has 
been celebrating the Diaspora Day on July 25 in addition to Science and Technology 
Conference with some tangible results. Apart from the establishment of personal and 
institutional linkages between scientists and technologists abroad and at home, diaspora 
scientists have gained access to local research funds through the Science and Technology 
Trust Fund (Akwani 2007). The conference also facilitated research and development in 
identified areas, an example being Dr. Obaija’s project, which produced a drug for the 
management of arthritis (Akwani 2007).  
Additional positive fallout from the Science and Technology Conferences was the 
Nigerian government’s initiative to set up African University of Science and Technology in 
Abuja in 2007. The main objective of this institution is to be a Pan-African centre of 
excellence as well as a citadel for the training of the next generation of engineers and 
scientists to drive Africa’s development. The University is modelled to create an extensive 
network within the African scientific community working in the best universities across the 
world and to tap their pool of knowledge to execute its programmes (African Diaspora Policy 
Centre 2011:13). What is not clear is the modalities put in place to stop the new institution 
from being a feeder-zone for the manpower needs of the developed countries like other 
Nigerian universities. 
The various Nigerian Ministries, Parastatals, and Agencies as well as state governments 
are involved in diaspora affairs, in relation to their mandates. For instance, in the 2006 
Science and Technology Conference, the NNVS and the Federal Ministry of Health on the 
one hand and the Medical Association of Nigerian Scientists and GPs in the British Isles 
(MANSAG) and the Association of Nigerian Physicians in America (ANPA) signed a 
memorandum of understanding in connection with facilitating medical missions to Nigeria 
(Akwani 2007). Despite the achievements recorded so far in the quest to integrate the 
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5.5 THE NIGERIAN DIASPORA AND THE DILEMMA OF INTEGRATION 
 
The Nigerian governments’ policies towards mainstreaming the Diaspora into 
national development are undoubtedly good. Their value lies in their pragmatism, which 
consists of cutting national losses associated with brain drain through employing available 
free brains in national development programmes, encouraging remittances in lieu of reverse-
migration and converting the diasporans into citizen-diplomats for the purpose of laundering 
the country’s image abroad and attracting foreign investors.  
Diaspora integration into national economies is not a simple issue of patriotism. It is 
much more complex than that. Citizens of a country do not just emigrate. Certain domestic 
and international factors singly or collectively interact to induce their emigration. These 
factors already categorised in this study as push, pull, suction and systematic factors, must be 
substantially addressed, if meaningful diaspora engagement must be facilitated and 
enthroned. Having emigrated, the integration of immigrants in most host countries is always 
so complete that dislocation for the purpose of reverse-migration is always a tough decision. 
Even where decisions to return to home country is reached, re-integration is not so 
straightforward considering problems of adaptation, and clash of ambitions between the local 
experts and their diaspora counterparts, which creates certain rigidities that undermine the 
purposes of diasporan engagement.  
Several dilemmas appear to characterise the processes of integration of the diaspora 
into national economies. It is not just enough to desire or decree policies into being for the 
purpose of mainstreaming diasporas into the national development grid. There are certain 
domestic, external and personal dilemmas that confront diaspora integration. These must be 
captured and addressed by national policies to facilitate meaningful diasporan engagement 
necessary to kindle their interest and ensure seamless integration. 
Domestic dilemma consists of the capacity of the national economy to absorb all the 
diaspora which it believes would contribute to its development. In Nigeria, the domestic 
conditions that induced emigration have remained largely unresolved. The state of the 
Nigerian economy is still parlous suggesting that it might not likely be able to meaningfully 
accommodate its diaspora. In other words, while the Nigerian economy has remained 
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inelastic in terms of available opportunities, the pool of diaspora’s expertise and knowledge is 
elastic, which suggests weak absorptive capacity on the part of Nigerian economy. Both 
national and global mappings of Nigerian diaspora experts and a net total estimate place 
Nigerian migrant stock in millions. Does Nigeria have the capacity to re-absorb the million of 
its experts and professionals who are gainfully employed in African and Western countries? 
If the answer is negative, which is most likely, then, what proportion of them could be 
accommodated by the Nigerian economy? The question of domestic incapacity combines 
with the problems of appropriate modalities to shortlist and chose diaspora experts and 
skilled personnel to create a serious dilemma. 
Another dilemma within the domestic milieu is the mechanism for determining areas 
of specialisation necessary for national development. The hierarchization of spheres of 
expertise and the attachment of national importance to them is likely to create feelings of 
marginalisation within the diaspora. There appears to be patent contradiction in the overall 
programme of diaspora engagement in Nigeria. Akwani (2007) argues that the formation of 
umbrella organisations such as NIDO and NNVS was a strategy to turn brain drain into brain 
gain without requiring the diaspora to physically relocate back to Nigeria. But the question is: 
if Nigerians in the diaspora do not return home, how would they contribute to national 
development outside the traditional remittance regime that had been their means of 
contributing to national development?  
Many Nigerians in the diaspora have tended to see their classification as diasporans 
negatively. According to Hagher (2011:119) such Nigerians feel that a Nigerian government 
initiative that considers them as the “Diaspora” actually severs, disenfranchises and 
disinherits them. This mindset made many Nigerians to refuse to identify with NIDO or 
participate in building the Nigerian diaspora database.  
Part of the national dilemma in diaspora integration consists of the disconnect 
between expectations and reality. Although the diasporas are assumed to understand the 
shortcomings of their countries of origin, their long absence and adaptation to the efficiency 
of their host countries create dilemma of adaptation. Emeagwali (2009) captures it succinctly 
thus: 
 
I long to visit the motherland, but I must confess that when 
Africa called me to return home, I couldn’t answer that call. 
The reason is that I work on creating new knowledge that could 
be used to redesign super computers. The most powerful 
supercomputer cost $120 million each and Nigeria could not 
afford to buy one for me. I created the knowledge that the 
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power of thousands of processors can be harnessed; this 
knowledge in turn inspired the reinvention of vector 
supercomputers into massively parallel supercomputers. New 
knowledge must precede new technological products and the 
supercomputer of today will become the personal computer of 
tomorrow. 
  
The import of Emeagwali’s assertion is that certain category of diaspora experts lacks 
the liberty of national patriotism, no matter the extent of their love for their country, as their 
contributions to development are global and beyond borders. The challenges of national 
security and inadequate domestic framework for fruitful engagement create re-integration 
dilemma. 
At the individual level, several dilemmas haunt the diaspora. While the moral 
argument for the individual professional to return home might be strong, the economic 
sacrifice required of him might be difficult to make. Patriotism also has economic 
underpinnings and is best served on a full stomach. Patriotism may not likely win in a duel 
between personal quest for economic wellbeing and national call to duty if it is anchored on a 
near-empty stomach and atmosphere of economic uncertainty. It might be a case of stretching 
patriotism too far to expect a Nigerian professional earning US $200,000 per annum to resign 
his appointment and accept a job offer in Nigeria that pays US $50,000 year. 
This problem came up between 2003 and 2007 during the regime of Obasanjo. 
President Obasanjo went to a considerable trouble to attract the duo of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-
Iweala of the World Bank and Chief Olu Adeniji of the United Nations into his cabinet as the 
Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs respectively. At that time Dr. Okonjo-Iweala 
grossed a yearly salary of US $262,200 at the World Bank and Chief Adeniji received a 
salary of US $186,252 per annum at the United Nations (Ajayi 2004). But the salary 
prescribed and approved for federal government Ministers as contained in the Certain 
Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances etc) Act No.6 of 2002 
was N794, 085.00, which was a far cry from the salaries of top-notch technocrats in 
international organisations. Appeal to patriotism seemed inadequate to attract these 
international technocrats. What Obasanjo did was that he negotiated their salaries slightly 
downward and circumvented the law by denominating their salaries in dollars and bringing in 
the UNDP to pay up the difference between the legally approved N794, 085.00 and their 
dollar-denominated salaries (La Olu 2011). Thus the federal government paid Dr. Okonjo-
Iweala US $241,000 (N38 million) per annum and Chief Adeniji US $120,000 (N17million) 
representing a sacrifice of US $15,200 and US $66,252 per annum respectively. However, 
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Nigeria’s Court of Appeal in a ruling on the matter, which was brought before it by the late 
Chief Gani Fawehinmi (SAN), not only declared dollar-denominated salaries in Nigeria 
illegal, but also ordered the duo of Dr. Okonjo Iweala and Chief Adeniji to refund the sum of 
N205 million naira representing excess money accruing from the salaries paid to them in 
dollars (Nwankwo 2007).  
Another example is the NUC’s LEADS. Since its commencement in 2007, the 
programme has only attracted 19 scholars. And yet millions of Nigerian scholars are all over 
the world. A major reason for the low response rate is locatable in the conditions of service. 
In 2007 when the programme started, it made provision for a stipend of US $1,750 per 
month. Currently, the stipend is US $2,500 per month 
(http://www.nuc.edu.ng/pages/pages.asp?id=54). Another reason could be the decrepit socio-
economic infrastructure and the security challenges in the country which tend to diminish life 
expectancy. Another reason could be the absence of insurance policy especially in the face of 
the peculiar dangers that confront returnee-diaspora as a result of the perception of criminals 
that they are loaded with hard currencies.  
Nigeria’s constitutional provision for dual nationality, which was originally 
contemplated to resolve citizenship dilemma, has exacerbated it. Most Nigerians appear 
ambivalent about where their primary citizenship obligation resides, the host country where 
they and their children are citizens or their home countries. Often, the country which the 
migrant has real connection with is the host country. The seeming indifference of  the 
Nigerian state to the plight of its citizens abroad and the attention and protection which their 
adopted countries showers on them have intensified the dilemma of many Nigerians in the 
diaspora and alienated them from answering the clarion call to contribute to Nigeria’s 
development. Eze (2007:37) paints a picture that underlies this dilemma thus:  
 
The “Nigerian Community” had organized a dinner for us. In 
the course of the evening, I got into a discussion with a 
“Nigerian”... . The discussion bordered on development issue 
and the role of big powers like the U S in it. As the discussion 
evolved, it became clear that we were not on the same wave 
length. This made me to ask him the question, “when you say 
we, who do you refer to? His answer was sharp and swift – 
America! 
 
The person under reference is a Nigerian by birth but mentally, he perceives himself 
primarily as an American and secondarily as a Nigerian. The Euro-American patriotism 
exhibited by Nigerians is understandable within the framework of proactive state actions to 
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protect them anywhere in the world. And their measured patriotism towards Nigeria is 
underpinned by its seeming ineptitude in meeting the expectations of its citizens. As Eze 
(2009:37) contends,   
If they [Nigerian-born American citizens] were to come to 
Nigeria and were to suffer some wrong, despite their Nigerian 
nationality, the USA seems to have the right of diplomatic 
protection but when the wrong is suffered in their country 
USA, Nigeria cannot come from her second position to displace 
the nationality of his first choice. 
 
This hierarchization of citizenship and the absence of a viable diaspora policy have 
combined to downgrade the relevance of Nigeria in the consciousness of its diasporans and 
deepen the ambivalence of reverse-migration. The impression which the national effort at 
diaspora integration creates is that Nigeria is selectively interested in the virile, healthy, 
young skilled professionals. There does not appear to be any contemplation of disadvantaged 
diasporans that could be assisted to return home. This is so because the mindset of policy 
makers and other stakeholders about diaspora is that they are a privileged class of affluent 
people. But this picture is utopian and unrepresentative of the reality. So many Nigerians in 
the affluent societies are trapped in the mire of destitution and are at a crossroads due medical 
afflictions or other gerontocratic factors.  
The turn of events in the lives of many Nigerians in the diaspora has circumscribed 
their capacity to relocate home. Apart from the constraints of naturalisation in their host 
countries and occupation of very high positions in corporate and government circles, most 
Nigerians are tied up nuptially with foreign wives. The cultural differences, the long period of 
domiciliation in the host country, the children’s educational programmes and the wives’ 
careers combine to act as restraining factors and deepen the migrant’s dilemma of returning 
to home country. Emeagwali’s personal experience, which appears to be representative of the 
experiences of many Nigerian diaspora captures the dilemma, “first, I have an American wife 
that has her academic career and an eight-year son that is in a good school.  It will be 
inconsiderate of me to disrupt my wife’s career and my son’s education [just to return home]” 
(http://emeagwali.com/interviews/brain-drain/education-in-africa-brain-drain-problem-
worldnet-africa-journal.html).  
So many Nigerians in the diaspora are underemployed, underutilized and frustrated, 
leading to what Adebayo (2010: 10) designated as “brain death”, a situation where a 
professional is forced into an employment that is not just below their qualifications but 
incongruent with their areas of specialisation.  Significant number of African professionals, 
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such as engineers, accountants, and lawyers, end up becoming de-skilled as they are trapped 
in such unskilled jobs as driving taxis or performing poorly paid manual jobs in working 
conditions that are far from congenial. According to Adebayo (2010:10), many Nigerians are 
in this category as “many of the taxi drivers who service the Atlanta airport hold higher 
degrees, and there could be Ph.D. degree holders among them”. The increasing high currency 
of migration in Nigeria and the generally erroneous and misleading perception that migration 
automatically translates to affluence have created the mentality of desperation amongst 
potential young migrants. The desperation often translates into taking very dangerous routes 
through the deserts, stowing away in ships, filing for asylum and presenting themselves as 
refugees. The optimisms of emigration have often turned to despondency as migrants 
confront reality. As Hagher (2011:128) asserts:  
 
Nigerians in the diaspora have often arrived in their host 
communities to face the grim reality of underemployment, 
unemployment, low wages, high cost of living, and in certain 
countries, they live among high risk crime environments. This 
kind of environment is not conducive to domestic stability. 
 
Most migrants never succeeded in surmounting these hurdles. In most cases, many 
migrants were swallowed by them with no escape route. In concrete terms, there are migrants 
who have reached points of no return: they are between the deep blue sea and the devil and 
therefore at a crossroads, unable to help themselves not to talk of contributing to home-
country development. Added to this is the crisis of family life and domestic instability. The 
pro-female laws in most developed countries and high divorce settlement costs have put 
many migrants in a very vulnerable financial position and foreclosed their capacity to answer 
national call to duty (Hagher 2011:128). 
The cultural freedom and permissiveness in many advanced economies, where many 
diasporans live, conflict with the cultural orientation and sensibilities in Nigeria. Many 
Nigerians in the diaspora have been sucked into the eddy of the so-called cultural freedom 
and trapped therein. Some have embraced hard drugs and such behavioural patterns and 
preferences that are considered anti-social in Nigeria but condoned and accepted in developed 
economies, such as homosexuality. As the Nigerian Minister of Information, Mr Labaran 
Maku opined, “between Europe, America and Africa there is a huge culture gap. Some of the 
things that are considered fundamental rights abroad also can be very offensive to African 
culture and tradition and to the way we live our lives here” (cited in Forbes 2011). While 
homosexuality in Nigeria is a “hush-hush” affair and practised in absolute secrecy, it is a 
292 
 
matter of human rights to be celebrated in developed economies (Hagher 2011:135). 
Recently, the Nigerian Senate passed a bill, which not only criminalises homosexuality in 
Nigeria, but also imposes stiff penalties ranging from 10-14-year jail terms for gays and their 
accomplices (Agbons 2011; Purefoy and Karimi 2011). Interestingly, the bill elicited Western 
condemnation and threats to stop aid to Nigeria. But the morality of the bill appears to 
outweigh the economic threats from Britain, US and other western countries as the Nigerian 
Senate rebuffed the Western pressure amidst popular support for the bill (Forbes 2011). 
Nigerians in the diaspora caught in this cultural crossroads are unlikely to contemplate 
reverse-migration. 
National programmes to attract the diaspora must factor the international mood in its 
formulation and implementation. Certain factors underpin the international trajectory of 
labour. Many developed countries’ migration policies are driven by demographic factors, 
challenges from emerging economies and the need to maintain their scientific and 
technological lead. High life expectancy and low birth rate have engendered inexorable 
march to gerontocratic societies in developed economies. Quoting the United Nations 
Population Division sources, Newland (2004:188) informs that Europe’s population declined 
from 728 million in 2000 to 726 million in 2003 and is projected to continue to decline to 632 
million in 2050. As the population is declining, it is also ageing. Although the world’s 
population is ageing, the developed countries’ populations age more rapidly because of low 
birth rate as a result of reduced fertility. According to United Nations (2010:31), “the median 
of the world population was, on average, 28.0 years in 2005, having climbed 4.3 years since 
1985. It is projected to climb further to 32.7 years in 2025 and 38.6 in 2050”. But the pace of 
ageing in the developed countries is very fast and has serious consequences economically, 
politically, socially and culturally. The combination of declining and ageing population 
created the urgent need for alternative sources of labour to cushion the effect of labour 
shortages and surging demand for services in many sectors especially healthcare and 










Table 5.5: Median Age for the World by Development Group, and Major Area, 
Selected Years 
Source: United Nations 2010:32 
 
 
Table 5.5 above shows the projected mean age across development regions. The 
population of the developed countries will continuously age as a result of several factors, 
especially high life expectancy, low fertility rate and low birth rate. Ageing population poses 
serious consequences to their development, hence their immigration policies which are aimed 
at addressing the shortfalls. Table 5.6 below shows countries whose populations are expected 
to decline. Africa is not included because of its youthful population, high fertility rate and 
high birth rate in the face of global efforts to reduce infant mortality. The traditional 
immigration countries like the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are not on 
the list because of their proactive immigration policies that aim to bridge manpower shortfalls 




Development Group or Major 
Area  
1950  1985  2005  2025  2050  
World 23.9  23.7  28.0  32.7  38.1  
More developed regions 29.0  33.2  38.6  43.0  45.7  
Less developed regions 21.5  20.9  25.5  30.8  36.9  
Least developed countries 19.5  17.7  19.0  22.1  27.9  
Other less developed countries 21.8  21.4  26.6  32.7  39.4  
Africa 19.1  17.4  19.0  22.1  28.0  
Asia 22.2  22.2  27.6  33.6  40.2  
Europe 29.7  33.7  38.9  44.2  47.3  
Latin America and the Caribbean 20.0  20.9  26.0  32.5  40.1  
Northern America 29.8  31.4  36.3  38.7  41.5  
Oceania 28.0  27.7  32.3  36.2  40.0  
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Table 5.6: Countries and Areas Whose Population is Expected to Decline between 
2000 and 2050 
 












































A stop-gap strategy adopted by these countries is the “wholesale importation” of 
skilled manpower to fill the shortfall. This international pull factor and other push factors in 
Nigeria’s domestic setting induced many skilled Nigerians to migrate to these countries. 
Thus, there is hardly any major economy that Nigerians are not present in appreciable 
numbers. And they are ubiquitous in all the sectors of these economies – medical, building, 
sports, business, engineering, maritime and information and communication technology 
among others. The relevance of the Nigerian diaspora and the dependence of their host 
countries on their professional competencies appear to be near-absolute in some countries. 
According to Adebayo (2010:10), “no hospital would function in Atlanta area, or in any part 
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of the United States for that matter, without Nigerian healthcare workers: doctors, nurses, 
nurse aids, therapists, laboratory technicians etc”. Therefore, if the Nigerian disapora were to 
leave most of their host countries, these countries’ development trajectory might be 
compromised to their disadvantage. Again, most Nigerians in the diaspora have worked their 
ways into top security positions in their host countries that their national allegiance is not 
only a matter of conjecture and therefore, doubtful but creates a dilemma of categorisation. 
The dilemmas that face the diaspora have multiplier effects on the individual, the 
home and host countries and the international community. The assumption that the diaspora 
is there for the home country to mop up and transport back to the country may not be entirely 
sustainable considering the fluidity of citizenship, the major interests that motorise and 
sustain migration, the customisation of diasporan skills and expertise in accordance with the 
host country’s needs and the high stakes attached to premium skills and expertise embodied 
in the diaspora in the international domain. Every effective policy on reverse-migration must 




5.6 SYNTHESISING THE LESSONS FROM OTHER CLIMES IN DIASPORA 
ENGAGEMENT IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The trend in the global stock of migrants has been upbeat in the last two decades. 
United Nations (2010:95) asserts, 
 
Over a half century, the growth rate of net international 
migrants has increased faster than world population. Migrants 
are coming from more countries and large streams are more 
common. Crises of one sort or another are producing a large 
though not necessarily dominant share of net international 
migrants. 
 
 Contemporary global stock is estimated at between 214 and 215.8 million (IOM 
2011:49; World Bank 2011:18). A most common feature of the global migrational trend is 
that every country is affected although differently. While some are net-recipients, others are 
net-exporters and yet others are caught in-between. For instance, there is concern in Canada 
about the brain drain of its human resources to the US, which De Voretz and Laryea 
(1998:23) describe as costly. This is despite that Canada is a traditional country of 
296 
 
immigration. The central preoccupation of states especially net-exporters of human capital is 
how to reverse the negative effects of brain drain associated with emigration. In other words, 
there have been conscious efforts on the part of countries with high incidence of emigration 
to cut their losses and bridge the negative effects of brain drain on their economies. Although 
the diaspora population of every country consists of an insignificant percentage, yet they 
constitute the core of the human capital vital for national development. This is so because 
emigration is driven by the national interest of destination countries and their immigration 
policies reflect it. And because the purpose of lowering the immigration barriers is to fill the 
shortfall in manpower needs of the countries, immigration policies of the developed countries 
tend to be selectively favourable to, and receptive of, certain categories of human capital. 
That is why traditional countries of immigration such as, Australia, U S, Canada and New 
Zealand are not included in the list of countries that would be plagued by manpower crisis in 
the face of ageing population. 
 
Table 5.7: Brain Gain Strategies 
 
The Common Patterns in Brain Gain 
Strategies 
 
The Uncommon Patterns in Brain Gain 
Strategies 
 
- a reasonable levels of economic and 
political stability preceded successful 
brain gain strategies;  
- earlier investments in quality 
education and its linkage with the 
labour market needs often the case 
behind the success stories on brain 
gain; 
- governments’ recognition of and 
commitment to the role of diasporas 
in the national development 
processes;  
- the creation of a conducive enabling 
environment and designing specific 
policy and financial incentive 
packages as part of the strategies;  
- Expatriate Knowledge Networks 
share similar organisational and 
administrative structures – website 
and databases of expertise;  
-  The knowledge networks have links 
with governmental structures and 
process; 
- concentration of critical mass of 
expatriates in a particular sector and 
location (Indian and Chinese 
communities in Silicon Valley);  
- strong transnational community living 
simultaneously in two countries 
(Taiwan);  
- promotion of university-industry 
collaboration in R&D (China);  
- Dual citizenship rights for Diaspora 
(Ghana) including the right to vote 
and the right to return and indefinite 
stay for Africans (including non-
Ghanaians) in the Diaspora; 
- Open membership in knowledge 
networks for nationals other than 
country of origin (South Africa and 
Colombia); Building on relative 
advantage (software sector in India, 
hardware and semiconductors in 
China and the shift to value added 
software products in Taiwan); 
- Evolving national plans and making 
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- Addressing national insecurity; 
- Creating conducive investment 
climate (tax holidays, exemption etc); 
- Dismantling the spectre of corruption; 
- The removal of bureaucratic red tape 
that complexify business transactions; 
- Instituting a diaspora day. 
 
the diaspora the cornerstone of its 
implementation; 
-   
 
Source: Adapted partly from UNDP 2007:3  
 
Table 5.7 shows the various common and uncommon strategies which countries have 
adopted in their brain gain quest. Peculiarities of countries in terms domestic settings 
determine which set of strategies to adopt. Although the ensemble of push factors in most 
labour-exporting countries exhibit similarities, the hierarchization of their impact factor 
yields the inherent dissimilarities among countries. Migration has come to assume an 
intercessory role in mitigating the effects of overpopulation in such countries as India, 
Philippines and Mexico. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 
high fertility rate plus a decline in infant mortality generated a large population growth in 
their working age bracket (http://www.rcmvs.org/documents/IOM_EMM/v2/v2s02_CM.pdf). 
So, migration has helped to reduce the likely pressure, which surplus working population 
would have mounted on these economies. But even at that, many developing countries have a 
surplus population that exceeds the capacities of their labour markets. For instance, the 
Philippines’ stock of trained healthcare providers is more than its domestic healthcare system 
can absorb. At 418 nurses per 100,000 population, Philippines has more than it actually needs 
and thus is a major exporter of trained nurses to countries experiencing shortages, especially 
Saudi Arabia and United States (http://www.rcmvs.org/documents/IOM_EMM/v2 
/v2s02_CM.pdf). Despite  the seeming mediatory role of migration in resolving sundry 
domestic contradictions in developing countries, brain drain, which is the necessary outcome 
of migration, has come to pose a significant challenge to their development prospects. This is 
so for three reasons: one, the manpower resources which emigrate are highly skilled 
professionals; two, development depends on this corps of professionals for conceptualisation, 
implementation and sustainability; and three, these human resources are unavailable to their 
home countries thus constraining the prospects of national development.  
The contemporary emphasis on human capital as the most important factor of 
production underpins the various policies formulated and implemented by countries to 
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reverse brain drain. For sure, human capital facilitates innovation and thus spawns higher 
productivity. As Bergheim (2005:5) contends: 
 
Equipping unskilled workers with ever more complicated and 
more expensive machines does not necessarily boost output. In 
fact, output might rise more significantly if the additional 
money were spent on more human capital instead of more 
physical capital. 
 
In other words, what boosts output is the availability of skilled professionals and their 
involvement in the production processes. Therefore, human capital availability underpins 
sustainable development and confers advantages to countries possessing it and disadvantages 
to countries dispossessed of it. From a developmental perspective, human capital flight, 
which is known as brain drain, represents a serious economic loss to developing countries as 
they lose their considerable investment in generating these human capabilities and skills and 
limit the prospects of their future development capabilities. Brain gain, which is an attempt to 
redirect migrant skills and knowledge to home country for development, consists of 
remittances. But there is a wide gulf between the place of remittances and human capabilities 
and skills in the development matrix. Thus, the volume of remittances, although good for the 
economy, does not necessarily translate into development unless it is accompanied by 
relevant skills and expertise. What states with large stock of migrants have done in recent 
times is the evolvement of roll-back strategies aimed at reversing the seemingly 
unidirectional flow of its skilled professionals. The brain gain programme has yielded 
different results to many states. Brain gain is underpinned by two basic assumptions: firstly, 
that the migrant to the industrialised country can play an important role in the development 
process of their home country through reverse-migration and/or transnational networks; and 
secondly, it is possible for the policy makers to initiate and amplify the positive development 
impulse of migrants by providing sufficient incentives even if they have been living abroad 
and not built any productive contact in their home country (Hunger 2002:2). 
Many states have been able to reap the fruits of its diaspora by adopting various 
strategies. The nature of the fruits reaped by states depended on the policy frameworks they 
adopted and their successes in implementing them. Table 5.8 shows the various institutional 






Table 5.8: Various Forms of Institutional Frameworks Adopted by Countries for Diaspora Engagement 
Countries with Ministry-
Level Diaspora Institutions 
Countries with Sub-ministry-Level 
Diaspora Institutions 
Countries with Other Diaspora 
Institutions at the National Level 
Countries with Diaspora 





Country Institution Country Institution Country Institution Country Institution Country Institution 
Armenia Ministry of 
Diaspora 
Albania Ministry of Foreign 


























Brazil Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Undersecretary 
General for Brazilian 
Communities Abroad 
China State Council, 
Overseas Chinese 


























Chile Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, General Office 
for Consular and 
Immigration Services; 
Office for Chileans 
Abroad 
Mexico National Council on 
Mexican 
Communities Abroad 






Mali High Council 
of Malians 
Abroad 






Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Vice Ministry 
for Salvadorans Abroad 
 






















Georgia State Ministry 
for Diaspora 
Issues 
Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ethiopian 
Expatriate Affairs 







  Peru Advisory 
Council 
Haiti Ministry of 
Haitians Living 
Abroad 
Mexico Secretariat of Foreign 
Affairs, Sub-secretariat 
for North America; 




Polonia and Polish 
Minorities Abroad 
    
India Ministry of 
Overseas Indian 
Affairs 






Office of the 
President, Office of 
the Diaspora 
    
Lebanon Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
and Emigrants 
Peru Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Undersecretary 
for Peruvians Abroad 






 (NNVS); Office of 
the Senior Special 
Assistant to the 
President on 
Diaspora Affairs; 





    








Department of Labor, 
Philippine Overseas 
Senegal Council of 
Senegalese Abroad 





Department of Foreign 




Serbia Ministry for 
Diaspora 
Romania Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Department for 
Relations with the 
Romanians Abroad 
      




Uruguay Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Directorate 
General for Consular 
Affairs and Expatriate 
Ties 
      





Senegal Ministry of foreign 
Affairs , Department of 
Senegalese Abroad 
      
Syria Ministry of 
Expatriates 
        





        
Yemen Ministry of 
Expatriate 
Affairs 
        




        
Senegal Ministry of 
Senegalese 
Abroad 
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Apart from the African Union’s recognition of the importance of the diaspora in 
national development, many African countries have made concrete efforts to mainstream 
their diaspora into their various development initiatives.  Many African countries have 
adopted various strategies to replicate some of the success stories of Mexico and some Asian 
countries in their domestic domain. About 24 African countries have deregulated citizenship 
bottlenecks by conferring dual nationality rights on their citizens to ease and facilitate their 
movement. 
 
Table 5.9: Dual Nationality Profile of African Countries 
 
Countries Permitting Dual 
Citizenship  








Burkina Faso  
Burundi  
Cape Verde  





















Congo Republic  
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Djibouti  























Sao Tome and Principe 
Sudan 
Source: Plaza and Ratha (2011:25)    
 
Many African countries collaborate with developed countries and international 
organisations to facilitate either reverse-migration or the involvement of their nationals in 
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their domestic development projects. At the fore front of international efforts to bridge the 
brain drain of African professionals are the United Nations Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN); IOM’s Migration 
for Development in Africa (MIDA) and the Global Commission on International Migration 
(GCIM). Several African countries, including Nigeria, have benefitted from these 
programmes. TOKTEN was initiated in 1977 as a means to counter the exodus of developing 
countries’ professionals. The strategy of TOKTEN consists of providing short-term advisory 
services in priority areas identified by host governments through the citizens of that country. 
TOKTEN was initially administered by the UNDP and the United Nations Fund for Science 
and technology for Development until 1994 when it came under the United Nations 
Volunteer programme 
(http://www.unv.org/fileadmin/docdb/pdf/2008/TOKTEN_factsheet_01.12.2008.pdf). The 
MIDA programme was endorsed by the then Organization for the African Unity (OAU) (now 
AU) at the 74th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and the 37th Ordinary Session 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU that took place from 5 to 7 
July 2001 and from 9 to 11 July 2001 respectively, in Lusaka, Zambia.  MIDA’s major 
objective consists of initiating capacity-building programmes, which help to mobilise 
competencies acquired by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa's development 
(http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/mida-africa/). The Global Commission on International 
Migration (GCIM) was the first-ever global panel to address international migration. It 
originated at the instigation of the UN Secretary-General by the Governments of Sweden, 
Switzerland, Brazil, the Philippines, Morocco and Egypt and was launched on December 9, 
2003 in Geneva. It was composed of 19 members with diverse perspectives and expertise, 
drawn from all regions with the mandate to provide the framework for the formulation of a 
coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration. The 
Commission finished its work on 31 December 2005. The GCIM initiative gave rise to the 
2006 UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development as well as the 2007 first 
Global Forum on Migration and Development, which has been held annually since then  
(Judge and De Plaen 2011:8; http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/gcim) 
There are also initiatives at the pan-African level, especially the Africa Recruit and 
African Diaspora Marketplace (ADM). Africa Recruit was jointly established by the 
Commonwealth Business Council and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) as an economic development programme of the Africa Union (AU) and launched 
in 2001. Its major objective revolves around exciting the interest of Africans abroad to take 
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up jobs in Africa as well as providing consultancy services to African governments (Judge 
and De Plaen 2011:8). The African Diaspora Marketplace (ADM) was established in 2009 by 
USAID and Western Union as a form of competition to create opportunity for US-based 
members of the African diaspora — either US citizens or legal permanent residents — to 
contribute to economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa through a business plans for 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Currently, 21 countries qualify for consideration of 
proposals. These countries include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Côte D’Ivoire, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. The 
ADM  is designed to  spur job creation, generate income, and produce goods and services, 
preferably in designated sectors,  by offering matching grants to African-diaspora member 
living in the United States (Newland 2010:16). In 2010, ADM awarded matching grants of up 
to US$100,000 to 14 winners to them help fund businesses in seven countries 
(http://diasporamarketplace.org/grantee-websites). 
Many African countries have interfaced domestic efforts with bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with developed countries. The idea is to facilitate reverse-migration 
of its diaspora for national development. A notable example is Mali. Malians have strong 
migratory tendencies. This has been attributed to the central position of Mali, coupled with its 
history and the permeability of borders (http://www.migration4development.org 
/content/mali-0).  As a matter of fact, Mali’s geographic disadvantage made it prone to 
migration. Apart from being landlocked, it is drought-prone and therefore, suffers all 
associated disadvantages. The migrant stock of Malians in 2010 was 1.012 million people 
representing between 7 .6 and 9.0 percent of its 13 million population.  Findley (2004) 
explains the high rate of emigration from Mali thus: 
 
Migration is an apt response to the cyclical swings of poverty 
in this region. Migrants leave and work elsewhere during the 
dry season, returning for the rainy season or when times 
improve. In the meantime, they send money to their families in 
Mali to close the production-consumption gap. This migration 
response to cyclical downswings and seasonal food and cash 
shortages has been a part of the region's way of life for at least 
the last two centuries. It is especially the men of this region 





The Malian government has been making serious efforts to mainstream its diaspora 
into national development. Apart from the establishment of a full-fledged Ministry to address 
diaspora and African integration issues, the Malian government has been engaging the 
diaspora and collaborating with them through the High Council of Mali to evolve appropriate 
mechanisms, beyond remittances, for their involvement in nation-building.  In 2003, the first 
ever Malian conference with the diaspora was held in Bamako. The conference which had 
over 200 delegates was convened to address the involvement of foreign-based Malians 
abroad in the country’s development process, the promotion and protection of Malian 
executives working in international organisations and the mobilisation of Malian 
intelligentsia (Panapress 2003). Mali collaborates with France, which is the top destination 
country of Malians among Western countries, and other civil society organisations through 
joint initiatives and programmes to facilitate the reverse-migration of its diaspora. The two 
countries established a ministerial-level forum to address migration issues. The forum which 
is called the Mali-France Consultation on Migration deals with three issues, namely:  the 
integration of Malians who want to remain in France; co-management of migration flows; 
and, cooperative development in emigration areas of Mali (Scheindlin 2003:13).  
Ghana has also evolved robust diasporan policies to address its brain drain problem. 
In 2001, the Ghanaian government organised the first-ever Homecoming Summit in Accra. 
The summit was aimed at organising and mobilising the economic might of the Ghanaian 
Diaspora for national development. The Ghanaian government established the Non-Resident 
Ghanaians Secretariat (NRGS) in May 2003 to promote links with Ghana and its diaspora in 
order to mainstream them into national development. In addition, the Ghanaian government 
has also instituted such other domestic programmes as: dual citizenship rights to Ghanaians 
living abroad as an encouragement for them to return home freely; the establishment of the 
Ministry of Diaspora Affairs; the setting up of the Ghana Technology Park and the 
enfranchisement of its diaspora to vote in Ghanaian national elections and extension lifetime 
visa to Africans and people of African descent from all parts of the world UNDP 2007:15; 
Africa Diaspora Policy Centre 2011:8). As part of the measures to address brain drain in the 
health sector former President John Kufour liaised with the Council of Ghana College of 
Physicians and Surgeons and introduced measures aimed at improving the working 
conditions in the health sector, including the provision of cars to health sector workers (Black 
et al 2006:37).  
Internationally, a lot of countries have recorded significant success in tapping from 
the wealth of their diaspora, in terms of knowledge, experience, expertise and financial 
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resources, for national development. Such countries as China, India, Taiwan, the Philippines 
and Mexico have demonstrably initiated and implemented unique programmes that converted 
their brain drain to brain gain.  
China has benefitted immensely from its diaspora, both those domiciled in the 
continent and those in the industrialised Western countries. According to Balaam and Veseth 
(2005:370): 
The Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is a notable 
decentralised structure that in some ways dominates the 
economies in the region far more than do big-name 
multinational corporations. This economic diaspora is made up 
of thousands of Chinese-owned businesses linked by formal or 
informal family and cultural ties.   
 
The brain gain process is not a one-sided affair. It involves the diaspora, the home 
country’s government, international community and other stakeholders. But the critical actors 
that are indispensable in motorising it are the diaspora and the home-country government. 
Most countries that have registered success in mainstreaming their dispora into national 
development evolved conscious policies and followed them through. The success of China in 
diaspora integration is anchored on the active collaboration of the Chinese diaspora and 
Chinese government. It is estimated that as much as 15 percent of foreign investment in 
China today originates from the diaspora and that nearly all the country’s high-tech 
companies listed on NASDAQ were founded by the returnee Chinese diaspora (Balaam and 
Veseth 2005:371; UNDP 2007:9). The Chinese diaspora played various roles in national 
development in line with prevailing economic system and freedom in China. According to 
Balaam and Veseth (2005:371):  
 
During the period of strong communist control of the Chinese 
economy, the focus of the diaspora network was on creating 
connections and opportunities for Chinese migrants outside of 
mainland China. As China has adopted more market-based 
economic reforms, however, a reverse flow of funds has been 
channelled through the diaspora network. 
 
The Chinese government at all levels – national, provincial and municipal – played 
active roles by pursuing several policies: one, it encouraged overseas scholars to return to 
China. Between 1978 and 2002, approximately 580,000 students and scholars travelled 
abroad for higher studies. Out of this number, only 160,000, mainly government-sponsored 
visiting scholars, returned. Government’s persistent efforts led to an increase in the number 
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of returnees, which rose from 13 percent in the 1990s to 45 percent between 2001 and 2002 
(UNDP 2007:9); two, the Chinese government began the process of creating a favourable 
political climate that is more open and responsive than in the past and , therefore, amenable to 
the returning diaspora. Three, it began funding the universities and government-owned 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) to target returnees. Four, it adopted a plethora of 
programmes to lure scientists and technologists back and to help them engage in researches. 
It introduced such programmes as: the National 863 programme, the 100 Talents’ Programme 
(Bairen Jihua) and so on. Five, the Chinese government created a bouquet of incentives, not 
just to lure them home but also to keep them at home. According to UNDP (2007:9): 
 
Most awardees get new housing, a new laboratory, imported 
equipment, and a research team composed of graduate students 
and talented research staff, who may have home-grown Ph.D. 
These returnees immediately become Full Professors, 
regardless of their status overseas. The focus of these programs 
is cutting edge, scientific sectors, such as biotechnology, 
nanno-technology, energy efficiency, environmental protection, 
and material sciences. 
 
Apart from these specialised privileges for scientists and researchers, the entire 
country has been converted to an endless stretch of incentives, as provincial and municipal 
governments struggle amongst themselves to attract the returning diasporas. The preferences 
they grant include: housing discounts, imported cars, computers, free office or factory floor 
space, jobs for wives and special schools for their children, and residence permits for foreign 
passport holders, which allows them easy movement without having to relinquish their 
foreign citizenship. Six, the Chinese government made the returning Chinese diaspora the 
pivot of China’s prestigious scientific projects, such as space programme and human genome 
mapping (UNDP 2007:9). 
India is another country whose diaspora has made significant impact on its drive 
towards industrialisation and development, particularly in the information technology (IT) 
field. This was possible because of the relative prosperity of Indians around the world. As 
Pandey et al (2006):71) aver,  
 
The Indian diaspora constitutes an important and unique force 
in the world economy. As a result of centuries of migration, 
more than 20 million people of Indian origin live in 70 
countries. ...  The earnings of the 20-million-strong Indian 
diaspora are equivalent to about two-thirds of the gross 
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domestic product (GDP) of India, with a population of more 
than 1 billion people. 
The main engine of Indian diaspora’s involvement in their country’s development is 
the software sector of the IT field. This was not out of place as more than 300,000 people of 
Indian origin work in the IT sector in the United States and facilitated not less than 15 percent 
of IT start-ups. Also, nearly 40 percent of Silicon Valley start-ups in the 1990s had at least 
one founder of Indian origin (Pandey et al 2006:74, 76). India’s software sector generated a 
revenue of US$5.7 billion in 1999/2000 and it was projected that by 2008, the figure would 
reach US$87 billion with the creation of 2 million additional jobs (UNDP 2007:9). Actually, 
the total revenue for India’s IT industry in 2008/09 was US$73.4 billion 
(http://ict4dblog.wordpress.com/2010/01/05/indian-it-sector-statistics-1980-2009-time-series-
data/).  Indian government’s proactive policies drove the success of the diasporan 
involvement in the country’s brain gain project. One, the government’s national policy and 
investment strategy anchored on domestic economic reforms opened the economy. Two, the 
government identified five key sectors of the Indian economy which included the IT field as 
the drivers of its economic development programme. Three, it promoted open market 
economy that favoured liberalisation, tax and import liberalisation for the software sector. 
Four, it made extensive investment into technical and educational infrastructure. The Indian 
diaspora responded to the government’s efforts by returning home and investing in the 
country. This is exemplified by the preponderance of the diaspora in the IT field. For 
example, 19 out of 20 top software companies in India were set up by and/or have non-
resident Indians in their top management today (UNDP 2007:8). 
Taiwan paints another picture of success in terms of diaspora engagement in national 
development. Government policies were at the forefront of converting Taiwanese brain drain 
into brain gain. Government’s economic policy that produced economic growth and relative 
political stability acted as the first principle that underpinned the reverse-migration of 
Taiwanese diaspora. The trend of brain drain in Taiwan was as pernicious as it is in Nigeria, 
and indeed other African countries. According to O’Neil (2003), 
 
During the 1970s, and 1980s, an estimated 20 percent of 
Taiwanese college graduates went abroad for advanced study, 
and few of them returned. At the peak of the brain drain in 
1979, only eight percent of the students who studied abroad 




The strategies which the Taiwanese government adopted included: one, the 
subsidisation of education only up to the level actually demanded by the national economy. 
What this implied was that Taiwanese government focused on providing strong universal 
basic education and vocational programmes as demanded by the domestic labour market and 
left out the subsidisation of advanced education whose products ended up in the advanced 
countries in search of higher pay. This programme produced medium-skilled manpower, 
which was relevant to Taiwan’s booming manufacturing industry. And with relatively 
comfortable, rising wages and secure jobs, such workers had fewer incentives to emigrate 
(O’Neil 2003). Two, the Taiwanese government recognised the potentials of migrants as a 
veritable resource. The government used migrant expertise in formulating government 
policies in specialised fields. Three, the government set up the National Youth Council in the 
early 1970s. The tasks of the Council included: connecting Taiwanese businesses with skilled 
migrants, tracking migrants in a database, advertising jobs overseas and providing travel 
subsidies and temporary job placements to potential returnees. Four, the government used the 
National Science Council and the Ministry of Education to recruit thousands of migrants as 
professors and visiting lecturers for the country’s growing universities (O’Neil 2003). Five, 
the Taiwanese government set up the Hinschu Science-based Industrial Park which was a 
replication of the dense concentration of creative expertise found in Silicone Valley. O’Neil 
(2003) underscores the pivotal role of the park in driving the Taiwanese industrialisation 
thus: 
 
The park successfully attracted both high-tech companies and 
returning migrants. Companies in the park employed 102,000 
people and generated $28 billion in sales in 2000. Although 
only 4,108 returned migrants worked in the park that year, 113 
of the park’s 289 companies were started by US-educated 
Taiwanese, and 478 of the returnees hold Ph.Ds, indicating that 
the returned migrants are better educated than the average 
worker in the park and wields influence disproportionate to 
their numbers. ... The park is the center of Taiwan’s rapidly 
expanding research and development sector and a major 
contributor to the country’s strong economic growth. 
 
The Philippines has a long history of migration. Filipino migrants worked in major 
countries of the world from where they remit billions of dollars to their home country 
annually. For a long time, the Philippines has consistently made the top 10 remittance-
receiving countries’ list. Although the World Bank sources put the number of Filipino 
migrants at 4.3 million, Filipino authorities estimate that not less than 8 million Filipinos are 
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in the diaspora (World Bank 2011:205; Rosario 2011; Camroux 2008:3). The Filipino policy 
on emigration is a departure from most states. It conceives emigration from a positive 
perspective, as a safety net to cushion the incapacity of the Filipino economy to absorb the 
teeming number of unemployed people. Even though systematic emigration in the Philippines 
started in 1906 when the first batch of Filipinos arrived in Honolulu to work in the local 
plantations, it was in the 1970s following global economic crisis engendered by oil prices, 
that the Philippines launched a more structured and organised approach to labour migration, 
resulting in millions of Filipinos leaving the country and residing abroad (Baggio 2008:206). 
Specifically, the Philippines has bureaucratic bodies that oversee different categories 
of employment matters as they affect Filipino migrants and prospective migrants. They 
include: the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); the Overseas 
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA); the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), 
and the Office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers Affairs (OUMWA). OWWA, 
established under the Department of Labour and Employment, deals with problems 
associated with temporary workers abroad, including organising pre-departure orientation 
seminars, repatriation issues and processing of new business loans. Also, POEA functions as 
manager of the overseas employment programme and sole authority regulating temporary 
overseas employment, including illegal recruitment by agencies. In 1995, the government set 
up the office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers’ Affairs under the Department of 
Foreign Affairs to focus on the protection of migrant workers through providing legal advice 
and judicial support to distressed workers (Baggio 2006:216; Agunias 2009). The CFO is 
mandated to assist the executive and legislative arms in the formulation of national migration 
policies; develop and implement programmes that will promote the interest and well-being of 
Filipinos abroad; serve as a forum for preserving and enhancing the social, economic and 
cultural ties of Filipinos abroad and provide liaison services to Filipinos residing outside the 
Philippines among others (The Philippines 1980). The Commission is also actively promoting 
new policies aimed at mobilising and tapping the potentials of overseas Filipinos under 
Lingkod sa kapwa Pilipino or LINKAPIL (Service to Fellow Filipinos). 
Despite the massive emigration of Filipinos and attendant billions in remittances, 
different indicators of development do not show improved productivity (Baggio 2006:213). 
The 2011 estimates put the Philippines-bound remittances at US$23 billion (Mohapatra et al 
2011:3). The Philippines has recently set in motion processes to overhaul its framework for 
diaspora engagement. It organised the first global summit of Filipinos in the diaspora 
between 27 and 29 September 2011. The aims of the summit were two-pronged: to evolve a 
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common ground for diaspora engagement in national development outside the traditional 
framework of remittance receipts. The summit envisaged a more direct involvement of the 
diaspora in investing in the Philippines, engaging in diaspora philanthropy, pursuing 
technology transfer, championing cultural and educational exchanges, facilitating legal 
assistance to distressed overseas Filipinos and evolving tourism initiatives. Two, to delineate 
the extent of the Filipino government’s responsibility, especially in erecting the necessary 
frameworks to facilitate seamless collaboration between with the diaspora and the 
government. In his address during the summit, the Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Albert de Rosario reminded the 700 Filipino diaspora from over 40 countries that the 
Philippines government was still committed to the third pillar of its foreign policy which 
deals with the promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipinos in other 
countries and decidedly averred that the summit offered “an ideal opportunity not only to take 
stock of current actions but to consult on how and where to move forward” (Rosario 2011). 
Other notable examples of countries that have leveraged the diaspora in their national 
development grid include Mexico, Columbia, Argentina and South Africa among others. The 
uniqueness of the Mexican diaspora is its narrow geographic spread. The Mexican diaspora is 
mainly concentrated in the United States. Despite its narrow diaspora spread, Mexico is an 
important migrant country considering the number of its migrant stock and the volume of its 
remittance portfolio. Mexico is among the top 10 remittance-receiving countries as it netted 
an estimated US$24 billion in 2011 (Mohapatra et al 2011:3). The World Bank sources put 
the Mexican diaspora stock at about 12 million people (World Bank 2011:178). The Mexican 
government at all levels evolved innovative ways of mainstreaming the enormous remittance 
inflows into productive use. As Torres and Kuznetsov (2006:101) narrate,  
 
Since the early 1990s, some state governments in Mexico have 
recognised migrants’ potential and promoted new forms of 
public-private collaboration to increase the flows of community 
remittances and migrants’ savings. These governments have 
recognized the potential to stimulate these flows through local 
policies and instruments. 
 
Two notable examples of Mexican states that have forged a successful public-private 
collaboration are Guanajuato and Zacatecas who introduced Mi Communidad (My 
Community) and Tres Por Uno (Three for One) respectively. Guanajuato’s Mi Communidad 
seeks to attract migrants’ savings to maquiladoras dealing in garments and other textile 
products. Through such savings, 15 maquiladoras generating 500 permanent jobs were set 
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up. A maquiladora is a manufacturing operation that engages in assembling, processing, 
manufacturing and/or sale of designated products for profit. Zacatecas’ programme 
channelled community remittances to small-scale infrastructure development, such that US$1 
contributed by migrants was matched by US$1-3 from the federal government and US$1 
from state and municipal governments respectively (Torres and Kuznetsov (2006:102). Other 
government initiatives include: the Paisano Programme, which encourages reverse-migration 
through the improvement of border and custom services, and the Program for Mexican 
Communities Living Abroad (PCMLA), which also channels remittances to local 
development projects. 
There are a lot lessons that Nigeria could learn from the diverse experiences of other 
countries that have mitigated the devastating impact of brain drain. Learning these lessons 
and mainstreaming them into its policy framework appears easy since Nigeria has already 
recognised the relevance of its diaspora in its development framework and has also set up 


























SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the brain drain phenomenon and National development in 
Nigeria. We were basically concerned with the implications of brain drain to Nigeria’s 
development efforts considering that the Nigerian diaspora is composed of the most virile, 
educated and highly-skilled segment of its manpower formation, which is generally 
considered indispensable for national development. To be able to raise relevant questions 
necessary to address the vital concerns of our research area, we first of all took a detailed 
look at the state of inquiry on this subject matter and thereafter distilled three core concerns 
which we specifically formulated in hypothetical terms. 
The entire effort of this study was to empirically answer the research questions as 
couched in our hypotheses. The questions that were raised in this study and which served as 
the radar that directed the research efforts were as follows: 
1) Does the sustained depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals 
through brain drain necessarily lead to inefficient healthcare delivery?  
2) Have domestic investment incentives boosted diaspora-led investments in the 
Nigerian economy? 
3) Is the tighter regulation of the global regime of intellectual property rights 
inhibitive of diaspora-led industrial investments towards technology transfer? 
The above questions set the parameters for the research as the hypotheses were 
derived from them. Thus our hypotheses were: 
1) The sustained depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals through 
brain drain leads to inefficient healthcare delivery. 
2) Domestic investment incentives tend to boost diaspora-led investments in the 
Nigerian economy 
3) The tighter regulation of the global regime of intellectual property rights is 
inhibitive of diaspora-led industrial investments towards technology transfer. 
To be able to adequately address these hypotheses in terms of their validation or 
otherwise we adopted One-Group Time Series Research Design. This design enabled us to 
look at our variables and the analytic units of our study in such a way that compensated for 
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the absence of control group. The study was divided into five chapters. Chapter one was 
devoted to setting out the central problematique of the study as well as the research 
procedures. The relevant literature were reviewed and the theoretical framework set out. The 
study anchored its investigation on public choice and modern world system theories, which 
were synthesised from the political economy theoretical framework. The utilitarian value of 
this synthesis lay in their reinforcing applicability in accounting for the domestic and 
international forces that motorise brain drain out of Nigeria. The public choice theory locates 
the domestic impetus to brain drain in the myriad public policy choices of successive regime. 
Most of these policy choices created systemic contradictions that led to economic crisis, 
political instability and other socio-cultural rigidities that induced brain drain. The modern 
world system theory accounted for the international angle to brain drain. It anchored its 
analysis on the delineation of the modern capitalist world order and the complex system of 
interactions that tended to spawn global inequality. The inequality in the system creates the 
conditions that conduce well with migration as individuals, or more technically correct, 
labour power seeks market value for its services as it becomes marketised. 
Chapter two addressed issues pertaining to the political economy of migration, human 
capital expropriation and brain drain in Nigeria. We set out to evaluate the Euro-American 
contention that brain drain was a recent phenomenon. Our evaluation exposed the 
parochialism of this view and held that its shortcoming inhered from the methodological 
inexactitude of not properly contextualising it within historical epochs and the predominant 
forces of production. It examined the push and pull factors that underpin brain drain. 
Chapter three was also preoccupied with the impact assessment of brain drain on 
selected sectors of the Nigerian economy. This chapter addressed the three hypotheses of the 
study, to wit: one, whether sustained depletion of the stock of Nigeria’s health professionals 
led to inefficient healthcare delivery. It concluded in the affirmative after empirically 
examining the health sector and the worsening health indices. The rival explanation which 
could have come from underfunding, infrastructural inadequacies and so on were empirically 
studied and were found to have been the cause. We found that the depletion of health 
professionals through brain drain accounted for the inefficient healthcare delivery in Nigeria 
as brain drain not only eroded the doctor-population ration necessary for efficient healthcare 
delivery but the capacity for the production of qualified health professionals as attested by 
data on health manpower turn-out; two, whether domestic investment incentives tended to 
boost diaspora-led investments in the Nigerian economy. The study found that since 2002 
when the Nigerian government recognised the diaspora as a veritable source of foreign 
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capital infusion as well as a source of FDI inflows into the Nigeria economy, the FDI 
portfolio has appreciated. A component of such foreign capital inflow, remittances, had 
consistently bludgeoned in leaps and bounds with positive effects within the economy. The 
study found that indeed positive domestic incentives, an offshoot of domestic reforms under 
the auspices of NEEDS, tended to boost diaspora-led investments; three, if all the positivities 
attached to brain drain in terms of benefits to home country were feasible. It narrowed its 
inquiry on how IPRs have facilitated or impeded diaspora-led industrialisation through the 
instrumentality of technology transfer. It looked at the domestic framework for technology 
transfer and denoted the adequacy of these frameworks to actually facilitate technology 
transfer. The study evaluated the regime of IPRs and its restrictive provisions and found it 
inhibitive of diaspora-led industrialisation via technology transfer. The implication of this is 
that it has debunked the view that the Nigerian diaspora constituted a reserve army for the 
country’s development. 
Chapter four evaluated policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for the integration of 
diaspora resources in Nigeria. Although there are perceptible government efforts to harness the 
Nigerian diaspora and mainstream them into national development, there is absence of a master plan 
to anchor it. The power to address migration and diaspora issues are scattered in various government 
institutions thus creating duplication of efforts and unnecessary rivalry. What the Nigerian 
government has done so far, with regard to its diaspora and their engagement in national development, 
was the appointment of some of them into the government. There are so many other areas that the 
Nigerian diaspora could be relevant in national development but these areas have not been properly 
articulated.  
Chapter five encapsulated the summary, conclusion, major findings and 
recommendations for the advantageous harnessing of the diaspora for meaningful national 
development. 
From the findings of this work it could be concluded that out-migration is not 
completely negative as it also has positive effects on the economy. But a juxtaposition of the 
effects of out-migration, in terms of brain drain, shows that its negative effects far outweigh 
its positive contributions to the Nigerian economy. Brain drain constitutes capital flight in 
concrete terms as various highly-skilled Nigerians who were trained at enormous cost to the 
economy transferred their skills to the continued development of the developed countries and 
continued underdevelopment of their country. It was established in the course of this study 
that a skilled African makes enormous contributions to his host country and spends his 
earnings there; in contrast, he remits a portion of his earnings which is considered 
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insignificant. IFAD (2007: 8) puts the annual average remittances per migrant at US$1,177. 
While the perennial increment in the volume of remittances could be an indication of 
improved earnings or increased tendency to remit money home or both, the expansion in the 
population of Nigerian émigrés could be a more plausible explanation. Of course, if the 
average migrant were to remain in Nigeria, he would have made more contributions than his 
average remittances could make. But there is a caveat: provided the modern world system is 
reorganised to remove the debilitating inequality that characterise it. 
The modern world system as presently constituted provides the fodder that feeds and 
sustains migratory pressures. Essentially, the brain drain phenomenon has dual interpretations 
- to the individual and to the state - that are mutually exclusive. It is this duality in the 
interpretation of brain drain that imbued it with associated conceptual confusion. At the 
individual level, out-migration constitutes a leeway to economic freedom and self-
actualisation. To the individual therefore, out-migration means brain utilisation with adequate 
compensatory package. But to the state emigration constitutes a valid erosion of the vital 
ingredients of governance and development. The root of the dilemma that confronts the state 
and the individual is locatable in the modern world system that consigns Nigeria (and 
countries designated as developing countries) to the periphery of the world system and the 
seemingly cyclic war for change and maintenance of the status quo.  
The fact which this study established is that the brain drain is consistent with the 
overall stratagem of capitalist exploitation. The brain drain fits into the epochal schema of 
exploitation and self-renewal of capitalism. As our study established, the core countries 
poached the vital health professionals of Nigeria and other African countries to provide better 
health services in their domain even while paying lip-service to health crisis in the country 
and the continent. And to ensure that the exposure of Nigerian and African professionals to 
their knowledge base was not expropriated and thus pave the way for economic growth and 
development likely to lead to their exit from the periphery, the core countries, under the 
auspices of WTO initiated the IPRs. The IPRs thus constituted an effective bulwark against 
piecemeal transfer of technology through the diaspora. In the main, the brain drain has taken 
far, far more than it can ever give back and constitutes the Iron Gate that must be dismantled 







7.2 MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
This study made several findings about the impact of brain drain on Nigeria’s 
development. These include: 
 
1) Brain drain is a major disincentive to Nigeria’s national development. Apart from the 
loss of national investment in human resource development through the subsidization 
of education by the various levels of government, brain drain has constrained the 
capacity for the expansion of national development projects. 
 
2) The rate of emigration of Nigeria’s highly-skilled professionals, especially in the 
health sector far outstrips the rate of replacement, which deepens the manpower crisis 
in the sector. The production capacity of Nigeria’s medical schools, which are 
plagued by infrastructural challenges, inadequate funding and lack of relevant 
teaching personnel, has been constant while the demand for medical manpower across 
the globe has been on the increase. There is double standard within the international 
arena as the developed countries condemn the mass emigration of medical personnel 
in the face of critical shortages in the sector, in one breath, and in another breath, 
introduce policies to harness medical manpower from Nigeria and other countries. 
 
3) The data of Nigerian medical doctors and other health professionals are grossly 
unreliable as a policy tool. The MDCN’s register of doctors is not regularly pruned 
and updated to determine the actual number of doctors in Nigeria. Thus, the list is 
inclusive of those who have died, emigrated out of the country as well as those that 
have emigrated out of the profession. Also, there is no indication in the medical 
register whether those who are considered as being in good standing (that is, doctors 
that have paid their annual practising fees are still actively in the medical profession, 
practising within the country or emigrated abroad. The same scenario plays itself out 
in other medical fields. Thus, the data bandied as constituting the number of Nigerian 
doctors is grossly exaggerated and therefore misleading as policy-making 
information. 
 
4)  There are many institutions and stakeholders jostling for a place in migration 
management in Nigeria. This has led to duplication of efforts and tendency for 
318 
 
unnecessary scheming for ascendancy amongst government institutions. There is 
ambivalence and policy inconsistency in government circles. For instance, the 
Nigerian government moved NIDO from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
presidency and also moved the coordination of the National Policy on Migration from 
the Office of the Special Assistant to the President on Diaspora Matters to NCFR. All 
these policy inconsistencies and ambivalence introduce unnecessary politics. 
 
5) Many Nigerians in the diaspora are trapped abroad as a result of crisis of under-
achievement. Many of them are faced with such dilemmas as under-employed and 
unemployed despite their relative academic achievements. Some have become 
destitues as a result of old age and drug addiction. The major dilemma of returning 
home is lack of operational base (accommodation). 
 
6) Since 2002 when the federal government signified its interest to leverage the diaspora 
into national development, there is no holistic policy framework detailing how this 
could be achieved. The migration arena is littered with piecemeal, disparate, ad hoc 
and uncoordinated strategies. Lack of a national policy on migration and strategies for 
diaspora integration has sidelined and undermined their purposive mainstreaming in 
national development. 
 
7) There is no reliable data about the number of Nigerians in the diaspora as well as their 
professional affiliations. Every thing connected to migration and diaspora issues are 
based on estimates and conjectures that lack universal validity. Every group, ranging 
from scholars to national and international institutions, bandies various figures that 
lack the baseline for generalizability as they are often arbitrarily arrived at. Despite 
the launch and establishment of the Global Database of Nigerians in Diaspora 
(GDND) since the 21st of February 2009, the databank is yet to be consolidated as it 
is bedeviled by several challenges ranging from policy inconsistencies and policy 
reversals to funding.  
 
8) Many developed countries rely on the “importation” of human resources from Nigeria 
and elsewhere to augment the manpower crisis that hangs over them like the Sword of 
Damocles. The combination of such factors as national affluence and prosperity, high 
life expectancy, fertility and birth-rate, and good health has led to ageing population 
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in many developed countries. Therefore, unless the manpower requirements of these 
developed countries are adequately augmented through the attraction of human capital 
from Nigeria and other countries, many of them will be enveloped in manpower crisis 
that will affect their position and relevance in the global world order. Thus, despite 
the economic contradictions in Nigeria and other developing countries, the superiority 
of the developed economies, especially in terms of opportunities and return on labour 
power, will serve as superior inducement for emigration among highly-skilled 
personnel. 
 
9) Several countries such as China, Taiwan, India, the Philippines and Mexico among 
others have leveraged their diaspora into national development by putting in place 
relevant policies and necessary infrastructures. In most of these countries, their 
diaspora drive their FDI, technology development and generation of foreign 
exchange. This is often achieved through the floatation of specialised diaspora 
financial instrument. 
 
10) Nigeria occupies a position on the world’s top-ten remittance-receiving countries’ 
chart. Despite the billions of dollars that are annually remitted by the Nigerian 
diaspora, these remittances have no discernible macroeconomic impact on the 
economy. The Nigerian state has no operational policy framework or innovative 
strategy to raise money from the diaspora. So, despite the consistent high volume of 
remittances to Nigeria, remittances have only served subsistence purposes. In 
contrast, so many countries in the top-ten remittance-receiving bracket have converted 
remittances into tools for national development. 
 
11)  There appears to be extreme personalisation of policies on migration and diaspora 
issues. The interest of government in harnessing Nigerian diaspora and mainstreaming 
them into national development appeared to be dictated by the personal preferences of 
Nigerian leaders. Till today, there is no operational national policy to guide policy 
formulation and implementation in the area of diaspora engagement. 
 
12) The major push factors in the Nigerian state, which birthed the conditions for 
emigration and brain drain, have not been substantially addressed. The Nigerian 
economy is still in the woods. The political arena is still characterised by arbitrariness 
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and instability. The country is still enveloped in insecurity, which emanates from 
religious bigotry, political intolerance, and ethnic chauvinism. 
 
13) The dual nationality policy of Nigeria has created certain dilemmas for the Nigerian 
diaspora. There is conflict of nationality, which also affects the direction of 
patriotism. The inefficiency, corruption and manifest nonchalance associated with 
Nigerian missions abroad have created crisis of trust between them and the diaspora. 
 
14) Lack of databank on the actual number of Nigerians in the diaspora is as a result of 
certain domestic constraints namely, absence of a specialised institution handling 
migration and diaspora issues; low ICT capability, politicisation of diaspora issues 
and lack of funds.  
 
15) Despite the shift from the use of informal to formal channels by Nigerian diaspora to 
effect remittances as well as institutional improvement in the means of remitting 
money to the country, more still needs to be done.  The Nigerian remittance corridors 
are characterised by monopoly control by the Western Union and Money Gram, 
exclusive agreement between these MTOs and agent-banks, and high transaction 
costs.    
 
16) The traditional inefficiency of Nigerian Missions abroad alienated the diaspora from 
them. These Missions ought to have been proactive in designing strategies to address 
diaspora issues as well as being the repositories of data on Nigerian diaspora but  they 
have not lived up to this expectation. 
 
17) There is no national honour awards dedicated to the Nigerian diaspora community to 






 The brain drain is undoubtedly an albatross that compromises the possibility of 
development in Nigeria. Apart from the physical relocation of highly skilled professionals 
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and the attendant loss of their immediate contributions to national development, national 
capacity is threatened in terms “restocking capabilities”. Based on our major findings we 
prescribe as follows: 
 
1) The brain drain is human capital flight, which must be halted. Nigeria’s manpower 
resources which emigrated were subsidised by government. In Nigeria, there is no full 
tuition in public schools from the primary to the tertiary levels. For this reason, brain 
drain has been described as the subsidisation of other countries’ economies by 
Nigeria. Nigeria should remodel its educational sector to meet its peculiar needs. 
Nigeria should subsidise education to the extent of its immediate needs and build 
remunerative packages to keep this crop of trained personnel. Taiwan used this 
strategy to keep its necessary manpower at home.  
 
2) In this era of “no subsidy”, labour-receiving countries must be made to pay for the use 
of highly–skilled professionals by extrapolating and adopting brain gains tax. Nigeria 
should adopt sports model in relation to brain drain of its professionals. This model 
will allow the Nigerian government to negotiate transfer fees with countries desiring 
certain skilled Nigerians and for these professionals to come home from time to time 
to help in domestic projects. Relevant insights could be drawn from FIFA and its rules 
on transfer of soccer skills and relevant fees. Nigeria should set up a specialised 
institution on diaspora issues to coordinate this. 
 
3) The Nigerian medical and academic professionals have been the most targeted 
professionals by labour-receiving countries. This has created crisis in these sectors. 
Just like the developed countries used the platform of the WTO to expand the 
frontiers of intellectual property rights by introducing “trade-related intellectual 
property rights” (TRIP), Nigeria should, through the African Union, press for the 
inclusion of brain drain as part of TRIP. Just like the argument by the developed 
countries that without adequate protection of IPRs, their firms would find it difficult 
to profit from product and process innovation; likewise, without the imposition of 
certain costs on the emigration of Nigeria’s highly-skilled professionals, the country 





4) Corollary to the above, the WIPO should be strengthened to incorporate this in its 
mandate. In other words, brain drain should be seen in terms of its effects on the 
development trajectory of nations and appropriate policies for compensation worked 
out. 
 
5) Efforts should be made to establish a reliable databank of Nigerian medical 
practitioners. All medical bodies must embark on the census of its members in order 
to establish the actual number of its membership. The Medical and Dental Council of 
Nigeria, the National Universities Commission, Nigeria Bureau of Statistics and the 
National Planning Commission should liaise among themselves to produce a reliable 
databank and statistics of production and emigration patterns of medical 
professionals. 
 
6) Government should set up a diaspora village in Abuja to accommodate the Nigerian 
professionals willing to brave it and come home. It should also set up a drug 
therapeutic and rehabilitation centre to address the problem of drug addiction among 
them. 
 
7) Brain drain of Nigeria’s highly-skilled professionals was a response to certain 
domestic stimuli, mainly economic crisis, political instability and ethnic rivalries that 
often degenerated to bloodbath. Contemporary brain drain could be periodised to have 
commenced in 1966 when the first military coup d’état took place. The Nigerian civil 
war and the economic distress that hit the Nigerian economy from 1982 intensified it. 
The peak was post-1986 when attempts at economic reforms deepened the crisis. 
What needs to be done to roll back brain drain is the introduction of workable 
strategies to address the underlying factors that engendered the conditions for 
emigration. Nigeria should ensure political stability; evolve a strategy for national 
reconciliation and develop a national security policy. This will serve as a form of 
signal to the Nigerian diaspora and rekindle their desire to return home. The federal 
ministry of information and national orientation and the national security apparatuses 
should implement it.  
 
8) The Nigerian government should streamline efforts at mainstreaming the diaspora into 
national development by weeding out the multiplicity of institutions jostling for a 
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space. What needs to done is to centralise diaspora issues in one institution. We 
recommend the setting up a Commission or full-fledged ministry for the diaspora. The 
Commission or ministry will have the mandate to decide areas of collaboration with 
other agencies and all such issues. The manner which issues relating to migration and 
diaspora are currently handled in Nigeria can never yield the kind of result recorded in 
other countries like China, Mexico, India and others. 
 
9) The Nigerian government should ensure consistency in its policy prescriptions with 
regards to migration and diaspora issues. Since 2005, the Nigerian government has 
not been able to produce a national policy on migration despite efforts invested in its 
production. Efforts should be made to produce such a policy framework immediately. 
It should be noted that the evolvement of such a policy framework without a 
specialised agency to execute its provisions might be counter-productive. Thus, the 
conferment of the force of law on such a policy framework must be accompanied by 
the creation of a specialised institution to implement its provisions. 
 
10) There is absence of data about the actual number of Nigerians in the diaspora and 
their qualifications. A reliable data is part of the ensembles of productive planning. Its 
absence poses a serious challenge to policy formulation and general planning for 
development. The diaspora data-capturing exercise is indirectly affected by the 
ambivalence of government on diaspora issues. Nigerian government should, not only 
establish a domestic institution and saddle it with the development and maintenance 
of a databank of Nigerians in the diaspora, it should accord it priority status and 
adequately fund it.  
 
11) The Nigerian government should evolve clear-cut pro-diaspora domestic and foreign 
policies that would place the welfare of Nigerian diaspora in the front burner. This 
strategy will fire their patriotic zeal for the country and rekindle their feeling of 
“Nigerian-ness”. It will certainly make them eager to contribute to national 
development and “ambassadors-at-large” for the attraction of foreign investments. 
The government should set up a specialised technology park to harness diaspora 
scientific and technological talents. Instead of building a brand-new park, the federal 
government can utilise TINAPA initiative of Cross River State as a twin-strategy of 
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building a critical mass of returnees and developing a platform for industrial 
development. 
 
12) Government should de-personalise diaspora issues by setting up an independent 
institution to handle diaspora issues. The institution will be guided by the extant law 
establishing it. This will ensure continuity and sustain diaspora patriotism. 
 
13) Although the superiority of the labour-receiving countries of the West means that they 
will continue to attract highly-skilled professionals from Nigeria and other less-
developed countries, a robust economy will drastically reduce the rate of emigration. 
The Nigerian government must embark on extensive restructuring of its economy to 
make it responsive and competitive enough to stop mass emigration. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria, the National Planning Commission, the Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission and the National Bureau of statistics must build critical mass 
of statistics to showcase the strong points of the Nigerian economy. 
 
14) The Nigerian government should include the diaspora in its national identity card 
project as a mechanism to extract a confirmation of their patriotism to Nigeria outside 
the framework of dual nationality. The Nigerian government should develop National 
Identification Card System for Nigerians in the diaspora. This should be made 
available to all Nigerians domiciled abroad. The possession of this identification card 
should qualify the migrant in distress express government intervention and also confer 
eligibility on the migrant to vote in national elections.  
 
15) The Nigerian government should deregulate the remittance market by creating room 
for the entrance of more MTOs. The entrance of more MTOs in the face of rapid 
advancement in ICTs in Nigeria will have positive impact on remittance transaction 
costs. 
 
16) The Nigerian government should expand the primary mandate of its Missions Abroad 
to include the provision of personalised services such as assisting in the integration 
efforts of migrants by connecting them to the migrant communities where they exist, 
providing legal assistance and offering immigration support services and advice. The 
government should also expand its diplomatic presence by creating new consulates 
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where there are large Nigerian populations in order to reduce the stress of going to the 
embassy, which is often located at the capital city. 
 
17) Nigeria has not leveraged its diaspora into its development agenda. Since 2001 when 
the presidential dialogues led to the formation of institutional frameworks for diaspora 
engagement, the country has not benefited from them in concrete terms. The Nigerian 
government should create a mechanism through the CBN, Ministry of Finance and 
Debt Management Office (DMO) to harness the excess liquidity of the diaspora 
through the floatation of bonds and other specialised securities. 
 
18) Nigeria should institutionalise a national merit award specifically to honour members 
of the Nigerian diaspora who have made significant contributions to the country’s 
development agenda. This will both acknowledge those who have contributed to 
Nigeria’s development efforts and act as a healthy incentive to others to make their 
own contribution. 
 
19) Finally, Nigeria should get its leadership question right by enthroning a visionary, 
pragmatic, dedicated, and patriotic leadership through credible elections. Once that is 
achieved, the next step is to mobilise and utilise the abundant human and material 
resources for the onerous but achievable task of productive and sustainable 
development. 
The brain drain cannot be decreed out by fiat but by conscious, purposeful and 
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